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I believe that I can best make the relation of my ideography to ordinary language clear if I compare
it to that which the microscope has to the eye. Because of the range of its possible uses and the
versatility with which it can adapt to the most diverse circumstances, the eye is far superior to the
microscope. Considered as an optical instrument, to be sure, it exhibits many imperfections, which
ordinarily remain unnoticed only on account of its intimate connection with our mental life. But,
as soon as scientific goals demand great sharpness of resolution, the eye proves to be insufficient .
The microscope, on the other hand, is perfectly suited to precisely such goals, but that is just why
it is useless for all others.
Gottlob Frege, 1878, in the Preface to Begriffsschrift (translation by Stefan Bauer-
Mengelberg)
Charlie: Right. Let’s slash his tires.
Mac: Well, not that, though, because then he can’t leave. That doesn’t make any sense.
Charlie: Well, you start putting plans under microscopes, nothing’s gonna make sense, all right?
Mac: Lots of things make sense! Slashing someone’s tires so they leave makes no sense, Charlie.
Charlie: Are you gonna put everything I say under a microscope, bud?
Dennis: It’s a stupid idea, Charlie.
Charlie: I’m sorry, do you have a better plan?
Charlie Day, Rob McElhenney and Glenn Howerton, 2009, in the opening scene to “The
Great Recession”: E03S05 of It’s Always Sunny in Philadelphia (written by David
Hornsby, Chadd Gindin, Rob McElhenney and Glenn Howerton)
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General Introduction
“Ordinary language and ordinary
thought have been the victims of
neglect in economic science in
general. Their potential for the
explanation of the most economic
of phenomena may, however, be
great.” (Bacharach 1990, p.368)
“[E]conomists seem to have
largely ignored language. This is
an unfortunate state of affairs.
The world people live in is a
world of words, not functions,
and many real phenomena might
be more easily analyzed if we
take this into account” (Lipman
2003, p.75)
“[M]ost information sharing is
not done through Spence-style
signaling, through the price
system, nor through carefully
crafted Hurwicz-style incentive
compatible mechanisms: it is
done through ordinary, informal
talk.” (Farell and Rabin 1996,
p.104)
Over the last three decades, the standard economic analysis of individual behaviors has been
subjected to the relentless criticisms of an approach known as ‘behavioral economics’. An ever
growing set of empirical regularities is presented by behavioral economists as contradicting the
predictions of theoretical models used in standard economics. These criticisms are accompanied
by various methodological considerations, notably on the lack of interdisciplinary relations be-
tween economics and psychology, or about the role of the positive/normative distinction within
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models of individual behaviors in economics. Over the last decade, standard economists have
increasingly responded to the these criticisms, albeit not in a homogenous way. Some standard
economists have granted the soundness of parts of behavioral economists’ criticisms; other ones
have granted the soundness of all of them to the point of now practicing behavioral economics
and calling themselves ‘behavioral economists’. Yet some others have criticized back, arguing
notably that behavioral economists misunderstood the standard approach. In short, the fron-
tier between behavioral and standard economics is today fuzzier than it was thirty years ago,
as are the connections between the theoretical, empirical and methodological issues underlying
it. This fuzzy frontier constituted by the behavioral versus standard economics debates is the
object of the present dissertation. The main intended contribution is to try to provide a better
understanding of the theoretical and methodological ongoing transformations to the economic
analysis of individual behaviors impulsed by behavioral economics.
One of the causes of the fuzziness of the frontier is that behavioral economics is an approach
that uses insights from the discipline of psychology to modify the standard models of individual
behaviors in economics. In other words, the traditional homo œconomicus – always making
correct reasoning, never regretting past choices and guided only by self-interest – is modified to
take a more human face, or so behavioral economists argue. This argument is systematized by
the father of behavioral economics, Richard Thaler (2015; 2016), who contrasts the species of
‘Econs’ represented in standard economics’ models with the species of ‘Humans’ represented in
his approach. In behavioral economics, he argues, economic agents are represented as sometimes
making mistaken choices and reasoning, as well as not always behaving regarding their own self-
interest. In other words, behavioral economics is presented as a generalization of standard
economics: Econs never behave like Humans but Humans sometimes behave like Econs. One of
the reasons why Thaler and other behavioral economists do not completely criticize standard
economics is that they need it as a normative benchmark to characterize what counts as rational
behaviors. Hence, psychology is used in behavioral economics for the purpose of modeling the
departures between how economic agents are behaving and how they ought to behave rationally.
The goal of this dissertation is to try to show that a non-trivial aspect of what makes economic
agents Humans remains largely unexplored in behavioral economics and that exploring it can
actually shed some useful lights on the standard versus behavioral economics debates. This
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aspect is quite simply that we talk. That is, we use language in ways other species, including
Econs, do not. How does the uses of language play a role in economic rationality that can help
us better understand the standard versus behavioral economics debates?
This dissertation argues that the uses of language do not play one but two roles in economic
rationality. On the one hand, economists use language to discuss, dispute and theorize economic
rationality. On the other hand, economic agents use language to make economic choices, or,
more importantly, to construct decision problems in which other agents make economic choices.
As Ariel Rubinstein puts it:
“economic agents are human beings for whom language is a central tool in the process
of making decisions and forming judgments. And [...] the other important “players”
in Economic Theory – namely ourselves, the economic theorists – use formal models
but these are not simply mathematical models; their significance derives from their
interpretation, which is expressed using daily language.” (2000 pp.3-4, my emphases)
In other words, the role of language in economic rationality is twofold: the behaviors of eco-
nomic agents are partly constituted of language uses, and so are the professional activities of
economists, especially theoreticians. Two sets of classical distinctions used among linguists and
philosophers of language are useful to clarify further how the role of language in economic ra-
tionality is studied in this dissertation. The first one, made by Ferdinand de Saussure (1916,
chap.3), is between language (langage), a language (langue) and speech (parole). Roughly,
‘language’ refers to the overarching set of all communicative devices (e.g., symbols, gestures,
phonemes, etc.), a particular conventional articulation of which constitutes ‘a language’ used
in a community (e.g., English, French, local dialects etc.), which is individually used and in-
stantiated by ‘speech’ (e.g., written or spoken words and sentences). The second set of classical
distinctions, made by Charles W. Morris in 1938, is between three types of relations among the
symbols constitutive of a language (see Posner 1987, sect.1): syntax, semantics and pragmatics.
Roughly, syntax designates the relations between symbols, semantics designates the relations
between symbols and other entities (e.g., ‘objects’, ‘things’, ‘other people’ etc.) that are neither
symbols nor the human who is using them and pragmatics designates the relations between sym-
bols and the human who is using them (e.g., what are his or here intentions? Towards whom
is he using them? etc.). In this dissertation, we shall focus on the speeches and pragmatics of
both economists participating to the standard versus behavioral debates and economic agents in
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the decision situations (e.g., laboratory experiments, surveys, market transactions etc.) that are
discussed in these debates. My contention is that scrutinizing these uses of language can con-
tribute to provide a clearer picture of the main issues underlying the standard versus behavioral
economics debates.1
This general introduction presents three of these main issues that are discussed throughout
this dissertation, namely the issue of theoretical unification (0.1), the issue of interdisciplinarity
between economics and psychology (0.2) and the positive/normative issue (0.3); before present-
ing how the intended contributions are articulated in the chapters (0.4).
0.1 Theoretical unification and the three dimensions
In terms of the convenient distinction drawn by Esther-Mirjam Sent (2004) between “new” and
“old” behavioral economics, this dissertation is strictly about new behavioral economics. Old
behavioral economics stems from the work of Herbert Simon on bounded rationality from the
mid-1950s onwards. New behavioral economics (just ‘behavioral economics’ henceforth) stems
from the influence of psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky on Thaler in the late
1970s.2
From this date onwards, and mostly by borrowing psychologists’ experimental methodology,
behavioral economists have investigated empirical regularities of individual behaviors that sys-
tematically depart from the predictions of standard models. The diverse behavioral regularities
investigated in behavioral economics were once given theoretical accounts by separate models
(caricaturing a little, there was one model by regularity), but unifying theoretical explanations
have been increasingly sought from around the mid-2000s (one model for several regularities).
1For a thorough historical and philosophical perspective on the distinctions presented here and other ones
used among linguists and philosophers of language, see Rastier (2012). Mongin (2006b;c) discusses other classical
distinctions with respect to economic methodology, e.g., between sentences (the linguistic entities), statements
(roughly, the meanings of sentences in terms of sense and reference), propositions (roughly, the meanings of
sentences in terms of truth and falsity) and utterances (roughly, the actions of pronouncing and writing sentences
performed by speakers or writers); or between the uses of words and sentences and the mere mentions of words
and sentences. Other economists have already claimed that language uses play a specific role in economic
rationality that is yet to be fully investigated (for surveys, see Zhang and Grenier 2013; and Alcouffe 2013).
However, most (if not all) these contributions focus on ‘a language’ and not ‘speech’. The relation between these
contributions and this dissertation will not be discussed here but kept for further work, mainly because they are
totally unconnected to behavioral economics (though see Chen 2013).
2Connections and contrasts between “new” and “old” behavioral economics are not discussed in this disser-
tation since they have already been discussed at length elsewhere (see, e.g., Sent 2004; Klaes and Sent 2005, esp.
p.47; Egidi 2012; Kao and Velupillai 2015; Geiger 2016).
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Most models from behavioral economics before the mid-2000s have been reprinted in the vol-
ume Advances in Behavioral Economics (henceforth Advances), edited by Colin Camerer, George
Loewenstein and Matthew Rabin in 2004. The structure of one part in Advances named “basic
topic” gives a nice picture of what behavioral economists take to be the most primary domains
of economic analysis. In this part, the contributions are organized into five sections, the sec-
ond, third and fourth of which are labeled “preferences over risky and uncertain outcomes”,
“intertemporal choice”, “fairness and social preferences”, respectively. This way by which three
dimensions of economic behaviors – ‘uncertainty’, ‘time’, and ‘other people’ – are saliently sep-
arated is pervasive in the literature around behavioral economics.3
This separation is also present in some classics of standard economics (e.g., Deaton and
Muellbauer 1980; Mas-Colell et al. 1995), albeit in a less salient fashion. It is however ex-
tremely explicit in the contemporary writings of prominent standard economists on behavioral
economics. This is not only the case in the two review-essays of Advances by Drew Fudenberg
(2006) and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (2006), but also, for instance in the book-length criticism Is
Behavioral Economics Doomed? by David Levine (2012). Furthermore, consider the position of
Fudenberg (2006):
“behavioral economists (and economic theorists!) should devote more effort to syn-
thesizing existing models and developing more general ones, and less effort to mod-
eling yet another particular behavioral observation” (Fudenberg 2006, p.699, my
emphasis)
What Fudenberg is asking is what he and Levine (2006; 2011; 2012c) are doing in their re-
cent joint work, by proposing a model that provides a unified explanation of the behavioral
economists’ regularities in the three dimensions altogether. Hence the theoretical and empirical
relations among the three dimensions of economic behaviors is currently an area of economic
analysis where the boundaries between behavioral and standard economics are fuzzy, to say the
least. One intended contribution of this dissertation is to investigate the conditions under which
a theoretical unification (i.e., one model for several regularities) articulating the three dimen-
sions altogether is possible. To do so, we shall scrutinize the uses of language by economists
3The two other sections considered as “basic topic” by these behavioral economists are entitled “Reference-
dependence and loss-aversion” and “game theory”. The former includes contributions about individual behaviors
under certainty and will have a specific place in this dissertation. By contrast, the latter includes mostly
contributions about strategic interactions (between at least two people) and will not be discussed at length.
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in their models of individual behaviors in the three dimensions (e.g., the notion of ‘dynamic
consistency’) and by the economic agents in the situations where the behavioral regularities are
observed (e.g., marking the linguistic distinction between ‘now’ and ‘later’).
One further clarification is worth stating. In this dissertation, standard economics refers
to the economics defended and practiced by self-identified ‘standard’ economists (such as Fu-
denberg, Levine, Pesendorfer) that have debated or critically commented on self-identified ‘be-
havioral’ economists (such as Thaler, Camerer, Loewenstein, Rabin). However, such criticisms
of behavioral economics have somewhat different positions regarding what they take to be the
founding principles of standard economics. On the one hand, game theorists such as Levine
emphasizes that “[t]he heart of modern “rational” economic theory is the concept of a non-
cooperative or “Nash” equilibrium of a game” (Levine 2012, chap.2). Nash equilibrium can be
stated as the identification of the rational actions to be undertaken by (at least) two agents
independently of one another but the respective consequences of these actions for each agent are
mutually dependent on the actions chosen. This dissertation will not be primarily concerned
with such game theoretical issues. It will by contrast focus much more on the issues raised
by decision theorists such as Pesendorfer for whom the founding principle of economics is the
revealed preference “methodology” or “principle” – which are the words they use instead of ‘the-
ory’ (see Gul and Pesendorfer 2008; see also Dekel and Lipman 2010). For the purpose of this
general introduction, revealed preference can be stated as the identification of economic agents’
choices (directly observable in economic data) with their preferences (indirectly observable in
the minds of agents).4
For instance, Pesendorfer puts his main methodological concerns with behavioral economics
as follows:
“Traditional choice theoretic models and behavioral [economics’] theories differ in
their focus when analyzing “behavioral” phenomena [...]. Theoretical work in behav-
ioral economics often focuses on the psychology of the situation using the economic
behavior as a window into the mind of the decision maker [...]. Note the reversal in
the roles of economics and psychology. The economic evidence is used to flesh out
4A refined view of the embeddedness of ‘behavioral’, ‘standard’, ‘mainstream’ and ‘neoclassical’ economics is
offered by Colander (2000) and Davis (2006, 2007b, 2009b, 2011). On the historical evolution and contemporary
state of the relations between decision theory and game theory see, e.g., Mirowski (2002, 2006, 2009) or Aumann
and Drèze (2009). On how this relation fits in the evolution of general equilibrium theory, consumer choice
theory and demand theory see, e.g., Kirman (1989) or Mirowski and Hands (2006). On the contemporary status
of ‘revealed preferences’ theory, see Hands (2012a; 2013b).
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the details of a particular mental process that is operational for this particular case.”
(Pesendorfer 2006, pp.718-719)
In other words, the main methodological issue with behavioral economics from a decision theo-
retic perspective is its relation with psychology; this issue is presented in the next section.
0.2 Economics and psychology: the issue of interdisciplinarity
Pesendorfer is the co-author with Faruk Gul (2008) of one of the strongest and most discussed
criticism of behavioral economics in the 2000s, which triggered a whole volume of replies and
comments on it: The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics (henceforth The Foun-
dations; Caplin and Schotter 2008a). In this volume, the critical exchanges of Gul and Pe-
sendorfer (2008) versus Camerer (2008) provide an explicit illustration of the role of economists
uses of language in economic rationality with respect to the issue of interdisciplinarity between
economics and psychology. At some point in their defense of standard economics, Gul and
Pesendorfer put two quotes – one from psychology and one from economics – right next to
each others, and then discuss the contrast between them (2008, p.5, references omitted, my
emphasis):
“Much aversion to risks is driven by immediate fear responses, which are largely
traceable to a small area of the brain called the amygdala.
A decision maker is (globally) risk averse, . . . if and only if his von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility is concave at the relevant (all) wealth levels.
[. . . ]Most researchers recognize the various terms in the second statement as abstrac-
tions belonging to the specialized vocabulary of economics. Though less apparent,
the language of the first statement is equally specialized in its use of discipline-
specific abstractions. The terms “immediate fear” and “traceable” are abstractions
of psychology and neuroscience.”
Notice that Gul and Pesendorfer’s point here is not only that economists and psychologists use
different languages. It is also that the one from economics (e.g., “von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility”) is a more technical language (or more “discipline-specific”) than the one from psychology
(e.g., “immediate fear”) which is closer to our everyday language. In his response, Camerer
argues about some behavioral regularities that:
“many of these phenomena can be translated into conventional economic language.
Indeed, a major contribution of neuroeconomics [i.e., which also means ‘behavioral
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economics’ in this context – DJ] may be to provide a formal language for talking
about these phenomena. [. . . ] [O]ther phenomena are more clearly understood by
adopting new terms from psychology and neuroscience rather than struggling to
fit the brain’s complex activity awkwardly into the Procrustean bed of economic
language.” (Camerer 2008, p.50, my emphasis)
In other words, his point is that the formal language of mathematics, logic and probability
theory used in economics is of interests for both economists and psychologists (and that is
“a major contribution” of behavioral economics); but using that formal language should not
prevent economists, when they feel the need to do so, to interpret it through the language used
by psychologists.5
One intended contribution of the present dissertation is to flesh out in a systematic way this
perspective on the issue of interdisciplinarity between economics and psychology in terms of the
uses of language by economists or psychologists. To do so, I shall use the categories of formal,
technical and everyday languages emphasized in the previous paragraphs as follows. Formal
language refers to the symbolism and syntax of mathematics, logic and probability theory as
used for instance by economists to construct the “formal models” Rubinstein was talking about
– themselves used for various purposes such as making measurements, drawing inferences, and
so on (see Boumans 2005; Morgan 2012). Technical language refers to a language used in a
“discipline-specific” manner within scientific communities. And everyday language refers to
our uses of language in our daily lives that have a priori nothing to do with the practice of
science. I do not mean that these three distinctions cut sharply the whole uses of language
by economists and economic agents into neat and independent categories. Quite the contrary,
making these distinctions can shed some lights on the standard versus behavioral economics
debates when we focus on how these categories interact and influence each others. For instance,
in economics, the use of formal language encourages to combine the technical term ‘convex’
from mathematics with the everyday term ‘preferences’ to make the technical term ‘convex
preferences’ (instead of using a longer everyday version like ‘a preference for an average of various
goods over an extreme amount of one good’). Historian of psychology Kurt Danziger (1997)
provides an account of the interactions between the uses of technical and everyday languages
5Exactly the same conclusion on the explicit importance of the role of language for standard and behavioral
economists could have been made by discussing the two introductions of The Psychology of Economic Decisions
(Brocas and Carillo 2003b; 2004a).
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by psychologists. In his account, he distinguishes ‘psychology’ as the everyday uses of language
about the mental (e.g., ‘I prefer chocolate’, ‘I had so much fear ’) from ‘Psychology’ as the
technical uses of language about the mental by psychologists in their scientific activities (e.g.,
‘This task is meant to put the subjects into a state of cognitive dissonance’, ‘The brain scan
shows that the subjects’ responses were due to emotions’, the psychologists’ statements in Gul
and Pesendorfer’s quote above, etc). We shall adopt this typographical distinction between
everyday psychology and technical Psychology because it is convenient for discussing the issue of
interdisciplinarity between economics and Psychology underlying the standard versus behavioral
economics debates. Finally, to better emphasize the interactions between technical and everyday
languages, we shall consider them as two instances of ordinary language uses, a more general
category that I will often contrast as a whole with formal language uses.6
Furthermore, the category of ordinary language allows the methodological perspective pre-
sented so far to be easily connected to the last issue underlying the standard versus behavioral
economics debates, namely, the positive/normative issue.
0.3 Positive/normative issues: the entanglement thesis
As the name of the volume mentioned above suggests – The Foundations of Positive and Nor-
mative Economics – and as the book-length historical perspective on behavioral economics
conducted by Floris Heukelom (2014) attests, there are various connections between the issue of
interdisciplinarity and the positive/normative issue. Outside of behavioral economics, decision
theory and some areas of the methodology and philosophy of economics, the ‘positive/normative
issue’ is rarely associated with models of individual behaviors or rationality. Rather, it is asso-
ciated with collective forms of behaviors or rationality and the evaluation of market efficiency.
6Two remarks are worth making. Firslty, sometimes under different names, these distinctions between dif-
ferent types of language have been discussed by others in economics (see esp. Dennis 1982a; b; 1996; 1998a;
b; Vilks 1995; 1998; Weintraub 1998; 2002; Backhouse 1998; Mirowski 2002; 2012; Mongin 2001; 2003; 2004;
Armatte 2004; Giocoli 2003), as has been the psychological status of ‘preferences’ and ‘choices’ in economics
and decision theory (see, e.g., Pettit 1991; Rosenberg 1992, chaps.5-6; Mongin 2011; Guala 2012; Hands 2012a).
In both cases, these authors do not tackle the issues underlying behavioral economics that are at the center
of this dissertation. Secondly, outside of economics, the issue of interdisciplinarity in contemporary sciences is
discussed mainly from in ‘interdisciplinarity studies’ (see, e.g., Klein 2010; Huutoniemi et al. 2010) or regarding
the ‘unity or disunity of science’ (see, e.g., Oppenheim and Putnam 1958; Kitcher 1984). Cat (2013) argues
that both perspectives are sometimes compatible especially in the work of Galison (1999) who focuses on the
interactions between languages across and within disciplines; it should be noted that Heukelom (2009) used the
latter’s perspective on behavioral economics.
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At this level, the positive/normative issue concerns the organization of subareas in economics
into ‘positive economics’ and ‘normative economics’. Positive economics is supposed to describe,
explain and/or predict economic states of affairs, e.g., ‘The demand for apples has risen or will
rise because the price of apples has decreased or will decrease’, such as in consumer choice theory
or demand analysis. Normative economics is supposed to evaluate, recommend and/or prescribe
economic states of affairs, e.g., ‘The production of apples should be subsidized to increase con-
sumers’ welfare’, such as in welfare economics, public economics or social choice theory. Though
models of individual behaviors in economics are rightly seen as ‘the toolbox’ used by economists
to model social phenomena, the positive/normative issue is also present in them through the
claims of rationality attached to their interpretations. In standard economics, these models
have a positive dimension in the sense that they describe, explain and/or predict the behaviors
of rational individuals, e.g., ‘you prefer apples to oranges and oranges to banana, then you prefer
or will prefer apples to banana, because you are rational’. But the very same models also have a
normative dimension, in the sense they evaluate, recommend and/or prescribe the rationality of
individual behaviors, e.g., ‘if you prefer apples to oranges and oranges to banana then you ought
to prefer apples to banana, or else you are irrational’.7
Can positive economics and normative economics be totally separated? How are they ar-
ticulated? These are the questions underlying the positive/normative issue at the level of the
articulation of positive economics and normative economics. They will be discussed in this
dissertation only briefly and only for the purpose of furthering our understanding of the indi-
vidual level of the positive/normative issue. At this level, the underlying questions are: How
is it that the axioms of rationality at the root of these models were considered both normative
and positive and then became positively implausible from experiments but remained consid-
ered as normatively sound? Where does the normativity of these axioms and models come
7See Hausman and McPherson (2006) or Hands (2012b) on the relations between these two levels of the
positive/normative issue. At the individual level at least, it should be noted that the nuance between ‘descriptive’
and ‘positive’ is sometimes meaningful in economics. The former means something like ‘description of human
behavioral patterns’ and the latter something like ‘theoretical explanation of human behaviors’. But that is not
always the case. Often both ‘positive’ and ‘descriptive’ are synonyms and can take either of these two meanings.
The same ambiguity arises with ‘normative’ and ‘prescriptive’, often taken to mean something like ‘theoretical
account of some norms of human behaviors’ (for the former) and ‘recommendations for being in conformity with
some norms of human behaviors’ (for the latter). Also, ‘positive’ is often more associated with the predictive
dimension of a model as opposed to the descriptive dimension of its assumptions, following Friedman (1953).
In this dissertation, the precise meanings of these terms will be made explicit only when it is crucial for the
arguments and when the context does not provide sufficient clues to determine these meanings.
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from? In this dissertation, these questions raised in the behavioral versus standard economics
debates will be scrutinized through the lenses of the entanglement thesis of Hilary Putnam (a
philosopher), Vivian Walsh and Amartya Sen (both philosophers and economists). We adopt
this thesis mainly because of the central role of both ordinary and formal language uses in its
arguments. To understand briefly how, it is worth remembering that the philosophical roots
of the positive/normative issue in economics are that “many economists take for granted the
positivist tenet that only mathematical and factual judgments – and not value judgments –
are amenable to rational discussion” (Mongin 2006c, p.258, my emphasis; see also Hands 2001,
chaps.2-3; 2012b). Indeed, it seems easily feasible in-principle to reach an agreement through
rational discussion over what the facts are, e.g., ‘the GDP has increased by 10%’ or ‘he sold one
bottle of wine’, because the data (and the process of their construction) can checked by others
(at least in-principle). The same goes for whether the mathematical proofs of theorems and
propositions are corrects, e.g., ‘2x = 1⇔ x = 12 ’, because the steps of the proofs can be checked
by others. But that does not hold for values, especially of an ethical sort, e.g., ‘wearing short
skirts is morally unacceptable’ or ‘the riches should be in solidarity with the poor’, for which
we seem to have no scientific or formal procedures to reach an agreement over. And in any
case we feel (as if we shared a meta-value judgment) that we ought to be free to disagree with
anybody else’s value judgments for a host of different reasons that may please us to entertain.
The rebuttal of this positivist tenet along with the proposition of an alternative is the core of
the entanglement thesis.
Adapted for behavioral economics, which is needed because this was not Sen, Walsh or Put-
nam’s initial target, the entanglement thesis can be summarized as follows. Whatever scientists
and lay people, e.g., economists and economic agents, refer to when they speak about particular
facts and particular values cannot usually be fully separated and scrutinized in isolation of one
another. But they can be distinguished and their articulation can be scrutinized. Furthermore,
their articulation can never be fully understood without taking into account the role of con-
ventions, theoretical ones for the economist and social ones for the economic agents. The uses
of ordinary language play a crucial role in the social conventions that are entangled with facts
and values in our everyday life as lay people. And somewhat symmetrically, the uses of formal
language from logic, mathematics and probability theory play a crucial role in the theoretical
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conventions that are entangled with facts and values in science. It is under this version that
this thesis will be used to scrutinize the theoretical and empirical contributions constitutive of
the standard versus behavioral economics debates in order to provide a better understanding of
the positive/normative issue within models of individual behaviors.
Roughly, the entanglement thesis is the fruit of a synthesis from various areas of philosophy
(i.e., ethics, the philosophy of language, of logic, of mathematics, of mind and of science) that
Putnam (2002; 2004; 2013; 2015) worked out before his recent death. Putnam’s work (esp.
2002) bears on the positive/normative issues in economics mostly through Walsh’s historical
and methodological work (synthesized in Walsh 1996). And Sen is taken by both Putnam
and Walsh as an illustration of the practice of economic theory self-consciously without the
dichotomies, i.e., facts/conventions or facts/values (see esp. Sen 1987; 2002). In turn, Sen
acknowledged that Putnam and Walsh’s work in the 2000s indeed fleshed out his historical
and methodological positions (see Sen 2005; 2009, esp. the fn p.357). In terms of the role of
language, three philosophers play a specific role in the background of the entanglement thesis:
W.V.O. Quine (in the work of Putnam), Ludwig Wittgenstein (in the works of Putnam and
Sen) and John Austin (in the works of Putnam and Walsh). In order to avoid the philosophical
dimension of this dissertation overtaking its intended contribution regarding economics, I will
not discuss the works of Quine, Wittgenstein and Austin, but stick to ones of Putnam, Walsh
and Sen (see also the contributions collected by Putnam and Walsh 2011).8
For the same reason, in this dissertation, the entanglement thesis will be used mainly by
illustrating as concretely as possible various entanglements of facts, values and conventions
in the behavioral versus standard economics debates. This strategy of working by concrete
8The entanglement thesis brings together preexisting arguments against the existence of two dichotomies.
There are the arguments to the extent that the fact/convention dichotomy does hold only as a useful distinction:
(1) from the philosophy of sciences by the positivists themselves on the implications of unobservable entities
in quantum physics along with the work of Quine from “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951) onwards; and (2)
from the philosophy of mathematics and logic about the indispensability of mathematics and logic in science
and the consensual agreement over their ‘objectivity’ despite their absence of reference to observable objects
in the sense science is supposed to refer to observable objects from a positivist perspective (see esp. Putnam
1971; 2004). And there are the arguments to the extent that the fact/value dichotomy does hold only as a
useful distinction: (1) from the philosophical school of pragmatism which argues that regardless of ethical value
judgments, the practice of science necessitate a great deal of epistemic value judgments such as ‘simplicity’,
‘coherence’, ‘relevance’, ‘conservation of past theories’ for the construction and selection of theories (see esp.
Putnam 2002, chap. 2); and (2) from the post-1960s debates in meta-ethics on the distinction between thin
predicates that can make value judgments purely evaluative (or ‘normative’), e.g., ‘good’, ‘right’, ‘it is morally
good to never lie’, and thick predicates that can make value judgments that are inseparably both evaluative and
descriptive (or ‘normative’ and ‘positive’), e.g., ‘cruel’, ‘rude’, ‘rational’, ‘prefer’, ‘it is rational to sell a bottle of
wine when one does not drink wine’.
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illustration seems well in line with the philosophical approach of pragmatism or neopragmatism
to which Putnam, Walsh and Sen are often identified and have showed explicit sympathy for.
Notably, this strategy seems to fit the two first features used by Wade Hands (2001, pp.216-217)
to characterize pragmatism or neopragmatism: (1) the refusal of a foundationalist methodology
whereby criteria for the evaluation of scientific contributions are defined a priori and from
the outside of scientific practice, and (2) the refusal of a sharp dichotomy between theoretical
contributions and empirical work in a given discipline. Furthermore, it seems also fit for the
intended contributions of this dissertation, as explained in the next section.9
0.4 Intended contributions and articulation of the chapters
To better situate the methodological perspective on the role of language in economic rationality
presented so far, consider two existing positions on this issue in economic methodology and the
philosophy of economics. On the one hand, there is the position of Deirdre McCloskey (1998
[1985]) who analyzed the rethorics underlying economists’ uses of language. Roughly, McCloskey
is arguing that (1) the norms of conversation in everyday language are necessary and sufficient
to deal with (2) the methdological problems faced by economists. Hence (3) the epistemological
prescriptions from the philosophy of science sometimes proclaimed by economists, methodolo-
gists or philosophers produce parasitic interferences between (1) and (2). On the other hand,
there is the position of Don Ross (2005; 2014), which can be seen as the exact opposite of
McCloskey’s; and by contrast with her, he discusses behavioral economics. Roughly, Ross ar-
gues that (1) everyday language produces parasitic interferences in the relation between (2)
the methodological issues around behavioral economics and (3) the philosophical solutions he
proposes to them from the philosophy of mind and of science (see Ross, Ladyman and Spurrett
2007 for a more general version of his position). The methodological perspective on the role of
language in economic rationality developed so far, especially as grounded in the entanglement
thesis, seeks a viable middle ground in-between these two extremes. In short, this dissertation
takes the position that because (1) everyday language (esp. psychology) is an indispensable
9It should be noted that (1) comes also with a refusal of a radical relativism. The differences between
pragmatism and neopragmatism are not significant for the purpose of this dissertation, and these should not
be confused with the pragmatics of language discussed at the beginning of this general introduction, despite
non-trivial existing connections (see Hands 2001, chap.6).
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dimension of both the economic agent’s choices and the economists’ theories, paying some at-
tention to it can contribute to both (2) and (3). It can contribute to (3) some philosophical
problems posed by methodologists or philosophers interested in economic theory or posed by
economists themselves in their methodological manifestos. And it can also contribute to (2)
some methodological, theoretical and empirical problems faced by economists interested in the
individual behaviors of economic agents.
To sum up, the intended contribution of this dissertation is to show how a methodological
perspective on the twofold role of language in economic rationality can clarify three main is-
sues (and their connections), underlying the behavioral versus standard economics debates: the
issue of the theoretical unification regarding the three dimensions of economic rationality, the
issue of interdisciplinarity between economics and Psychology and the positive/normative issue
within models of individual behaviors. Furthermore, this dissertation seeks to go beyond mere
clarification regarding the positive/normative issue and the role of language in the behaviors
of economic agents. My intention is to provide a constructive criticism of contributions from
behavioral as well as standard economists on both of these points. Following the entanglement
thesis, it will be argued that both standard and behavioral economists propose an unsatisfying
articulation between the positive and normative dimensions of models of individual behaviors;
and that recognizing the entanglement of facts, values and convention can actually be theoret-
ically and empirically fruitful. Furthermore, it will be argued that paying some attention to
the role of language in the behaviors of economic agents may sometimes show that a seemingly
irrational behavior can in fact be defended as rational; hence the implicit axiom – known as
‘description invariance’ – in standard models of individual behaviors preventing the influence of
language needs to be weakened (though not dropped entirely), contrary to the positions of most
behavioral and standard economists.
This dissertation is structured in five chapters. In the first chapter, the methodological per-
spective sketched in this introduction is further developed ‘in action’, that is, the developments
are constructed by putting this perspective on concrete problems underlying the behavioral ver-
sus standard economics debates. The grounding of this perspective in the entanglement thesis
is also further developed ‘in action’, by discussing the criticisms addressed by Sen to the same
standard models of individual behaviors that are criticized by behavioral economics. Hence the
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chapter is organized as a comparative study of the works of Sen (as a representative of the entan-
glement thesis) and Thaler (as a representative of behavioral economics). It focuses on consumer
choice theory and rational choice theory under certainty, where both authors have made their
main contributions. Two conclusions of this chapter motivate the subsequent developments in
the dissertation. First, despite our focus on economic analysis under certainty, the three dimen-
sions of individual behaviors (under uncertainty, over time and regarding other people) keep
popping up when questions related to the causes or determinants of individual preferences arise
(i.e., when preferences are not taken as a ‘given’). Second, if the role of language in economic
agents’ choices is to be taken seriously, then the communicative structure of choices needs to
be made explicit. To do so, two entities are distinguished: the decision modeler who poses a
decision problem to the decision maker who has to make the choice. The decision modeler can,
among other possibilities, be an economist, especially in laboratory experiments, where issues
related to the interactions between the languages of the economist and the economic agent loom
large.
In the second chapter, the challenges posed by behavioral economics to standard economics
on the three dimensions of individual behaviors are scrutinized. We structure our discussion
around a historical rupture between two periods. On the one hand, the classical challenges
posed by behavioral economics from the end of the 1970s to the middle of the 2000s were
about the three dimensions taken separately. On the other hand, more recent challenges from
the middle of the 2000s onwards are now involving interactions across dimensions. Regarding
the communicative structure of choices, it is argued that the marking of linguistic distinctions
within the three dimensions (e.g., ‘now’ and ‘later’, ‘certainly’ and ‘probably’, ‘you’ and ‘me’)
is a condition of possibility for these challenges to be posed in the first place. Again, two
conclusions motivate the subsequent developments in the dissertation. First, historically, there
has been a slow shift in standard decision theory from a primacy of the dimension of uncertainty
(over the two others) to a primacy of the dimension of time in economists’ value judgments
of rationality or irrationality about individual behaviors. Second, no models, be they from
behavioral economics or standard economics, can explain the full set of behavioral regularities
constitutive of the recent challenges from interactions across dimensions. Hence the process
of theoretical unification sought by standard and behavioral economists cannot ignore existing
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interactions across dimensions, instead of focusing on phenomena dimension by dimension.
In the third chapter, a set of models that are explicitly seeking theoretical unification between
behavioral and standard economics, which will be called ‘dual models’, are scrutinized regarding
whether or not they can account for interactions across the three dimensions. The role of
language in economic rationality is investigated only from the economists’ perspective, by looking
at the interactions between, on the one hand, the original formal and technical languages from
economics, and, on the other hand, a new technical language borrowed from the Psychology of
self-control. We suggest that the historical shift from a primacy of the dimension of uncertainty
to the primacy of the dimension of time observed in the previous chapter finds its paradigmatic
illustration in dual models. We also show that only one of these dual models, namely Fudenberg
and Levine’s, does tackle the issue of the interaction across the three dimensions, hence providing
a promising avenue of theoretical unification and reconciliation between standard and behavioral
economics. One conclusion motivates the subsequent developments in the dissertation: a set
of behavioral regularities known as ‘framing effects’ is explicitly pointed by Fudenberg and
Levine (along with other authors of dual models) as the main limit to their intended theoretical
unification.
In the fourth chapter, framing effects are scrutinized to understand their empirical structure
and theoretical implications. We focus on one specific type of framing effects, namely those
violating an implicit axiom of standard models of individual behaviors known as ‘description
invariance’. As its name suggests, description invariance is the axiom of standard models that
make them blind to the role of language in economic rationality as displayed by economic agents.
Hence the role of language in economic rationality is investigated only from the perspective of
economic agents, by looking at three decades of research on framing effects in Psychology.
Because this body of research is not discussed in behavioral and standard economics, the goal
of the chapter is to organize it in a way that is useful for an economist who wants to deal with
framing effects. It is argued that the received view in economics about framing effects, which
is based mostly on the original work from Kahneman and Tversky on the topic in the 1980s, is
misleading in several respects. The main conclusion that motivates the last and next chapter
is that there is a considerable set of reasons for wanting to weaken the axiom of description
invariance, notably because its violations are pervasive in the three dimensions but also because
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they are not always irrational.
The last chapter is co-written with a colleague who practice axiomatic decision theory (Dino
Borie). We propose an axiomatic framework in which the axiom of description invariance can
be made explicit, and then explore how to weaken it in order to account for framing effects. Our
interpretation of the mathematical structure in terms of two simultaneous but possibly distinct
perspectives on one decision problem, namely the decision maker’s and the decision modeler’s,
is intended to place the communicative structure of choices in the foreground. We argue that,
contrary to the received view on framing effects, the axiom of description invariance is not an
‘all or nothing’ axiom, i.e., either you have it or you don’t. That is, we argue that description
invariance can be weakened instead of being totally dropped, and that different weakening imply
different degrees of dependence to description. We apply our framework to different framing
effects to show either that the few existing models of framing in economics do not deal with
violations of description invariance in a satisfactory manner, or that the positive/normative
issue underlying framing effect can be clarified through our framework. The simplicity of our
framework, along with our results in terms of the classical equivalence between choice, preference
and utility, are intended as minor modifications to economists’ formal and technical languages in
order to take into account economically relevant uses of everyday language by economic agents.
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Chapter 1
The entanglement of facts, values and
conventions, under certainty
“Normative theories tell you the
right way to think about some
problem. By “right” I do not
mean right in some moral sense;
instead, I mean logically
consistent, as prescribed by the
optimizing model at the heart of
economic reasoning, sometimes
called rational choice theory.
That is the only way I will use
the word “normative” in this
book. For instance, the
Pythagorean theorem is a
normative theory of how to
calculate the length of one side of
a right triangle if you know the
length of the two sides. If you
use any other formula you will be
wrong” (Thaler 2015, p.25)
Introduction
In retrospect, 1980 is usually marked as the birth of behavioral economics. The reason is
that it corresponds to the publication year of Richard Thaler’s “Toward a positive theory of
consumer choice” in the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. In this paper, Thaler
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addresses a constructive criticism to standard consumer choice theory. He targets the empirical
performance of the theory, which, he argues, makes systematic erroneous predictions in well-
identified consumption situations. The constructive aspect of the criticism is that, in order to
explain and formalize the correct predictions, he introduces some elements from prospect theory,
a theory of decision making conceived by psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
(1979). In other words, Thaler identified systematic deviations between actual and predicted
consumption behaviors in economics and proposed to account for these deviations by enriching
standard economic models with some Psychology.
Improving the empirical and explanatory scope of economic theory about individual deci-
sion making by borrowing insights from Psychology are still the main goals of contemporary
behavioral economics. Another key aspect of Thaler’s work that profoundly marked contempo-
rary behavioral economics is his uses of the words ‘descriptive’ or ‘positive’ and ‘normative’ or
‘prescriptive’. He used them to insist that the standard model of consumer choice is descriptive
or positive because it supposedly describes, predicts and/or explains consumers’ actual behav-
iors, i.e., what they do, when we assume that they are ‘rational’. While at the same time the
very same model is normative or prescriptive because it also recommends, prescribes and/or
evaluates consumers’ rational behaviors, i.e., what they ought to do to be ‘rational’. He further
argued that there should be a separation between these two dimensions because psychologists
had done so and this is how they got successful at predicting individual behaviors. Though it is
now more common since the recent rise of behavioral economics, such uses of these terms were
very much unusual at the time within consumer choice theory. Rather, they were (and are still)
used to distinguish between subareas of economics, i.e., positive economics (e.g., consumer choice
theory) and normative economics (e.g., welfare economics), not to distinguish two dimensions of
a single model of individual behaviors within positive economics. Indeed, the words ‘normative’
and ‘prescriptive’ were (and are still) strongly associated with a collective notion of rationality
from which, e.g., the efficiency of market allocations is judged.1
1Here are a few illustrations of Thaler’s declarations:
“The economic theory of the consumer is a combination of positive and normative theories. Since it
is based on a rational maximizing model it describes how consumers should choose, but it is alleged
to also describe how they do choose.” (Thaler 1980, opening sentence of the abstract)
“The problem is in using the same model to prescribe rational choice and to describe actual choices.
If people are not always rational, then we may need two different models for these two distinct tasks”
(Thaler 1992, p.4)
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This chapter has three related goals, all derived from the perspective presented in the general
introduction. The first goal, pertaining to the positive/normative issue, is to make explicit the
entanglement of facts, values and theoretical conventions constitutive of some classical challenges
posed by Thaler and other behavioral economists to standard models of economic behaviors
under certainty. To do so, we shall proceed through a systematic comparison between, on the
one hand, these classical challenges from behavioral economics, and, on the other hand, the
classical challenges from Sen to the very same standard models of economic behaviors under
certainty. The second goal, pertaining to the issue of interdisciplinarity, is to study the relations
between economics and both psychology and Psychology throughout that comparison. The
third goal, pertaining to the role of language in economic rationality, is first to show how the
challenges from both Thaler and Sen underlie a methodology where the role of ordinary language
is non-trivial and then explicitly develop the theoretical and methdological implications of this
observation.
More precisely, this chapter focuses on individual decision under certainty for three reasons.
Firstly, this restriction allows to be more precise on the methodological issues that are at the
center of this dissertation so that they will be more easily discussed in the subsequent chapters.
Secondly, by contrast with the next chapter which focuses on decisions explicitly conceived in
economics as being under uncertainty, over time and regarding other people (i.e., not under
certainty per se), this chapter aims to show there are already inherent tensions under certainty
with respect to these three dimensions of economic behaviors. Thirdly, this restriction allows
a clean comparison of two different critical perspectives – namely Thaler’s and Sen’s – on the
very same models of economic behaviors. These two perspectives are obviously central for this
dissertation as Thaler’s work is constitutive of the behavioral versus standard economics debates,
i.e., the object of this dissertation, and Sen’s work is constitutive of the entanglement thesis,
i.e., the methodological perspective of this dissertation.
By models of economic behaviors under certainty per se I mean the models from consumer
“What should the new kind of economic theory be? The most important advance I would like to
see is a clear distinction made between normative and descriptive theories.” (ibid, p.197)
“Psychologists distinguish between two kinds of theories: normative and descriptive. To them,
normative theories characterize rational choice [...]. Descriptive theories try to characterize actual
choices. [...] Economists have traditionally used one theory to serve both the normative and
descriptive purposes” (Thaler 2000, p.138)
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choice theory and rational choice theory. It is worth clarifying what I take to be the relations
between these two theories. The principal theoretical motivation of consumer choice theory is
to ground the so-called ‘Law of Demand’ – an inverse relation between prices and quantities
demanded of consumption goods – in individual consumers’ decisions made under the constraint
of their income or budget. From the late 19th century onwards, various authors or even tra-
ditions have theorized the consumer’s decisions through three main theoretical entities: choice,
preference and utility. The meanings and formalizations of these entities have evolved through
time and across traditions, the historical and methodological details of which are fairly complex
(see Lallement 1984; Walsh 1996; Mongin 2000; and the references in Mirowski and Hands’ 2006
symposium). Notably, the theoretical role of money and the budget (or income) constraint has
always been problematic regardless of the traditions (see Lallement 1984; and Mirowski and
Hands 1998; or Hands and Mirowski 1998). In this chapter, ‘rational choice theory’ will be used
as meaning ‘consumer choice theory without a budget constraint and without necessarily involv-
ing money’. Hence because the heterogeneity of traditions in consumer choice theory is mainly
threefold since the postwar era (Mirowski and Hands 1998), rational choice theory inherits that
threefold heterogeneity.2
The three main traditions identified by Mirowski and Hands are the general-equilibrium
theory developed at the Cowles Commission notably by Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu,
the revealed preference theory developed at MIT notably by Paul Samuelson, and the microe-
conomics from the Chicago School developed notably by Milton Friedman, George Stigler and
Gary Becker. A point worth noting for discussing Sen’s and Thaler’s criticisms is that:
“Each subprogram had the capacity to absorb certain forms of criticism and thus
deflect those criticisms away from the vulnerable areas in other subprograms, where
they might do the most damage. Attack general-equilibrium theory for its lack of
empirical relevance, and one is quickly directed toward Becker, Stigler, and the grand
2There is a wide variety of uses of the expression ‘rational choice theory’ which do not seem to be all
mutually compatible, especially on what they take to be the ‘foundational’ defining feature of a rational choice,
e.g., consistency, self-interest, means-ends reasoning, optimization, maximization, preference satisfaction (for
discussions of this variety, see Sen 2002, chap.1; Amadae 2003; Herfeld 2013; 2016). By contrast my use of
‘rational choice theory’ as consumer choice theory without budget constraint is not ‘foundational’ but merely
meant to capture the contrast between, on the one hand, choices in a market with prices and a budget (consumer
choice theory), and, on the other hand, choices possibly outside of a market without prices and a budget (rational
choice theory). We will see below that there is a mathematically non-trivial reason for this distinction (roughly,
all the axioms underlying rational choice theory in my sense have to be satisfied in consumer choice theory but
not all the axioms underlying consumer choice theory have to be satisfied in rational choice theory). I do not
claim to be the only one using ‘rational choice theory’ in that sense (see, e.g., Richter 1971; Sen 1971; Bossert
and Suzumura 2010, chap. 1; see also Pollak 1990’s discussion of “extended domains” of choice).
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Chicago tradition of applied microeconomics. Go after Chicago for its loose use of
subjective utility and a priori categories, and one is quickly told how the relevant
preferences are operationally defined and could be revealed by direct observations
of consumers’ choices. Finally, go after revealed preference theory for emptiness
as a tautological definition of consistency in choice, and one is immediately shown
the way through the equivalence results and right into the heart of the complete
Walrasian general-equilibrium model.” (Mirowski and Hands 1998, p.289)
In other words, the threefold heterogeneity of traditions confers to standard models of individual
behaviors a certain resilience to criticisms. In this chapter we shall keep that in mind in order
to fully appreciate the strength of (at least the combination of) Sen’s and Thaler’s criticisms.
This chapter is organized into four sections, each focusing on a point of comparison be-
tween Sen’s and Thaler’s (together with some other behavioral economists’) criticisms. We
first highlight how they share the same target, i.e., standard models of individual behaviors
under certainty, with the same interpretation of positive/normative issue in those models, but
diverge on their methodological positions against that interpretation (1.1). We discuss some
methodological statements from both of these two authors displaying a peculiar role of ordinary
language for economic rationality, which we propose to flesh out and develop through the so-
called theory of speech act (1.2). We then argue that Sen and the behavioral economics of Thaler
display a further methodological convergence in their criticism of the exogeneity of preferences
in standard economic analysis (1.3). We finally contrast their positions on the articulation of
positive economics and normative economics to explain how they rather disagree on most points
underlying this issue (1.4).3
1.1 Same target, same interpretation, but different methodological
positions
The goal of this section is to illustrate two counter-examples to standard models of individual
behaviors in economics and to explain their theoretical and methodological implications in some
details. One counter example from Sen is taken from his work on context-dependent preferences
3The chapter could have been organized through a sequential comparison between Sen’s and Thaler’s (with
other behavioral economists’) works, i.e., discussing first the contributions from one, then the contribution from
the other and finally a comparative synthesis. We have indeed opted for a systematic comparison organized
through thematic sections because it fits better the methodological and philosophical (rather than historical)
points that are going to be developed. Also we thought that readers acquainted with one of the two authors but
not the other would find the systematic presentation more informative than the sequential one.
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(1.1.1). The other counter-examples from Thaler is about what he labeled the ‘endowment
effect’ (1.1.2). We then highlight how these two counter-examples come from two symmetrically
opposed methodological criticisms of the same interpretation of standard models of individual
behaviors (1.1.3).
1.1.1 Sen on context-dependent preferences
Imagine that, at a dinner-guest party, someone does not take an apple from the fruit basket when
it is the last one, but he does take it when there is another apple in the basket (Sen 2002, chap.3,
p.129). In other words, he chooses nothing when he has the choice between {nothing, an apple}
but an apple when he has the choice between {nothing, an apple, another apple}. Formally,
denoting respectively by x, y and z the elements nothing, an apple and another apple, we have
a decision maker choosing x from the choice set {x, y} but y from {x, y, z}. Using the formal
language of choice functions (C(.)), ‘x is chosen from the choice set {x, y}’ can be written
{x} = C({x, y}) and ‘y is chosen from the choice set {x, y, z}’ is written {y} = C({x, y, z}).
The conjunction of {x} = C({x, y}) and {y} = C({x, y, z}) is an example of what Sen calls
context-dependent preferences. Sen uses intuitive examples such as the one with the apple to
suggest that context-dependent preferences are perfectly common and rational. How can such
a simple choice situation be a counter-example to the grand theories of consumer choice and
rational choice in economics?
Despite the simplicity of the example, Sen taps down to the deepest axiomatic grounds
of rational choice theory stemming from the revealed preference theory of consumer choice
(see Bossert and Suzumura 2010, chap.1). In this tradition, axioms are imposed on choices,
supposedly observable directly in factual data, so as to define a choice function – which, roughly,
is a formal summary of the correspondence between possible choices made from possible choice
sets. The axioms thus define conditions of internal consistency of choice. The most minimal of
such conditions is sometimes called ‘contraction consistency’: if an element y is chosen from a
set {x, y, z} and belongs to one of its subset {x, y} then it (y) must be chosen from this subset
({x, y}). In formal language: {y} = C({x, y, z})⇒ {y} = C({x, y}). The apple example above
violates precisely that condition. Another important and very minimal condition is sometimes
called ‘expansion consistency’: if y is chosen from both {x, y} and {y, z} then it (y) must also
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be chosen from their union {x, y, z}. In formal language: [{y} = C({x, y})&{y} = C({y, z})]⇒
{y} = C({x, y, z}). Notice the (emphasized) normativity of formal language here, or, as Sen
puts it, “the authoritarianism of some context-independent axioms” (2002, chap.1, p.6).
When these two minimal conditions are imposed on a choice function, it can be proved that
the observed choices are made according to a complete and transitive binary relation of prefer-
ence that is supposedly unobservable and arguably captures how the decision maker subjectively
values the elements of the choice set. And equivalently, if a decision maker ranks all the objects
of choice in the choice set according to such binary relation of preference then the pattern of
choices can be generated by a choice function respecting the minimal conditions. And it is
well known that a complete and transitive binary relation of preference implies, with an added
axiom of continuity, the existence of a real-valued utility function, an important result for the
general-equilibrium version of consumer choice theory proved by Debreu in 1954. The “equiva-
lence results” between revealed preference theory and general-equilibrium theory mentioned by
Mirowski and Hands (1998, p.289) above can therefore be schematically represented as follows,
using C(.) to denote a choice function, % a binary relation of preference () and indifference
(∼), U(.) a utility function and ⇔ the equivalence results:
C(.)⇔%⇔ U(.)
1971 is an important year concerning the first equivalence between choice function and
preference relation for both consumer choice theory and rational choice theory. On the one
hand, it is the publication year of a volume that fully clarifies various ways of establishing this
equivalence for consumer choice theory (Chipman et. al 1971). On the other hand, it is also
the publication year of a widely cited paper by Sen (1971) which clarifies the conditions under
which the equivalence hold in rational choice theory (i.e., without a budget constraints), which
are (roughly) the congruence and expansion conditions exposed above. In other words, those
conditions are necessary and sufficient to ensure that: something, say x, is chosen instead of
something else, say y, if and only if x is preferred to y and if and only if x gives more utility
than y. In formal language: {x} = C({x, y})⇔ x  y ⇔ U(x) > U(y). Notice that the formal
expression in terms of choice function is the one giving the more information about the context
of choice, i.e., about the choice set. One implication of Sen’s (1971) results is that the internal
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consistency of choice conditions for rational choice theory are more minimal than the minimal
internal consistency of choice conditions for consumer choice theory; i.e., the former conditions
should be respected in the latter (or, put in another way, the latter imply the former), but not
vice versa. In other words, a consumer choice is always a rational choice but not vice versa.
What is worth noting with respect to the entanglement thesis is that these equivalence
results have been taken as a scientific warrant to work with given preferences without bothering
about their content, and still make claims about the rationality of the economic agent but in
a value-free way with respect to the agents’ own values; thus making the theoretical activity
‘value-free’.4
In the words of the entanglement thesis: there are some theoretical conventions (the formal
structure of the consistency conditions and their implied equivalence with preference and utility)
that warrant some value judgments from the theorist (claims of rationality) about some factual
observations (the agent’s choices). But there is some irony in Sen’s contributions to those
equivalence results because his long lasting criticisms of revealed preference theory is precisely
against that scientific warrant. His intuitive examples, such as the one with the apples above,
are meant to show that the weakest internal consistency of choice conditions can be violated in
choice behaviors that everybody understand as perfectly rational. Indeed, one can rationally
refuse to take the last apple out a fruit basket to respect social conventions of politeness, good
manners and whatnot. That does not mean that these conditions cannot characterize rationality
in some instances, but that they cannot do so a priori and without any reference to something
else than choices themselves: “There is no such thing as purely internal consistency of choice”
(Sen 2002, chap.3, p.127).
The simplicity of Sen’s examples can be deceptive regarding the reach of their implications. If
economics is supposed to be about rational choices, and the whole formal theoretical systems of
rational choice theory and consumer choice theory rest on foundations (i.e., their most minimal
4See Walsh (1996, chap. 4; and somewhat relatedly Mongin 2000, p.1143) on how this penetrated in consumer
choice theory from rational choice theory. An influential contemporary illustration of the equivalence results being
used as a scientific warrant for making value-neutral claims of rationality is to be found in the textbook of Andreu
Mas-Colell et. al (1995, chaps. 1-2). Peter Wakker offers some skeptical comments on this scientific warrant
(discussing Mas-Collel et al. among others) that is close to Sen’s criticism exposed below: “Many authors
introducing a new formal principle in a particular theory use naïve and overly broad terms such as rational,
coherent, consistent, and so on, for their particular principle to make it appear impressive.[...] Sometimes, such
authors go to great lengths to argue that their particular principle is not only necessary, but also sufficient,
for rationality. Citation scores show that such naïve terminologies can nevertheless be effective” (Wakker 2010,
p.378, fn3, references omitted)
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internal consistency of choice conditions) that are plagued with an infinity of counterexamples
(rational behaviors violating the minimal conditions), then economic theory is in bad shape. The
counterexamples cannot be easily dismissed by formalizing the type of ordinary explanation given
above. Indeed, it would be easy to argue that the decision maker is in fact not facing the same
objects of choice in the two choice situations: {nothing, an apple, another apple} or {x, y, z} in
one case or , and {nothing, the last apple} or {x,w} in the other. But that strategy brings a host
of other problems, roughly because some of the empirical counterpart of the objects of choice is
lost: an apple and the last apple, or x and w, are different formal elements referring to the same
thing, whereas in the example above, we had the same formal element referring to the same
thing. That loss is due the interpretation of an apple as the last apple. This is tantamount to
the injection of some psychology into the objects of choice, and that is problematic because such
psychology is supposed to be confined in the preference relation or the utility function (or more
controversially in the choice function), while the objects of choice are supposed to represent the
purposeless Nature faced by the decision maker. Notice that the very individuation of objects of
choice necessitates a bit of interpretation too, because it necessitates at least some perception,
e.g., of an apple distinct from another apple and from the possibility of choosing nothing. But
if we were to reformulate the choice set as {nothing, an apple, an apple} or {x, y, y}, then we
have the reverse of the previous empirical problem: an apple and an apple, or y and y, are
the same formal element but they are referring to different things (namely to different apples
here). Thus the individuation in terms of an apple and another apple or y and z appears to
the least problematic under those considerations, but it happens to be deeply problematic for
rational choice theory and consumer choice theory (for more details on the debates around those
considerations see the references in Hédoin 2016; Baccelli 2013a; b). Finally, notice also that
‘context’, usually one of the vaguest notion in social sciences and philosophy, is rather concise
in the literature just discussed: it is the structure of the objects of choice in the choice set, i.e.,
their numbers individuated with minimal interpretation (beyond mere discrimination).
Summing up, Sen targets the deepest assumptions, or ‘axioms’, of the standard models of
individual behaviors under certainty in economics. He does so by mean of a counter-example
that shows, through its intuitive appeal, that the most minimal notion of rationality in economics
is not so minimal after all.
27
1.1.2 Thaler on endowment effects
Imagine someone who bought some bottles of wine at $5 a bottle thirty years ago and refuses
to sell even one of them for $100 now (the current market price), though he never spent more
than $35 on a bottle (Thaler 1980, example 1; 2015, chap.2). This kind of situation, where
the amount of money a decision maker is willing to accept for selling a good x he owns is far
more superior to the amount of money he is willing to pay for buying the same good x when
he doesn’t own it, is an instance of what Thaler calls the endowment effect. Like Sen, Thaler
uses intuitive example such as the one with the bottle of one to suggest that endowment effects
are perfectly common. Unlike Sen, however, Thaler does not suggest that in addition to being
perfectly common they are also perfectly rational, as we shall see. But let’s first see how, again,
such a simple choice situation is a counter-example to consumer choice theory and rational
choice theory.
Thaler’s endowment effects are better understood as counter-examples to the rational choice
theory stemming from the version of consumer choice theory of “the grand Chicago tradition
of applied microeconomics”, as Mirowski and Hands (1998, p.289) put it. Unlike Sen’s apple
story, Thaler’s wine story was not designed as a clear-cut logical counter-example to one of
the formal axioms constitutive of the structure of consumer (and rational) choice theory. It
rather illustrates an anomalous quantitative deviation from a prediction derived from consumer
choice theory. The prediction is that if income and substitution effects are null for a good,
then consumers’ willingness to pay for buying the good (if they don’t own it) and willingness
to accept money for selling the good (if they own it) ought to be equal. And the smallest are
these two effects the closer the two willingness ought to be. Notice here that the normativity of
formal language comes from the formal derivation of this prediction (see Hanemann 1991 and
the references therein), compared to the imposition of assumption in Sen’s case. Notice also
how the consumer’s unobservable values and his factually observable behavior are conflated in
his willingness to pay or to accept money.5
5In other words, Hanemann’s (1991) result is that if the inverse relation between variations in the price of
a good and variations in the consumer’s real income (i.e., income effects) and if the inverse relation between
variations in the price of a good and variations in the relative prices of the good’s substitutes (i.e., substitution
effects) are both null, then the willingness to pay or to accept ought to be equal. Notice also that these
formal results about the role of substitution effect were published (in 1991) after Thaler’s 1980 paper, in which
substitution effects are therefore not discussed (but are in his post-1991 papers on endowment effects). However,
since most of Thaler’s examples are about willingness to pay or to accept the same good, substitution effects are
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In Thaler’s example, the decision maker has a (maximum) willingness to pay for wine of
$35, on the one hand, but a (minimum) willingness to sell wine over $100, on the other hand,
implying a discrepancy of more than $65 between the two. In formal language (with some
abuses from the conventional notations in economics), let x denote a bottle of wine, WTP (.)
andWTA(.) willingness to pay and willingness to accept functions both isomorphically related to
the decision maker’s utility function and the symbol meaning ‘much more’. Thaler’s example
can be expressed as WTP (x) < $35WTA(x) > $100⇒ U(x) 6= U(x), in stark contradiction
with the standard model where, quite trivially in this situation,WTP (x) = WTA(x)⇔ U(x) =
U(x). Notice here that the problem is not that we fail to recognize that one bottle of wine thirty
years ago and that bottle today are not the same bottle as its value increases with aging. That
the bottle was bought thirty years ago is an irrelevant economic aspect of the problem pointed
by Thaler. The problem is that today the consumer does not want to pay more than $35 for any
bottle of wine and does not want to be paid $100 or even much more to sell a bottle of wine.
Thaler proposes “that a more parsimonious explanation is available if one distinguishes
between the opportunity costs and out-of-pocket costs” (1980, p.44). Hence, abstracting from
the explanatory role of the decision maker’s income or budget, Thaler moves his target one
ground below consumer choice theory, toward Chicago-style rational choice theory:
“The first lesson of economics is that all costs are (in some sense) opportunity costs.
Therefore opportunity costs should be treated as equivalent to out-of-pocket costs.
How good is this normative advice as a descriptive model?” (ibid)
But let’s consider what Thaler thinks of ‘how good is this normative advice tout court’ be-
fore. The answer is not as straightforward as it appears at first sight. In their methodological
manifestos (e.g., Camerer and Loewenstein 2004), Thaler and other behavioral economists are
often arguing that the normative advice from consumer choice theory and rational choice theory
under certainty are taken as good ones, though it is never as directly stated as it is for decision
under risk, e.g., “[e]xpected utility is the right way to make decisions” (Thaler 2015, p.30). It is
rather indirectly stated, as when Thaler describes a list in which endowment effects figures as
“Dumb stuff people do” (2015, p.21). In the words of the entanglement thesis, here the theoret-
plausibly null in these examples. This is obviously the case for the wine example, where we are only talking
about the decision maker preferences among bottles of wine. Furthermore, Thaler argues that, in this and
other examples, income effects are very small, and (blocking a likely objection from the Chicago School) so are
transaction costs.
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ical conventions (‘all costs are opportunity costs’) warrant value judgments from the theorists
(claims of non-rationality) about factual observations (the agent’s willingness to pay and to
accept) that contradict the theoretical conventions. That seems to be very different from Sen’s
critical attitude towards standard economics’ characterization of the rationality of individual
behaviors. But it will be later argued (in section 1.3 below) that a closer scrutiny of behavioral
economists’ attitudes (including Thaler’s) towards the standard model reveal that they are not
always incompatible with Sen’s. In any case, Thaler illustrates how ‘all costs are opportunity
costs’ is not a very good descriptive model by many examples where opportunity costs (e.g.,
of buying extra less-than-$35 bottles of wine from the $100 obtained in selling an old one) are
underweighted compared to out-of-pocket costs (e.g., of these extra bottles without selling an
old one).
Summing up, Thaler targets the empirical predictions of standard models of behaviors under
certainty in economics. He does so by mean of a counter-example that shows, through its
intuitive appeal, that much of us have indeed seen numerous such violations of these empirical
predictions in our daily life.
1.1.3 Abiding by the fact/value dichotomy versus turning it upside down
Sen and Thaler (along with behavioral economics) share the same interpretation of standard
models of individual behaviors regarding the positive/normative issue. This interpretation is
the one already presented, both in the general introduction of this dissertation and in the
introduction of this chapter. That is, on their account, standard models of individual behaviors
have both a positive and a normative dimension, i.e., they predict, explain and/or describe
what decision makers do and at the same time they recommend, prescribe and/or evaluate
what decision makers ought to do. Thaler’s interpretation is quite straightforward and stops
at this observation (see the quotes in the first footnote of this chapter). Sen goes a little
further. On his accounts standard models are directly normative and indirectly positive. They
are directly normative in the sense that they directly characterize the substance of rationality,
i.e., the constraints for a choice to be rational, such as consistency conditions or self-interest
maximization. In other words, they directly states how to “think and act wisely and judiciously,
rather than stupidly or impulsively” (Sen 2002, chap.1, p: 42). On the other hand, they are
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indirectly positive in the sense that they first characterize the normative substance of rationality
“and then assum[e] that actual behavior will coincide with rational behavior” (Sen 2007, pp.20-
21, my emphasis). According to Sen, in standard economics,
“[t]he two uses – directly normative and indirectly predictive – are closely linked.
Indeed, the latter is basically parasitic on the former, but not vice versa.” (Sen 2002,
chap. 1, p.43)
Methodological manifestos from behavioral economics (including Thaler’s) display a striking
disagreement with Sen on how to handle that “parasitic” aspect of the positive on the normative.
Thaler and behavioral economists tend to interpret the “parasitic” aspect of the positive on the
normative as failures of human rationality. They handle those failures by developing positive
models of the systematic deviations from standard models that are observed, most of the time,
in lab experiments. The positive dimension of standard models is thus taken away from it,
only its normative dimension remains, and behavioral economists develop models where the
positive dimension is “direct” in Sen’s sense. One feature of this methodological move is its
underlying interdisciplinary exchanges with Psychology, to provide insights for the behavioral
assumptions in the modeling of those deviations. That methodological move itself draws on the
position of the psychologists from whom the insights are borrowed. Those psychologists, most
notably Kahneman and Tversky, come from a tradition where normative standards of behaviors
and cognition are used as benchmarks for the measurement of various human performances (see
Heukelom 2014, chaps. 3-4). This interdisciplinary aspect of behavioral economics’ methodology
is illustrated in the next section and more fully developed in the next chapter.6
By contrast, Sen’s position departs from the standard articulation between the positive
and normative dimension by, as it were, turning it upside down: he develops the normative
6Thaler displays this position and its origin quite vividly in the following passage:
“The BDR [Behavioral Decision Research] approach to the study of human decision making has been
similar to (and strongly influenced by) the psychological approach to the study of perception. Much
can be learned about visual processes by studying powerful optical illusions. [Certain deviations
from the normative model of individual behavior] have the force of an illusion to many and have
provided similar insights into decision processes. It goes without saying that the existence of an
optical illusion that causes us to see one of two equal lines as longer than the other should not reduce
the value we place on accurate measurement. On the contrary, illusions demonstrate the need for
rulers! Similarly, a demonstration that human choices often violate the axioms of rationality does
not necessarily imply any criticism of the axioms of rational choice as a normative ideal. Rather, the
research is simply intended to show that, for descriptive purposes, alternative models are sometimes
necessary.” (Thaler 1987, p.100)
31
direct purpose of rational choice theory from its positive indirect purpose. In other words, he
theorizes the substance of rationality with insights gained from observations and discussions of
actual behaviors ‘in the real world’ (i.e., not from lab experiments). One underlying feature
of this methodological move is its interdisciplinary exchanges with ethics, moral and political
philosophy, to provide insights on the plurality of motives underlying individual choices. Sen
therefore argues that an explicit account of the value judgments that are at play in actual
individual decision making could improve the behavioral assumptions made in positive economics
(see esp. Runciman and Sen 1965; Sen 1987; 2002; 2009). This interdisciplinary aspect of his
methodology is further illustrated in the rest of this chapter.
Summing up in the words of the entanglement thesis, Sen derives value judgments from
observations of factual behaviors to develop theoretical conventions through the scrutiny of social
conventions, norms of behaviors and the like. By contrasts, Thaler and behavioral economists
use the theoretical conventions of standard economics to warrant claims of non-rationality (as
already argued above) and to derive factual measures related to individual behaviors.
Conclusion
We have seen that both Sen and Thaler criticize standard models from consumer choice theory
with implications for rational choice theory by means of intuitive counter-examples involving
situations that are pervasive in our daily lives. While Sen target assumptions and Thaler targets
predictions, the main methodological difference is clearly the former’s defense of the behaviors
in his examples as rational by contrast with the latter’s emphasis on their non-rationality.
This difference underlies different methodological criticisms of the same interpretation of the
positive/normative issue in standard models of individual behaviors. The next sections will keep
using the two examples presented here to illustrate some theoretical and methodological points.
The next section focuses on the explicit role of psychology and Psychology (p-&-Psychology
henceforth), along with the more implicit role of language for economic rationality, in Sen’s and
Thaler’s work.
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1.2 p-&-Psychology in the communicative structure of choices
The goal of this section is to argue that when we look closely at the role of p-&-Psychology
in Sen’s and Thaler’s (along with other behavioral economists’) work, we see that there is
what can be called a communicative structure underlying the notion of choice, in two related
senses. In a methodological sense, there is a communicative structure underlying the relation
between the economist and the economic agent: in order to develop his theory, which includes
his uses of formal language, the former can speak to the latter through the ordinary language
and psychology they share (1.2.1). In an empirical sense, there is a communicative structure
underlying the relation between, on the one hand, economic agents using ordinary language to
present decision problems to, on the other hand, other economic agents who make choices using
ordinary language as well (1.2.2). The implications and limits of such communicative structure
for economics are fleshed out by developing some of Sen’s methodological reflections through
the so-called theory of speech acts (1.2.3).
1.2.1 The methodological communicative structure of choices
A characteristic methodological feature of Thaler’s explanations of his examples is that they
combine intuitive appeal to the psychology of the reader with some further Psychological prin-
ciple. In the case of the endowment effect seen above, the Psychological principle is what is
called loss aversion in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory: decision makers value
losses and gains of the same magnitude asymmetrically, losses involving usually twice more disu-
tility than the utility from gains of the same absolute size. That explains the underweighting
of opportunity costs in two ways (Thaler 1980, p.44). One explanation is that the disutility
from losing goods (e.g., removing bottles from one’s wine endowment) is superior to the utility
from gaining goods (e.g., adding the same bottles to one’s wine endowment). And the other
non-mutually exclusive explanation is that the disutility of the money spent on a good (e.g., $35
for a good bottle of wine) is superior to the utility of the money received from selling the good
(e.g., $100 for an old bottle of wine) – notice how the consumer’s values for money is no more
taken as observable through behaviors but is subsumed under an unobservable Psychological
principle. Figure 1.1 provides graphical representations of these two explanations on Kahneman
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Figure 1.1: Loss aversion and the wine example
and Tversky’s ‘value function’ (through some modifications on Thaler’s 2015, figure 3).
The S-shape of the curve represents the asymmetric valuation of, or marginal utility for,
losses and gains; and the abrupt change represents loss aversion, i.e., the difference in magnitude
between utility from gains and disutility from losses (also represented by the different lengths
of the dotted lines). Thaler has expressed the “view of endowment effects and loss aversion as
fundamental characteristics of preferences” (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1990, p.1346).
Loss aversion as a fundamental characteristic of preferences is indeed a distinctive feature
of behavioral economics, “the single most powerful tool in the behavioral economist’s arsenal”
(Thaler 2015, p.33), and a very disputed one from standard economics’ perspective. Its con-
ceptual possibility condition, however, the notion of reference-dependent preferences, is (maybe
‘paradoxically’) not that controversial. Reference-dependent preferences are inherent to prospect
theory’s most central Psychological principle of a reference point: a given decision problem can
very often (if not always) be presented from (at least) two perspectives whereby a given con-
sequence of a given choice appears either as a gain or as a loss. And when the reference point
implies the perspective of losses then by virtue of loss aversion the preference is determined
toward the choice that will avoid the losses. For instance, the decision of selling or not selling a
bottle of wine can be seen from two different reference points: from (1) a given endowment of
bottles of wine, or from (2) the opportunity of buying bottles of wine. But the former presents
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Figure 1.2: Reference-dependence and the wine example
the opportunity of losing a bottle of wine as opposed to the latter’s monetary gains from the
sale of that bottle. Hence, in the former presentation, loss aversion determines the choice of
not selling the bottle, while the prospect of buying further bottles in the latter presentation de-
termines the choice of selling it. Figure 1.2 provides graphical representations of the reasoning
(again through some modifications on Thaler’s 2015, figure 3).
Reference-dependent preferences are not to be confused with Sen’s context-dependent pref-
erences: a decision problem has always a context constituted by the alternatives available, i.e., by
the objects of choice in the choice set. And different contexts – e.g., {nothing, an apple, another apple}
as opposed to {nothing, an apple} – imply different choices – e.g., an apple as opposed to
nothing. Hence the example of the endowment effect discussed so far underlies no context-
dependency as there is just one choice set regardless of how the problem is presented, i.e.,
{selling the bottle, not selling the bottle}.
Turning to Sen’s explanations of context-dependent preferences, his and others’ contributions
to choice theory consist in making formally explicit the external reference to behavior, i.e.,
reference to the agent’s values or to some social norms. Such external references inevitably
rely on the shared psychology of the economists and the economic agents, and the connection
between Sen’s work on rational choice theory with ethics, moral and political philosophy arise
at this juncture: his and others’ contributions to these areas of philosophy guide and justify his
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formalizations of such external references. Obviously, the apple example given previously does
not need a grand ethical, moral or political theory to be rationalized. Simple references to the
desires to “behave decently [...] without violating rules of good behaviors [...] given [the decision
maker’s] values and scruples” are enough (Sen 2002, chap.3, p.129). But that is not the case in all
of his examples, and the simplicity of such examples have their implications in some preference-
based formal systems of ethics, moral and political philosophy, where the minimal conditions
of consistency violated in the apple example are imposed a priori as universal requirement of
rationality, just as in economics.7
In their early writings, both Thaler and Sen have defended some methodological theses that
acknowledged the role of psychology and communication between the economist and the eco-
nomic agent. Both subsequently did abide by those theses but without explicitly preaching them
as clearly as they did back then. Here are two respective instances where their methodological
theses are clearly expressed. Thaler puts it as follows:
“These examples are intended to illustrate the behavior under discussion in a man-
ner that appeals to the reader’s intuition and experiences. I have discussed these
examples with hundreds of friends, colleagues, and students. Many of the exam-
ples have also been used as questionnaires – I can informally report that a large
majority of non-economists say they would act in the hypothesized manner [...]. I
try to provide as many kinds of evidence as possible for each type of behavior [...]
from questionnaires, to regressions using market data, to laboratory experiments,
to market institutions that exist apparently to exploit these actions.” (Thaler 1980,
pp.40-41)
As for Sen:
“There is, of course, something of a problem in interpreting answers to questions as
correct and in taking the stated preference to be the actual preference, and there are
well-known limitations of the questionnaire method. But then there are problems,
as we have seen, with the interpretation of behaviour as well. [...] The thrust of
the revealed preference approach has been to undermine thinking as a method of
self-knowledge and talking as a method of knowing about others. In this, I think,
we have been prone, on the one hand, to overstate the difficulties of introspection
and communication, and on the other, to underestimate the problems of studying
preferences revealed by observed behaviour.” (Sen 1973, pp.257-8, my emphasis)
7On the whole axiomatic machinery of external references see Sen (2002, part II), Bossert and Suzumura
(2010, chap.8) and the references therein. On the implications of simple examples such as the apple one to
preference-based formal systems of ethics, moral and political philosophy see Sen’s (1983, section VII) discussion,
along with most of the discussions in parts III and IV of his 2002 volume.
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Thaler the economist talking with his “friends, colleagues, and students” is just illustrating Sen’s
point on “talking as a method of knowing about others” (my emphasis). To be sure, at a certain
level, that is unavoidable for any theorist (especially working on individual decision making) in
standard or behavioral economics. My point is just that the communicative structure between
the economist and the decision maker is explicitly acknowledged by Thaler and Sen in a way
that goes further than the often recognized role of so-called ‘casual empiricism’ in economic
theory.
Summing up, the uses of psychology and/or Psychology by Sen and Thaler make their
explanations of counter-examples to standard models of individual behaviors appealing no-
tably because of a methodological communicative structure underlying the relation between
the economist and the economic agent. In the next section, we shall see that ‘in the real world’,
so to speak, this is paralleled by an empirical communicative structure underlying the making
of economically relevant choices.
1.2.2 The empirical communicative structure of choices
The goal of this subsection is to argue that, beyond the realm of theory making, the communica-
tive structure illustrated in the previous subsection has an empirical counterpart in the realm
of decision making. We shall illustrate this claim through four sets of related issues that are
relevant to contemporary debates between standard and behavioral economics.
The first set of issues arise with force in contingent valuations studies. The latter consist in
elicitations of individuals’ willingness to pay or willingness to accept (mostly) for non-market
goods. Discrepancies between willingness to pay and willingness to accept is a well-known prob-
lem in contingent valuations – the latter being far greater than the former, just as in endowment
effects. One underlying problem that is often silenced in discussions of those discrepancies within
the contingent valuations literature is that it is not rare to observe more than fifty percent of
protest from the decision makers who are being under elicitation of willingness to accept (Kah-
neman, Knetsch and Thaler 1991, pp.202-203). Protesters manifest themselves by refusing to
state their willingness to accept or by stating unusual answers (refusal to sell or asking literally
an infinite amount of money).
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“These extreme responses reflect the feelings of outrage often seen when communities
are faced with the prospect of accepting a new risk such as a nuclear power plant
or waste disposal facility. [...] [C]ompensation [...] often do not help as they are
typically perceived as bribes. This is a situation in which people loudly say one
thing and the theory asserts another. It is of interest that the practitioners of
contingent valuation elected to listen to the theory, rather than to the respondents.”
(Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1991, pp.202-203 and fn4, my emphases)
This is a vivid illustration of a conflict between the influence of the economist’s formal language
on his ordinary language, or more precisely on the “practitioners”’ ordinary language, which
blinds them to the agents’ ordinary language, i.e., “the respondents” who were not being listened
to. In other words, the formal language from economic theory creates some noises in the exchange
of information that takes place within the communicative structure underlying the relation
between an economic agent who poses a decision problem to another economic agent, i.e., a
representative of an institution asking a citizen to state a willingness to pay or to accept.
There are obvious concrete economic implications here. Although Thaler and his co-authors
feel concerned about this problem, they do not propose a clear solution to it. What they do
instead is very close to the work of Sen: they go on discussing the implications of loss aversion
concerning social preference for fairness. That is a topic discussed in the next chapter, but
notice here how an anomaly regarding risk (emphasized in the quote) suggest explanations from
another dimension of economic behavior, namely social preferences and norms.8
The second set of issues pertain to experiments conducted in laboratories. Thaler’s endow-
ment effect, especially through the experiments he conducted with Kahneman and Jack Knestch
(Kahneman et al. 1990), is part of an ongoing controversy between standard and behavioral eco-
nomics. Roughly, the controversy is about whether we really need the language of Psychology in
explaining the phenomenon or whether we can either find a way out with the one from standard
consumer choice theory or cancel the effects through more traditional experimental designs from
economics (showing the phenomenon was just an artifact after all). It has been suggested that
subjects may try to infer information about the quality of the good they are endowed with from
8See Sandel (2000) for a critical discussion of several cases other than environmental matters where bringing
money into non-market goods triggers the same reaction. See Milanesi (2010) and the references therein a
historical perspective on the method of contingent valuations in economics and further ethical issues involved
in its application to the environment in economics. Beyond the environment, see Weber (1996) for a balanced
criticism of how the Beckerian theory of household consumption blinds practitioners conducting surveys on
domestic consumption to the ‘real’ subjective cost-benefit analysis and opportunity costs perceived by economic
agents (the role of time is central in this misperception). I thank Maxime Desmarais-Tremblay, Tom Juille and
Agnès Gramain, respectively, for having pointed these three references to me.
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the mere acts of the experimenter choosing to endow subjects with the good. If that is the case
then the latter’s social preferences may play a role if the endowment is seen as a gift given by
the experimenter (see Wilkinson and Klaes 2012, p.212). In other words, the formal language
of economic theory may not be translated faithfully enough in the experimental instructions,
leading to experimenter effects, i.e., different interpretations of the same instruction from the
experimenter and the subjects (see Bardsley 2005; Zizzo 2010 for precise accounts of experi-
menter effects). Hence endowment effects may be due to some noises created in the exchange
of information that takes place within the communicative structure underlying the relation be-
tween, on the one hand, an experimenter posing a decision problem to, on the other hand, the
subjects.9
That such experimenter effects are obviously generalizable to all behavioral experiments has
been part of yet another controversy around behavioral economics in the 2000s stemming from
the criticisms of Chicago School microeconometricians Steven Levitt and John List (2007a,b;
2008). In his reply to them, Camerer (2015, esp. pp.260-263) argues that these are well-known
problems in the behavioral sciences with which behavioral economists have dealt from the start,
notably by using “very carefully written” (p.260) experimental instructions. It is therefore not
an issue to be confused with the social preferences of the decision makers, a theoretical construct
meant to capture something else. Without disagreeing with Camerer’s position, I would like
to highlight how experimenter effects and ways of correcting them remain a methodological
issue where the role of language is deeply entrenched. This is so for a quite simple reason:
there is necessarily some sort of communication between the scientist and its subjects in the
lab because experimental instructions and procedures are necessarily written or spoken. The
9If such a controversy is raging, that might be because the theoretical and practical stakes concerning
elicitations of consumers’ willingness to pay and to accept are quite substantial (as in contingent valuation
studies, where experimental results can be used to correct some elicitation problems; see Robinson and Hammit
2011a, b). On the controversy over endowment effects see Wilkinson and Klaes (2012, Case 5.1), and Isoni et
al. (2011) versus Plott and Zeiler (2011) for the latest round; see also Engelman and Hollard (2010) for an
interpretation of, and experimental evidence on, the endowment effects as driven by various forms of uncertainty
subsuming social preferences. By “more traditional experimental designs from economics” the experimental
methods developed by economists in the study of market efficiency by contrast with the ones developed by
behavioral economists which are inspired from Psychology; roughly, the former but not the latter necessarily
respect the following three conditions: systematic use of monetary incentives, anonymity thoroughly ensured,
subjects not being deceived by experimenters. With Nicolas Vallois (Jullien and Vallois 2014), we have argued for
a threefold clarification between ‘behavioral economics’, ‘experimental market economics’ (the two approaches
just mentioned) and ‘experimental economics’ (an hybrid of the two former). Keep in mind that those are
methodological distinctions between approaches, not authors; although some authors have contributed more to
(or even constituted) some approaches, most authors have contributed to all approaches. See Cot and Ferey
(2016) and the references therein for historical and methodological discussions of experimental economics.
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following anecdotal evidence illustrates the relevance of this point for the present discussion.
Experimenters in economics always run a “pilot” of their experiments with colleagues instead of
‘real’ (i.e., paid) subjects in order to check, among other things (e.g., if the computer program
runs well), if the experimental instructions are clear enough (see Guala 2005, chap.2). In one
such pilot to which I participated, the experimenter had written the symbols ‘{∅}’ in one decision
problem. A non-economist colleague not acquainted with mathematics and set-theory did not
get (I quote from memory) ‘what those symbols meant’ and therefore did not understand that
some choices implied nothing as consequences. Discussing this issue during the debriefing,
the experimenter was surprised and quite disappointed that he had to change the symbols for
something more comprehensible because (I quote from memory) ‘the symbols did match exactly
with the model’. Again, this is a case where the formal language from the theory creates some
noises in the informational exchange within the communicative structure of choices.
The third set of issues is about economic choices that do not necessarily involve an economist
(at least directly) in the communicative structure of choices, e.g., in a market. An instance of this
set of issues is raised in one of Thaler’s (1980) example of a market institution (in the U.S.) trying
to exploit the endowment effect. The example concerns a bill that was about to pass in Congress
to outlaw existing agreements between credit card companies and stores whereby the former
prevented the latter to charge higher prices for credit card payments. During the negotiation of
the bill, “the credit card lobby turned its attention to form rather than substance” by agreeing
on such a bill if the stores presented the difference between cash and credit card payments
as cash discounts rather than credit card surcharge (1980, p.45). The point is that when the
stores actually charge higher for credit card payments, the underlying economic consequences
for the consumers are the same whether it says ‘cash discount’ or ‘credit card surcharge’. In
both cases it is cheaper to pay by cash and more expansive to pay by credit card. The only
difference is in how the presentation of the prices is written. But the ‘surcharge’ presentation
clearly discourages the uses of credit card, implying rather unwelcome economic consequences
for the credit card companies, who therefore lobbied for the consumer’s economic decisions to be
presented as ‘cash discount’. Whether or not this creates noises in the informational exchanges
between consumers, stores and credit card companies is arguably a matter of which of these
three agents’ perspective one takes.
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In short, consumers confront their decision problems as they are presented in a certain way
through certain words that are not arbitrarily chosen. Some of these words are even constitutive
of the ‘objects of choice’ faced by the decision makers, i.e., the empirical counterpart to the
theoretical entities represented in a choice set. For consumer choices, this issue is obviously
related to the careful packaging that constitutes the presentation of much consumption goods,
just as words are constitutive of the options among which they have to choose in questionnaires
or lab experiments, or the answers they give as statements of their choices. Understanding
or interpreting such words is therefore constitutive of the process by which most (especially
economically important) decisions are taken; and subsequently using such words is directly or
indirectly, by way of speaking or by way of writing, constitutive of most (again, especially
economically important) acts of choice:
“Every economic choice (even institutional choices) depends on an individual saying
“Yes,” nodding, handing something to a cashier, signing a contract, reaching into a
wallet, clicking “submit” online, releasing an earnings announcement, or executing
some other action that requires brain activity.” (Camerer 2008, p.47)
I think it is uncontroversial that all these are actions embedded in a communicative structure,
because it is uncontroversial that economic decisions have informational structures (which re-
ceive a substantial share of mathematical economics’ attention) with senders and receivers of
messages. Taking stock of that communicative structure could not only refine informational
analyses but also behavioral economists’ analyses of decision making since the psychological
processes underlying human language is one of the most studied topics in the cognitive sciences.
The last set of issues can be thought of as pushing the previous one a bit further to con-
centrate on information per se. The media (press, TV etc.) seems a paradigmatic example and
the underlying issues can be illustrated by a set of field and experimental studies conducted by
psychologists Marwan Sinaceur, Chip Heath and Steve Cole (2005), and used by Camerer (2008)
in an instance of the behavioral versus standard economics debates. It concerns the impact on
consumers of a change in the labels used by the media in France during the Mad Cow Crisis,
from “bovine spongiform encephalopathy” to “mad cow disease”, both referring to the same
disease. Market data showed a decline in beef consumption and experimental results showed
more emotional reactions to the “mad cow disease” label than to the other one. Camerer’s point
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is that those phenomena are easily describable “in the language of preferences, beliefs, and con-
straints” by inferring “from the data, for example, that [...] that relabeling BSE as “mad cow
disease” genuinely conveys new information (doubtful) or grabs attention and activates emotion
(more likely)” (Camerer 2008, p.50, my emphases).
But it can be argued that it is not because there is an attentional and emotional dimension in
the agents’ attitude that the communicative structure underlying the conveying of information
is irrelevant in explaining the former dimension. For the emotional responses come from the
informational structure and its underlying communicative structure – information doesn’t, as it
were, fall from the sky. It can be furthermore argued that the very fact that the medias chose
to change the words is a genuine new information that grabs attention and activates emotion
differently depending on one’s attitudes toward the media outlets (see Sen 2009, p. 336 on the
informational and value-formation roles of the media).
Summing up, the methodological communicative structure highlighted in the previous sub-
section seem to have rather pervasive empirical counterparts, from the uses of questionnaires,
to lab experiments, market institutions and the media. In each cases, the communicative struc-
ture is constituted at least by an agent who poses a decision problem in ordinary language to
another agent who has to make an economic choice. The sharing of a common psychology is a
condition of possibility for such communication to be possible at all, let alone to be efficient. As
Nicholas Bardsley (2008, p.131) puts it about experimenter effects, they “ha[ve] methodological
implications but also potential theoretical consequences, since standard accounts of such effects
invoke a more sociological model of action than economists have traditionally employed”. The
next subsection sketches a way to take the role of ordinary language uses into such a model of
action without going too far away from economics.10
10Besides the four sets of issues discussed in this subsection, other ones could have been the verbal and
non-verbal means of communication in financial markets as discussed by Schinkus (2010) or the activity of
communication by central banks in their conduct of monetary policy as discussed by Blinder et al. (2008). Both
are however less directly connected to consumer choice theory and rational choice theory than what was discussed
here
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1.2.3 The communicative structure of choices and the theory of speech
acts
The goal of this subsection is to flesh out the theoretical consequences of the communicative
structure of economic choices in a way that balances logical and sociological considerations.
The discussion of the examples from behavioral economics in the previous subsection was
in line with Sen’s position that “[a]n act of choice [...] is, in a fundamental sense, always a
social act” (1973, p.252). And although we are not constantly being “aware of the immense
problems of interdependence that characterize a society”, behaviors are not “mere translation of
[...] personal preferences” (ibid). One of the underlying methodological implications for rational
choice theory of acts of choice always being social acts is that choice should not be thought to
have the same logical structure than statements or propositions. As Sen puts it:
“Statements A and not-A are contradictory in a way that choosing x from {x, y} and
y from {x, y, z} cannot be. If the latter pair of choices were to entail respectively
the statements (1) x is a better alternative than y, and (2) y is a better alternative
than x, then there would indeed be a contradiction here.” (Sen 2002, chap.3, p.126)
But:
“An act of choice is not a statement of any kind. Nor does it entail a statement, on
its own.” (Sen 1995, p.27)
And the Senian motto of external references resurfaces: it is only through them that we can
interpret choices as implied statements subjected to the logical rules of contradiction and en-
tailment that are constitutive of the formal language of logic. Sen further illustrates his point
by making a very brief parallel with ordinary language uses:
“The statements A and not-A do make a contradictory pair; the acts of saying them
need not. Indeed, being consistent or not consistent is not the kind of thing that can
happen to choice functions without interpretation – without a presumption about
the context that takes us beyond the choices themselves.” (Sen 2002, chap.3, p.127)
In other words, although acts of choice do not share the same logical structure as statements,
they do seem to share the same logical structure as the acts of saying those statements, at least
with respect to contradictory relations. This point can be fleshed out through the so-called
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theory of ‘speech acts’, one of the main concern of which is to work out the similarities and
differences between statements and acts of saying statements.11
We shall here follow John Searle’s (1969; 1979) version of the theory of speech acts. The
starting point of the theory is that the act of saying something is called a ‘speech act’ and is taken
as the unit of communication. At the most general level, speech acts are formalized by F (p).
Following Searle’s (1979, chap.1) terminology, F represents the “psychological state” expressed
while speaking, and p the proposition that represents what is said (to be loosely associated with
‘statement’ in Sen’s terms). Using this formula, we can easily illustrate Sen’s point about the
difference in logical structure between propositions and the acts of saying them. Imagine that a
representative from a credit card company in Thaler’s example wants to say that the company
prefers that their customers use their credit cards. At a basic level abstracting from contextual
features, the following four speech acts F (p) are perfectly consistent with each other:
“F1 = We prefer that (p1 = our customers pay more in credit card)”
“F2 = We do not prefer that (p2 = our customers do not pay more in credit card)”
“F2 = We do not prefer that (p3 = our customers pay less in cash)”
“F1 = We prefer that (p4 = our customers do not pay less in cash)”
Notice the contradictions between p1 and p2, and between p3 and p4. Yet all four speech acts
Fi(pi) are consistent (i = 1, 2, 3, 4). That can be noticed only if one pays attention to something
external to the proposition, namely the psychological states F of the speaker, which is here
explicit in the act of saying though it needs not be (especially in daily conversations). Arguably,
the main advantage of the F (p) formula is that it can capture quite simply the two main aspects
of the communicative structure discussed in this section, namely the shared psychology (F ) and
the use of ordinary language (through p).
11On the place of speech acts within philosophy of language and the sciences of language more generally see
Smith (1990), Recanati (2006), Bach (2006), Sadock (2006), and Green (2014). One specificity of that theory,
at least as conceived by two of its instigators – Austin (1975 [1955]) and Searle (1969) – is that it considers the
philosophy of language to be a subarea of the philosophy of action (which seems like an appropriate starting
point to integrate some philosophy of language for rational choice theory), itself a subarea of the philosophy
of mind for Searle (which seems even more appropriate regarding the rise of behavioral economics). Searle and
Vanderveken (1985) provide an axiomatic treatment of Searle’s theory of speech acts which uses (most of) the
same formal language used in economics. Speech act theory has been discussed in relation to economics regarding
the so-called ‘performativity’ of some economic statements by economists or economic institutions, i.e., when the
description of economic states of affairs creates a part of these very states of affairs and further ones (see, e.g.,
Mäki 2013 and the references therein). These issues are beyond the scope of the present dissertation.
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Two limits of the scope of this formula should be acknowledged. The first limit is that the
more contextual features one adds, the greater the number of speech acts that can be made
consistent with each other. Indeed, besides the speaker’s psychological states, the situation in
which the speech act is to be performed greatly influences the proposition that the speaker will
choose to express. For instance, in the above example, it is very likely that the representative
performs the first speech act if he is addressing some shareholders, but not if he is addressing a
consumer union, in which case he’ll probably go more for something confusing like the second
or third ones – or yet add various contextual features (some suggestive details are offered by
Kitch 1990 on the whole story behind Thaler’s credit card example). Beyond the words and the
propositions they express, what matters more is that they are expressed, how they are expressed
and who are expressing them to whom. Formal languages are notoriously at pain to capture
those features, which are nevertheless constitutive of the daily business of ordinary language.
Hence the formula F (p) is not saved from such difficulties, though most of them are explicitly
acknowledged and addressed by linguists (pragmaticians) and philosophers of language working
on speech act theory.
The second limit is that the communicative structure of choices depicted so far includes at
least two speakers: the one who presents the decision problem and the decision maker who makes
the choice. Economics (including Sen, Thaler, behavioral economics, rational choice theory and
consumer choice theory) is primarily concerned with the acts of choice of the decision maker.
Sen suggests that there is a logical similarity between the act of saying and the act of choosing.
Indeed, notice how the four examples above can easily be interpreted as four ways by which
a decision maker expresses his preferences with contradictory propositions though the overall
behavior, i.e., the economic choices or set of speech acts, is logically consistent. However, it
seems that to replace the study of the decision maker’s preferences by the study of his speech
acts in interactions with the speech acts of the one who posed the decision problem is too radical.
Tractability issues and/or ending up not doing economics anymore are looming large.
While the first issue is arguably inherent to any theory of action, I would like to sketch a way
of addressing the second one. The key distinction to draw, I suggest, is between the decision
maker who makes the choices and what will be called in the rest of this dissertation the decision
modeler who presents the decision problem to the former. The decision modeler can sometimes
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be identified with an economist or a decision theorist, as in lab experiments or questionnaire
surveys. But that is not necessarily the case, and most of the time the decision modeler is to
be identified, in the real world, by various social entities (firms, banks, administrations, the
media etc.), corresponding to what Thaler recently came to label “choice architects” (discussed
in section 1.4 below). That necessity of a decision modeler always involved in a decision problem
goes against the background assumption in decision theory of a decision maker facing the brute
force of a purposeless ‘Nature’, and it seems that the framework of game theory would be
much better suited to discuss those issues. That seems like a reasonable way to go when
the interactions between the decision modeler and the decision maker, i.e., the communicative
structure, is strategic. But notice that it is not necessarily the case in the examples presented
in the previous subsection. The axiomatic framework for decision theory constructed (with
Dino Borie) in the last chapter of this dissertation will be primarily motivated, in terms of
interpretation, by the distinction between a decision modeler and a decision maker. Until then,
that distinction will be discussed only informally. The idea is that decision makers’ preferences,
choice and utility can be discussed as usual in economics, but keeping in mind that his preferences
in a given problem are most of the time conditional on a given speech act from a decision modeler
(this could be formally represented as ‘% |F (p)’). This captures the following remark made by
Sen (1995, p.25):
“Observation is not a one-way process. Just as the decision theorist “reads” what
people choose, people also “read” what is being offered.”
There is a methodological reason for focusing an account of the communicative structure of
choices on the decision modeler: the kind of control we can hope to have concerning the ob-
servability of the data needed for potential modeling within this perspective. Notably, we have
a nearly total control over the speech acts performed by the decision modelers in experimen-
tal lab since he is the economist and that most of the instructions that are presented to the
decision makers are neatly recorded (usually for the purpose of experimental replication, see
Camerer 2015, pp.256-257). By contrast, although we can have a fairly high degree of control
over the decision maker’s speech acts (especially in the lab), it should be acknowledged that
not all economic choices in the classical sense of the term of, e.g., buying something, necessarily
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involves the performance of a speech act strictly speaking. Recall, for instance, Camerer’s daily
examples of “nodding, handing something to a cashier, [...] reaching into a wallet” (2008, p.47)
where the decision maker doesn’t speak even though he is involved in a transaction and thus
within a communicative structure.12
Summing up, we have proposed to characterize some theoretical implications of the commu-
nicative structure of choice presented in the previous subsection through the theory of speech
act. For these implications to be related to economics, we have, on the one hand, followed Sen’s
reflections on the distinction between acts of choice and statements about acts of choice, and,
on the other, characterized the communicative structure of choices with a ‘decision modeler’
whose role is very close to Thaler’s introduction of ‘choice architects’ in behavioral economics.
Conclusion
This section developed two related senses of the communicative structure of choices, a method-
ological one between the economist making theory and decision makers making choices and
an empirical one between a decision modeler posing decision problems and a decision maker
making choices in those problems. We have suggested that both senses are in line with Sen’s
and Thaler’s (with other behavioral economists’) works, which we have used to develop some
implications of the communicative structure of choices through the theory of speech acts. Fur-
thermore, it was emphasized that sharing both a common psychology and a common ordinary
language is a condition of possibility for the communicative structure of economic choices. The
role of Psychology in the communicative structure of choices was not discussed very much. This
will be addressed in the penultimate chapter on framing effects. Until then, the communicative
structure of choices will be developed throughout this dissertation as it will be used to shed some
new lights on the classical issues raised by behavioral economics. The next section discusses one
such issue about the notion of ‘given’ preferences in standard economics.
12However, these are still intentional actions. The logical structure of speech acts discussed above is derived
from the logical structure of Searle’s theory of intentionality, the formalization of which is accordingly very
similar: S(p) represents whole intentional states with S standing for various psychological modes. Hence the
same arguments presented here about Sen’s distinction between the (decision maker’s) acts of choices and
statements about such acts of choices carries over non-linguistic acts of choice. A detailed account of the decision
maker’s intentionality within that framework is however beyond the scope of this dissertation (I have presented
such an account elsewhere, see Jullien 2013).
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1.3 Convergence against ‘given’ preferences
The goal of this section is to compare the criticisms addressed by Sen and the behavioral eco-
nomics of Thaler to one of the deepest methodological convention or “methodological conviction”
(Mongin and d’Aspremont 1998, p.384) in standard economic analysis, namely that preferences
are given, i.e., they are fixed or exogenous variables in the explanation of economic situations
under analysis. I will suggest that Sen and behavioral economists have produced criticisms of
given preferences that are not mutually exclusive. These criticisms, although initially about
decisions under certainty (1.3.1), drift towards either one of three dimensions of economic be-
haviors beyond certainty and take this dimension to be a primary determinant of individual
preferences. It can be argued that we naturally drift towards a primacy of time preferences in
the work of Kahneman without Tversky (1.3.2) and towards a primacy of risk preferences in the
work of Tversky without Kahneman (1.3.3) – Thaler’s and other behavioral economists’ work
are directly or indirectly related to both drifts. Finally, we naturally drift towards a primacy of
social preferences in the work of Sen (1.3.4). Though the labels ‘primacy of social or time or risk
preferences’ are somewhat inadequate regarding the issues discussed in this chapter (for reasons
explained below) we shall keep using them because they provide a nice point of connection with
the next chapter (which focuses exclusively on these three dimensions).
1.3.1 Violations of invariance: procedure, description and context
Claims of behavioral economists against the methodological convention of given preferences
are usually made with respect to phenomena that violate three axioms of standard models
of individual behaviors: “procedure invariance”, (2) “description invariance” and (3) “context
invariance” (Camerer 1995, sections H-I and fn.55). Violations of these three axioms show how
preferences may not be inherent to decision makers but dependent on, respectively:
(1) how they are elicited, e.g., willingness to pay for a bottle of wine versus willingness
to accept money for (selling) a bottle of wine;
(2) how parts of the objects of choice are described, e.g., ‘cash discount’ versus ‘credit
card surcharge’;
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(3) how the choice set is structured, e.g., {nothing, an apple, another apple} versus
{nothing, an apple};
From a historical perspective, (1) and (2) were not explicit axioms of standard models, unlike
(3). Indeed, the latter corresponds to the consistency conditions imposed on choice functions
in the revealed preference tradition, e.g., expansion and contraction consistency – the targets
of Sen’s criticisms presented above. Starting around the mid-1980s (esp. since Tversky and
Kahneman 1986), observed violations of (1) and (2) had two main consequences. A theoretical
consequence was to point out the existence of such implicit axioms in standard models. A
methodological consequence was to ground Thaler’s (1980) early argument for the separation
of the normative and positive dimensions of models of individual behaviors. Indeed, behavioral
economists share the view of the psychologists who first demonstrated violations of (1) and (2),
namely that these two axioms are “normatively unassailable and descriptively incorrect, [hence]
it does not seem possible to construct a theory of choice that is both normatively acceptable
and descriptively adequate” (Tversky, Slovic and Kahneman 1990, p.215). It should be noted
that in Tversky’s landmark contributions to (3) with Itamar Simonson, some violations of it
are discussed as rational when relevant information can be rationally inferred from the very
structure of the choice set, quite like in Sen’s contributions to (3). But some other violations
are also discussed as not being normatively defensible. Again, this is put as an argument for
the claim that no model of economic behaviors can be both positive and normative at the same
time (see Simonson and Tversky 1992, p.284; Tversky and Simonson 1993, pp.1181-2; Shafir,
Simonson and Tversky 1993, pp.25-26; Tversky 1996, p.194).
Behavioral economics has triggered a fair amount of contributions on (1) and (3) in the
2000s. These contributions are done by behavioral economists themselves but also by standard
economists (see esp. Giraud 2012 regarding (1); Ok et al. 2015 regarding (3); and the references
therein). In the latter, quite like in Sen’s contributions to (3), preferences are not totally
given in so far as they depend on features that are external to the decision makers’ preferences
about the material consequences of choices. Unlike Sen’s contributions, however, these axiomatic
characterizations are either agnostic about the rationality or irrationality of the departures from
standard models they are formalizing (e.g., Giraud 2012) or emphasize that they are formalizing
departures from rationality (e.g., Ok et al. 2015). In that latter case, the statistical normality
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of certain behavioral patterns (i.e., the ‘facts’) don’t shake up the normativity (i.e., the ‘values’)
of the benchmark from which they depart. In short, the fact/value dichotomy prevails. The
same methodological remarks apply to (2), though there has been much less work done on this
axiom (chapter 4 and 5 of this dissertation are dedicated to it; indeed, as its name suggests,
“description invariance” is the key implicit axiom preventing standard models to account for
the uses of ordinary language in economic choices).
The following tension should be noted. On the one hand, reference-dependent preferences
are often used to explain violations of the three invariance axioms (c.f., the references cited in
this subsection). Whether or not loss aversion is involved in those explanations can be said to
separate the behavioral economists (when it is involved) from the standard economists (when
it isn’t involved). Recall that we said at the beginning of this subsection that violations of (1),
(2) and – though to a lesser extent – (3) were judged as signs of irrationality from behavioral
economists and from the psychologists who demonstrated these violations. On the other hand,
however, the notions of reference-dependence and loss aversion (which are used to explain those
violations) are not necessarily considered as irrational. This is the case at least regarding the
position of Tversky and Khaneman (1991) in their landmark formal contribution to reference-
dependence and loss aversion under certainty, where they asked quite straightforwardly:
“Is loss aversion irrational? This question raises a number of difficult normative
issues. Questioning the values that decision makers assign to outcomes requires
a criterion for the evaluation of preferences. [...] We conclude that there is no
general answer to the question about the normative status of loss aversion or of
other reference effects, but there is a principled way of examining the normative
status of these effects in particular cases.” (pp.1057-8)
In other words, the rationality or irrationality of loss aversion is highly situation-dependent.
The tension mentioned above may be resolved quite straightforwardly: reference-dependent
preferences and loss aversion are necessarily irrational at least when they lead to violations
of (1) and (2), while there is still some room for arguments when they lead to violations of
(3). However, it can be argued that the “criterion for the evaluation of preferences” or the
“principled way of examining the normative” Tversky and Kahneman are talking about can be
more nuanced than that. The next three subsections discuss three such nuances that are often
made in behavioral economics and are not restricted to loss aversion or reference-dependency,
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but applies to the broad issue of the normative dimension of models of individual behaviors.
Summing up, the factual observations of violations of procedure and description invariance
from psychologist gave rise, through behavioral economics, to new theoretical conventions in
economics, i.e., two new implicit axioms, and hence to new value judgments, i.e., violations of
these axioms is irrational. This is different from Sen’s work on context invariance and from some
remarks made by Tversky on this axiom. Because violations of these three axioms go against
the methodological convention of given preferences, it can be argued that Sen tends to argue
for the rationality of endogenous preferences while behavioral economists tend to argue for their
irrationality. The next subsections are meant to temperate this latter claim.
1.3.2 Kahneman on hedonic experience, or ‘the primacy of time
preferences’
The primacy of time preferences (over risk and social preferences) is implicit in the contributions
that Kahneman has made (with various co-authors) on “experienced utility” from the 1990s
onwards, and is usually associated with the revival of hedonic psychology (see esp. Kahneman
1994; Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin 1997; Kahneman and Sugden 2005; Kahneman and Thaler
2006). Experienced utility is indeed identified with the hedonic sensation of the consequence
of a choice, and its maximization is taken to be a criteria of rationality that is empirically
measurable. Using ‘the primacy of time preferences’ might be thought to be misleading here
because the underlying model assumes no time preferences in the usual technical sense (i.e.,
with a discount rate and/or measuring the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, cf. next
chapter). But I still want to use this expression to mark the fact that the concepts and notions
constitutive of the model of experienced utility are inherently temporal, at least regarding
decision makers’ mental processes about time though not necessarily about their behaviors over
time. Using Kahneman et al.’s (1997) terminology, the model of experienced utility consists in
the (axiomatically characterized) relations among four (empirically measurable) concepts:
(i) “predicted utility”: the beliefs about future hedonic experiences of “temporally ex-
tended outcomes”, i.e., of a sequence of consequences of a choice;
(ii) “instant utility”: the present hedonic experience of temporally extended outcomes
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(iii) “remembered utility”: the beliefs about past hedonic experiences of temporally ex-
tended outcomes
(iv) “total utility”: the aggregation of instant utilities
As Kahneman et al.’s put it, “[t]otal utility is a normative concept” in their model. They discuss
various experimental results showing that decision makers usually do not correctly anticipate or
remember the hedonic experience of the consequences of their choices (i.e., they hold incorrect
beliefs in (i) and (iii)). The hedonistic stance of the model implies that if instant utility is to be
inferred from (i) by, e.g., observed choices, or from (iii) by, e.g., statements in questionnaires,
then the biases in both should be corrected in (iv) the aggregation procedure. Or it implies that
non-traditional techniques should be used to measure (ii) instant utility directly (see Kahneman
and Sugden 2005, p.175 for a short discussion). In short, decision makers’ expressions of pref-
erences may not be taken directly as a ‘given’ in economic analysis, but they can be indirectly
taken as such by the economist whence the appropriate corrections are made or the appropriate
measurement techniques are used.
Notice that, within this framework, it is in principle possible to justify violations of procedure,
description or context invariance when the procedure of elicitation and/or the description of the
objects of choice and/or the context of choice impact the hedonic experience of a given choice.
For instance, if you cannot help feeling better when paying a consumption good by cash when
there is a ‘credit card surcharge’ by contrast with a ‘cash discount’ (e.g., because the former
brings you the nice sensation to ‘beat the system’), then a violation of description invariance
can be justified as rational from Kahneman’s experienced utility.13
Kahneman’s (1994) methodological discussion of experienced utility is one of the rare in-
stance where the work of Sen is discussed in (a contribution strongly related to) behavioral
economics. It is first discussed to make a distinction: that experienced utility is a “substantive
criteria of rational choice” akin to the ordinary language of “non-technical discourse”, not a
“logical criteria of rationality” as are conditions of internal consistency of choices in the formal
language underlying “technical discussions” (Kahneman 1994, p.18, my emphases). Kahneman
also discusses the work of Sen to highlight that while the latter emphasizes on the values ex-
13Further developments and empirical evidence about this reasoning are provided in chapter 4 and 5 of this
dissertation.
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pressed by decision makers and Kahneman on the inherent biases in these expressions, both
are explicitly claiming a non-universal domain of application, and agree on each other’ domain-
dependent claims. In other words, the reliability of the decision maker’s knowledge, or lack
thereof, of his own values and preferences is domain specific (see esp. Kahneman and Thaler
2006 on that point). Furthermore, Sen’s criticisms of hedonism (within his criticism of util-
itarianism) are discussed to acknowledge that not only the knowledge of values are domain
dependent, but also the values themselves, i.e., (instantaneous) hedonic experience is not taken
to be a universal normative criterion applicable to all domains. One domain where hedonic
experience is not a good criterion is where social and ethical values are involved, while other
domains where it is thought to be a good domain is daily consumption goods (see Kahneman
1994, p.21; Kahneman and Sugden 2005, p.176). Finally, it is worth noting that Thaler explicitly
endorses Kahneman’s position (see Kahneman and Thaler 2006).14
Summing up, focusing on decision makers’ relations to time allows the derivation of value
judgments from hedonism eventually rationalizing factual violations of the theoretical conven-
tions underlying that preferences are given. Though such reasoning can be justified within the
framework of experienced utility, its valid application is acknowledged to be non-universal.
1.3.3 Tversky on reflexive reasoning, or ‘the primacy of risk preferences’
The primacy of risk preferences (over time and social preferences) is implicit in some contri-
butions made by Tversky on expected utility theory (Slovic and Tversky 1974; Tversky 1975;
1996). These contributions are embedded within the controversies on the normative status of
the axiomatic structure of expected utility theory discussed in the next chapter. Quite generally,
Tversky argues that to settle such controversies, the arguments of theorists should be presented
to decision makers (who have or have not violated the axioms in experiments). And the ten-
dency of the latter to be convinced by one side or the other of the controversies should itself be
taken into account in the controversies. In other words, the inductive and deductive reasoning
14A comment by two behavioral economists on the contributions of Kahneman discussed in this subsection is
worth quoting:
“Some insightful economists such as Sen (1986) have for a long time harshly criticized the serious
limits of analyzing human behavior by revealed preference alone. However, this had little effect on
economics teaching and research as long as utility was thought to be unmeasurable.” (Frey and
Stutzer 2007, p.9)
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capacities of decision makers are called for to settle some issues within the reasoning process of
a scientific community. Again using the ‘primacy of risk preferences’ might be thought to be
misleading because this experimental methodology is not directly about the measurement of risk
preferences in the technical sense (i.e., the curvature of a utility function and/or of a weighting
function, cf. next chapter). But I still want to use this expression to mark the fact that this
methodology comes from and have been mainly used to study decision maker’s behaviors under
risk and uncertainty. It nicely makes salient how the two main formal languages used in the
search for certainty in science, i.e., probability theory and logic (viz. the axiomatic method)
are constitutive of the issues raised in the literature on risk preferences, by contrast with the
ones raised in the literature on social and times preferences. The contributions of Tversky under
discussion here can be seen as a way of improving economists’ and decision theorists’ uses of
those formal languages by studying their implications as seen by the economic agents.
The main point emphasized by Tversky throughout those contributions is that both the
positive and normative dimensions of economic (or even human) behaviors are empirical matters.
And the empirical inquiry into the normative dimension necessarily requires, on the one hand,
a careful translation of the formal issues into the ordinary language that is shared by the
economists and the economic agents, and, on the other hand, a careful reflexion from the decision
maker during his reasoning process. These conditions can rationally influence changes in the
initial (‘given’) preferences of the decision makers as well as in theorists’ attitudes regarding the
normative values of some axioms. In such situation, the final preferences expressed by a decision
maker can be considered as endogenous to the interaction between him and the economist. To
illustrate with the example from the previous subsection, imagine that a decision maker violates
description invariance by paying with cash when there is a ‘credit card surcharge’ but with his
credit card when there is a ‘cash discount’ (e.g., at different days or at different stores). Imagine
further that the decision maker was being followed by two decision theorists disagreeing on
the normative value of description invariance: one holds that the influence of descriptions on
behaviors is irrational by following the requirement of standard models while the other holds
that if descriptions influence experienced utility then this requirement should be relaxed. They
decide to resolve their controversy by presenting their arguments to the decision maker and let
the latter’s evaluation of these arguments settle the controversy. If, after careful reflections, the
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decision maker resolves the controversy in favor of experienced utility, then this warrants some
weakening of this axiom in standard models.15
The role of reasons in such process has been further investigated by Tversky and his co-
authors to show how “an analysis based on reasons may contribute to the standard quantitative
approach based on the maximization of value” (Shafir, Simonson and Tversky 1993, p.33). As
they point out, “[t]he reliance on reasons to explain experimental findings has been the hallmark
of social psychological analyses” (p.34, my emphasis), which played a very small role (if at all)
in the making of behavioral economics. Indeed, those contributions from Tversky are today
seen to be at odds from behavioral economics. Recently, Eric Angner and Loewenstein (2012,
p.667) compared the “incremental” approaches taken in most of behavioral economics’ models
who modify some behavioral assumptions of standard models (see next chapter) to the reason-
based contribution from Tversky and his co-authors. They claim the latter to be among the
“radical approaches [that] try to improve the predictive power and explanatory adequacy of
current theory by starting from scratch” (ibid, my emphasis). So the message from Tversky
and his co-authors that there are important complementarities to be developed between their
reason-based approach and the standard model does not seem to have come across. It will be
argued in the next section that much of Thaler’s work in normative economics share nontrivial
similarities with a reason-based approach.16
How does this fit within the comparison between Sen and behavioral economics? Reason-
based approaches are well in line with Sen’s overall approach to rationality as “reasoned scrutiny”
(2002, chap. 1, sect. 13). Roughly, Sen’s reasoned scrutiny aims at articulating the different
uses of rationality in economics, and argues that the role of reasons in the economists’ work
and the economic agents’ decisions is necessarily central in that task. Sen himself acknowledges
that his broad interpretation of rationality and the openness of the approach he preaches are
subject to a number of criticisms, to which he offers some replies. Notably, to the objection
that his approach provides no clear criteria regarding what counts as rational or not in a given
situation, Sen replies that “while there is scope for much work on the type of criteria that may
15This scenario is a very rough idealization of what happened to the independence axiom of expected utility
theory (cf. next chapter) and what may be happening to description invariance (cf. chapters 4-5).
16For recent developments of the reason-based approach, see Dietrich and List (2013; 2015) and Lecouteux
(2015).
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be used, [...] maximizing the domain of applicability, irrespective of the quality or cogency of
that application, is not necessarily a great virtue for a critical discipline” (2002, chap.1, p.49). It
can be argued that the experimental methodology underlying Tversky’s contributions discussed
above allows for a disciplined yet situation-dependent way of assessing criteria of rationality.
Furthermore the exchanges of reasons between economic theorists and economic agents that
takes place in these experiments is in line with the openness of Sen’s reasoned scrutiny.
Summing up, the primacy of risk preferences in the work of Tversky refers to the method-
ology used primarily in his experiments about risk preferences. The general idea is to let the
reflexive reasoning of decision makers be the arbiter of theoretical disagreements on the norma-
tive dimension of models of individual behaviors. It can be extended straightforwardly to any
dimension of economic behaviors where there is such theoretical disagreement and is well in line
with Sen’s approach to rationality as reasoned scrutiny. The next subsection provides further
characterization to Sen’s reasoned scrutiny.
1.3.4 Sen on reasoned scrutiny, or ‘the primacy of social preferences’
In this subsection, I wish to argue that there is a primacy of social preferences in Sen’s conception
of rationality as reasoned scrutiny. Indeed, it is not a coincidence if the first contribution
where Sen (2002, chap.1) characterizes what he means by reasoned scrutiny is also the first
contribution where he discusses behavioral economics at some length and that this discussion
focuses on accounts of social preferences within the latter (notably Thaler’s). It can be argued
that the very introduction of ‘reasoned scrutiny’ by Sen (2002, chap. 1, sect. 10) is meant to
articulate most of the conceptual apparatus he developed in earlier criticisms of standard models
of individual behaviors. More precisely, under this interpretation, reasoned scrutiny makes a
conceptual connection between, on the one hand, his threefold characterization of the notion
of self-interest, and, on the other hand, his distinction between sympathy and commitment.
This subsection explains this conceptual connection and discusses one of the rare instance of
experimental work inspired from Sen’s conceptual apparatus.
Besides the revealed preferences tradition imposing consistency conditions of rationality on
choice functions, other traditions (esp. the Chicago School) imposes as a requirement of ratio-
nality on behaviors that they can be interpreted as the maximization of the decision maker’s
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‘self-interest’. By contrast with the former tradition, controversies around self-interest have
been less concerned with technical issues within a formal language than with the interpreta-
tional issues arising from the use of ordinary language. Hence for the purpose of “distinguishing
between the distinct [interpretational] issues involved in the contemporary debates on the role
of self-interest in rationality” (2002, chap.1, p.33) Sen has characterized “three requirements”
usually “imposed in the traditional models” (ibid, p.34):
“Self-centered welfare: A person’s welfare depends only on her own consumption and
other features of the richness of her life (without any sympathy or antipathy towards
others, and without any procedural concern).
Self-welfare goal: A person’s only goal is to maximize her own welfare.
Self-goal choice: A person’s choices must be based entirely on the pursuit of her own
goals” (ibid, pp.33-4)
Sen argues that interpretations of self-interest through standard models of individual behaviors
typically take any of these three forms or any combination of them. On Sen’s account, these
three requirements usefully capture “three different aspects of the “self”” (ibid). However, none
of them and no possible combination of them can capture a fourth aspect of the self which, he
argues, is crucial to characterize human rationality, namely the capacity “to do self-scrutiny and
reasoning” (ibid). Roughly, reasoned scrutiny refers to the decision maker’s ability to critically
examines his own welfare or goal to eventually change them. In other words, it refers to a
conscious process of endogenous changes in preferences, during which they are therefore not
a ‘given’ for the decision makers. This is indeed the reasoning driving Sen’s explanations of
violations of context invariance (see Sen 2002, chaps.3-4).
With respect to this set of distinctions, Sen’s further distinction between sympathy and
commitment marks two “possible foundations for other-regarding behavior” (p.35), i.e., two ways
interpretations from the three requirements or their combinations may be criticized. Sympathy
is the uncontroversial part of Sen’s distinction: “one person’s welfare being affected by the
state of others” (2002, ibid); or, put in words appealing to a behavioral economist, “[w]hen a
person’s [...] well-being is psychologically dependent on someone else’s welfare” (1977b, p.327).
It necessarily violates the first requirement but not necessarily the two others. We shall see in
the next chapter that behavioral economics accounts of social preferences can be interpreted as
different models of sympathy but not of commitment. Indeed, the latter, which is “concerned
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with breaking the tight link between individual welfare (with or without sympathy) and the
choice of action” (2002, ibid), is the controversial part of Sen’s distinction. By contrast with
sympathy, commitment does not necessarily break any one of the these three requirements. But
it can, and its conceptual usefulness lies precisely in potential violations of self-welfare goal and
especially self-goal choice. The connection with reasoned scrutiny arises at this juncture, namely
in explaining violations of self-goal choice, which imply an action that is motivated by something
else than one’s own goals, i.e., by other people’s goals or by any other reasons not necessary
for the pursuit of others’ or one’s own goals, e.g., some “moral or social or political reasons”
(Sen 2002, p.36). Hence the central explanatory feature of reasoned scrutiny is its potential
production of such reasons to motivate choices.17
It is often argued that interpretational issues are looming large in Sen’s conceptual apparatus
(see Peter and Schmid 2007). In what sense can either someone else’s goal or the moral or
social or political reasons be any different from my own goals when they motivate my actions?
How can it be that I can fulfill goals without increasing my welfare? Besides philosophical
arguments, there have been no experimental investigations of Sen’s conceptual apparatus to
answer such questions. Partial answers can however be found in Allan Shiell and Bonnie Rush’s
(2003) empirical study in the health domain. Though it is not an experiment strictly speaking
(there is no control condition or even different conditions to be compared), the design of their
survey contains questions that are akin to the ones posed in lab experiments. There are two
steps. First, decision makers are asked their willingness to pay for two vaccination programs:
one program benefits only to the decision maker while the other program does not benefit the
decision maker but benefits other people among the poorest 10% of the population. Second,
structured interviews with these decision makers are conducted and recorded, from which they
then extract verbatims that allow to disentangle self-centered, sympathetic, and committed
reasons of decision makers. For instance, the three following verbatims illustrate each of these
types of reasons (pp.656-5):18
17The important link between the expressions of commitment through reasoned scrutiny in ordinary language
and the uses of partial ordering in Sen’s formalization of context-dependent preferences is worth mentioning but
will not be discussed in this dissertation (see Sen 2002, part I).
18To be more precise on their methodology, their interviews contain notably two types of closed questions:
“‘how difficult did you find the exercise?’ and ‘does your reported willingness to pay reflect the value that you
place on the vaccine?”’ (p.652). Shiell and Rush’s quantitative data consist in the willingness to pay, and in a
dichotomization of answers to the two previous questions into “‘some or no difficulty’ or ‘difficult or very difficult’
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Self-centeredness from a decision maker willing to pay $0 for the others:
“There is no direct benefit to me. I hate to sound cold, but if there is no
direct effect then there is no real value to me.”
Sympathy from a decision maker willing to pay $60 for the others:
“(I was) trying to assess whether the increase in costs to myself would
compare with the value that I would place on extra coverage for other
people.”
Commitment from a decision maker willing to pay $10 for the others:
“the benefits of the program are not worth anything to me because I
would not be receiving anything from the vaccination . . . . I would feel
comfortable paying $10 to have someone else have a vaccination (but) I
have nothing to gain from it. It doesn’t affect me in any way.”
Two points that are not often stressed (though they are not denied either) in the conceptual
discussions of commitment can be emphasized here. First, commitment does not imply irrational
degrees of generosity, as illustrated by the committed decision maker who gives less than the
sympathetic one. Second, the observability of committed behaviors necessitates a communicative
structure between the observer (e.g., the economist) and the decision maker that goes beyond the
elicitation of choices as traditionally conceived. That does not mean that commitment cannot
be observed in choice experiments, but that their observability necessitate the exploitation of
extra data from choice data. Or in Sen’s words: “empirical evidence for this cannot be sought in
the mere observation of actual choices, and must involve other sources of information, including
introspection and discussion” (1977b, p.342, my emphasis).
Summing up, by contrast with the primacy of time and risk preference in the work of Kahne-
man and Tversky (respectively) the primacy of social preferences in Sen’s rationality as reasoned
scrutiny is much closer to the technical meaning of social preferences in economics (outside of
the ‘aggregation’ meaning in social choice theory, however) as characterizing departures from
self-interest. Reasoned scrutiny however emphasize the endogenous process of preference revi-
sion through critical self-examination during which preferences are not taken as a ‘given’ by
and ‘yes’ or ‘no’ respectively” (p.653). Their qualitative data consist in the recording of the interviews, from
which they extract the verbatims; the ones presented here are extracted from answers to the second question,
i.e., ‘does your reported willingness to pay reflect the value that you place on the vaccine?’
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decision makers. It is through this process that Sen’s controversial ‘commitments’ emerges,
which we saw are observable though not directly as choice behaviors but through the uses of
ordinary language by the decision makers.
Conclusion
This section developed some points of convergence between the criticisms from Sen and from the
behavioral economics of Thaler to the methodological convention of taking preferences as ‘given’
in standard economic analysis. Violations of three theoretical conventions underlying standard
models – procedure, description and context invariance – are the main phenomena that the
psychologists who inspired behavioral economics have demonstrated to highlight the limits,
from a positive perspective, of this methodological convention. Both these psychologists and
behavioral economists usually derive value judgments from standard models to argue that the
factual behaviors are irrational and the theoretical conventions are rational. However, looking
for arguments that would go against this reasoning within the work of these psychologists, we
found some from hedonic experience in the work of Kahneman and from reflective reasoning
in the work of Tversky. We argued that none of them are incompatible with Sen’s normative
stance against the methodological convention of given preferences from reasoned scrutiny. On
this matter, there is more than an absence of incompatibility between Tverksy’s and Sen’s works;
some fruitful mutual developments could be made. Indeed, Tversky’s work can be seen as an
experimental implementation of Sen’s reasoned scrutiny where a communicative structure is
designed for the purpose of resolving theoretical controversies between decision theorists through
the reasoning of decision makers. However, for the fruitfulness of such mutual developments to
be maximal, data about the uses of ordinary language should be collected besides choice data,
in order to make the reasons behind choices empirically observable.
It was also mentioned that Thaler’s work in normative economics bears some resemblance to
the work of Tversky discussed here. The next section will develop this remark as it scrutinizes,
by contrast with this one, the strongest points of disagreements between Sen and behavioral
economics, namely about the articulation between positive and normative economics.
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1.4 Strong disagreements over the articulation of positive and
normative economics
The goal of this section is to conclude the comparison between Sen and the behavioral economics
of Thaler on the issue about which they disagree the most, namely the articulation between
positive and normative economics. We shall focus on how the entanglement thesis highlights
that the normative dimensions of models of economic behaviors is partly influenced by some
features of the articulation between positive and normative economics (1.4.1). Thaler’s position
is presented with an emphasis on its proximity with Tversky’s work from the previous section and
on the proximity between what he calls ‘choice architects’ and what we called ‘decision modeler’
(1.4.2). His position is then contrasted with Sen’s (1.4.2). Finally, the strong disagreements
are situated within a rough sketch of the current methodological reflections on the articulation
between positive and normative economics (1.4.4).19
1.4.1 The normativity of rationality that comes from normative economics
For starters, some clarifications regarding ‘normative economics’ and ‘welfare economics’ are
in order. As remarked by Mongin (2006a), the historical developments of different areas of
normative economics in the postwar era (notably social choice theory and public economics)
made it so that “[f]ew works with the title “welfare economics” were published beyond the
1960s” (fn.10 p.24). The expression ‘welfare economics’ is however not out of date because, as
Antoinette Baujard shows, it is broadly understood as “the economic study of the definition and
the measure of the social welfare; it offers the theoretical framework used in public economics
to help collective decision making, to design public policies, and to make social evaluations”
(forthcoming, first page). On that account, it is nearly synonymous with ‘normative economics’,
19This section is the only place in this dissertation where the positive/normative issue understood as the
characterization of subareas of economics into ‘normative economics’ and ‘positive economics’ will be scrutinized.
Since the problems and references discussed here are very partial, the interested reader can find the adequate
bibliography in Hands’ (2012b, sect.2) chapter to which one could add Brochier (1995) and Su and Colander
(2013). The latter reference is specifically concerned with the entanglement thesis and assesses a debate between
Putnam and Walsh versus Partha Dasgupta (2005; 2007; 2009). This debate will not be discussed here because
it would take us too far of the implications of the entanglement thesis for behavioral economics. However, a good
illustration of the heterogeneity of what counts as standard welfare economics among self-identified standard
economists can be drawn by comparing Dasgupta’s position with the positions in Caplin and Schotter’s (2008a).
As for the recent debates around normative economics triggered by behavioral economics, see Lecouteux (2015)
and the references therein.
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especially in so far as
“it is notoriously hard to say what exactly normative economics is about – welfare or
choice, value judgments or the study of value judgments, economic policy or armchair
evaluation. Economic methodologists or theorists have provided grand statements on
how normative economics should be separated from positive economics and applied
economics” (Mongin 2006a, pp.19-20)
One of the least controversial way of viewing the matter (which we shall endorse in this dis-
sertation) is this: “the task of normative economics is to investigate methods and criteria for
evaluating the relative desirability of economic states of affairs” (ibid, p.20).
The entanglement thesis can be seen as one of those “grand statements on how normative
economics should be separated from positive economics” (ibid), stating that it not be separated
but articulated differently. Sen opens the second chapter of On Ethics and Economics by a
criticism of the “one-way relationship by which endings of predictive economics [i.e., positive
economics] are allowed to influence welfare economic analysis, but welfare economic ideas are
not allowed to influence predictive economics” (Sen 1987, p.29). Hence “[w]elfare economics
has been something like an economic equivalent of the ‘black hole’ – things can get into it, but
nothing can escape from it” (ibid). Despite this “one-way relationship”, Walsh (1996) points
out an implicit methodological impact of normative economics on positive economics that shows
how any kind of separation thesis is untenable given the theoretical structure of economics. One
of the main inputs from positive economics into normative economics is general equilibrium
theory, to which the application of the normative criterion of Pareto-optimality yielded the two
fundamental theorems of welfare economics. One way of putting these two theorems in ordinary
and non-technical language is as follows. Given some assumptions about production and some
assumptions about consumption, i.e., about consumer’s preferences:
1st Theorem: every competitive general equilibria in an economy, i.e., every states of the econ-
omy where market interactions determine the prices at which all production is con-
sumed, will be Pareto-optimal, i.e., there are no other allocations of the production
to the consumers that will make all consumers better-off;
2nd Theorem: every such Pareto-optimal states of an economy can be attained through com-
petitive mechanism, i.e., by prices determined through market interactions instead
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of State decisions, if consumers’ initial budgets are distributed in certain ways.
Walsh (1996) argues at length that one retroactive methodological consequence of those results
from normative economics on positive economics is the strengthening of the normative dimen-
sions of models of economic behaviors used in consumer choice theory. This is so because the
axioms on which these models are constructed are the assumptions on consumer’s preferences
needed for the proofs of the theorems. Hence the formal properties of standard models of eco-
nomic behaviors are an especially nice form of rationality because of the role they play “at the
heart of elaborate proofs” of “equilibrium allocations, [which are] the rational dispositions of
goods resulting from the rational choices of every individual agent in such models” (Walsh 1996,
p.161). Therefore, a part of the normativity in standard models of economic behaviors comes
from the role they play at another theoretical level (i.e., general equilibrium theory), in making
possible that the economy reaches an optimal or efficient state. To put it crudely, one reason
why economic agents ought to behave according to the standard models of behaviors is that, if
they don’t, they and every other economic agents will not be better-off and the economy will
not be efficient.
Furthermore, the standard interpretation (i.e., not only the mere uses) of models of individ-
ual behaviors in those results further explains parts of the normativity of the methodological
convention of given preferences in positive economics. Indeed, if there are any meanings to
those two theorems being called ‘fundamental theorems of welfare economics’, the ‘better-off’
relation in their statements has to be interpreted in terms of the consumers’ welfare. A standard
theoretical move here consists simply in defining individual welfare as individual choice, pref-
erence or utility, with the standard conditions ensuring their equivalence, i.e. C(.) ⇔%⇔ U(.)
discussed in the first section. This theoretical move, though standard, is often strongly disputed
(see esp. Sen 1973, sect. VI; Mongin 2006a, sect. 8). Roughly, just as there are problems in
positive economics because, e.g., one can have plenty of reasons not to prefer what he chooses,
the problems in normative economics are that, e.g., one can have plenty of reasons to derive
some welfare from what he does not prefer, to choose to decrease his welfare, etc. (see Sen 1987,
chap.2; Hausman 2012, part. II). What matters for the present purpose, however, are less the
problems underlying that theoretical move than its justification by consumer sovereignty, maybe
the most widely shared value judgment among standard economists (see Juille 2015). As Blaug
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explains:
“the modern doctrine of Pareto optimality rests among other things, on the fun-
damental postulate of consumer sovereignty – only self-chosen preferences count as
yardsticks of welfare or, in popular parlance, an individual is the best judge of his
or her welfare – and it has long been argued that consumer sovereignty is a value
judgment par excellence, implying that Paretian welfare economics is fundamentally
normative. However, [some] have argued instead that the theorems of Paretian wel-
fare economics are theorems in positive economics; on this view, the assumption of
consumer sovereignty is not a value judgment but simply the assertion of the axiom
that individual preferences are to be taken as given for purposes of assessing a po-
tential Pareto improvement, without endorsing or approving of these preferences”
(1998, p.373)
If the discussion of given preferences in the previous section is correct, then the argument in the
last sentence of the quote is flawed. Working with given preferences does not only consists in
not endorsing or approving their contents, but also consists in taking them to be exogenous to
the economic situation under study. In other words, the potential Pareto improvement will just
satisfy preferences without changing them. For instance, if the government decreases the price
of candies, it should just satisfy my preference for candies over vegetables, not change it for the
reverse because, say, I automatically disprefer any consumption goods subject to state inter-
vention. In any case, what is at stake here are value judgments. The difference is that it is an
ethical value judgment (consumer sovereignty) in the normative economics interpretation – “an
individual is the best judge of his or her welfare” (ibid) –, and an epistemic or methodological
value judgment (given preferences) in the positive economics interpretation – ‘individual pref-
erences are exogenous variables in the study of an economic situation’. In both cases the result
is however the same: economists cannot or should not judge economic agents’ judgments, i.e.,
economists ought not to question the economic agent’s reasons for their choices. And that, it
can be argued, goes a long way towards explaining the reluctance of economists for reason-based
models of choices (at least up until recently) we observed in the previous section.20
20Cowen (1993, sect. 2) discusses more fully the problem posed in this paragraph with references to other
economists who stated it. I thank Tom Juille for this reference.
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1.4.2 Behavioral economics: disappearance of theoretical normative
economics?
In the previous section, we also observed that contemporary behavioral economists shared such
reluctance, contrary to the work of Tversky and Sen. I would now like to suggest that although
Thaler’s stance in normative economics is not incompatible with a reason-based approach, his
closeness with the standard approach on Pareto-optimality and consumer sovereignty may ex-
plain why reason-based approaches are unpopular in behavioral economics.
The book Nudge (Thaler and Sunstein 2008) has raised a host of debates around the new
form of paternalistic interventions in the economy that Thaler and Cass Sunstein defend under
an approach they label ‘libertarian paternalism’. One methodological point of their approach is
that they “do not always equate revealed preference with welfare” (Thaler and Sunstein 2003,
p.175), and economic agent’s welfare is not supposed to be determined by the economist but by
the economic agent’s own reflective reasoning. Thaler colorfully puts the point and the issues
around it as follows:
“a point that critics of our book seem incapable of getting: we have no interest in
telling people what to do. We want to help them achieve their own goals. Readers
who manage to reach the fifth page of Nudge find that we define our objective as
trying to “influence choices in a way that will make choosers better off, as judged by
themselves.” The italics are in the original but perhaps we should have also used bold
and a large font, given the number of times we have been accused of thinking that
we know what is best for everyone. Yes, it is true that we think that most people
would like to have a comfortable retirement, but we want to leave that choice up
for them. We just want to reduce what people would themselves call errors” (2015,
p.326)
But how does the economist know what the economic agent judges to be his own goals, if
his observable choices don’t reveal it? One usual answer is that observable conflicting choices,
e.g., buying cigarettes to smoke and buying drugs to stop smoking cigarettes, provide enough
information to infer that the economic agent’s own goal is to stop smoking. Another usual
answer is that the economic agent just expresses his goal straightforwardly, as in a famous
questionnaire study often referenced by behavioral economists where the majority of Americans
state that they don’t save as much money as they would like to (though they could). Notice
that in both cases, it is the psychology and ordinary language shared by the economist and the
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economic agent that allows the former’s inferences. More controversially, another usual answer
is that economic agent’s own goals are the ones corresponding to the choices they would made “if
they had complete information, unlimited cognitive abilities, and no lack of willpower” (Thaler
and Sunstein 2003, p.175). In most cases, however, behavioral economists limit themselves to
situations where the agents’ own goals seem “profoundly plausible and of great policy relevance”
(O’Donoghue and Rabin 2003, p.191). That is, they “skirt the metaquestion of what it means for
a person’s behavior to be in their “best interest” [...] [and] simply assume that if an individual
expresses a consistent desire to achieve a certain goal, such as losing weight, taking medications
or saving money, it is relatively unobjectionable to help them achieve that goal in a fashion that
does not restrict their ultimate freedom of choice” (Loewenstein et al. 2013, p.362).
Such an insistence on not restricting freedom of choice is widespread in the great majority
of behavioral economists’ contributions to normative economics. It is in fact necessary for
another requirement of their approach, namely that the interventions that increase the welfare
of those who made mistakes do not decrease the welfare of those who don’t. In other words, not
restricting freedom of choice ensures that the existence of conflicts among the goals of economic
agents, e.g., those whose own goals are to save more money and those whose own goals are to
save less money, will not decrease the welfare of those who are not targeted by the intervention
(see esp. Camerer et al. 2003). For instance a traditional policy intervention on some rate of
interests related to savings impacts (positively or negatively) the welfare of all economic agents
indiscriminately, while in behavioral economists’ proposals of different saving plans, economic
agents are still free to choose to save as much as they want after the intervention (e.g., by
refusing the plan). Such insistence on freedom of choice for the sake of improving the welfare of
some without decreasing the welfare of others is a clear (but not formally explicit) commitment
to the standard defense of the criterion of Pareto-optimality through (a slightly altered version
of) consumer sovereignty.
If behavioral economics is methodologically very close to standard normative economics on
that point, they are not close to it on the point that “paternalism is unavoidable: behavior is
shaped by people’s environments, and environments have to be structured in some way; there
is no neutral way to structure an environment” (Loewenstein et al. 2013, p.362, my emphasis).
As Thaler and his co-authors have recently put it:
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“everything matters. Tiny details, from the color of an alert lamp to the size of
the font can influence choices. [...] [S]ince everything matters, it is important for
those who design choice environments whom Thaler and Sunstein (2008) call “choice
architects,” to take human factors into account” (Benartzi et al. 2013, p.245)
Indeed, all the discussions in Nudge are centered around the notion of a choice architect, who,
according to Thaler and Sunstein should better know the empirical evidence about human
behaviors gathered by the behavioral sciences (including behavioral economics) for their choice
architecture activities to be successful (see also Thaler et al. 2013). That is what is meant in
the previous quote by taking the “human factors into account”. All the features of the role of a
choice architect in the activity of choice architecture discussed by Thaler are well in line with
the role of the decision modeler in the communicative structure of economic choices discussed
two sections ago. Especially worth noting is Thaler’s emphasis on how the important economic
choices invariably involve choice architects’ uses of ordinary language, e.g., describing options
and consequences in the drawing of a contract, be it for health care, employment, sales, etc..
That “[w]hen dealing with Humans, words matter” is carefully stressed by Thaler (2015, end of
chap.32). As he puts it while describing one of his policy making experience: “[a]ll we had to do
was fiddle with the wording of a letter that would be sent to taxpayer anyway [...], fine-tuning
the letters could potentially save millions of pounds” (chap.33; the whole chapter emphasizes
the importance of different impacts of same propositions expressed using ordinary language
differently).
One development from Thaler and Sunstein to our communicative structure of choices is their
discussions of architects are themselves making choices, whether unconsciously or not. That is,
the consequences of their actions are a certain presentation of a choice set to a decision maker,
while other presentations would have been possible. That matters because even if a certain
presentation is chosen for no specific reason, decision makers will tend to infer (incorrectly)
such a reason. For instance, when one option is put as a default and decision makers infer
(correctly or incorrectly) that the fact that this option rather than another is the default is an
implicit endorsement of this option by the choice architect (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, p.35).
That is another way of saying that “there is no such thing as a “neutral” design” (p.3), or in the
terms used two sections ago, that decision makers are not facing the brute force of a purposeless
Nature. One tension in their account should however be noted. If decision makers are necessarily
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influenced by choice architects, then decision makers need to be aware of this influence when
they are expressing what makes them better off ‘as judged by themselves’. This seems to require
the exercise of reasoned scrutiny as discussed in the previous section, which itself requires the
expressions of the reasons that motivate what decision makers would like to do. Following
the arguments from the previous section, without a way of expressing those reasons through
ordinary language, the observing behavioral economists might miss some commitments that are
important for decision makers. The lack of popularity of reason-based models in behavioral
economics seems problematic regarding these issues.
Another development from Thaler’s choice architects may be his emphasis on how knowl-
edge from the social and behavioral sciences can impact the choice architect’s or the decision
modeler’s activities. By contrast, one difference between both account may be that Thaler’s
choice architect is never identified with an economist doing positive economics, e.g., conduct-
ing a lab experiment. However, recall that one of the main purpose of making the distinction
between decision modeler and decision maker was to account for such existing communicative
interactions between economists and economic agents. If this is indeed the difference between
Thaler’s choice architect and our decision modeler, then the latter is a bit more general than the
former, i.e., by including the possibility of identification with the activity of economists doing
positive economics.
To conclude, it should be noted that contrary to existing theoretical contributions of behav-
ioral economists on models of individual behaviors, much of their contributions to normative
economics are not strictly speaking theoretical. That is at least the case for Thaler’s contribu-
tions, which are rather straightforward policy proposals based on behavioral evidence (from the
lab or from the field), that are aiming to change some targeted individual behaviors. Neither the-
oretical models of individual behaviors explaining the behavioral evidence through Psychology,
nor (and even less) potential formalized frameworks of normative economics play a crucial role in
the justification of the proposals. What plays a crucial role are the existing behavioral evidence,
not only about individuals behaving in certain ways to be changed, but (and especially) about
the effectiveness of the proposed policy to change those behaviors in the advocated way. That is
all explicitly part of the so-called (behavioral) ‘evidence-based policy’ movement (Shafir 2013;
Thaler 2015, part. VIII; for a reflexive perspective see Favereau 2014, pp.96-106, 268-305). On
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this account, normative economics is just an application of the empirical findings of positive
economics. The economist has nothing specifically important to say about the values at play
either in the policy proposal at stake or in the underlying behaviors of the economic agents.
More than a clear separation between normative economics and positive economics, if normative
economics is supposed to have something of scientific interests to say about such values, then it
seems that normative economics has disappeared.
1.4.3 Sen: the disappearance of a separate normative economics
On this latter point, the contrast with Sen’s articulation of positive economics and normative
economics, at the heart of the entanglement thesis, is radical. As remarked by Mongin (2006a,
sect.8), Sen is one of the main author marking a rupture between past normative economics
and contemporary normative economics, a rupture characterized mainly by a dialogue with
ethics, moral and political philosophy (maybe the evidence policy movement, not discussed by
Mongin, is an even newer rupture with no such dialogue). One methodological specificity of
Sen’s position in that rupture is to make such dialogue not only useful for normative economics,
but for positive economics as well; and also for ethics, moral and political philosophy themselves
for that matter (see Sen 1987). Just as these interdisciplinary exchanges provides insights about
the plurality of motives underlying individual choices (relevant for accurately characterizing
them in positive economics, as we saw above), they also provides potential alternative criteria
to Pareto-optimality for the evaluation of economic states of affairs. It is not so much Pareto-
optimality by itself that Sen criticizes throughout his work in normative economics, but mainly
the lack of pluralism of standard economists who do not seriously consider other alternative
criteria better suited in some situations (based on rights, or equity, or fairness, among other
well-discussed criteria in ethics, moral and political philosophy).
Contrary to behavioral economics’ contributions to normative economics, most of Sen’s are
theoretical in the sense of providing an articulated framework of concepts and measurement
procedures where the explicit role of (the economists’ and the economic agents’) value judgments
looms large. The ‘capability approach’ is the label of the framework for normative economics in
which Sen articulates the pluralism mentioned above. That approach offers a “freedom-based”
middle ground between the two main approaches used to evaluate economic states of affairs (Sen
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2009, p.231). On the one hand, there is the “utility-based” approach from welfare economics,
often taken to be ‘subjective’ (ibid). On the other hand, there is the “resource-based” approach
based on income, wealth, GDP and the like, often taken to be ‘objective’ (ibid). One salient
characteristic of the capability approach is to evaluate the quality of life inherent to an economic
situation by putting some weights on, say, education, without reducing it to the utility economic
agents eventually derive from education, or to the economic consequences of education in terms
of growth for instance. That implies enriching the informational basis of normative economics
so as to include the content of the agents’ preferences and the reasons they may have to value
some objects of choice intrinsically, but not necessarily instrumentally, as in terms of utility
from the agent’s perspective or in terms of GDP from the economist’s perspective.21
Sophie Pellé remarks that “by proposing to evaluate welfare in terms of individual ‘capa-
bility’, the position defended by Sen distances itself from consumer sovereignty in so far as it
conceives welfare in terms of elements that should be satisfied, whatever individuals are think-
ing” (2009, p.151, my translation). The elements that should be satisfied are not predetermined
in Sen’s framework, they must emerge through – or as Sen often puts it, they must ‘survive’ –
the economic agent’s reasoned scrutiny, as well as some collective (maybe public, and possibly
political) process of reasoned scrutiny – especially in the assessment of economic states of affairs
(instead of individual decision making). Although Sen is much more critical than behavioral
economists on the centrality of Pareto-optimality, his position on consumer sovereignty is not
so different than theirs. Both so to speak ‘weaken’ consumer sovereignty based on mere choice
towards consumer sovereignty based on a form of reflexive reasoning from the consumer (what-
ever they are thinking, they ought to undertake such reflexive reasoning). As Sen puts it, “the
idea of freedom also respects our being free to determine what we want, what we value and
ultimately what we decide to choose.” (2009, p.232). Where Sen’s weakening is stronger is in
the inclusion of a collective process in the justification of the uses of consumer sovereignty as a
criteria for the evaluation of economic states of affairs (ibid, pp.241-247). That means at least
the economic agent’s exercise of “comparative judgments” (p.243), the confrontation of his own
21This is a very partial account of Sen’s capability approach. Besides Sen’s own work (the references of which
are to be found in the following ones), lengthier accounts that are in line with the entanglement thesis have been
offered by Pellé (2009), Gilardone (2010), Nuno Martins (2013) and Davis (2011, chap.10) among others and
besides the papers in Walsh and Putnam’s (2011) volume.
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reasons with other people’s reasons, for his reasoning process to qualify as reasoned scrutiny.
Notice that it is perfectly possible in such reasoning process that the economic agent confronts
his reason to the economists’, and whether the latter is the decision modeler (or choice architect)
in such process becomes arguably an important issue.
As Putnam and Walsh put it while commenting on Sen’s methodological position about the
articulation between positive and normative economics, “the logical entailments of entangle-
ment render the concept of a separate ‘welfare’ economics meaningless” (2009, p.291). Indeed,
methodologically speaking, in scrutinizing the “triple entanglement: of fact, convention and
value” (Sen 2005, p.112), the activity of describing economic states of affairs and of evaluating
them can still be relevantly distinguish, but not relevantly separated in the sense of making
them independent. Some descriptions are more accurate when made through an enriched eval-
uative framework that includes considerations of social justice, e.g., a woman paid less than a
man for the same job is more accurately described as ‘suffering from gender inequality’ than as
‘revealing a preference for a smaller wage’. Conversly (but more trivially), some evaluations are
more accurate when made through an enriched description of the economic state of affair to be
evaluated, e.g., an evaluation of the previous example is more accurate with some descriptive
accounts of woman-man productivity differentials and of woman’s bargaining power in wage ne-
gotiation. That might seem disturbingly obvious at first sight. But if such claim is worth stating
and even defending at all, as Putnam, Sen and Walsh have done, it is because it goes against
the dominant positions in the current methodological reflections on the articulation between
normative economics and positive economics.
1.4.4 A picture of the contemporary methodological reflections
Mongin (2006c) provides a thorough systematization of the different positions taken by various
economists at various times on the articulation between positive and normative economics. He
characterizes these positions by three mutually exclusive thesis that they may hold, to which he
adds a fourth one he defends. However, Mongin discusses neither the debates around behavioral
economics nor the entanglement thesis. Hence, to conclude this section, I would like to enrich the
picture he offers by, on the one hand, situating in it the debates around behavioral economics,
and, on the other hand, adding a fifth thesis corresponding to the entanglement thesis. It may
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The neutrality thesis The non-neutrality thesis
Strong version Weak version Weak version Strong version
Economists... ... should never
make value
judgments
... can make a
clear set of value
judgments
separable from
factual and
analytical
judgments
... can make value
judgments,
but some are not
separable from
factual
judgments
... cannot avoid
making value
judgments
Normative
economics... ... is not
scientifically
legitimate,
only positive
economics is
... is scientifically
legitimate,
but separated
from positive
economics
... is scientifically
legitimate,
but not
separated from
positive
economics
... is scientifically
legitimate,
the pretension to
do purely positive
economics is not
Current
situation
Gul and
Pesendorfer (2008)
Behavioral
economists;
Foundations
(2008)
Mongin (2006c)
Moderate version
The entanglement thesis:
some value judgments are
indistinguishable from facutal and
analytical judgments
Table 1.1: Contemporary positions on the articulation of positive and normative economics
be more convenient to first have an overall illustration of this enrichment as provided in Table
1.1, and then discuss the meaning of its content.
On Mongin’s account, both versions of the neutrality theses have been discussed and disputed
within standard economics, while the strong version of the non-neutrality thesis has come from
heterodox economics and other social sciences outside of economics, where it also applies.
Mongin’s clarification holds pretty well for the contemporary literature around behavioral
economics on the matter, at least as posed in the Foundations of Positive and Normative Eco-
nomics (Caplin and Schotter 2008a). On the one hand, Gul and Pesendorfer’s (2008) defense of
standard economics is based on the strong version of the neutrality thesis. More precisely, one of
Mongin’s remark (2006c, p.259) characterizes particularly well Gul and Pesendorfer’s position:
defendants of the strong neutrality thesis either see welfare economics as not being economics
but ethics (this is how Gul and Pesendorfer see welfare economics when it formulates policy
recommendations) or as positive economics because its formalization through mathematics and
logic makes it value-free (this is how they see the relevance of welfare economics, i.e., as raising
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questions for positive economics).22
On the other hand, behavioral economists (Köszegi and Rabin 2008b; Loewenstein and
Hainsley 2008) and standard economists strongly sympathetic to behavioral economics – or
‘formerly-standard-but-recently-turned-behavioral economists’ – (Bernheim and Rangel 2008)
defend variants of the weak version of the neutrality thesis. They also follow the traditional
strategy associated to it by Mongin, namely to argue that judging economic states of affairs
in terms of Pareto-optimality for the sake of making evaluation, recommendation or prescrip-
tion is scientifically legitimate. One small difference is that Pareto-optimality is weakened in
the discussion around behavioral economics as explained above, or that some other criteria are
so weakened. Especially relevant for the characterization of the current situation is Bernheim
and Rangel’s (2008; 2009) weakening, which does take the form of a theoretical and formal-
ized framework to conduct welfare analysis, unlike behavioral economists’ work in normative
economics as explained above.
Nothing quite like Mongin’s (2006c) own weak non-neutrality thesis occurs in the Founda-
tions. That is not so surprising because the thesis Mongin defends is philosophically sophis-
ticated in bringing altogether arguments from the philosophy of economics, ethics and moral
philosophy, along with the philosophy of language, which might seem at first sight too exotic
to be discussed in such volume. Parts of Mongin’s (2006c) arguments (regarding thick predi-
cates, see the general introduction of this dissertation) are the same ones that are at the core
of the entanglement thesis, notably regarding the impossibility of an absolute dichotomy (i.e.,
the non-necessary independence) between judgments of values and judgments of facts. That is
the core of Mongin’s thesis (as mentioned in the table above). Recall from the general introduc-
tion of this dissertation that the entanglement thesis borrows further arguments from yet other
areas of philosophy – of science , of mathematics and of logic – arguing for the impossibility
of an absolute dichotomy, in science, between judgments of facts and judgments of analyticity
22Caplin and Schotter’s (2008b, p.xvi) summary of Gul and Pesendorfer’s captures this nicely:
“[According to Gul and Pesendorfer,] [t]he traditional normative economic question concerning
how to design policies to forward some definition of the good inappropriately treats economics as
social therapy. The only significant role of normative economics should be to highlight interesting
questions for positive economics, such as how best to model the forces accounting for apparent
failures of Pareto optimality. Given that normative economics is designed only to suggest new
approaches to positive economics, it too must be centered around theories of choice.”
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(e.g., the conventions of mathematics and logic). By taking into account arguments against
this other dichotomy, it can be argued that the entanglement thesis is stronger than Mongin’s
weak non-neutrality thesis, yet weaker than the strong non-neutrality thesis: it is a moderate
non-neutrality thesis. I do not suggest that Mongin is necessarily in disagreement with the en-
tanglement thesis. Indeed, though he does not put them together with his arguments against the
fact/value dichotomy (2006c), Mongin (2006b) has also advanced a set of arguments against the
fact/convention dichotomy in economics (by bringing together arguments from the philosophy
of language, of science and of economics, but not of mathematics and of logic). By contrast, as
said in the general introduction the specificity of the entanglement thesis is to bring together
arguments from various areas of philosophy against both the fact/value and fact/convention
dichotomies to reshape the usual way of characterizing ‘facts’ by making explicit their interde-
pendence, in science, with values and conventions.
Conclusion
This section is the only place in this dissertation where the positive/normative issue at the
level of the articulation of positive and normative economics is discussed at some length. This
discussion was necessary to fully understand the positive/normative issue at the level of models
of individual behaviors on which the rest of the dissertation focuses. This is so because part of
the normativity in the latter level comes from the former level. It was also necessary to fully
appreciate a comparison between Sen and the behavioral economics of Thaler, since it is on the
former level that one finds their strongest disagreements. The underlying methodological issues
of these disagreements crystallize in the gap we found between behavioral economists’ position
and the entanglement thesis within the picture of the contemporary reflections on the matter.
Despite our adherence to the entanglement thesis, it should be noted that Thaler’s ‘choice
architects’ in his contributions to normative economics allowed us to give further grounds to our
decision modeler in the communicative structure of choices.
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Conclusion and transition: catching the drifts towards the three
dimensions
We have seen that Sen and Thaler (along with other behavioral economists) criticize the same
standard models of individual behaviors in consumer choice theory and rational choice theory,
with the same interpretation of the positive/normative issue within those models. Part of their
methodology is similar, e.g., the uses of intuitive example, introspection and, most importantly,
a nontrivial and explicitly stated uses of discussions with decision makers, i.e., what we called
the methodological communicative structure of choices. We pointed the non-triviality of the
latter by examining its empirical counterpart and some developments through the theory of
speech acts. The key distinction was between, on the one hand, a decision modeler who poses a
decision problem to, on the other hand, the decision makers traditionally studied in economics.
The decision modeler is, on our account, very similar to Thaler’s choice architects (i.e., can be
identified with a firm, a policy maker etc.), albeit slightly more general as one motivation un-
derlying its development was to capture interactions between economic agents and economists
doing positive economics. We also saw how Sen and the psychologists who inspired the behav-
ioral economics of Thaler, i.e., Kahneman and Tversky, proposed a set of non-mutually exclusive
normative criteria to evaluate the content of preferences and how this relates to all these authors’
criticisms of the methodological convention that preferences are exogenously ‘given’ in standard
economic analysis.
However, despite these possible mutual developments Sen and the behavioral economics of
Thaler share non-trivial disagreements. The basic one underlies their different methodological
position regarding how the positive/normative issue in models of individual behaviors should be
dealt with. Roughly, behavioral economics wishes to keep the standard model for its normative
dimension but to strip it down of its positive dimension. Behavioral economists’ models of
individual behaviors inspired from, or directly using, Psychology, propose to take the lead on
that latter dimension. On the other hand, Sen wishes to re-articulate the positive and normative
dimensions within models of individual behaviors instead of separating these dimensions. The
entanglement thesis plays a crucial epistemological justification here since Sen’s methodology
implies some violations of the fact/value dichotomy. Finally, we have shown that the implications
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of these different methodological positions are at their strongest on the issue of the articulation
between positive and normative economics.
Though the focus was on standard models of individual behaviors under certainty, at several
points the discussion drifted towards three other dimensions of individual behaviors. This was
notably the case while discussing arguments against the exogeneity of ‘given’ preferences. There,
we saw that the information about the contents of preferences that could give some normative
justification to their endogeneity were located in the relation of the decision makers to the
dimensions of (1) other people, (2) time, (3) uncertainty. The work of Sen strongly emphasized
(1) to the point of seeming to be primary over (2) and (3), and roughly the same can be said
about Kahneman for (2) and Tversky for (3). Clearly, the rather informal and brief nature of
these drifts of the discussion towards these three dimensions calls for more careful scrutiny. This
is what I propose to do in the next chapter.
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Chapter 2
Under uncertainty, over time and
regarding other people: rationality in
3D
“[A] rich toolbox for “neoclassical
repair,” [...] may be a curse (a
Pandora’s box) rather than a
blessing [...]. Some guidance on
how risk attitudes, time
preferences, and other-regarding
concerns are interrelated
becomes, therefore, necessary
when we want to make sound
behavioral predictions. [...]
Except for a few attempts,
economic theory offers no idea of
whether risk aversion goes hand
in hand with patience and
other-regarding concerns.” (Güth
et al. 2008, p.261 fn1 omitted)
Behavioral economics is often presented as having demonstrated inconsistencies of individual
behaviors (see, e.g., Camerer and Loewenstein 2004). Besides the contributions under certainty
discussed in the previous chapter, if one asks ‘but inconsistency with respect to what exactly?’,
answers are likely to be at least threefold, e.g., “risk attitudes, time preferences, and other-
regarding concerns” in the words of Werner Güth and his co-authors. Depending on the tar-
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geted audience, these are expressed differently. Using much broader terms to reach an audience
outside of economics, Thaler and his co-authors have stressed “Three Bounds of Human Na-
ture” (Mullainathan and Thaler 2001, p.1095), namely that “people exhibit bounded rationality,
bounded self-interest, and bounded willpower” (Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler 1998, p.1471). By
contrast, addressing economists explicitly, Stefano DellaVigna announces the first section of his
influential survey of behavioral economics using the language of preferences : “[t]he first class
of deviations from the standard model [...] is nonstandard preferences [...] on three dimensions:
time preferences, risk preferences, and social preferences” (2009, p.316). In short, behavioral
economics has mainly challenged standard models of individual behaviors under uncertainty,
over time and regarding other people.
This chapter has four related goals – the first three are derived from the general perspective
of this dissertation and the last one is more specific to this chapter. The first goal, pertaining to
the positive/normative issue, is to make explicit the entanglement of facts, values and theoretical
conventions constitutive of the main challenges posed by behavioral economics to the standard
accounts of behaviors under uncertainty, over time and regarding other people. This will be
done in roughly the same fashion as in the previous chapter, i.e., by scrutinizing empirical
and theoretical contributions through the entanglement thesis (though with a less systematic
comparison to Sen’s work here). The second goal, pertaining to the issue of interdisciplinarity,
is to study the relations between economics and p-&-Psychology underlying these challenges.
The third goal, pertaining to the role of language in economic rationality, is to make explicit
the communicative structure of economic choices that underlies these challenges. To do so, I
will draw on Table 2.1 taken from linguist-semiotician François Rastier, which organizes some
similarities of ordinary language uses across the three dimensions by three zones within them.1
Rastier capitalizes the words in the table because they represent specific types of informa-
tion that can be instantiated in communication through a variety of other words, e.g., ‘Sure’,
‘Likely’, ‘Immediately’, ‘Later’, ‘Me’, ‘Us’, ‘Dear reader’, etc. Throughout this chapter,
we shall stick to Rastier’s typographical convention of capitalizing the information about the
1This is a modified version of Rastier’s (1996, fig. 14.2; see also 2008, p.213; 2012, fn41 p.23). There are two
main modifications. First, what Rastier calls “Mode” what is here called ‘(Un)certainty’, and with less difference
in translation, “Personnes” what is here called ‘People’. Second, a fourth dimension in his table, ‘Space’ (with
Here, There and Over there/Elsewhere as its three zones), is not a relevant dimension of individual behavior
in this chapter, and has thus been omitted
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Identity Zone Proximal Zone Distal Zone
(Un)certainty Certain Probable Possible, Unreal
Time Now Once, Soon Past, Future
People I, We You He, It
Table 2.1: Similarities of language uses across the three dimensions
three dimensions, especially to make such information explicit when they are implicit. This will
be done to illustrate the following claim: one condition of possibility for the challenges posed
by behavioral economics on the three dimensions is that a decision modeler can use ordinary
language to mark the distinctions of this table, so as to communicate them to the decision
maker. In other words, marking the distinctions within and across Rastier’s table is a condition
of possibility for most if not all of the issues discussed in this chapter to be intelligible in the
first place. Showing this throughout this chapter is the main way by which the role of language
in economic rationality will be tackled. Finally, the last (and more specific) goal of this chap-
ter is to provide systematic discussions of the three dimensions altogether – to see, as it were,
rationality in 3D.2
By systematically seeing rationality in 3D, the intended contribution of this chapter is to
provide a better understanding of the issues underlying the contemporary behavioral versus
standard economics debates. The evolution of the literature around behavioral economics on
the three dimensions followed a pattern that can be nicely interpreted through Rastier’s table.
Prior to the mid-2000s, interactions between zones of a given dimension were studied, e.g.,
between the identity and distal zones within the dimension of uncertainty in pairs of decision
problems such as (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, p.266):
€3000 For sure versus 80% chance of getting €4000
25% chance of getting €3000 versus 20% chance of getting €4000.
The research agenda focused on how such interactions create anomalies for standard models
of risk, time and social preferences, respectively, and on developing alternative ‘behavioral’
models to offer parsimonious accounts of these dimension-dependent anomalies. From the mid-
2Chen (2013) provides a comparative study of saving behaviors across countries that have different language in
the sense that different zones in the dimension of time are or are not linguistically marked by verb conjugation. He
finds that around 30% of the differences between saving behaviors are statistically explainable by these linguistic
differences.
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2000s onwards, interactions across dimensions started to be studied, e.g., between the identity
and distal zones across the dimensions of uncertainty and time in pairs of decision problems
such as (Baucells and Heukamp 2010, p.151):
€9 For sure In three months versus 80% Chance of getting €12 In three months
10% Chance of getting €10 In three months versus 8% Chance of getting €12 In three
months
As the epigraph from Güth et al. (2008) suggests, the topic of interactions across dimensions
has been understudied in economic theory. Even the contributions on the interactions across
dimensions are quite disconnected from one another. That is, each of these contributions focuses
on one of the three pairs (time-risk or risk-other people or other people-time) and usually in one
direction (e.g., risk introduced in intertemporal problems or time introduced in problems under
uncertainty or risk introduced in interpersonal problem etc.). Not only the three dimensions
are never tackled altogether, but different pairs of cross-interactions are never contrasted with
one another. It can be argued that the widespread urge to isolate the three dimensions from
one another turns this tripartition into a trichotomy, which is as theoretically counterproductive
as taking the fact/value distinction as a dichotomy was argued to be methodologically counter-
productive in the previous chapter. Trying to systematically see rationality in 3D is intended
to counterbalance this widespread urge for isolation.
More precisely, the intended contributions with respect to the contemporary behavioral
versus standard economics debates are the following. As we shall see, while interactions within
dimensions created anomalies for standard models but were in line with behavioral models3,
some introductions of extra dimensions created anomalies for behavioral models but were in
line with standard models4. Seeing rationality in 3D points a non-trivial need for convergence
between standard and behavioral economics’ models if all the anomalies are to be parsimoniously
captured theoretically. Furthermore, a convergence is more likely to occur with the three types
of preference taken as theoretical targets, rather than other Psychological constructs such as
‘emotion’, ‘attention’ or ‘motivation’. This is so because risk, time and social preferences have a
3e.g., [€3000 For sure  80% chance of getting €4000]&[25% chance of getting €3000 ≺ 20% chance of
getting €4000]
4e.g., [€9 For sure In three months ≺ 80% chance of getting €12 In three months]&[10% chance of
getting €10 In three months ≺ 8% chance of getting €12 In three months]
80
long history in, and are central to, standard economics in a way other Psychological constructs
are not (which does not imply that the latter cannot play any role in economic theory).
There are two limits of this chapter that are worth noting before the conclusion. The first
limit is that this chapter focuses much more on what could be called the qualitative challenges
from behavioral economics than on the quantitative ones. By qualitative challenge I mean
inconsistent behaviors that violate some axioms underlying the standard models, making it
impossible to represent those behaviors by one utility function. Quantitative challenges, on
the other hand, are behaviors that can be captured by one such function, but at the price of
implying absurd numerical values and degrees of curvature (interpreted as measures of risk,
time and/or social preferences in different situations, see Broome 1991). I focus mainly on the
qualitative issues because it can be argued they furnish the conditions of possibility for the
quantitative ones. Of course both are related and play a role in the standard versus behavioral
economics debates. I will only discuss the quantitative ones that arguably play a non-trivial role
in the debates on which this dissertation focuses, and briefly so, i.e., without fully characterizing
their relations with the qualitative ones. The second limit is that the traditional distinction in
economics between probabilistic ‘risk’ (the proximal zone of uncertainty in the table) and non-
probabilistic ‘uncertainty’ (its distal zone in the table) will not be terminologically respected in
this chapter, as the latter will not be treated so that both terms will be used synonymously to
refer to the former. Thus the distal zone in the dimension of uncertainty will not be discussed,
i.e., decision making regarding what Possibly happens (though not probabilistically so, see the
literature on ambiguity, e.g., Wakker 2010), or what may be thought of as Unreal (see the
literature on ignorance and unawareness, e.g., Zeckhauser 2014 provides some references and
claims that this is where the future of the economics of uncertainty lies to understand the real
world).
Finally, one precision needs to be made. Though the three dimensions are always discussed
altogether in all the subsections, the latter are systematically structured by first discussing risk
preferences, then time preferences, and finally social preferences. This is done for two main rea-
sons, reflecting two related senses of what could be called a primacy of risk over time over social
preferences. Firstly, risk preferences have been central in the making of behavioral economics,
especially regarding its treatment of the normative/positive distinction in models of individual
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behaviors (see Heukelom 2014). Even if this is now also the case for time preferences, historically,
discussions of risk preferences influenced discussions of time preferences more than the reverse
in the making of behavioral economics. And discussions of social preferences have always been
less connected to either one of the two others than the two others have been connected between
themselves. Secondly, in standard economics (and outside of decision theory) risk preferences
seem to be far more used and taken to be far less problematic than time preferences (see, e.g.,
Gollier 2001), while social preferences seem to be always controversial (see, e.g., Mongin and
d’Aspremont 1998; or Binmore and Shaked 2010a;b versus Fehr and Schmidt 2010 and Eckel and
Gintis 2010). We shall see that this implicit primacy of risk over time over social preferences is
also reflected in the pairs of dimensions that have attracted the most attention in contributions
on interactions across dimensions.
This chapter is simply structured in two sections that mimic the before/after mid-2000s
movement mentioned above, i.e., first discussing behavioral economics’ challenges stemming
from interactions within dimensions (2.1) and then from interactions across dimensions (2.2).
2.1 Interactions within the three dimensions
A picture of the main empirical regularities that have motivated behavioral economists’ work
on the three dimensions is first presented (2.1.1), and shown to violate instantiations of ‘con-
sequentialism’ in the standard models of preferences for the three dimensions (2.1.2). The
three primacies from the previous chapter are then developed altogether to suggest how they
may offer counter-arguments to the standard consequentialist picture of the three dimensions
(2.1.3). Finally, the main theoretical developments that the main empirical regularities have
motivated in behavioral economics are discussed altogether (2.1.4), under the critical scrutiny
of the arguments from the previous subsections.
A general note on the way experiments will be discussed throughout this dissertation is in
order. Since most experiments involve monetary consequences, all currencies are displayed in
euros and some slight rewordings and changes in the letters that denote objects of choice are also
made. All this is done to homogenize the decision problems and facilitate the reasoning regarding
the theoretical implications. Furthermore, while most, if not all, experiments presented here are
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considered as robust in behavioral economics, we are not concerned with issues of replications
and statistical significance (e.g., whether 51% or 100% of the subjects of an experiment displayed
the effect): the focus is on what these behavioral patterns can tell us, theoretically speaking,
about the standard versus behavioral economics debates.
2.1.1 The main empirical regularities, altogether and naked
This subsection tries to present a structured picture of the main empirical regularities that are
being discussed around behavioral economics with respect to the three dimensions. Compared
to what is usually presented in the literature (e.g., Prelec and Loewenstein 1991), the two
main specificity of this picture is that (1) it focuses on the similarities and differences of the
three dimensions altogether, and it is (2) naked in the sense of being devoid of theoretical
and methodological considerations. The former specificity is self-justified from the goal of this
chapter, while the latter, which looks quite at odds with the entanglement thesis, is justified from
both convenience (allowing easy references in later subsections to the ‘facts’ under discussion)
and conciseness (not disrupting the discussion with theoretical and empirical comments increases
the salience of the similarities and differences between dimensions). It should also be noted that
some of the examples illustrating the regularities have been carefully chosen for the way they
make the ‘logic’ of the regularities transparent, though they are extreme instances of them.
The example of a decision problem under risk mentioned in the introduction was part of
what is usually labeled the ‘common ratio effect’ (more precisely, a specific version of it called
the ‘certainty effect’) from Kahneman and Tversky (1979; problems 3 and 4). The decision
maker is presented the following two pairs of objects of choice (A versus B, and C versus D).
The first one was mentioned in the introduction, it is between objects of choice with a Certain
consequence (3000€) or Probable consequences (4000€ and 0€):
A: The certainty of winning €3000 [i.e., 100% chance]__________
B: 80% chance of winning €4000 [and 20% chance of winning nothing]
The second pair is obtained from the previous one by reducing the probability of occurrences
of the non-null consequences by a common factor, here by 4, so as to choose between objects of
choice with only Probable consequences:
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C: 25% chance of winning €3000 [and 75% chance of winning nothing]
D: 20% chance of winning €4000 [and 80% chance of winning nothing]
For the time dimension, consider the following ‘common difference effect’ (more precisely,
a specific version of it called the ‘immediacy effect’) from Thaler (1981, opening example).
Again there are two pairs of objects of choice. The first pair is between objects of choice with
consequences occurring Now or Later:
A: One apple today [and nothing tomorrow]
B: Two apples tomorrow [and nothing today]
The second pair is obtained by keeping the consequences, but increasing the delay of the
non-null consequences by a year, so that they are occurring in the Future though one even
Later than the other:
C: One apple in one year________
D: Two apples in one year plus one day
For the social dimension, consider the following ‘dictator game’ from Kahneman, Knetsch
and Thaler (1986b, experiment 2, part 1). The decision maker is given a choice between two
ways of dividing €20 between Himself and Another anonymous person:
A: €18 to self and €2 to other
B: €10 to self and €10 to other
Before we present more examples, a notational and terminological note is helpful at this
point to highlight some similarities and differences between the three dimensions. An ob-
ject of choice X can be represented as a set of consequences {x1, x2, ..., xn} distributed ei-
ther probabilistically (p1, p2, ..., pn summing to 1), or over time (t1, t2, ...), or across people
(i, j, k, ...). In the standard terminology, objects of choice can be ‘lotteries’ where x1 has p1
chance to occur, etc. so that X = (x1, p1; ...;xn, pn); or ‘plans’ where x1 happens at t1,
etc. so that X = (x1, t1;x2, t2; ...); or ‘allocations’ where x1 is for individual i, etc. so that
X = (x1, i;x2, j; ...). For instance, B = (b1, p1; b2, p2) = (€4000, .8;€0, .2) in the common ratio
84
effect, B = (b1, t1; b2, t2) = (0 apple, today; 2 apples, tomorrow) in the common difference effect,
and B = (b1, i; b2, j) = (€10, self ;€10, other) in the dictator game.
Following Drazen Prelec and Loewenstein (1991), who already inspired the presentation of
the first two examples on the dimensions of uncertainty and time, a structured way to introduce
more examples is to present what they call ‘sign effects’ and ‘magnitude effects’ (1991, pp. 774-
5). An instance of a sign effect under uncertainty that is especially convenient to introduce
here is the following one, taken from Kahneman and Tversky (1979, problems 3’ and 4’). Take
the above example of the certainty effect, and simply reverse the sign of the consequences from
monetary gains (e.g., winning €3000) to monetary losses (e.g., losing €3000):
A′: The certainty of losing €3000 [i.e., 100% chance]_________
B′: 80% chance of losing €4000 [and 20% chance of losing nothing]
C′: 25% chance of losing €3000 [and 75% chance of losing nothing]
D′: 20% chance of losing €4000 [and 80% chance of losing nothing]
Notice that here the pattern of preferences [B′ % A′]&[C ′ % D′] is the reverse of the one over
monetary gains [A % B]&[D % C]; Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p.268) label this sign effect
under uncertainty the ‘reflection effect’. Though Thaler (1981) demonstrates some sign effects
over time, the following other instance is easier to introduce (it is taken from Faralla, Benuzzi,
Nichelli and Dimitri 2012, stimuli 107 and 109). In a first set of pairs of plans (A versus B and
C versus D), the same pattern of preference as in Thaler’s apple example is observed, i.e., a
preference for a small consequence Now over a slightly bigger one Later, which reverses when
the first consequence is available Soon and the second one even Later:5
A: Winning €5 today______________
B: Winning €7.50 in a month _________
C: Winning €5 in two weeks__________
D: Winning €7.50 in a month and two weeks
Then, by simply reversing the sign of the consequences, from monetary gains to monetary
losses, one can observe:
5Faralla et al. (2012) have very clean experimental tasks, making it easy to introduce the patterns of
preferences constitutive of the effects under discussion. But their discussion of the data is not at the level of
comparisons between pairs of plans, as the bolding of modal preferences here would suggest. It is however in
line with the authors’ qualitative discussion of the patterns in their data, and of course in line with the sign and
magnitude effects as defined by Prelec and Loewenstein.
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A′: Losing €5 today______________
B′: Losing €7.50 in a month_________
C′: Losing €5 in two weeks__________
D′: Losing €7.50 in a month and two weeks
With this pattern of preference just displayed, it is easy to introduce an instance of magnitude
effects over time. The following pattern of preferences are between pairs of plans which have the
same delay as in the previous sign effect example, but the amount of money (i.e., the magnitude
of the consequence) is increased by a factor of six (Faralla et al. 2012, stimuli 117 and 119):
A′′: Winning €30 today_____________
B′′: Winning €45 in a month_________
C ′′: Winning €30 in two weeks________
D′′: Winning €45 in a month and two weeks
A′′′: Losing €30 today_____________
B′′′: Losing €45 in a month__________
C′′′: Losing €30 in two weeks_________
D′′′: Losing €45 in a month and two weeks_
Therefore, the magnitude effect over time is the overall pattern of preference whereby com-
mon difference effects tend to disappear when the magnitudes of the consequence increase, for
both gains and losses.
As an instance of a magnitude effect under uncertainty, Prelec and Loewenstein (1991) defer
to a series of informal decision problems that Harry Markowitz (1952, pp.153-2) posed to his
friends. Markowitz reports to have observed the following pattern of preferences, whereby the
Probability of getting a very small consequence is preferred to the Certainty of receiving
an even smaller (by a factor of 10) consequences, but the Certainty of receiving a very big
consequence is preferred to the (same) Probability of receiving an even bigger (still by a factor
of 10) consequences:
A: The certainty of winning 10 cents__
B: 10% chance of winning €1______
C: The certainty of winning €1,000,000
D: 10% chance of winning €10,000,000
And such a magnitude effect is also observed for monetary losses, though the pattern of
preferences is the reverse of the one for gains:
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A′: The certainty of losing 10 cents__
B′: 10% chance of losing €1______
C ′: The certainty of losing 1,000,000_
D′: 10% chance of losing €10,000,000
This concludes the presentation of empirical regularities on two (uncertainty and time) of the
three dimensions for this subsection. What are the corresponding effects in the third dimension,
that of other people? It is possible to make explicit parallels between the structure of the
effects on risk and time preferences just discussed and some of the classical challenges from the
literature around behavioral economics that stemmed from experiments on the dictator game.
By contrast with the original dictator game from Kahneman et al. (1986b) presented above,
most experiments do not present a decision problem between two allocations. Rather decision
makers can allocate a given amount of money between Himself and The other as he wishes
(i.e., he can choose within a quasi-continuous distribution of monetary consequences).6
The simplest parallel suggesting itself is with magnitude effects. By contrast with the previ-
ous examples, changing the amount of money to be allocated in a dictator game does not usually
have an effect on the chosen allocation. Notice that it is the absence of an effect that is taken
as a (problematic) empirical regularity (e.g., List and Levitt 2007, p.164; and see the references
in Novakova and Flegr 2013). In one of the rare study displaying a magnitude effect, Julie
Novakova and Jaroslav Flegr (2013, Table 1) strongly increased the amount of (hypothetical)
money to be allocated: four times by a factor of 10 – e.g., €20, €200, €2000, €20000, €200000;
the proportion of the allocation given to The other reduced constantly from 28.3% to 23.3%.
Even in that case, the allocations to The other are well within the 20-30% range of aggregate
results on standard dictator game, with less than 40% of decision maker giving nothing (see
Camerer 2003, chap.2; Engel 2011). In other words, even very large magnitudes of monetary
consequences do not drive decision makers to offer nothing or close to nothing.
Though the parallel with money is easy because it is identical in experiments on the three
dimensions, the parallel between uncertainty or time, on the one hand, and other people, on the
6Other games with more game-theoretic issues (e.g., ultimatum games, trust games etc.) that are used to
study social preferences, but they will not be discussed in this dissertation. We focus on the dictator game because
the degree of interactions between the players are very weak. Game-theoretic issues render the comparison with
the two other dimensions less clear because the latter underlie more decision-theoretic issues (though see Aumann
and Dreze 2009), and they underlie interactions of risk and time preferences which would complete the comparison
but again at the cost of some complications (see the role of ‘strategic uncertainty’ in ‘repeated games’ in Camerer
2003).
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other, is less straightforward. What has been called ‘social distance’ in the literature around
the dictator game provides a plausible parallel with uncertainty or time. A traditional dictator
game always involves the three zones in the dimension of people: a decision maker (I, The
allocator) communicating to the experimenter (You, The economist) how much to give
to someone else (He, The recipient) who is usually anonymous. In standard designs, there
is close to zero communication between the allocator and the recipient; though both commu-
nicate with the experimenter. Roughly, the social distance in a dictator game characterize the
communication among these three protagonist, whether and how they talk to each other and
what they know about each others’ identity and actions. The challenging empirical regularities
in this literature is that variations of social distance can push allocators both ways: either to
give more than the 20-30%, or, at the opposite, to keep more than 80-70% (see Engel 2011,
sect. 4.5). Two classical papers illustrate this point. Notably using double blind experimental
design where both the experimenter and the recipient do not know who gave to whom, Elizabeth
Hoffman, Kevin McCabe and Vernon Smith (1996) show how the less communication between
the allocator and the experimenter, the more the former is likely to keep 100% of the money
for himself. Keeping communication between the allocator and the experimenter very low, Iris
Bohnet and Bruno Frey (1999) show how the more communication between the allocator and
the recipient (from the former just seeing the latter, to both seeing each others, through the
former seeing and hearing personal information about the latter), the more the former is likely
to propose above the traditional 20-30% of the allocation to the latter. The identity of the
recipient is indeed one of the rare variable that seems to trigger (mean) allocation where the
allocator keeps less than 50% for himself, as when the recipient is from a poor community in a
third world country (Brañas-Garza 2006).7
As for the impact of monetary losses, it has not been as thoroughly studied in the dictator
games as it has been in decision under risk and over time. The empirical regularity that can
be interpreted as being about losses and that has been discussed around behavioral economics,
is the following. Endowing both the allocator and the recipient with some money and allowing
7‘Social distance’ was also used long ago by Edgeworth to discuss what is today called social preferences
(see Fontaine 2000, p.413), and is currently used by behavioral psychologists making the case that it is the
interpersonal analogue of probability and time in decision making (see e.g., Jones and Rachlin 2006; and Ida and
Ogawa 2013 for a discussion in economics).
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the former to give some of his money as well as to take from some of the latter’s tend to push
the former to give 0%, but not to take from the latter (List 2007; Bardsley 2008). But that does
not (nor was it intended to) parallel the studies of losses under uncertainty or over time where
some decision problems have no positive monetary consequences at all. Therefore potential sign
effects in the dictator game are yet to be investigated (though see Antinyan 2014 in economics;
and Leliveld et al. 2009, exp.3, in social psychology).
All the effects discussed in this section were meant to study the interactions of different zones
within a given dimension in Rastier’s sense. The implicit assumptions behind the experiments
discussed here is that the Sure or Probabilistic consequences of a lottery are Immediate
and for Oneself (i.e., not Delayed and/or for Someone Else); the Immediate or Delayed
consequences of plan are Sure and for Oneself; and the consequences of an allocation be-
tween Oneself and Another are Sure and Immediate. The experimental literature on the
dimension of other people points another implicit assumption, namely that the decision maker
who reasons in the first person (I, Me) communicates in the second person (You, Mr. The
Experimenter, or what-not) to a decision modeler who posed the decision problem under
investigation (as it was emphasized throughout the previous chapter).
2.1.2 Violations of consequentialism
In discussions around behavioral economics, the patterns of choice just presented are usually
taken as factual observations that are problematic regarding different theoretical conventions of
the standard models of risk, time and social preferences, from which value judgments of ratio-
nality or irrationality are often derived. More precisely, these patterns of choice are problematic
for the frameworks of expected utility (EU), exponentially discounted utility (EDU), and self-
interest into which risk, time and social preferences can be respectively modeled. There is a
striking contrast between the first two and the last one. On the one hand, the first two frame-
works have been expressed in formal language through different uses of the axiomatic method
at different times; in economics, the first ones being usually credited to Paul Samuelson (1937)
or Tjalling Koopmans (1960) for EDU, and John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1947,
chap.1; 1953, appendix) for EU. On the other hand, “the assumption of self-interest is not pre-
sented as a formal axiom – it does not come in, as it were, by the front door” (Walsh 1996,
89
p.113). As we shall see, systematic discussions of self-interest are nevertheless possible through
Sen’s (2002, chap.1, sects 8-10) critical characterizations of various ways by which self-interest
enters standard models in economic theory by the back door. The goal of this subsection is to
contrast the three main theoretical conventions violated by the patterns of preferences discussed
in the previous subsection, namely, the independence axiom constitutive of EU, the dynamic
consistency implied by EDU, and the self-centeredness underlying self-interest. The main point
of connection emerging from these contrasts is what is usually referred to as the consequentialism
of standard economics.
The theoretical framework of EU provides the conditions under which a decision maker
chooses a lottery over another one, i.e., if and only if he prefers the chosen one and if and only if
he derives more utility from the chosen and preferred one; or in formal language and with the last
chapter’s notation, the conditions under which X = C({X,Y }) ⇔ X % Y ⇔ U(X) ≥ U(Y ).
There are additional theoretical conventions from the framework of consumer choice theory due
to the features of the objects of choices, i.e., of the probabilities in the lotteries. The expected
utility (U(.)) of a lottery is a real number given by the sum of the evaluations of its consequences
by a function (u(.)), linearly weighted by their respective probabilities. Expressed more formally,
the expected utility of B in the common ratio effect above is calculated by U(B) = u(b1)p1 +
u(b2)p2 = .8u(€4000) + .2u(€0). The linear weighting by probability is represented by the
absence of a function that could change the numerical values of the probabilities. The so-called
‘meaning of u(.)’, and especially its relation with U(.) under certainty, is a matter of controversy
that we will not discuss in this dissertation. And to avoid making controversial statements, we
will call u(.) a “subutility function” (following Gorman 1968, p.368), and say accordingly that
it ‘subevaluates’ the consequences or give real numbers representing the ‘subutilities’ of the
consequences, while U(.) evaluates lotteries.8
The independence axiom, “the most critical condition in [the] behavioral foundations of
expected utility” (Wakker 2010, p.36), is a condition that the decision maker’s preferences over
8Roughly, the issue is that u(.) has cardinal properties for comparisons among consequences that U(.) does
not need for comparisons among lotteries (or among temporal plans or social allocations for the two other
dimensions, see below). So if both are strongly related, then we may end up with cardinal utility in decision
under certainty, contra the ordinalist revolution (see esp. Fishburn 1989b; Wakker 1994; Ellingsen 1994; Guala
2000; Abdellaoui et al. 2007; Mongin 2009; Moscati 2013a; b; 2016a; b). This gets even more problematic if the
cardinality of u(.) is given explicit p-or-Psychological meanings (contra purely techincal ones), as is the case in
behavioral economics (see Rabin 2000, fn3 p.1282; Wakker 2010).
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lotteries have to respect for the key theoretical convention A % B ⇔ U(A) ≥ U(B) to hold. The
most usual way of stating the independence axiom is in terms of the independence of preferences
from the ‘mixing’ of lotteries. pA+(1−p)X is said to be a mix of lottery A with lottery X, and
the mix can be weighted by any probability p. The independence axiom states that a preference
for a lottery over another should not change if a third lottery is mixed with both former lotteries
in the same way. For instance, if there is a preference between two lotteries A % B, it should
not change (for the mix where there is B over the mix where there is A) if both are mixed with
X with the same weight: pA + (1 − p)X % pB + (1 − p)X. Thus the independence axiom can
be expressed as A % B ⇔ pA + (1 − p)X % pB + (1 − p)X. In the common ratio example,
we can denote by X the certainty of getting nothing, i.e., (with abuse of ordinary language)
the ‘lottery’ (x1, p1) = (0, 1), and mix it by the same weights of p = .25, 1 − p = .75 with
A = (€3000, 1) and B = (€4000, .8;€0, .2) to get .25A + .75X = C = (€3000, .25;€0, .75) and
.25B + .75X = D = (€4000, .2;€0, .8). Thus the modal pattern of preference in the common
ratio effect [A  B]&[D  C] violates the independence axiom; magnitude and sign effects
under uncertainty also violate the independence axiom.9
The theoretical framework of EDU can be stated in quite similar terms. The discounted
utility (U(.)) of a plan is a real number given by a weighted sum of the subutilities of the
consequences. However, unlike the linear weighting by probabilities in EU, the weighting by time
in EDU is exponential through a discount function (δ(.)). From the period t−1, the subutilities
of the consequences that happen at t are discounted by δt−1 = ( 11+ρ )t, where ρ is the constant
rate of discounting that the decision maker uses indifferently in all periods. For instance, in
the apple example from Thaler (1981), U(B) = δ1−1u(b1) + δ2−1u(b2) = u(0 apple) + u(2 apples)1+ρ .
Note that δ0 always equals 1, so that the subutility of the first consequence is never discounted,
and that of the second one is discounted by 1+ρ, that of a third one would have been discounted
by (1 + ρ)2 (though the discounting between the second and third periods is still 1 + ρ), that of
a fourth one by (1 + ρ)3 (thought the discounting between the third and fourth periods is still
1 + ρ), and so on exponentially. ρ is often called ‘pure time preference’ and said to represent
the decision maker’s patience (when it tends to 0 or becomes negative) or impatience (when
9This is the least general way of presenting the independence axiom. Indeed, there are several ways by which
the independence axiom can be stated formally and informally (see MacCrimmon and Larson 1979; Fishburn
and Wakker 1995; and Mongin 2009), or decomposed in sub-parts (see Machina 1989; and Burghart et al. 2015).
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it grows). Notice the subjective attitude to time by contrast with the objective perception of
probabilities in EU.
By contrast with the independence axiom in EU, dynamic consistency is an implication of
axioms in EDU. This implication is the consistent evaluation of the same plan through time, in
the sense that its discounted value does not depend on the period from which it is evaluated.
In the apple example, to evaluate C and D from t = 1 consist in evaluating ‘one apple at
t = 365 (one year) but nothing at t = 366’ and ‘nothing at t = 365 but two apples at t = 366’,
respectively. On EDU’s terms, the modal preference is D  C ⇔ U(D) > U(C). To evaluate
C and D from t = 365 consists in evaluating ‘one apple today and nothing tomorrow’ and
‘two apples tomorrow and nothing today’, respectively, i.e., it consists in evaluating A and B,
respectively. On EDU’s terms, the modal preference is A  B ⇔ U(A) > U(B). Denoting the
time of evaluation by a superscript (U t), we have U365(C) = U1(A) and U365(D) = U1(B).
Thus, time consistency requires that U1(C) = U365(C) = U1(A) and U1(D) = U365(D) =
U1(B), which together imply U1(D) ≥ U1(C) ⇔ U365(D) ≥ U365(C) ⇔ U1(B) ≥ U1(A),
which is obviously violated by the modal pattern of preferences in the common difference effect
[D  C]&[A  B]; magnitude and sign effects over time also violate dynamic consistency.10
Self-interest is not a theoretical framework in the sense EU and EDU are, mainly because
the former is not an axiomatic system as the latter two can said to be. Compared with EU
and EDU, issues around self-interest have been less around the formal language of optimization
than around the ordinary language used to characterize the behaviors under study. This was
pointed in the previous chapter when we discussed Sen’s characterization of the three implicit
requirement imposed by the notion self-interest in standard economics (self-centered welfare,
self-welfare goal, self-goal choice). It is only one part of these requirement that is violated in
dictator games, namely self-centered welfare, i.e., “[a] person’s welfare depends only on her own
consumption and other features of the richness of her life (without any sympathy or antipathy
towards others, and without any procedural concern)” (Sen 2002, chap.1, p.33, my emphasises).
Violations of self-centered welfare in dictator games can be interpreted in a notation related
10More precisely, the two main axioms implying dynamic consistency are ‘separability’, which has the same
mathematical structure as the independence axiom and gives EDU its separably additive form, and especially
‘stationarity’, which requires the subutility of a given consequence to be the same for any period; the latter is
obviously central in yielding dynamic consistency (see Fishburn and Rubinstein 1982; Bleichrodt et al. 2008;
Lapied and Renault 2012).
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to the ones used so far, provided we make the standard identification of ‘welfare’ and ‘utility’ –
thus we can call the requirement just self-centeredness. The self-centered utility of an allocation
evaluated by Oneself (i) is a real number given by a functional (U i(.)) constituted by the sum
of the subutilities of its consequences for Oneself (ui(.)) and Other People (u−i(.), with
−i = j, k... 6= i), with the requirement that for any consequence x we have u−i(x) = 0, assuming
otherwise the kind of standard conditions on preferences used in consumer choice theory (see
Sobel 2005, sect.3.1). In Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler’s dictator game, self-centered utility
implies U i(A) = ui(a1) + uj(a2) = ui(€18) > U i(B) = ui(b1) + uj(b2) = ui(€10), which
the modal pattern of preference B  A violates; indeed any dictator game where the decision
maker allocates even the tiniest amount of money to the other although he could have allocated
it for himself violates self-centeredness. That violates only the “consumption” and “others”
parts of the requirement of self-centeredness (italicized in the above quote from Sen). Pretty
much all other variations in experimental design that trigger variations in allocations violate
the “procedural concern” part of the requirement. It is not difficult to see that behaviors in
dictator games do not necessarily violate self-welfare goal and self-goal choice, provided we drop
the dubious but also standard identification of welfare and/or utility with choice, respectively.
With respect to the perspective of this chapter, the following quantitative issue about the
standard accounts of the three dimensions should be briefly noted. Depending on the shared
interests of economists working within different subfields, the curvature of u(.) is interpreted as
the marginal utility of consequences and allows inferences of different unobservable behavioral
information. Among these behavioral information, three prominent ones are (1) risk aversion,
(2) elasticity of intertemporal substitution and (3) inequality aversion. Informally, they re-
spectively measure the attitudes of decision makers towards more or less equal distributions of
consequences over (1) different probabilistic states of the world, (2) different points in time and
(3) different people. In other words, there are different interpretations of the same mathemati-
cal construction. Most economists seem to go along with this by focusing, in a given situation,
on one of the three dimensions while explicitly abstracting from, or assuming no specific role
played by, one of the two others (see esp. Strotz 1956, p.166, focusing on time abstracting
from risk or Pratt 1964, p.123, focusing on risk with no specific role for time); but one of the
three is simply ignored (outside of normative economics and subfields such as the economics
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of the family, of charity or of discrimination, the ignored dimension is usually other people).
This strategy is worth noting for the purpose of this chapter only in order to provide some
contrasts with two other strategies that aim to go beyond it. On the one hand, some economists
think that there are good reasons to separate the dimensions and have accordingly specified
more general functional forms to give different measures to two of the three different attitudes
(see esp. Kreps and Porteus 1978 on risk and time preferences). On the other hand, other
economists have searched normative justifications for why the three types of attitudes should be
identical, and in the empirical cases they are not, which one among the three should play the
normative benchmark defining how one of the other two should change for the decision maker
to be totally consistent (see esp. Harsanyi 1955; 1988 on risk preferences as a benchmark for
social preferences). Notice that in both cases one of three dimensions is ignored. These two
strategies involve a mix of quantitative and qualitative considerations that hinges on the issue
of interactions across dimensions; their discussion is therefore deferred to the next section.11
Only one of these considerations is appropriate to be discussed here, namely how the inde-
pendence axiom, dynamic consistency and self-centeredness are all justified by value judgments
derived from consequentialism, i.e., the principle that the consequences of a choice are the only
sources of reasons from which that choice can be justified. It is rather immediate to see why
this is so for these three requirements independently of each others. Self-centeredness is justified
by consequentialism through the part of its requirement that “procedural concern” should not
influence an individual’s choices. The independence axiom and dynamic consistency are justi-
fied by consequentialism in the sense that they both force decision makers to reason only about
the consequences of choices abstracted from psychological inclinations and situational factors.
Such implicit consequentialism is critically discussed by Sen, who proposes a more nuanced and
less narrow version of consequentialism in various contributions (see the pages referenced at
“consequences, relevance of” in the index of Sen’s 2002 Rationality and Freedom). The role
played by consequentialism in standard models of individual behaviors has been made formally
11For other instances of explicit discussions of interactions across dimensions, see the penultimate footnote
in the previous subsection on ‘strategic uncertainty’ and ‘repeated games’; Christian Gollier (2001) on the
interactions between the dimensions of risk and time in macroeconomics and financial economics; the references
at the end of the next subsection on the ‘veil of ignorance’ arguments in normative economics (that exploit
expected utility to draw conclusions about social arrangements); Thibault Gajdos and John Weymark (2012) on
the parallels between second-order stochastic dominance of distributions of income (hence related to inequality)
and of probability; and the references in the last subsection of this section on intergenerational altruism in
macroeconomics that have been borrowed by behavioral economics to model individual time preferences.
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explicit over the years by Peter Hammond (1976; 1977; 1983; 1987; 1988a; b; 1989; 1998; Ham-
mond and Zank 2014). Roughly, Hammond formally defined consequentialism as an axiomatic
requirement on choice functions to show how this requirement implies dynamic consistency, the
independence axiom and self-centeredness. What is worth noting about Hammond’s contribu-
tions is that the notion of dynamic consistency becomes the normative benchmark from which
risk and social preferences are to be evaluated, even in atemporal settings (i.e., when working
on unreduced decision trees for decision under uncertainty and when comparing ex ante and ex
post evaluations of social allocations in normative economics). Hence, while the primacy of risk
over time over social preferences mentioned in the introduction of this chapter holds at a general
level in the practice of standard economists, it is to be contrasted with a primacy of time over
risk over social preferences that results from consequentialism as the normative justification of
standard models of individual behaviors.12
Notice that in terms of Rastier’s table, one condition of possibility for these discussions to
have happened is the marking of distinctions within the three dimensions (and their subsequent
articulations across them). In the words of the entanglement thesis, the factual patterns of
choice that violate the theoretical conventions of the independence axiom, dynamic consistency
and self-centeredness are subjected to value judgments from consequentialism. Put simply,
criticisms of these patterns of choice as irrational are often made explicitly or implicitly from
consequentialism, and defenses of these patterns of choice as rational or irrational often involve
criticisms of (at least some features of) consequentialism. Sen’s and Hammond’s discussions
of consequentialism point out several ways by which it is one of the deepest source of value
judgments in economics. The origin of this is, according to them, mainly due to the philo-
sophical influence of utilitarianism in economics (see also Walsh 1996). But is can be noticed
further that, as logicians Dov Gabbay and John Woods (2005, p.21) put it: “[h]istorically, [...]
logic is an examination of consequentialist reasoning whose success or failure is definable for or
representable in semi-interpreted formal languages”. Hence, besides the influence of utilitarian-
ism, the widespread acceptance of consequentialist reasoning in standard economics can also be
12Peter Wakker pointed to me that, historically, the first contribution on what I call the primacy of time
preferences, is the fifth chapter in the Burks, Arthur W. (1977) “Chance, Cause, Reason (An Inquiry into
the Nature of Scientific Evidence).” The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. According to Wakker, “[t]his
philosopher is not only the first, but also about the best and deepest on this topic” (personal communication
20/04/2016).
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attributed to the epistemic value judgments favoring the uses of formal languages in economic
theory, especially through the axiomatic method.13
Summing up, this subsection characterized the qualitative challenges, i.e., violations of the
standard models’ underlying axioms, posed by the empirical picture depicted in the previous
section. The next subsection scrutinizes the main theoretical alternatives from behavioral eco-
nomics to deal with these challenges.
2.1.3 Theoretical alternatives from behavioral economics
It is impossible to scrutinize the entanglement of facts, values and theoretical conventions un-
derlying all these theoretical outcomes. This subsection concentrates on the most representative
alternatives from behavioral economics, namely, cumulative prospect theory for risk preferences,
quasi-hyperbolic discounting for time preferences and non-self-centered motives for social pref-
erences.
Under risk14
Cumulative prospect theory (CPT) is the theoretical outcome of a series of historical episodes
in decision theory where both the issue of interdisciplinarity between economics and psychology
and the positive/normative issue loom large (see Heukelom 2014 for a more detailed historical
account than the present one). In 1979, psychologists Kahneman and Tversky published their
prospect theory (PT), which can be formally illustrated as follows. In PT, the utility of a lottery
X = (x1, p1;x2, p2) is a real number given by U(X) = u(x1)pi(p1) +u(x2)pi(p2). In this formula,
u(.) is the value function presented in the previous chapter (i.e., concave for gains, convex for
losses, and asymmetrically so around a reference point to represent loss aversion) and pi(.) is a
weighting function that transforms nonlinearly the probabilities. Before Kahneman and Tver-
sky (1979), economists displayed a consequentialist sensitivity through expected utility which
transforms only the consequences but not the probabilities, and vice-versa for psychologists
13For a concise statement of the central issues underlying ‘logical consequences’, see Mikaël Cozic’s (2009)
presentation of a classical text from Alfred Tarski (2009 [1936]) and the text itself. Unrelatedly, it can be argued
that economics sneaked in the rationality debates in Psychology and cognitive sciences (also related to Kahneman
and Tversky’s work), mainly through the door of consequentialism (see the economic examples and reasoning
used by Baron 1994 in a debate within Psychology).
14Parts of the developments here have been used in Jullien (20016a).
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who displayed a probabilistic sensitivity through the use of weighting function without nonlinear
subutility functions (this contrast is borrowed from Wakker 2010, p.162). In a way, by u(.) and
pi(.), Kahneman and Tversky (1979) brought both sensibilities together. Economists have had
issues bearing on the positive/normative distinction with both the weighting and value func-
tions, which we briefly discuss in that order (see Wakker 2010 for detailed developments; see
also Barberis 2013).15
Put simply, the weighting function transforms a probability p given by the decision modeler
into the ‘decision weights’ pi(p) that the decision maker puts on the associated utility of conse-
quences. Analytically, decision weights are not to be confused with subjective probabilities. One
reason is that the former can be interpreted either as the irrational misperception of objective
probabilities or as the rational over- or under-weighting of the importance of some consequences;
subjective probabilities may be interpreted as irrational misperception (e.g., due to lack of infor-
mation) but cannot be interpreted as over- or under-weighting because they have to sum up to
1. Exactly what shape the weighting function takes is an empirical and quantitative issue, where
decision weights do not necessarily sum up to 1. To illustrate how this property account for
some of the challenges presented above, consider the certainty effect, the probabilities of which
are approximately plotted on Figure 2.1, i.e., on the graphical representation of Kahneman and
Tversky’s (1979) empirical estimation of the weighting function.
This 1979 version was conceived by Kahneman and Tversky only for lotteries with at most two
non-null consequences. Furthermore, it is normalized at the end point pi(0) = 0 and pi(1) = 1,
but not well-behaved near the end points 0 and 1, which can be interpreted as “the quantum
of doubt” that makes it hard to draw exact lines representing “the categorical distinction[s]”
between Certainty and Uncertainty, and between Uncertainty and Impossibility (Kah-
neman and Tversky 1979, p.282). Normalizing u(€0) = 0 to simplify the exposition, PT accounts
for the certainty effect as follows. Though the decision modeler’s presentation of the problems is
‘the certainty of €3000 versus 80% chance of winning €4000’ and ‘25% chance of winning €3000
15Peter Wakker pointed to me that he advocates, following Tversky, the use of ‘prospect theory’ for the 1992
version and of ‘original prospect theory’ for the 1979 version. According to them, the ‘cumulative’ adjective
discourages people with no mathematical degree to use this version (“A theory with such a horrible technical
name cannot carry far. let us use the best term for the best theory.” personal communication 20/04/2016).
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Figure 2.1: Kahneman and Tversky’s 1979 weighting function and the certainty effect
versus 20% chance of winning €4000’, the decision maker’s representation of the objects of choice
when he evaluates them is [U(A) = u(€3000) > U(B) = .65u(€4000)]&[U(D) = .17u(€4000) >
U(C) = .2u(€3000)]. Notice that if the decision weights were the given probability, there would
be no common ratio effect as there is no common factor by which 1 is reduced to .2, and .65 to
.17. Unlike in EU, the non-linearity of decision weights allows to formally represent the pref-
erences that underlie common ratio (and other) effects. This was the main goal of Kahneman
and Tversky, as it was for many other decision theorists.16
But the non-linearity of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) decision weights also allowed to
formally represent some preferences that standard decision theorists wish to avoid being for-
mally representable, namely, preferences against first-order stochastic dominance. First-order
stochastic dominance is maybe the most important theoretical convention in decision theory
from which value judgments of rationality and irrationality are derived. It states that:
“shifting probability mass from an outcome to a preferred outcome lead to preferred
prospect. In other words, the more money the better.” (Wakker 2010, p.65)
It thus applies only when there is a relation between two lotteries whereby there are more chance
to win at least as much more money in the lottery that is said to first-order stochastically
16For reviews see Fishburn (1989a, sect.5), Machina (1987, pp.132-6; 1989, table 1), Camerer (1995, table
8.1), Starmer (2000, sect. 4.1), Quiggin (2014, sects. 12.4.2-12.7). A very pedagogical perspective is offered by
Wilkinson and Klaes (2013, sect. 5.2).
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dominate the other, e.g., ‘50% chance of winning €10 and 50% chance of winning nothing’ first-
order stochastically dominates ‘60% chance of winning €10 and 40% chance of winning nothing’.
EU, as most of its alternatives in decision theory that are seriously considered by economists
(cf. previous footnote), implies necessarily a preference for first-order stochastic dominance, i.e.,
for the lottery that first-order stochastically dominates. In other words, first-order stochastic
dominance is “a hallmark of rationality” (ibid), and not necessarily implying a preference for it
“has generally been regarded as a fatal flaw sufficient to damn theories of this type” (Bardsley
et al. 2010, p130). Hence one reason why economists have had issues with PT is that despite its
psychological advantages on the positive side, the non-linear decision weights do not necessarily
imply preference for first-order stochastic dominance, hence it has some serious drawbacks on
the normative side. This mainly comes from the non-additivity of decision weights, especially
for small probabilities, e.g., pi(.01) + pi(.06) > pi(.07), so that ‘1% chance of winning €10, 6%
chance of winning €10 and 97% chance of winning nothing’ could be preferred to ‘7% chance of
winning €11 and 97 chance of winning nothing’ (for more detailed explanations see Kahneman
and Tversky themselves 1979, pp.283-4; see also Wakker 2010, sect. 5.3).
The issue of interdisciplinarity between economics and Psychology looms large in how this is-
sue was solved. Roughly, Kahneman and Tversky were in agreement with economists’ stance on
first-order stochastic dominance. Their way of bypassing the problem was to include in PT a set
of rather informal considerations about the p-&-Psychology of decision makers to diminish the
importance of the formal implications of violations of first-order stochastic dominance. Kahne-
man and Tversky (1979, p.274) avoid such violations by distinguishing “two phases in the choice
process: an early phase of editing and a subsequent phase of evaluation”. The latter is the value
and weighting functions, that are therefore applied to the decision makers’ representation of the
objects of choices, which do not necessarily correspond with their presentation by the decision
modeler (as in the above numerical example with the certainty effect). By contrast, the editing
phase corresponds to how the decision maker transforms the decision modeler’s presentation of
the decision problem into a representation from which he will make his choice. Kahneman and
Tversky only gave an informal account of it, in which two “operations” are worth mentioning for
the purpose of this chapter (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, p.274). The first one is the “Coding”
of consequences as gains or losses, i.e., the determination of a “neutral reference point” in the
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value function, which is not necessarily 0 as we saw in the previous chapter (ibid). This aspect
is discussed shortly. The second one is the “detection of dominance” which “involves the scan-
ning of offered prospects to detect dominated alternatives, which are rejected without further
evaluation” (p.275). This informal way of using the decision maker’s p-&-Psychology to prevent
a formal implication of a theory did not convince economists. What did convince at the same
time standard economists, behavioral economists, and even Tversky and Kahneman (1992) is
the so-called ‘rank-dependent expected utility’ or ‘rank-dependent utility’17 for short (RDU)
approach pioneered by economist John Quiggin (1982). We shall not go into the formal details
of this approach, but only note the methodological features of that matter for the purpose of
this chapter.18
Quiggin formally modified psychologists’ decision weights so as to avoid violations of first-
order stochastic dominance, and yet accounts for some of the challenges presented above, es-
pecially common ratio effects. The formal proximity with EU has been clarified through ax-
iomatizations of RDU, which shares the EU axioms but with a weakened form of independence
(see Quiggin 1982; Quiggin and Wakker 1994). Its explanatory power has been offered p-
&-Psychological interpretations in terms of optimism and pessimism, which admit normative
interpretations unlike with PT (see Diecidue and Wakker 2001). However, if RDU makes a
step toward psychologists’ probabilistic sensitivity, it still remains silent regarding the specific
perspective taken by the latter, especially Kahneman and Tversky, on consequences, i.e., the
17‘RDU’ is now preferred to ‘RDEU’ roughly because, as Wakker puts it in a text about these two expressions,
‘expected’ does not add much information and “[i]t is very very important that terms be short and tractable”
(see: http://people.few.eur.nl/wakker/miscella/rduquiggin.txt ; last consulted 03/05/2016). I thank him for
having pointed this text to me.
18It can be illustrated briefly. The main specificity of Quiggin’s decision weights shows up for lotteries that
have at least three non-null consequences, and so it is not appropriate to compare it directly with Kahneman
and Tversky’s (1979) original approach (see Wakker 2010, pp.274-5 on this point). The distinction between
both approaches is that Quiggin’s weighting function is not applied to consequences’ probabilities, but to ranks,
i.e., to cumulative probabilities. Consequences need to be already ranked, i.e., the subscripts of the xs are
meaningful, e.g., x1 ≥ ... ≥ xn. Decision weights for a given consequence are derived from the entire probability
distribution of consequences. More precisely, they are derived from the ranks of consequences xi, which are the
probability of receiving a given consequence or anything better, i.e., the cumulative probability pi + ... + pn,
not just pi. Take the lottery (borrowed from Wakker 2010, pp.158-9) where you have 16 chance of winning €80,
1
2 chance of winning €30,
1
3 chance of winning €20, i.e., X = (x1, p1;x2,p2;x3, p3) = (€80,
1
6 ;€30,
1
2€20,
1
3 ).
There are four ranks: 0, 16 ,
2
3 and 1, corresponding respectively to the cumulative probabilities of more than
€80 (0), €30 (0 + 16 ), €20 (0 +
1
6 +
1
2 ) and €0 (0 +
1
6 +
1
2 +
1
3 ). Probabilities of individual consequences can
be expressed in terms of differences between ranks: the probability of ‘winning €80’ is 16 which is equal to the
rank of winning more than €30 ( 16 ) minus the rank of winning more than €80 (0); by the same reasoning, the
probability of ‘winning €30’ is 12 (i.e.,
2
3 − 16 ) and the probability of ‘winning €20’ is 13 (i.e., 1− 23 ). Finally, the
decision weight wi of a consequence xi is the difference between ranks transformed by a weighting function pi(.):
U(X) = u(x1)w1+u(x2)w2+u(x3)w3 = u(€80)× [pi( 16 )−pi(0)]+u(€30)× [pi( 23 )−pi( 16 )]+u(€20)× [pi(1)−pi( 23 )].
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central distinction between gains and losses. In short, RDU cannot straightforwardly account
for sign effects. The critical role played by RDU in the post-1979 developments around the
making of behavioral economics is the adoption of this approach to decision weights by Tversky
and Kahneman (1992) themselves in CPT. Hence CPT avoids violations of first-order stochas-
tic dominance, and extends Quiggin’s approach to the asymmetry between gains and losses,
notably through two weighting functions, one for positive consequences and one for negative
consequences (see Tversky and Kahneman 1992, fig.3). CPT therefore makes new empirical
predictions (see Fennema and Wakker 1997; or Wakker 2010 appendix 9.8 for comparisons) and
has also been axiomatized (see Wakker and Tversky 1993; Chateauneuf and Wakker 1999). This
opened the door to some possible reconciliations between behavioral and standard economics,
at least for decision under risk. Indeed, since the publication of CPT, there have been much
discussions over the appropriate functional form of the weighting function, the implications of
its parameter values, and other quantitative issues into which this dissertation will not delve
(see Fehr-Duda and Epper 2012).
One such quantitative issue is however worth briefly discussing, if only because, as we shall
see, it indirectly underlies some normative contentions between standard and behavioral eco-
nomics. Recall that, informally and atheoretically, there are three basic risk attitudes that
economists try to empirically measure: risk neutrality if the decision maker is indifferent be-
tween a lottery and the certainty of its expected value, e.g., ‘50% chance to get €6000 and
50% chance to get €0’ ∼ ‘The Certainty of getting €3000’; risk seekingness if he prefers the
lottery to the certainty of the expected value; and risk aversion if he prefers the certainty of the
lottery’s expected value to the lottery. Economists’ consequentialist sensitivity manifests itself
in their uses of EU for measuring risk preferences by deriving indexes of risk aversion which only
take into account the decision makers’ attitudes toward consequences, not toward their probabil-
ities. Indeed, these measures are derived from the theoretical convention that the whole of risk
attitudes are identified with measures of the curvature of the subutility function (risk neutrality
corresponds to u(.) being linear, risk seekingness to u(.) being convex and risk aversion to u(.)
being concave). Under either PT or CPT, the use of a weighting function implies (also under
RDU) that risk attitudes are not anymore taken to be entirely determined by the curvature of
the subutility function, but also relates to the curvature of the weighting function – and to the
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curvature of loss aversion (see the preceding chapter, and below). Thus, Wakker (2010) insists
at length that all the sophisticated measures of the curvature of utility developed in standard
economics should not anymore be called measures of risk aversion in non-EU settings, they
should just be called what they are, i.e., measures of utility curvature.19
The issues underlying the value function of PT and CPT touch mainly the economists’
consequentialist sensitivity on the way of dealing with asymmetries between gains and losses, i.e.,
with sign effects. The value function handles these asymmetries through ‘reference-dependence’
as explained in the previous chapter, i.e., consequences are taken as gains or losses with respect
to a reference point: it is u(x) or u(−x)). EU, on the other hand, handles them through ‘asset
integration’, by counting as a consequence not the consequence of a given choice per se but its
consequence on the decision maker’s final wealth through its initial wealth w: it is u(w + x)
or u(w − x)). The most salient contention between these two approaches arose with respect to
a quantitative challenge, the so-called ‘Rabin paradox’. Rabin (2000) considers the following
preference:
A: nothing________________________________
B: 50% chance of winning €110 and 50% chance of losing €100
Through some algebraic manipulations, he shows that absurd quantitative measures of risk
aversion are implied by EU with asset integration, regardless of both initial wealth levels and
functional forms except for concavity. In particular, the previous preference for nothing implies
the following one:
A′: nothing_________________________________________
B′: 50% chance of losing €1000 and 50% chance of winning any sum of money
In short, plausible risk aversion over win/lose small stakes imply implausible risk aversion
over large ones (e.g., replace ‘any sum of money’ by $1.000.000). This comes from the whole
of risk attitudes being derived from the marginal utility of money in EU. Rabin’s solution is
19For more on the quantitative empirical issues underlying CPT versus EU, see Harrison and Rutström
(2008) and Holt and Laury (2014). The theoretical background needed to understand these issues is pedagocially
displayed by Mas-Collel et al. (1995, chap.6), Varian (2005, chap.12), Baccelli (2016) and especially Wakker
(2010, chap.3); see Gollier (2001) and Meyer (2014) for more advanced discussions.
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to drop asset integration and to use loss aversion, which implies reference-dependence, which is
tantamount to using PT’s value function. Regarding the purpose of this chapter, there are at
least three points of contentions between standard and behavioral economists over the use of
that function.20
Firstly, as for probability weighting, loss aversion is not necessarily considered as irrational
in so far as it can be thought of as decision weights whereby the decision maker consciously
put twice more weights on losses than on gains (Wakker 2010, p.239). This underlies the most
frequent criticism of prospect theory: there is only sporadic considerations but no systematic
theory of how the reference point changes, which have to be guessed in a pragmatic way by
the decision theorist (see, e.g., Wilkinson and Klaes 2012, p.190; Wakker, 2010, p.241-2 and
sect.8.7; Stommel 2013). Thus, there is a lack of systematicity not only about the fixation of
the reference point, but also, by implication, on the underlying (ir)rationality of the behavior
under analysis. In other word, the point made in the previous chapter about the situation-
dependency of rationality judgments made from PT’s value function under certainty carries
over under uncertainty.
Secondly, there is a third way of resolving the asset integration versus asset isolation conflicts,
by dropping neither of them but making some value judgments on the content of decision makers’
preferences. This is the underlying normative contentions that was mentioned above as being
indirectly connected with the quantitative challenges posed by behavioral economics. This is for
instance Wakker’s position (2010, chap.8), who argues that rationality requires risk neutrality
(or very weak risk aversion) over small consequences. In other words, Wakker argues against
the translation of consumer sovereignty in decision under uncertainty, i.e., that the content of
preferences (for or against risk) is amenable to rational criticism.
Finally, the real difference between standard analysis and prospect theoretic analysis is not
the notion of reference-point per se, but the fact that it can be variable in the latter and is
necessarily fixed in the former. Indeed, EU’s asset integration and prospect theory’s reference-
20For more on the Rabin paradox, see Rabin and Thaler (2001) and Barberis, Huang and Thaler (2006) from
behavioral economics’ perspective and the references discussed by Wakker (2010, pp.244-5) from standard eco-
nomics’ perspective. There has always been a tradition in standard economics (esp. in experimental economics)
to model EU over income rather than over final wealth. Many response to the Rabin paradox used EU over in-
come, but without remarking that this is tantamount to reference-dependence (see Harrison, Lau and Rutström’s
2007 appendix; and Wakker 2010, p.245). Regarding the positive/normative issue, because Rabin’s solution is
through loss aversion which entails reference-dependence, the only remaining disagreement between users of EU
over income and prospect theory seems to be about the (ir)rationality of decision makers.
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dependence are in agreement when the latter’s reference point is a fixed level of initial wealth,
so that there is “a unique relation between the [consequences] and the final wealth” (Wakker
2010, p.238); this unique relation is simply initial wealth plus consequences equals final wealth.
It is when, for a given decision maker and a given set of choices, this unique relation is broken
during the analysis by a change in reference point that both approaches disagree. In such
cases, the traditional behavioral economics position of keeping the standard approach as the
normative benchmark and using psychologists’ theories as positive models surfaces rather clearly:
“traditional EU is, in my opinion, the hallmark of rationality, any deviation from final wealth
due to reference dependence is utterly irrational” (Wakker 2010, p.245). In short, “[e]xpected
utility is the right way to make decisions” (Thaler 2015, p.30).21
Over time
We now turn to time preferences, by way of contrast with what has been discussed for risk pref-
erences. Here, the main inspiration from Psychology comes from psychiatrist George Ainslie
(1975; 1992) instead of Kahneman and Tversky, whose theory of hyperbolic discounting played
a role somewhat analogous to PT in the making of behavioral economics. In 1975, Ainslie
published a famous paper putting together a large amount of empirical observations and theo-
retical considerations from various disciplines on human and animal individual behaviors over
time. There and in subsequent publications, he has argued for the high regularity of two phe-
nomena: “impulsiveness”, responsible for dynamic inconsistencies and “impulse control”, i.e.,
various ways by which humans and animals try to avoid dynamic inconsistencies. It can be
argued that one parallel to the consequentialist versus probabilistic sensitivities that divided
21It should be noted that there have been a few attempts at endogneizing changes of reference point, notably
by Botond Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007, 2009) in several settings (see also Schmidt 2003; Schmidt, Starmer and
Sugden 2008). Köszegi and Rabin formally characterize reference point as “probabilistic beliefs about the relevant
consumption outcome held between the time she first focused on the decision determining the outcome and shortly
before consumption occurs” (2006, p.1141). Their determination of reference-point is (1) counterfactual (see e.g.,
2006, fn3 p.1138), (2) temporal, and (3) rational. The last feature is surprising regarding what has just been
discussed. They assume rational beliefs (i.e., rational expectation) for simplicity and often stress (esp. in the
2006 and 2007 conclusions) the inability of their models to account for some irrational behaviors demonstrated
in behavioral economics (though see 2009, sect. III, where some of these irrational behaviors are seen as rational
through the lenses of their model). Their main formal innovation in decision making under risk is their uses of
tools from game theory as in models of time preferences (see below), i.e., selves playing a game, the equilibrium
of which determine the utility, preference and behavior of the decision maker (see Köszegi 2010). Thus, there is
a (not so) implicit interaction with the dimension of time, in line with the developments on the primacy of risk
preferences discussed in the previous subsection.
104
Figure 2.2: Exponential versus hyperbolic discounting and the apple example
standard economists and psychologists in the dimension of uncertainty is, in the dimension of
time, the distinction between impatience and impulsivity.
We can illustrate that through Thaler’s (1981) apple example. The exponentially discounted
utility of ‘one apple early and then nothing’ should always be superior or inferior to the the ex-
ponentially discounted utility of ‘nothing and then two apples later’. There cannot be preference
reversals and this absence of dynamic inconsistencies is due to the rate of discounting being a
positive constant which is usually interpreted as impatience. By contrast, the rate of discounting
is not constant in an hyperbolic discount function. The closer the time of evaluation is to the
time when the consequence happens, the greater the rate of discounting which Ainslie interprets
as impatience and impulsiveness. Hence, the hyperbolically discounted utility of ‘nothing and
then two apples’ can be superior to the one of ‘one apple early and then nothing’, but the closer
the time of evaluation is to the time of the early apple, the faster its utility increases compared
to the increase of the utility of the two later apples. Figure 2.2 provides a graphical comparison
between exponential and hyperbolic discounting to capture the contrast just made (through a
modification on Ainslie 1975, fig.1).
Under exponential discounting, a choice for ‘one apple early and then nothing’ should be repre-
sented by its utility being always superior to the utility of ‘nothing and then two apples later’.
This contradicts the outcome of Thaler’s example. In line with it, however, under hyperbolic
discounting the utility of ‘nothing and then two apples later’ is represented as being superior
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to the utility of ‘one apple early and then nothing’ at early evaluation times before smoothly
reversing as evaluation times get closer to the time of getting the early apple. Roughly, accord-
ing to Ainslie, impulsivity is responsible for the crossing of the curves, and the combination of
impatience, impulsivity and impulse control is responsible for their smoothness.
The most famous introduction of Ainslie’s work in economics was made by behavioral
economist David Laibson (1994; 1997) in his models of quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The latter
can be seen as introducing the consequences of hyperbolic discounting within the formalism of
exponential discounting. The quasi-hyperbolic discount function in Laibson’s models is a step
function. It discounts the utility of a plan as its exponentially discounted utility with an ad-
ditional discounting parameter β that is (i) necessarily equal to one at the time of evaluation
and (ii) can then take any value between zero and one to multiply all exponentially discounted
subutilities. Formally, this is represented by U t(X) = u(xt)+β
∞∑
i=1
δiu(xt+i), i.e., the utility of a
plan is the undiscounted subutility of the consequence that happens at the time of evaluation (as
in standard exponential models) added to the sum of the exponentially discounted subutilities
each multiplied by the parameter β. It is easy to see that if β = 1 even after t, quasi-hyperbolic
discounting reduces to exponential discounting and thus implies dynamic consistency. It is also
easy to see that if β = 0 after t, the decision maker does not care at all about Later and The
Future in the sense that all consequences after the date of evaluation contribute nothing to
the utility of the plan under evaluation, which is thus just the subutility of the Instantaneous
consequence (i.e., U t(X) = u(xt)). Thus, in-between, i.e., for 0 < β < 1, the “perturbation to
the “standard” [time] preferences” (Laibson 1994, p.14) triggered by β are so that the closer β
gets to 0, the greater the evaluation of the plan is biased by the Present consequence (with
respect to an evaluation under exponential discounting). Hence the two alternative labels for
quasi-hyperbolic preferences in the literature, ‘present-biased preferences’ or more neutrally ‘β-δ
preferences’.22
The quasi-hyperbolic functional form is not directly Laibson’s contribution. It was originally
developed by Edmund Phelps and Robert Pollak (1968) to model intergenerational altruism in
macroeconomics. In their model, the Present generation is denoted by t, and is evaluating a
22Some precedents to Laibson’s introduction of Ainslie’s work in behavioral economics should be acknowledged,
especially Thaler (1981) from an empirical perspective and, from a theoretical perspective, Thaler and Shefrin
(1981) (discussed in the next chapter) and Loewenstein and Prelec (1992).
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plan where the consequences are its Own consumption (xt), along with the consumptions of all
Future generations (xt+i). The latter’s utilities are discounted exponentially (through δi) and
all multiplied by the constant β which measures “the degree to which the present generation
values other peoples’ consumption relative to their own”, with β = 1 representing “perfect
altruism” and 0 < β < 1 “imperfect altruism” (p.186). This functional form, used in a dynamic
game theoretical setting, enables Phelps and Pollak to characterize equilibria corresponding
to more or less optimal saving rates depending on the degree of altruism. Laibson’s main
interpretational move is to turn Phelps and Pollak’s generations into “temporal selves” (Laibson
1994, p.13), i.e., into a so-called multiple selves model. Thus, intertemporal decision problems
are modeled by indexing by t the Present self who is currently evaluating a plan (U t(X)) with
respect to his own undiscounted utility (u(xt)) and the exponentially discounted utilities of the
Future selves (
∞∑
i=1
δiu(xt+i)), anticipating that they will be biased towards Their Present
when they will re-evaluate the same plan (β). Regarding the theme of this chapter, notice how
the formal similarities in two of the three dimensions allowed Laibson to use a functional form
originally designed for the social preferences of generations to model the time preferences of a
single individual.23
At this individual level, quasi-hyperbolic discounting can, like hyperbolic discounting, imply
the preference reversals that characterize dynamic inconsistency. But unlike with hyperbolic
discounting, the reversal is not smooth. Before the time of evaluation coincides with the oc-
currence of consequences, quasi-hyperbolic discounting is like exponential discounting but ‘re-
strained’ by β < 1. When the time of evaluation coincides with the occurrence of consequences,
then β = 1, which suddenly makes their utility higher, especially compared to the utility of the
consequences occurring later. Figure 2.3 provides a graphical representation of the explanation
just made (again with the apple example and through a modification on Ainslie 2012, fig.3).
If time is discrete, then kinks due to β suddenly becoming equal to 1 should be interpreted
as the beginning of the evaluation period where consequences (either one or two apples) are
occurring.
23Elster (1979, p.71ff) should be acknowledged as a precedent for the intuition of adapting Phelps and Pollak’s
model at the individual level.
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Figure 2.3: Quasi-hyperbolic discounting and the apple example
By contrast with the discussion of risk preferences above, there are some contentions between
behavioral economics and Psychology, i.e., hyperbolic discounting versus quasi-hyperbolic dis-
counting. That is, the issue of interdisciplinarity between economics and Psychology is more
internal to behavioral economics than it was for risk preferences. If quasi-hyperbolic discounting
has been widely used in behavioral economics, it is mainly for the good compromise it offers
between the analytical tractability of its exponential discounting structure and the psychological
realism of its implied preference reversals (the most important qualitative property of hyperbolic
discounting from a revealed preference perspective). Reviewing the mathematical structure of
much of the discount functions in economics and Psychology, psychologist John Doyle (2013,
p.125) remarks that despite the quasi-hyperbolic discontinuity being motivated primarily by
analytical matters, it is “a model devised by economists for economists [which] has the capacity
to capture a psychological distinction that the other models cannot”, namely the “qualitative
difference between now and any time to come, which we all appreciate intuitively, and which
language mirrors in verb tenses”. Doyle further argues that this qualitative difference is all
the more important to be captured because it also occurs in other situations, so that quasi-
hyperbolic models are useful as partly able to capture the facts that “[r]ewards that are certain,
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mine and now”, i.e., consequences in the Rastier’s identity zones of the three dimensions, “are
all over-valued” (ibid). This remark is obviously well in line with the perspective of this chapter.
Nevertheless, this sympathetic comment from a psychologist should be contrasted with the un-
sympathetic ones recently addressed by Ainslie (2012) to quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Among
the three main criticisms from Ainslie (2012) to be discussed, the first two are worth mentioning
because the underlying issues will resurface later; only the last one is central for the purpose of
this section.
Firstly, Ainslie claims that all the sophisticated techniques of self-control that he has ob-
served and theorized through the years cannot be captured in a model where the whole of the
preference reversal comes from the anticipation of a ‘last-minute’ sudden “β spike” of utility for
a given consequence (the expression is from Ainslie 2012). In other words, Ainslie argues from
Psychology that decision makers exercising self-control anticipate a much more complex process.
This claim is central for the current debates between standard and behavioral economics around
quasi-hyperbolic discounting, which are discussed in the next chapter (see the discussion of the
work of Gul and Pesendorfer in §3.2.2).
Secondly, Ainslie argues that because the shape of β-δ curves in the long-run are similar
to the shape of exponential curves, they have just as much trouble as the latter notoriously
has in explaining the great diversity in empirical measures of discount rates. Recall that ex-
ponential discounting implies that in each period the utility of the next period’s consequences
are discounted by the same factor, namely 11+ρ , where ρ is a constant discount rate. Thus, the
utility of consequences between two periods in the future are discounted at the same rate than
between two periods in the near present (or in the very distant future for that matter). Though
the underlying methodological issues are numerous, studies that try to elicit explicit or implicit
discount rates report a very wide variety of values, from negative rates to infinitely positive
ones, even (and this is the most crucial finding for the present argument) within a same study
for a same individual (see Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue 2002, table 1; Wilkinson and
Klaes 2012, chaps.7-8). The general pattern seems to be that discount rates decline over time,
though there are many exceptions. What Ainslie argues is that β-δ curves reproduce this quali-
tative pattern but not quantitatively as well as hyperbolic discount curves, and that there is no
way to naturally explain the exceptions as hyperbolic curves does. By contrast with preference
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reversals violating dynamic consistency, this is a quantitative empirical issue akin to the ones
on the measurement of risk attitudes mentioned above.
Thirdly, Ainslie’s own analysis of hyperbolic discounting makes use of dynamic game theory
in an informal manner to cast most of his theoretical explanations (see esp. 1992). Another
difference (besides impatience versus impulsivity) that can characterize contrasting sensitivities
between economists and psychologists on time preferences is the respectively bad and good
epistemic values attached to the multiple equilibria resulting from both hyperbolic and quasi-
hyperbolic models. As Ainslie puts it, “[i]nformal discussion has suggested that the obstacle
[in the adoption of such models by economists] is economists’ determination to predict unique
decisions, in principle at least, from a given set of prior motives”, though it may be that “a
technically chaotic mechanism [...] is the way of the world” (2012, p.21 and p.29). In this respect,
it is very illustrative to note the following evolution in Laibson’s work. At the beginning of his
dissertation, Laibson states that “[t]he primary goal of this thesis is to formalize and extend
Ainslie’s psychological analysis, by explicitly modeling individual decision-making as an intra-
personal game” (1994, p.10). His interpretation of the multiple equilibria result is that this is not
necessarily a bad thing because it could be interpreted that “the model generates heterogeneous
behavior without making recourse to heterogeneous preferences” (1994, p.40). Furthermore,
with the same preferences, two decision makers may end up in equilibria that are Pareto inferior
or superior to one another, which Laibson interprets as decision makers with same preferences
but self-acknowledged “bad habits” ending in Pareto-inferior outcomes or “self-control” ending in
Pareto-superior outcomes (ibid). This reasoning is indeed close to Ainslie’s work. However, not
only does this interpretation disappears in the 1997 paper, but he has concentrated some efforts
from the 2000s onwards with Christopher Harris to find a way of getting a unique equilibrium
with β-δ preferences (see Harris and Laibson 2013 for the first published version).
A last comment on the theoretical consequence of time preferences seems in order regarding
the perspective of this chapter: the asymmetry between gains and losses at play in sign effect
has attracted neither the theoretical attention nor the controversies they have in the risk pref-
erence literature. Yet, an early introduction of hyperbolic (not quasi-hyperbolic) discounting
in economics was made by Loewenstein and Prelec, in several joint and individual papers, with
specific theoretical attention to sign effects. Their formal contribution (see esp. Loewenstein
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and Prelec 1992) consists in a generalized hyperbola that nests exponential, quasi-hyperbolic
and hyperbolic discounting function as special cases. Loewenstein and Prelec’s way of intro-
ducing hyperbolic discounting in economics is explicitly inspired from Kahneman and Tversky’s
prospect theory, especially by making the notion of temporal reference-dependence central in
their reflections (which implied working with different objects of choice, “temporal prospects” as
adjustment to consumption rather than consumption per se). This line of formal unification has
however not been pursued in behavioral economics, which could have taken the three dimensions
altogether as they remark at some point that “interpersonal comparisons of material outcomes
reflect a concern both for absolute and relative differences between one’s own and other persons’
payoffs” (Prelec and Loewenstein 1991, p.784). Though this very brief comparison to social
preferences is the only point at which they go into the three dimensions, it is worth keeping in
mind that the notion of reference-dependence has that kind of unifying potential in behavioral
economics.
What about the positive/normative issue with respect to time preferences? In this dimension,
the contentions are rather different than the ones we have seen for risk preferences. There might
have been some ambiguities between the positive/normative distinction at the individual level
and at the level of subareas in economics (i.e., positive versus normative economics, see the
previous chapter). Samuelson’s (1937) original comments at the individual level are at best
agnostic: he stresses the arbitrariness of the functional form throughout and only highlights
the rationality underlying dynamic consistency for the theoretical case of perfect markets with
interest rate. At the level of subareas in economics, he is more explicit on exponential discounting
having no place in normative economics: “any connection between utility as discussed here and
any welfare concept is disavowed [...] [and] any influence upon ethical judgments of policy
is one which deserves the impatience of modern economists” (p.161). Some have interpreted
the first part of this quote as belonging to the individual level of the positive/normative issue
(e.g., Frederick et al. 2002, p.355). From what has been argued in the previous chapter, this
would not be a fallacy in itself (i.e., there are several methodological arguments to connect both
levels). However, it goes against the general tendency shared by both standard and behavioral
economists to derive value judgment of rationality from exponential discounting because it
prevents intertemporal preference reversals (see, e.g., Gollier 2001; Loewenstein et al. 2015,
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pp.61-65, see next chapter §3.3.2). And symmetrically, value judgments of irrationality are
derived from quasi-hyperbolic discounting because it implies such reversals. On this latter
point, there are some subtleties that hinge on the use of quasi-hyperbolic discounting to model
“sophisticated” versus “naive” decision makers. Recall that in Laibson’s models β captures the
evaluation of a plan by a self at time t who anticipates all the next t + 1 selves to be biased
towards Their Present if re-evaluating the same plan. If these anticipations are assumed to
be correct, then the multiple selves model is taken to be about a sophisticated decision maker;
if incorrect, it is about a naive one. The normative issues underlying time preferences are just
stated here, but will be discussed in more depth in the next subsection and in the next chapter.24
Regarding other people
Turning to social preferences, there are four main theoretical papers seeking a unifying expla-
nation for the empirical regularities observed in games such as the dictator game (Fehr and
Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Andreoni and Miller 2002; Charness and Rabin 2002;
the latter can be seen as an extension of Rabin 1993, which has the same motivation as the oth-
ers). There are two main differences with the contributions on risk and time preferences. On the
one hand, there is not one but several alternatives (at least five) to the standard model (which,
moreover, has always had controversial interpretations issues of self-interest and altruism). On
the other hand, though some inspirations are drawn here and there from social psychology,
there is no a substantial influence from one psychologist (or even from a well-identified set of
psychologists for that matter). For these and other reasons the presentation of alternatives to
self-centeredness here will not be illustrated with notations pertaining to their uses of formal
language (as was done with risk and time preferences).25
What is worth discussing informally is how they all introduce non-self-centered motives
in utility functions, which can be clearly interpreted as specific cases of Sen’s sympathy, i.e.,
24Much of Ainslie’s work focus on self-control and the normative medical implications of pathological self-
control problems; the complex implications for standard and behavioral economics of the normal/pathological
categories will not be discussed in this dissertation (see Vallois 2011; 2012a; b; 2014).
25The other reasons are because the theoretical explanations discussed here are not entirely focused on the
dictator game and not at all concerned with the types of regularities depicted in the first subsection (e.g., on
‘social distance’). Furthermore, unlike the respective alternatives to expected utility and exponentially discounted
utility models, there is not a unique theoretical alternative here, and illustrating the differences among the formal
structure of models of social preferences would take too much space (and this has already been done, see esp.
Camerer 2003, chap.3; Sobel 2005, sect.3; Fehr and Schmidt 2006, sect.3; Wilkinson and Klaes 2012, sects.10.5-6).
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different ways by which the decision maker’s utility is dependent on “the state of others” (2002,
chap.1, p.35). For a given allocation, such dependence can be (1) on whether The Other gets
more or less than the decision maker (Fehr and Schmidt 1999), (2) on whether The Others
get on average more or less than the decision maker (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000), (3) on The
Other(s) who get(s) the least, or on (4) how much We get in total (both Andreoni and Miller
2002 and Charness and Rabin 2002 propose characterizations for the two latter cases). Notice
these correspond to positions in ethics, moral, or political philosophy: (1) and (2) are two species
of egalitarianism and (3)/(4) represent the Rawlsian/utilitarianist contrast. Though not well
illustrated by the simple choice over an allocation, the dependence of the decision maker’s utility
can also be on (5) The Other’s (a) own motives and (b) beliefs about the decision maker’s
motives (Rabin 1993). Notice that (5) does not match a position in ethics, moral, or political
philosophy; it corresponds to the realm of so-called ‘psychological game theory’ (see Dufwenberg
2008). In terms of Sen’s conceptual apparatus, (1)-(5) violate the requirement of self-welfare goal
(i.e., that own welfare maximization is the unique goal) because they all imply that the decision
maker is not only maximizing his own welfare, though they all imply that he is nevertheless
also maximizing his own welfare. Wilkinson and Klaes (2012, p.422) make a brief remark
regarding Sen’s reflections and the social preferences literature around behavioral economics:
the possibility in Sen’s conceptual apparatus of violating self-welfare goal by the disappearance
of own welfare maximization as a goal (even if compensated by the addition of others’ welfare
maximization as another goal) “is alien to economics, since it cannot be incorporated into
any utility maximization model, whether standard or behavioral”. Furthermore, by contrast
with the main interpretations of violations of the independence axiom and dynamic consistency
by behavioral economists (cf. above), (1)-(5) are always accompanied with statements about
the rationality of the underlying behaviors. This value judgment comes from the theoretical
conventions of using formal language to construct (just like in standard economics) well-behaved
utility functions from the maximization of which game-theoretical equilibria can be derived to
explain and predict factual behaviors in experimental games (see esp. Andreoni and Miller 2002;
and Fehr and Schmidt 2006, sect.2.2).
All (1)-(5) insist that one of the contribution of their formal model is the possibility of
capturing the value judgment of the decision makers, “the concerns for fairness and equity of
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the economic actors being studied” without “incorporat[ing] economists’ judgments of fairness
and equity” as usually done in normative economics (Rabin 1993, p.1282, my emphasis). As
Wilkinson and Klaes (2012, p.396) put it, they take “the view that ‘fairness is in the eye of the
beholder”’. In short, the use of formal language by the economist is supposed to capture how
decision makers would justify their behaviors in ordinary language, though without talking to
them. Notice that ‘fairness is in the eye of the beholder’ could be interpreted as guiding actions
independently of the decision maker’s welfare, i.e., as cases of Sen’s commitment – “breaking
the tight link between individual welfare (with or without sympathy) and the choice of action”
(2002, ibid). But this is not plausible here because (1)-(5) are all meant to capture “how people’s
attitudes toward fairness influence their behavior and well-being” (Rabin 1993, ibid), through
the uses of formal language in the maximization of utility and the derivation of game-theoretic
equilibria. But the empirical regularities that are the main motivation for (1)-(5) are confined
to lab experiments with designs as ‘neutral’ as possible compared with the situational factors
related to social distance discussed in the first subsection. Hence, it can be argued that the
impossibility for (1)-(5) to capture violations of self-welfare goal or commitment (à la Sen) does
not constitute a criticism of their lack of explanatory power or of their psychological realism per
se. Such criticism could however be made, in line with Sen’s original criticisms, to explanations
of real-world phenomena extrapolated qualitatively from (1)-(5), which are made here and there
in the papers referenced above (see also Meier 2007). We shall not conduct such a critical
exercise here, but notice that because (1)-(5) capture various degrees of Sen’s sympathy, it is
at some distance from the decision maker as “close to being a social moron” (Sen 1977b, p.336)
that was the original target of Sen. Thus the critical exercise may not be as radical as one
might think; it would mainly consist in discriminating sympathy from commitment in the field,
thus showing what remains the be incorporated in models of social preferences (or, depending
on one’s point of view, what remains beyond their scope).
Although (1)-(5) are primarily motivated by experimental results in ‘neutral’ situation, it
is often remarked that including “specific economic variables like rules of the game, as well
as social variables like the level of anonymity, the sex of one’s opponent, or the framing of the
decision” (Andreoni and Miller 2002, p.738) is in the agenda for future theoretical developments.
It is also not rare to read that the notion of identity (i.e, the decision makers’ personal, social
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and/or political identities) should be the central notion through which to achieve such theoretical
unification (e.g., Camerer 2003, p.476; see also Fehr and Shmidt 2006). Arguably, this is a project
that has been conducted in the influential work of Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole (2011) which
extends earlier reflections of these authors on non-monetary incentives and self-control to social
preferences as understood in (1)-(5). For the purpose of this subsection, three broad aspects of
Bénabou and Tirole’s work are worth commenting. Firstly, by contrast with (1)-(5), Bénabou
and Tirole do not emphasize that the behaviors they are modeling are necessarily rational
(though they do not pronounce explicit value judgments of irrationality, some are obviously
latent in their work). Secondly, as in (1)-(5), references from social Psychology are only briefly
mentioned and there is no focal psychologist (in the sense in which Kahneman and Tversky and
Ainslie are respectively focal for risk and time preferences). But unlike in (1)-(5) Bénabou and
Tirole (2011) mention much more of such references and seek to show how various phenomena
observed by social psychologists can be captured in the formal language of their model, which
at the same time highlights their economic implications. Finally, the third aspect is related to
the central role of the notion of identity in these interpretations and economic implications. At
one point, they argue that Sen’s commitment, especially when explained by decision makers’
identities, “can be formalized, in a way consistent with consequentialist rationality” through
their model (Bénabou and Tirole 2011, fn32 pp.828-9). Hence the only way Sen’s commitment
can be integrated into the social preferences literature around behavioral economics is if it is
devoided from one of its initial ambition, namely to capture some non-consequentialist form of
rationality relevant for the behavioral foundations of economics.
Summing up, this subsection tried to characterize the contrasts among the three dimensions
of the issue of interdisciplinarity as well as the positive/normative issue. Roughly, for the issue
of interdisciplinarity, the main contrast is that while there are well-identified work in Psychology
influencing behavioral economics’ models in the dimension of uncertainty and time, this is not
the case in the dimension of other people. For the positive/normative issue, while the standard
model versus behavioral models opposition tends to map rather clearly the value judgments
of rationality versus irrationality derived from them in the dimension of time, and with more
qualifications in the dimension of uncertainty, there are no such clear relations in the dimension
of other people.
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From a constructive perspective intended to motivate further empirical and theoretical con-
tributions, the next subsection proposes a critical assessment of the standard and behavioral
contributions discussed so far in the three dimensions.
2.1.4 The experimental translation of rationality, narrativity and identity
In the previous chapter, I tried to make the case that arguments against the methodological
convention of ‘given preferences’ in discussions of economic behavior under certainty “inevitably
drift toward one of the three dimensions of economic behaviors and take this dimension to be
a primary determinant of individual preferences” (in §1.3). In this sense of ‘primacy’, it was
then argued that there is a ‘primacy of risk, time and social preferences’ illustrated by the role
of reflective reasoning, of hedonic experiences and of ethical reasoning in the works of Tversky,
Kahneman and Sen, respectively. The goal of this subsection is to provide a critical assessment of
the contributions discussed in the three previous subsections from an historical, methodological
and philosophical perspective on these three primacies. Following Mongin (2014) we argue
for a revival of what he calls “the experimental translation of rationality”, a tradition that
stems from the work of Maurice Allais and to which reflective reasoning in the work of Tversky
belongs. The work of Robert Strotz, who played a somewhat analogous role on the behavioral
economics of time preferences to the one Allais played for risk preferences, is discussed to flesh
out the normative strength of dynamic consistently and show that it is amenable to the same
criticisms addressed to Kahneman’s primacy of time preference regarding the role of narrativity
in individual behavior. Finally, the role of identity in the formation of commitment within Sen’s
rationality as reasoned scrutiny is briefly explained.
The common ratio effect discussed in this section is the generalization of a decision problem
originally devised by Allais and other French economists (see Pradier and Jallais 2005), along
with other decision problems that are today called the ‘Allais paradoxes’. The initial intention of
Allais and his collaborators was to show that EU and its independence axiom were problematic
on both positive and normative ground. As emphasized by Mongin (2014; see also Guala 2000
and Heukelom 2014), Kahneman and Tversky (1979) were explicitly inspired by the Allais para-
doxes in their positive criticism of EU. But like the behavioral economists that followed them,
they did not side with Allais on the normative dimension. Hence, it is worth refreshing memories
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regarding how these normative issues have been raised, and to propose some developments to
revive them.26
Allais (1953, p.518) contends that it makes no sense to define rationality by “direct” ref-
erence to the EU’s additive formulation or by “indirect” reference to the axiom of preferences
implying it. In his positive and normative uses of counter-examples (i.e., the Allais paradoxes),
Allais (1953; 1979a;b) defends an alternative conception of rationality, that he labels “experi-
mental” (1953, p.521, my translation) or “pragmatic” (1979b, p.467): “it is possible to define
rationality [...] by observing the acts of people of whom there exist independent grounds, i.e.
without recourse to any consideration of random choices, for believing that they behave ratio-
nally” (ibid). More precisely, Allais’ conception of rationality concerns the acts of those people
who are acquainted with uses of formal language, i.e., that are “highly conversant with the
theory of probabilities, having generally extensive mathematical knowledge” (ibid, p.468).
Who are these people? They are the decision makers Allais recruits to answer his choice
problems. Besides high-ranking officials from various governmental institutions (see Pradier
and Jallais 2005), this notably includes decision theorists. Even the decision theorists defending
EU are decision makers in Allais’ choice problems. This is well known through the story of
Leonard Savage, a prominent contributor and defender of EU who violated his own independence
axiom. Savage (1972 [1954], p.103) famously argued that after careful reflections, his choices
were irrational so he would change them to obey his axiom if given the opportunity, which
made the models within EU normative on his account. But the choice problems constructed
by Allais were also intended as normative criticism of EU. A key feature of Allais’ normative
argument is that EU does not properly account for the specificity of Certainty in decision
making under Risk, especially regarding the values of prudence, security, and the avoidance of
ruin, that rationalize the factual violations of EU’s conventions by the rational men he selected
(see Allais 1953; 1979b; Guala 2000; Pradier and Jallais 2005; Heukelom 2014; and esp. Mongin
26It is worth contrasting Kahneman and Tversky’s with Quiggin’s positions on this issue. For the former,
patterns of preferences underlying common ratio effects among others are “anomalies implied by PT”, and
“[t]hese departures from expected utility must lead to normatively unacceptable consequences [...] normally
corrected by the decision maker when he realizes that his preferences are inconsistent” (Kahneman and Tversky
1979, p.277, my emphasis). For the latter, his RDU was partly motivated by normative considerations derived
from the experimental results discussed below (see Quiggin 1982, p.325), an approach that, as he later lamented,
“unfortunately has not been adopted by subsequent experimenters” (Quiggin, 1993, p.129; it should be noted
that in this passage, he comments on Slovic and Tversky’s design, but mistakenly references MacCrimmon and
Larsson).
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2009; 2014).
The work of Allais did pave the way for the “the experimental translation of rationality”
as Mongin (2014) puts it. In these experiments, the decision makers are not decision theorists
anymore, but ordinary subjects (or business executives in the pioneering one, MacCrimmon
1968). They confront both Allais’ decision problems (along with others) and the arguments
of decision theorists debating the rationality of the independence axiom. I wish to highlight
three points about these experiments that are related to the methodological perspective of this
dissertation.
The first point concerns Kenneth MacCrimmon and Stig Larsson’s (1979) experiments. In
their design, After his choices were made, the decision maker rates his degrees of agreement
with twenty decision rules, which are ordinary language translations of either the formal axiom
usually violated (e.g., the independence axioms), or their implications, or alternative decision
rules in contradiction with EU (e.g., from Allais’ theory on the specific role of Certainty, and
non-independence of Probability and utility). Notice the communicative structure, whereby
the issue of translation from decision theorists’ formal language to the decision makers’ ordinary
language becomes crucial .
The second point concerns MacCrimmon’s (1968, sect. III) pioneering experiment. In his
design, After his choices were made, the decision maker is presented with the descriptions
of two choices that are said to have been made by Other People, along with the respective
explanations of them reflecting Allais’ arguments on the specificity of Certainty or reflecting
the independence axiom. The decision maker is asked to select the choice and explanation he
prefers (and to try to criticize both): this step tends to make more people go for Allais, even
those who respected the independence axiom. Then, in a last step, MacCrimmon conducts an
interview with the decision maker to make sure he understood the task, and to know more about
the reasons for his choices and eventual switch of choices. This sort of explicit communicative
structure between the decision maker and the decision modeler seems very much in line with
the perspective defended in this dissertation. But it rather points the limits of this perspective,
because the results are rather puzzling: though this was not intended, decision makers decided
to re-reverse their choices during the interview, to side against Allais. This shows (as most
experimenters know well) how natural conversation, though not everyday ordinary language per
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se, does not fit with the type of behaviors the decision modeler seeks to observe in the lab.
The third point is about the work of Tversky in this literature; it concerns how Slovic
and Tversky’s (1974) experiments provide a way out of the problems in the previous point.
In one experiment, After his choices were made, the decision maker is introduced counter
arguments to his choices with the following instructions: “[n]ow that you have made your
choices you might be interested in reading what a prominent decision theorist has to say about
this problem” (pp.369-70). If they violated the independence axiom, they were introduced to a
careful explanation and defense of this axiom, narrated in the first-person by “Dr. S.”, reflecting
Savage’s arguments. If they did not violate the independence axiom, they were introduced to
“Dr. A.”’s careful explanation of why violating the axiom would have been rational, reflecting
Allais’ position. Then they had to choose again. Though there was much more people going for
Allais in the first choices, the argumentative interlude did not change this so much. In another
experiment, decision makers are presented with both argumentations with a careful step-by-step
explanations of the arguments by the experimenter, which they had to rate After they make
their choices. On the overall, Allais’ position was rated higher (more convincing), yet people
(include those rating Allais’ position high) chose more like Savage this time (MacCrimmon and
Larsson’s [1979, Fig.4] results display the same curious tendency).27
Despite the messiness of these results, they show at least that the traditional defense of the
independence axiom fails, i.e., it is not the case that ‘if people understand it then they tend to
accept it, and then, with careful reflection, not to reverse their preferences’. The independence
axiom is not always violated, yet its normative appeal to ordinary people, or lack thereof,
remains an open question. Recently, a careful dissection of these experiments has been done
by Mongin (2014), who offers a plea for their re-introduction into experimental economists’ lab.
Following Mongin (2014) I would like to propose potential experimental designs that may be
worth implementing. In this vein, notice one feature of Slovic and Tversky’s (1974) experiment:
their willingness to present the matter with a specific type of external validity, namely to reflect
the actual debate that is being carried out in the scientific community. This is especially vivid
27This tendency is further discussed in a comment on Mongin (2014), see Jullien (2016b). Also, though non-
probabilistic uncertainty lies outside the scope of this dissertation, it should be noted that in the version of the
problem with unknown probability (in the distale zone of the Possible), people overwhelmingly rated Allais’
position higher, and chose consistently with it.
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in the second experiment, where the two argumentations presented at the same time are based
on the controversial conversations that are actually taking place outside of the lab. The decision
makers’ reactions and reasoning are potentially having an impact on (at least a part of) this
debate (e.g., if there would have been 100% agreement on one side, the debate might have
been settled). But this is not how the decision problem is presented to them. Presenting the
decision problem as such, that is, as underlying actions constitutive of a scientific debate, might
yield interesting outcomes, and would be in line with economists’ experimental tradition of not
deceiving decision makers regarding the purpose of their tasks. In short, the proposal is to
present the tasks for what they are, i.e., as part of a controversial inquiry into the meaning(s)
of economic rationality, and into the potential correspondence between economic agents and
economic theorists on the issue.28
One obvious objection to this proposal – maybe even against the whole project of reviving this
type of experiments – is that it is plagued with ‘ambiguities’ given the elusive and controversial
aspects of the main measurement targets, namely the subjects’ reasons, or reasoning; or worse,
the meaning(s) of economic rationality. But as Sen puts it in his discussion of the debate around
EU, “the notion of rationality involves inherent ambiguities [...] with or without uncertainty”,
and “to make these ambiguities clear” is worth pursuing (2002, chap.6, p.230). From Sen’s
28To bring some concreteness to this proposal, let me relate how, with Dino Borie (the co-author of the last
chapter of this dissertation), we took a rough shot at implementing it with our students. On a few occasions
during a semester, we conducted choice experiments on framing effects. Besides telling students that there were
no wrong answers, that it was for our own research but had nothing to do with the course, we also told them that
if they were interested we would explain to them what this was all about at the end of semester. So at the end of
the semester, we explained them what this was all about. Roughly, we presented several pairs of choice from the
literature, asking them how they would choose and if they remembered how they had chosen, and telling them
how most people choose. All along, we explained that there were never ‘good’ answers, but that some theories
and theorists thought they were more or less ‘rational’ patterns of answers, how they disagreed, etc. This was, in
a way, an exercise in the popularization of science (which, in passing, is interestingly argued to be of more interest
for the scientist than for the reader by Jurdant 1973). At the end, we simply asked them again: ‘Now that you
know all that, does it make a difference to the way you see the problem? Would you change your original choices?’.
The answers are not very representative because this was conducted non-rigorously (more for our own curiosity,
and to actually test some weird axiom of our model, than for the sake of an eventual publication). Roughly,
most of them stuck with their initial choices and a few had interesing rationale for their choices that I never
thought about before despite having read the philosophical literature on the topic. It does not seem impossible
to introduce controls for the obivously potential self-confirmatory biases in such procedures (viz. MacCrimmon’s
1968 problems with the interview). The point here is that the proposition made in the paragraph is feasible.
Furthermore, it can be given an epistemological justification through the theory of reflective equilibrium and the
rationality debate in cognitive sciences (which is, as in economics, also around Kahneman and Tversky’s work,
among others); this is an argument I am currently developing in a working paper. Finally, it can be argued that
the proposal made here is in line with two recent trends related to behavioral economics. The first one is the
development of ‘experimental philosophy’ (Nagatsu 2013 provides an introduction directed to economists). The
second one is with the collective decision processes in “deliberative democracy” discussed by Lowesntein and
Ubel (2008, p.1807), where representative citizens are making decisions informed by scientific results on decision
making biases; my proposal is a variant at the individual level, with information about the debates around the
results.
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reflections and given the experiments discussed above, there are at least two ambiguities that
may be clarified with some specific experimental conditions. First, how much acquaintance with
formal language is to be required in tracing the rational/irrational line (ibid)? Mongin (2014)
contrasts Allais’ exogenous selection of subjects (only highly acquainted subjects participate
to the experiments) with MacCrimmon and Larsson’s nearly endogenous selection of subjects
(using within-subject data that seek to measure the coherence between choices and approval
of the underlying rules and reasoning of choices, the more coherent the more rational). The
recent focus on inter-individual differences and intelligence in the literature around behavioral
economics has already implemented strategies that mix exogenous and endogenous selection of
rational subjects (a brief discussion of which is made §4.2.1 in chapter 4 below). Second, “if
anyone does claim that Allais’ reasoning [...] are “erroneous,” he has to show why the apparent
justification is not “really” acceptable” (Sen 2002, chap.6, p.232). In other words, beyond
presenting subjects with Allais’ or Savage’s reasoning, one could also present them with what
is wrong with either reasoning from the other’s perspective. In short, beyond arguments for
or against a given axiom (as in Slovic and Tversky 1974), the decision makers should also be
provided with the existing counter-arguments to them (which is slightly different from being
asked to produce such counter-arguments, as in MacCrimmon’s 1968 experiments).29
Turning to time preferences, I would like to argue that there is an internal requirement of
reflective reasoning in dynamic consistency, by contrast with how this requirement has been
externally imposed on the independence axiom by economists as an evaluative criterion. This
is especially clear in the pioneering work of Strotz who introduced the notions of time consis-
tency and inconsistency used in the previous subsections. The main result for which Strotz
is usually credited is that only the theoretical convention of exponential discounting (and no
other functional form) ensures dynamic consistency (see Lapied and Renault 2012, sects.1-4, for
some subtle nuances to this observation). This result is indeed one of the main sources of value
judgments defending the normative soundness of exponential discounting. Strotz’s original dis-
cussion (1) gives some depth to this proposition (mainly because of the way he entangles facts
and values) and at the same time (2) suggests a classical argument against being consistent with
29There is a third ambiguity which is too deep to be discussed in this dissertation, regarding the uses of
counterfactual reasoning in the EU debates (see Sen 2002, chap.6, p.230; Bradley and Stefansson 2016).
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oneself through time (namely, that there is no ‘oneself’ through time, but a series of selves).
Let’s discuss these two points in turn.
Firstly, Strotz argues from psychology that we are not naturally dynamically consistent in
our intertemporal choices. But we seem to value dynamic consistency because there are many
empirical examples of behaviors where the decision maker tries to avoid dynamic inconsistency.
In short, the theoretical convention of dynamic consistency is justified by value judgments of
rationality and irrationality from the factually observable behaviors of decision makers who try
but not necessarily succeed to be dynamically consistent. Strotz classifies such behaviors in two
categories: precommitment and consistent planning (1956, p.173). The former includes cases
such as ‘Christmas Clubs’ where the decision maker save some money with overly restrictive
conditions in terms of interest rates and withdrawal fees so as to be sure to have enough money
to buy Christmas present in due time. The central point about precommitment is that decision
makers precommit to a plan to make it harder to revise it in the future because they anticipate
the unpleasant future consequences of the plan will trigger later revisions leading to dynamic
inconsistency. By contrast, consistent planning are cases when the decision maker anticipates
his inconsistency in future revision of the plan and chooses another initial plan accordingly.
Strotz offers no concrete examples of consistent planning; he only tries to offer a formal solution
to it by treating the decision problem backwards. Notice that, on Strotz’s accounts of both
precommitment and consistent planning, dynamic consistency is the fruit of the decision maker’s
reflective reasoning about how he would have behaved in the Future without having this
very reflection, which is Now changing how he will actually behave in the Future. Strotz’s
analytical result that only exponential discounting ensures dynamic consistency, added to the
entanglement of facts and values in his characterization of dynamic consistency, provides a non-
trivial normative justification for the theoretical conventions of exponential discounting and
their implications.30
30In a contemporary multiple selves’ terminology, if the evaluating self t can undertake a precommitment
action that retrains the actions of the future selves, then this game formalizes Strotz’s problem of precommitment,
otherwise it formalizes consistent planning. Though the language of selves was not used strictly speaking, the
“sophisticate”/“naïve” terminology introduced in the previous subsection indeed stems from (Pollak 1968) the
literature generated by Strotz’s consistent planning problem, which, like Laibson, focus only on the sophisticated
case (see esp. Peleg and Yaari 1973 and Goldman 1980). O’Donoghue and Rabin’s (1999a; b; 2001; 2003; 2005;
2006) contributions can be seen as systematically contrasting the sophisticated case with the naïve cases, and thus
pointing the implications of the latter case that has been under-examined in the consistent planning literature.
One non-trivial implication is that there is never consistent planning (by definition) and it is also harder to
122
Secondly, Strotz raises the point that “[t]o-day it will be rational for a man to jettison his
“optimal” plan of yesterday, not because his tastes have changed in any unexpected way nor
because his knowledge of the future is different, but because to-day he is a different person with
a new discount function – the old one shifted forward in time” (p.173). The main normative
implication for an economist being “[t]he interpersonal aspect of the intertemporal problem”
(p.179), namely that:
“consumer sovereignty has no meaning in the context of the dynamic decision-making
problem. The individual over time is an infinity of individuals, and the familiar
problems of interpersonal utility comparisons are there to plague us. ” (ibid)
In other words, Strotz’s position is that if the decision maker is not the unit of agency through
time, then dynamic consistency loses normative appeal, and by implication of Strotz’s main
analytical result, so does exponential discounting; though the facts remain that decision makers
often seek to achieve dynamic consistency, which suggest that they are the unit of agency through
time after all..
The relation with the ‘primacy of time preferences’ in the work of Kahneman is this. The
experimental literature on experienced utility is taken to show that, partly because they fail to
correctly remember Now what they have experienced in The Past, decision makers usually
fail to anticipate Now what they will experience in The Future. Since this is a prerequisite
to anticipate how they will behave then, dynamic inconsistency is more pervasive and inevitable
than Strotz thought. And dynamic inconsistency is not restricted to The Future, but to
consequences that occurs just a little bit Later after the choice. Thus, the systematic biases in
anticipation, formalized in Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and Rabin’s (2003) model of “projection
bias”, also contend to explain inconsistency in decisions that were usually explained in atemporal
frameworks, such as endowment effects (e.g., one fail to anticipate the effect of loss aversion in
his evaluation, see Loewenstein et al. 2003, p.1214).
On its normative dimension, the primacy of time preferences in the work of Kahneman has
been criticized on the basis that the maximization of instantaneous hedonic experiences does not
capture aspects of decision making that are normatively meaningful to decision makers. Among
these aspects, is the normative value of narrativity. That is, the value of planning one’s life
observe directly since naïves don’t undertake precommitment (as they think they are more time-consistent than
they actually are, see esp. O’Donoghue and Rabin’s 1999a, sect. V).
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as a story to be narrated which involves (among other things) unplanned drama that we may
or may not overcome (see the references in Loewenstein and Ubel 2008, p.1803). The upshot
of the argument is that dynamic inconsistencies can be justified as rational by a consistent
story. More precisely, one can construct a consistent story to justify dynamic inconsistencies by
arguing against the necessity of dynamic consistency (either in its behavioral or ‘experienced’
interpretations) as a component of the good life. Notice that this does not imply that all
dynamic inconsistencies are necessarily rational, just that some are, hence dynamic consistency
is not necessarily rational. To illustrate, imagine that I choose a plan in which I work as much
as possible on my dissertation during the last month before giving the final manuscript back
over other plans where I sometimes party with my friends at night (and do not work the day
after) or where I go on some road-trips to Italy and do not work during them. For this given
situation, consider the following two violations, which ceteris paribus, imply the same objective
outcome (e.g., minus one day of work on the dissertation): partying with my friends one night
versus an impulsively unplanned road-trip of one day to Italy with the same friends. It could
be argued that any story cannot make the place of the former violation in my life important
enough (without ‘lying to myself’) to judge the underlying behavior as rational, while the reverse
is true for the latter violation. The point is that this criticism raised against the primacy of time
preference in the work of Kahneman extends beyond it, i.e., to dynamic consistency in general.
Developing this argument at length would take too much space as it involves situating behavioral
economics within broader contemporary debates (notably in the philosophy of the social and
cognitive sciences, see Strawson 2004) about the issues underlying intertemporal choices.31
Turning to the ‘primacy of social preferences’ in the work of Sen, consider the following
question which is often raised in discussions of Sen’s commitment (see Peter and Schmid 2007).
If commitment is a species of reason, then what are the specific characteristic of that species
31Notice that for the criticism of this paragraph to hold, one must restrict notions such as ‘consequences’,
‘outcomes’ and the like to objective ones in the sense that their descriptions cannot contain references to mental
states (this issue is discussed in the conclusion of chapter 4 and in chapter 5). Notice also that John Davis (2009a;
2011) and Don Ross (2005; 2014) have undertaken to place behavioral economics within the debates on narrativity
and identiy in the philosophy of cognitive and social sciences. We critically assess their work in a working paper
co-written with Tom Juille. It should finally be noted that, at least implicitly and mostly by drawing on the
“narrative fallacy” developed by Nassim Taleb in his popular book The Black Swan (2007), Kahneman (2011,
pp.199-200, 218-221, and chap.36) took a stance on this narrative criticism. He agrees that narrativity is indeed
an important source of motivation for people’s behavior, so it should be explained positively. But he argues
that it does not in fact tend to contribute to make them happier and has other negative consequences, and so it
should not be used as a normative criterion.
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from the other ones (self-centeredness and sympathy), especially regarding the way it motivates
behavior? One part of the answer (but by all mean not the full answer) is that rational com-
mitments can be the fruit of social identity regimented by reasoned scrutiny. Expressed in his
words, rational commitments are possible through “a sense of “identity” generated in a commu-
nity (without leading to a congruence of goals)”, and managing the non-congruence with others’
goals is achieved through “the fourth aspect of the self” besides the three requirements of self
interest and not imposed in standard models, i.e., “one’s own reasoning and self-scrutiny” (Sen
2002, chap.5, p.219 for the first quote; then chap.1, p.36; see also Davis 2007a).
Sen defends a plural conception of identity where what makes the decision maker the unit of
agency is his reasoned scrutiny about all the identities he has from belonging to different social
groups. It is however worth keeping in mind that this does not exhaust the specificity of rational
commitments because “identity-based reasoning, even of the most permissive kind, including the
identity of belonging to the group of all human beings, must, however, be distinguished from
those arguments for concern that make no use of any particular shared membership, but never-
theless invoke ethical norms (of, say, kindness, fairness or humaneness) that may be expected
to guide the behaviour of any human being” (Sen 2009 fn pp.142-3; see also 2006, pp.22-3).
Social identity underlies a methodological issue about the unity of agency which makes a
connection with time preferences, as we saw a similar issue arise there as well. Put simply, while
the issue for time preferences is ‘what makes it the case that I will be Me in The Future
(and was Me in The Past)’, for social preferences it is ‘what makes it the case that I am Now
Me and not You, and that He is (or They are) not with Us?’. The precommitment behaviors
discussed by Strotz and the commitment behaviors related to social identity discussed by Sen
are only a tiny part of the answers to these two questions.32
To conclude this subsection, it can be argued that there are characteristics of reasoned
scrutiny involved in the experimental translation of rationality, in both dynamic consistency
and its violations rationalized by narrativity and in commitments, even those that the decision
maker’s derived from his identity. Several complementarities suggest themselves. For instance,
32They two questions have been formulated in a more sophisticated way and deeply scrutinized by John Davis
in many publications (systematized in his 2003 and 2011 books; see esp. 2007a). His contribution is in line with
this chapter for two reasons. First, Davis takes the two questions together. Second, he argues for a consistent
answers to both questions by building on Sen’s work on capability and commitment (with a specific attention to
reasoned scrutiny that Davis develops in his account of ‘reflexivity’).
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the experimental translation of rationality can be applied in experiments on time and social
preferences; or the type of dialogue between Dr. A. and Dr. S. in Slovic and Tversky’s experi-
ments can be used as inspiration to write experimental instructions in a narrative manner that
speaks more directly to decision makers than either open ended questions or neutral ones (for
the purpose of checking reasons for choices at least). The perspective taken in this subsection
suggests that an articulation of the notions of identity and narrativity can provide an helpful
critical background to assess the normative dimensions of economic behaviors under uncertainty
and especially over time and regarding other people (for developments in that direction, see Ross
2005; 2014; Davis 2009a; 2011). Finally, note that this perspective is somewhat ‘external’ in
the sense of using arguments developed by authors who do not participate to the contemporary
standard versus behavioral economics debates – though it is not external in the sense of not
proposing alternatives alien to these debates, quite the contrary.
Conclusion
This section has provided an empirical and theoretical picture of the main challenges posed by
behavioral economics to the standard accounts of behaviors under uncertainty, over time and
regarding other people. Despite being three different areas of research, we saw non-trivial but
implicit connections across the three dimensions. Both in terms of the issue of interdisciplinarity
between economics and Psychology and of the positive/normative issues, the dimensions of
uncertainty and time have more similitude than uncertainty and other people or time and other
people (recall that we focus on the challenges posed by behavioral economics, not on standard
economics taken as a whole). Notably, while under uncertainty and over time there are two well
identified sources of inspirations from Psychology (respectively Kahneman and Tversky, and
Ainslie) and a rather strong adherence to the doctrine of consequentialism from a normative
perspective, both these aspects are less present regarding other people (but they are there).
Throughout, we have emphasized by means of Rastier’s typographical convention that one
condition of possibility for the discussions provided here to be intelligible in the first place is
the marking of linguistic distinctions within and among his table presented in the introduction
of the chapter. Finally, it can be said that the critical exercise conducted in the last subsection
was ‘external’ in the sense that the arguments developed here are not derived from authors
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that participate to the contemporary standard versus behavioral economics debates. The next
section can be seen, by contrast, as continuing this critical exercise ‘internally’, i.e., by drawing
on contemporary authors participating to these debates.
2.2 Interactions across the three dimensions
Actually, the perspective taken in this section can deemed ‘internal’ in two senses. There is
the sense just mentioned, i.e., putting together a number of contributions from within the
standard versus behavioral debates. But it is also internal in the sense that what most of
these contributions do is to ‘internally’ fold the three dimensions over each others, by contrast
with putting them in perspective with a fourth ‘external’ entity, e.g., the p-&-Psychological
constructs of motivation, attention or emotion (see e.g., Bruno 2013) – or even narrativity
and identity as in the previous subsection. This section characterizes some details of the post
mid-2000s emergence of interests in interactions across the three dimensions. Because many of
the contributions discussed here do not discuss each others, the main goal of this subsection
is to state the issues and argue that they are non-trivial for the behavioral versus standard
economics debates; the goal is not to discuss a possible general solution to these issues (this will
be the object of the next chapter). A picture of the main empirical regularities characterizing
the post mid-2000s’ interactions across dimensions movement is first presented (2.2.1). Then,
in order to understand what the theoretical and normative implications of this picture are
and are not, it is put into perspective with three sets of contributions. The first one is on
separability as the main theoretical convention and source of normativity underlying interactions
across dimensions within standard models (2.2.2). The second one is on early theoretical and
normative challenges to separability – from the timing of uncertainty resolution and conflicts
between dynamic consistency and consequentialism – which have recently gained interests around
behavioral economics because of the post mid-2000s’ interactions across dimensions (2.2.3). The
last one is on more recent (quantitative) measurement and (qualitative) theoretical issues that
relates the picture with both the issue of interdisciplinarity and an explicit version of the issue
of the primacy of one type of preference over the others (2.2.4).
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2.2.1 Altogether and naked again: the main empirical regularities
In the same fashion as what was done in the first subsection of the previous section, this subsec-
tion tries to present a structured picture of the main empirical regularities about interactions
across the three dimensions. Just as one of the specificity of the picture there was to discuss the
three dimensions altogether instead of separately (as is usually the case), the picture here dis-
cuss the three pairs of interactions (i.e., time-risk, risk-social, social-time) altogether instead of
separately (as is usually the case). It is also naked in the sense that theoretical and methodolog-
ical considerations have been kept at minimum for the same reasons evoked there. And again,
the examples have been carefully selected for the way they make the ‘logic’ of the regularities
transparent. The main goal of this subsection is to flesh one feature of this logic, namely that
there are directions of introduction of one dimension in another one, due to historical reasons
pertaining to the empirical structure of the classical challenges discussed in the previous section.
The example of a decision problem involving time and risk in the introduction of this chapter
was taken from economists Manuel Baucells and Franz Heukamp (2010, table 1). It can be said
of this example that it introduced time in the dimension of uncertainty because the structure of
the decision problem is the one traditionally used to study common ratio effects, which played
a crucial role in the literature around risk preferences. Indeed, Baucells and Heukamp first
replicated the common ratio effect ([A  B]&[D  C]) from the previous section with the
dimension of time made explicit and the following monetary values (where the common ratio
dividing the probabilities is 10):
A: The Certainty of winning €9 now
B: 80% chance of winning €12 now_
C: 10% chance of winning €9 now__
D: 8% chance of winning €12 now__
Then they show how varying the dimension of time can, with respect to the standard model
(EU), restore consistency in risk preferences ([B′  A′]&[D′  C ′]), as in the following decision
problems where all the consequences from the previous problems are delayed in The Future:
A′: The certainty of winning €9 in 3 months
B′: 80% chance of winning €12 in 3 months
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C ′: 10% chance of winning €9 in 3 months
D′: 8% chance of winning €12 in 3 months
One of the main inspirations of Baucells and Heukamp’s experiment was a series of experi-
mental results obtained fifteen years earlier by psychologists Gideon Keren and Peter Roelofsma
(1995). The latter paper is indeed one of the main trigger (with ten years of delay) of the
mid-2000s emergence of interests in the interactions between time and risk preferences around
behavioral economics. Keren and Roelofsma (1995, exp.1) also introduced risk in the dimension
of time, through the decision problem used to study the common difference effect discussed in
the previous section. They first replicated the effect ([A  B]&[D  C]) with the dimension of
risk made explicit and the following monetary values (where the difference in time is 4 weeks):
A: The certainty of winning €100 now____
B: The certainty of winning €110 in 4 weeks_
C: The certainty of winning €100 in 26 weeks
D: The certainty of winning €110 in 30 weeks
Then they show how varying the dimension of risk can, with respect to the standard model
(EDU), restore consistency in time preferences ([B′  C ′]&[D′  C ′]), as in the following
decision problems where all the consequences from the previous problems can be won with
Probability .5:
A′: 50% chance of winning €100 now_____
B′: 50% chance of winning €110 in 4 weeks_
C ′: 50% chance of winning €100 in 26 weeks
D′: 50% chance of winning €110 in 30 weeks
We have seen that the interactions between risk and time preferences can go both ways: time
preferences can restore consistency in risk preferences (Baucells and Heukamp 2010; Keren and
Roelofsma 1995, exp.2), and risk preferences can restore consistency in time preferences (Keren
and Roelofsma 1995, exp.1). These interactions are indeed often discussed altogether in the
post mid-2000s literature on the interactions across dimensions, focusing mainly on the effects
just presented (though there are others that will not be discussed here, see the references in the
next subsection). But, on the one hand, they are discussed apart from interactions involving
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the dimension of other people, and, on the other hand, the different interactions involving the
dimension of other people are often discussed separately from one another. We now turn to the
latter, starting with how risk and time have been introduced in the dimension of other people.
An instance of the introduction of risk in the dimension of other people is the dictator games
of Michal Krawczyk and Fabrice Le Lec (2010). They construct a “probabilistic dictator game”
(p.500) where a decision maker has to allocate 10 tokens between himself and the recipient
in different conditions. In a deterministic condition mimicking standard dictator game under
certainty, one token is worth 10% of the consequences of a predetermined allocation, e.g., if
the predetermined allocation is €20 for the decision maker and €20 for the other, then keeping
the 10 tokens imply €20 for the decision maker (100% of his consequences) and nothing for
the other (0% of his consequences), while giving 5 tokens to the others imply €10 for the
decision maker (50% of his consequences) and €10 for the others (50% of his consequences).
In another condition with risk, one token is worth 10% chance of winning the consequences of
a predetermined allocation, e.g., (with the same €20/€20 allocation) keeping 10 tokens imply
the certainty (100% chance) of winning €20 for the decision maker and the impossibility (0%
chance) of winning €20, while giving 5 tokens to the others imply the lottery with 50% chance
of winning €20 and 50% chance of winning nothing for the decision maker, and the same lottery
for the other. The decision makers who gave at least one token in the first case (they gave 2.43
on average) gave significantly less token in the second case (they gave 1.98 on average). With
other results from other conditions, the tendency is that the greater the uncertainty introduced
the closer to self-centeredness the decision makers tend.
An instance of the introduction of time in the dimension of other people is in the dictator
games of Jaromir Kovarik (2009). He constructs dictator games where the decision maker has to
allocate €6 between himself and the recipient in different conditions. In an immediate condition
mimicking the standard dictator, the decision maker and the other both receive their money at
the end of the experiment. The other conditions vary the delay with which the money is received,
from two days to twenty two days. The tendency is that the greater the delay introduced, the
closer to self-centeredness the decision makers tend, with virtually everybody being strictly
self-centered after fourteen days of delay (i.e., all give €0 from fourteen till twenty two days of
delay).
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Again, other effects of risk and time in the dimension of other people have been shown with
other games but they will not be discussed here (see the references in the next subsection).
The point is that introducing risk and time in the dimension of other people can push decision
makers to abide by the requirement of self-interest that was initially violated in the dictator
game, i.e., self-centeredness.
We can finally turn to how other people can be introduced in the dimensions of risk and time.
An instance of the introduction of other people in the dimension of risk is in the experiments of
Gary Bolton and Axel Ockenfels (2010), with decision problems such the following two pairs (A
versus B and A′ versus B′):
A: the certainty of winning €9 for Me_____________________
B: 50% chance of winning €16 and 50% chance of winning nothing for Me
A′: the certainty of winning €9 for Me and €16 for Him___________
B′: 50% chance of winning €16 for Me and €16 for Him___________
and 50% chance of winning nothing for Me and nothing for Him______
Notice how the modal risk preference for oneself (A  B) reverses when the other is intro-
duced (B′  A′ ) even though the consequences for oneself are invariant across the two pairs.
The second pair just adds inequality in the sure object of choice and equality in the risky one.
Thus it seems that a preference for equality (or against inequality) interacts with risk prefer-
ences, creating inconsistency in the latter (at least with respect to the standard model). So by
contrast with the two first examples of this subsection, the interaction here creates a further
inconsistency rather than restoring consistency.
To my knowledge, there is no experiments introducing other people in the dimension of time,
at least in the same fashion as the experiments discussed so far in this subsection, i.e., where the
introduction of other people in an intertemporal choice would create a conflict that would have
an effect on time preferences. This is surprising for two reasons, which I will briefly discuss and
for which I will propose decision problems that would easily be implemented in lab experiments.
First, such decision problems are not hard to imagine. For instance, one instance drawing on
the previous choice experiment would look like this:
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A: €9 for Me now____________________
B: €16 for Me in a week________________
A′: €9 for Me now and €16 for Him now_______
B′: €16 for Me in a week and €16 for Him in a week
The second reason why the absence of such experiments is surprising is because the relation
between discounting and altruism (cf. the problems of intergenerational altruism mentioned in
the previous section) is currently gaining great theoretical and empirical attention regarding
climate change, and this has directed the attention of macroeconomists interested in this issue
of so-called ‘social discounting’ to look at the behavioral economics literature on individual
time preferences (see the references in Peroco and Nijkamp 2009). An important problem
related to individual time preferences in social discounting is illustrated by Sen’s (1961, pp.487-
9) “Isolation Paradox”, which could also be of interest to behavioral economists. The original
thought experiment runs roughly as follows. A decision maker who will be dead in twenty years
prefers one unit of consumption now to three units of consumption in twenty years, even though
he cares about the future generations, i.e., three for the other is not enough for him to sacrifice
one for himself. Another individual confronted with the same problem comes to the decision
maker and says: ‘if you save your three units, then I will do the same, if you consume your
unit now, then I will also do the same’. The decision maker changes his preferences, and Sen
argues that this reversal is perfectly rational, even without deep moral considerations, i.e., only
on quantitative grounds, sacrificing one unit for himself for six units to the other is enough.
This would easily translate in the following individual decision problem:33
A: €10 for Me now_____________
B: €30 for Him in a week_________
A′: €10 for Me now and €10 for You now
B′: €60 for Him in a week_________
Summing up, we have seen in this subsection that interactions across dimensions can (with
respect to the standard models) either restore consistency in risk, time or social preferences, or
33In psychology experiments the expression ‘social discounting’ is also used in the literature on ‘social-distance’
mentioned in the last footnote of the first subsection (e.g., Jones and Rachlin 2008). The example suggested here
is somewhat close to the ones presented there (see esp. Yi et al. 2011), with the difference that the psychologists
introduce more experimental manipulations aimed at measuring the social distance between Me You and Him
(they asked to imagine who and how you would rank people on a list from 1 to 100).
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produce further inconsistencies. Experiments have investigated interactions across dimensions
by pairs, with an absence of interest in the time-social pair, at least in the same experimen-
tal fashion as the other ones have been studied. Although the effects presented here are not
exhaustive, it seems that there has not been similar studies on interactions across dimensions
in magnitude effects (though see the pattern of preferences called ‘subendurance’ in Baucells
and Heukamp 2012, table 1, lines 7-8) or in sign effects. The same hold for ‘social distance’ as
defined in experimental economics (see the previous section), though psychologists have done
such studies regarding the social-time pair with a somewhat different understanding (or at least
experimental implementation) of ‘social distance’ (see the previous footnote). But the picture
presented here is (I hope) enough to get a concrete taste of what is meant here by interactions
across dimensions compared with the interactions within dimensions from the previous section,
which were constitutive of the making of behavioral economics. The main contrast is that here
the patterns of preferences are, taken altogether, in contradictions with both the standard model
and the behavioral alternatives presented in the previous section.
2.2.2 Separability and the three dimensions altogether
In standard models, the implicit connections between the three dimensions are due to mathe-
matical results and theoretical contributions of John Harsanyi (1955), William Gorman (1968)
and Debreu (1960). The goal of this subsection is first to explain these connections by following
John Broome’s (1991) book-length investigation of the theoretical and normative interpretations
of these contributions. Broome provides one of the rare discussion of the implicit connections
in the standard model of the three dimensions taken altogether; we shall then to put it in
perspective with two more recent contributions that also tackle the three dimensions altogether.
Broom’s account focuses on the role of separability in the construction of functional represen-
tation (U(.)) of preferences (%). We shall first illustrate that the standard models studied above
share a common requirement of separability, namely additive separability, before we illustrate
Broome’s account of the interactions across dimensions though what he calls crosscutting separa-
bility (see also Grant and van Zandt 2009). In the dimension of uncertainty, preferences are sepa-
rable between mutually-exclusive states, e.g., in a coin flip lottery (X), there are only two mutu-
ally exclusive states, namely of head or tail coming up (1 or 2, respectively), the consequences in
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each being therefore mutually exclusive as well (you get x1 or x2). Additive separability requires,
not only that each of these consequences be subevaluated separately, but that they can be added,
i.e., U(x1, x2) = u1(x1) + u2(x2). The independence axiom necessary for EU is thus a separa-
bility condition that further requires the subutilities of consequences to be weighted linearly by
their respective Probabilities, i.e., U(X) = .5u1(x1) + .5u2(x2), and assumptions of a unique
subutility function are often made, i.e., U(X) = .5u(x1) + .5u(x2). In the dimension of time,
preferences are separable between mutually exclusive periods of a plan (X), e.g., Now or Later
(1 or 2, respectively), with mutually exclusive consequences x1 or x2. What is sometimes called
‘time separability’ implies additive separability, i.e., U(X) = u1(x1)+u2(x2). Time separability
is part of the axioms necessary for EDU, other axioms implying the weighting of the subutilities
of the consequences to be an exponential function of time, i.e., U(X) = u1(x2)+ u2(x2)1+ρ , together
with the assumption of a unique subutility function, i.e., U(X) = u(x2)+ u(x2)1+ρ . In the dimension
of other people, preferences are separable between the mutually the exclusive people that are
the recipients allocation (X), e.g., Me and You (1 and 2, respectively) receives consequences
x1 and x2 that are mutually exclusive in that X = x1 + x2. In modeling whoever evaluate
an allocation (e.g., Me, You, or A Social Observer), additive separability between people
is often implied by axioms on preferences or assumed directly, i.e., U(X) = u1(x1) + u2(x2),
together with various and usually controversial assumptions or axioms about how to weight
and/or compare the (sub)utilities of people (see Sen 1977a; or Harsanyi 1988 on these issues).
Crosscutting separability concerns preferences over consequences that are distributed across
dimensions. To illustrate what crosscutting separability means and requires, as well as the
analytical connection it gives rise to, we shall use Broome’s type of example that are, as he
puts it, “conveniently symmetrical” (1991, p.62) on two dimensions only. To do so, consider the
following ‘temporal allocation’ or ‘social plan’:
A: €10 now and €10 soon for me, and €10 now and €10 soon for you
B: €5 now and €20 soon for me, and €20 now and €5 soon for you_
This decision problem can be represented as in Table 2.2, where the subscripts separated by
a comma indicate the coordinates of what Broome calls the “locations” (related to the ‘zones’
of a dimension in Rastier’s terminology), the first one is the time coordinate, i.e., location 1 is
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People
Time
Now Soon Now Soon
Me €10 (a1,1) €10 (a2,1) €5 (b1,1) €20 (b2,1)
You €10 (a1,2) €10 (a2,2) €20 (b1,2) €5 (b2,2)
A B
Table 2.2: A conveniently symmetrical example for crosscutting separability
Now and location 2 is Soon, the second one is the people coordinate, i.e., location 1 is Me and
location 2 is You.
Crosscutting separability implies that you can evaluate the row and the column of this
table separately. Because crosscutting separability implies additive separability, there is at
least four subutility functions evaluating the consequences here, i.e., u1,1(.), u2,1(.), u1,2(.),
u2,2(.). And the connections across dimensions occur because one evaluation on one dimension
will depend on my preferences regarding the other dimension. This is the case because each
consequence cuts across two dimensions (i.e., is localized in one location of each dimension), so
that each consequence is evaluated by one subutility function, which captures both time and
social preferences, which are thus identical. Let’s illustrate this reasoning in more details.
Evaluating the time locations (i.e., the columns) separately means that I can subevaluate
what happens Now separately from what happens Soon. When I subevaluate what happens
now, I see that if I choose A, You and Me get the same thing (€10), and if I choose B, we
don’t get the same thing (I get €5 and you get €20). On this time location, my choice therefore
depends on (at least one aspect of) my social preferences: what are my attitudes towards an
equal treatment where both of us receive the same thing, and towards an unequal treatment
where there is €20 for you and €5 for me? If I like equality, I will tend to choose A, if I don’t
mind about inequality (and/or if I genuinely care about other people at the expense of my
self-centered self-interest) I will tend to choose B. When I sub-evaluate what happens Soon,
I see that if I choose A, You and Me both get the same thing (€10), and if I choose B we
don’t get the same thing (I get €20 and you get €5). Again, on this time location my choice
depends again on my social preferences: if I like equality I still tend to choose A, and if I don’t
mind about inequality (and/or if I genuinely care only about me), I will still tend to choose B.
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Therefore, evaluated separately on the dimension of time, the result is the same whatever the
time locations: if I like equality, I choose A, if I don’t mind about inequality, I choose B. Thus,
the result on the dimension of time depends on (at leas one aspect of) my social preferences.
Evaluating the people locations separately means that I can subevaluate what happens for
Me separately from what happens for You. When I sub-evaluate what happens for me, I
see that if I choose A I get €10 Now and €10 Soon, and if I choose B, I get €5 Now and
€20 Soon. On this personal location, my choice therefore depends on (at least one aspect of)
my time preferences which does not correspond directly to discounting but to the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution: what are my attitudes towards an equally distributed flow of money
between two points in time separated by a week, and towards an unequally distributed flow of
a slightly bigger amount of money between the same points in time? If I like steady flows of
money (where I get the same amount periodically), I will tend to choose A, but if I like unsteady
flows of money (where I get more at some points though less at others), I will tend to choose
B. When I sub-evaluate what happens for You, I see that if I choose A, you get €10 Now
and €10 Soon, and if I choose B, you get €20 Now and €5 Soon. Again my choice on this
location depends on (at least one aspect of) my time preferences: if I like equally distributed
flow of money I will tend to choose A, but if I like unequally distributed flows of money I will
tend to choose B. Therefore, evaluated separately on the dimension of people, the result is the
same whatever the people locations: if I like equally distributed flow of money, I will tend to
choose A, but if I like unequally distributed flows of money I will tend to choose B. Thus,
the result on the dimension of people depends on (at least one aspect of) my time preferences.
Notice that high discounting leads to a preference for plans with distribution of consequences
skewed towards the present. By contrast, high elasticity of intertemporal substitution leads
to a preference for plans with unequal distribution of consequences, not necessarily skewed,
but usually assumed to be so towards the future because of positive interest (or growth) rates.
Hence, from a revealed preference perspective, violations of dynamic consistency can come
from a change in the former and/or the latter. Probably because the latter is meaningful in
economics only with respect to further economic variables that are absent from experimental
setups, measures derived from intertemporal experiments are interpreted as being about ‘pure’
time preferences, i.e., discounting. Nevertheless, both parameters can non-controversially said
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to constitute decision makers’ attitudes over time. As Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue
(2002, p.359) put it:
“diminishing marginal utility (that the instantaneous utility function [...] is concave)
and positive time preference (that the discount rate ρ is positive) [...] create opposing
forces in intertemporal choice: diminishing marginal utility motivates a person to
spread consumption over time, while positive time preference motivates a person to
concentrate consumption in the present.”
When we bring the evaluation on the dimension of time and the evaluation on the dimension of
people together, we have a very simple and elegant conclusion. On the one hand, if I choose A,
it reveals a preference for equality in the distribution of money across people, and a preference
for equality in the distribution of money across time. On the other hand, if I choose B, it
reveals a preference for inequality in the distribution of money across people, and a preference
for inequality in the distribution of money across time. Hence disliking inequality in the dis-
tribution of money over time and across people “must be linked”: “[t]hey are really just two
ways of describing the same pattern of preferences” (Broome 1991, pp. 63-64, my emphasis).
Adding one dimension to the previous reasoning generalizes it, the point being that, in standard
models, one consequence that cuts across two or three dimensions is evaluated by one single
subutility function that identify aspects of risk, time and social preferences with one another.
The plausibility of the argument depends on crosscutting separability and “[i]f separability fails
in one or the other dimension, the conclusion will fail too” (ibid). Of course, violations of the
independence axiom, dynamic consistency and self-centeredness imply that separability tends
to fail empirically in each dimensions. Broome is aware of this but his perspective is normative
– and related to discussions of decisions about future unknown social positions under a ‘veil
of ignorance’ where decision makers’ risk and inequality aversion should be identical. Roughly,
he argues from a version of consequentialism that violations of separability in the dimension of
risk and other people are irrational; while those in the dimension of time are rationally justifi-
able because separability in that dimension carries a metaphysical implication of multiple selves
which he finds unappealing.34
34Two further points are worth noting. Firstly, in a working paper, we have tried to illustrate how Broome’s
illustration of crosscutting separability reasoning carries over for the three dimensions altogether and/or for
decision problems which are not “conveniently symmetrical”; it turns our that the elegance ans simplicity of
the above reasoning is nontrivially reduced. Secondly, the main weakness that Broome acknowledges about
crosscutting separability (in risk and people) is what he calls “[t]he rectangular field assumption” (p.80): that
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Some empirical implications of the theoretical issues discussed by Broome have recently
resurfaced in the normative economics of climate change, especially in a paper by Giles Atkin-
son, Simon Dietz, Jennifer Helgeson, Cameron Hepburn and Hakon Soelen (2009). One such
implication is that standard social welfare functionals can be calibrated with data about ei-
ther one of these three dimensions (i.e., risk aversion, elasticity of intertemporal substitution
and inequality aversion), notably to calculate the social discount rate through which policies
are evaluated. But in practice these are not identical because decision makers usually violate
separability conditions. Hence calibrations with either one of the three types of data imply dif-
ferent policy recommendations from calibrations with either one of the two others. Thus, “[a]n
important theoretical lacuna still exists because no model to date enables all three concepts to
be disentangled simultaneously” (p.3). Furthermore, they argue against normative defense à la
Broome for the identification of even two of the three aspects. Such a defense, on their account,
presupposes conditions for reasoning that are unrealizable in practice (i.e., veil of ignorance-
like). They further argue that normative justifications for the articulation (or lack thereof)
among attitudes in the three dimensions need to be debatable in a democratic decision process,
hence possibly going against consequentialism. Accordingly, they conduct a large scale internet
survey to elicit these three attitudes of people regarding climate change issues, and found large
difference and furthermore weak correlations among the three, contrary to “the standard welfare
model [which] implicitly assumes a perfect correlation” (p.4). One implication is that an extra
value judgment is needed in applied work, namely with data from which dimension should social
welfare functionals be calibrated? This is obviously an issue where the stakes of the primacy of
one type of preference over the two others looms large.
Finally, the paper by Güth, Vittoria Levati and Matteo Ploner (2008) quoted in the epigraph
to this chapter tackles such correlations across the three dimensions using lab experiments.
Decision makers are asked the minimum amount of money they would accept to sell each one
of these objects of choice (i.e., their willingness to accept, WTA). Here are four examples of the
sixteen objects of choices, where the lottery gives 50% chance of winning €16 and 50% chance
all the consequences need to be arranged in a cartesian product structure (rougly, as the above table), rendering
some logically possible combinations of consequences empirically impossible (see Mongin and Pivato 2015 for a
recent attempt at solving this issue). It could be argued from the perspective of this chapter that it does not
matter if objects of choice are impossible or unreal if they remain describable and communicable to a decision
maker (e.g., through a decision modeler belonging to an adverstisment company or a religion, for the better or
worse of the decision maker’s welfare).
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of winning €38, ‘later’ is in three months, and ‘you’ is the decision maker (ibid, appendix,
emphasizes and bolded terms are theirs):
You get €27 for sure now, and the other gets the lottery now.__
You get €27 for sure later, and the other gets the lottery later._
You get €27 for sure now, and the other gets the lottery later. _
You get €27 for sure later, and the other gets the lottery now.35
The main tendencies are that decision makers care about the other’s consequences when
their own consequences are immediate and sure, that their discount rates reveal much more
impatience for their own consequences than for the other’s, and that risk aversion usually goes
with more impatience and risk seeking with more patience.
Notice that empirical studies traditionally investigate correlations between, on the one hand,
either risk or time or social preferences, and, on the other hand, something ‘external’ to these
preferences, e.g., some measures of economic success (as in Tanaka et al. 2010) or some measures
of stability over the years in a given data panel of one type of preferences (as in Chuang and
Schechtner 2015). By contrast, both Atkinson et al. (2009) and Güth et al. (2008) study
‘internal’ correlations among the three types of preferences. This approach is less traditional
though not new per se (see the references cited by Jamison et al. 2012, p.14), but it can
be argued that it is a growing trend motivated by behavioral economics (see esp. Dean and
Ortoleva 2015). Two remarks about this trend are worth making, as they respectively introduce
the objects of the next two subsections. The first one is that this trend is globally silent
on the normative dimension (i.e., à la Broome) or implication (i.e., à la Atkinson et al.) of
35
Here are the remaining twelve objects of choices:
You get the lottery now, and the other gets €27 for sure now.
You get the lottery later, and the other gets €27 for sure later.
You get the lottery now, and the other gets €27 for sure later.
You get the lottery later, and the other gets €27 for sure now.
Both you and the other get €27 for sure now.__________
Both you and the other get €27 for sure later._________
You get €27 for sure now, and the other gets €27 for sure later.
You get €27 for sure later, and the other gets €27 for sure now.
Both you and the other get the lottery now.__________
Both you and the other get the lottery later.__________
You get the lottery now, and the other gets the lottery later.
You get the lottery later, and the other gets the lottery now.
Güth et al. are not interested in the absolute values of the WTAs, only in the differences between WTAs, thus
the biases with this elicitation method do not matter much for their purpose.
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their empirical results. The second one is that, though helpful to understand some underlying
issues of the empirical picture presented in the previous subsection, quantitative correlations
among dimensions are different from the qualitative issue of how new inconsistencies arise or
disappear with the introduction of new dimensions into a given one. Notably, the former does
not (at least) directly address how to get a parsimonious theoretical account of the patterns
of preferences displayed in the empirical pictures of both this and the previous section taken
together. Hence it could be argued that without such a qualitative work available, it is impossible
to even represent the quantitative variations in risk time and/or social preferences underlying
the choices of one decision maker abiding by the regularities of these two pictures, let alone
investigate the correlations among them.
Summing up this subsection, the theoretical convention that decision makers attitudes in
the three dimensions should be identical underlies standard models of individual behaviors.
Value judgments from consequentialism can justify this theoretical convention and criticize its
empirical violations, or vice-versa, value judgments against consequentialism can criticize the
convention and justify the violations. Factual observations from correlational studies tend to
show that, far from being identical, the three dimensions are not even strongly correlated.
Finally, the marking of linguistic distinctions within and across Rastier’s table is a condition of
possibility for these empirical and theoretical discussions to be intelligible in the first place.
2.2.3 Timing of uncertainty and consequentialism versus dynamic
consistency
The goal of this subsection is to briefly illustrate two classical challenges from within standard
economics against the implications of separability discussed in the previous section, and to show
that they have gained recent interests around behavioral economics.
The first one is the so-called issue of ‘the timing of uncertainty resolution’. The classical
paper stating the issue is David Kreps and Evan Porteus’ (1978), who use the following intuitive
example to illustrate it (p.185). A decision modeler proposes to flip a coin: if heads comes up you
win €5 Now and €10 Later, if tail comes up you win €5 Now and nothing Later. Because
there is a common consequence for now (€5), EU implies that the decision maker should be
indifferent between flipping the coin Now – so that the uncertainty about whether you get €10
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or nothing later resolves now – or flipping it Later – i.e., you get your €5 Now anyway but
the uncertainty about whether you get €10 or nothing later resolves at the same time when
you know which one you actually get. Kreps and Porteus’ argument is twofold. On the one
hand, they argue that there are good reasons for not being indifferent, notably a preference
for early resolution can be justified from the ease it creates for budgeting Now one’s Future
expenditures. On the other hand, they propose an axiomatic framework from which models that
analytically distinguish risk and time attitudes can be constructed. While such models have had
their success in macroeconomics (see Gollier 2001, chap.20), they have not been discussed much
around behavioral economics (though see Coble and Lusk 2010 and the reference therein for
contributions in experimental economics).
The second challenge points some conflicts between consequentialism and dynamic consis-
tency. Originally, the first instances of these challenges have been raised in normative economics
(e.g., Diamond 1967; or more recently, Giraud and Renouard 2011; Bovens 2015; and more gen-
erally, see Mongin and d’Aspremont 1998). The structure of the argument has been applied
to decision theory and Hammond’s version of consequentialism in a classical paper by Mark
Machina (1989). The following intuitive example illustrates such arguments (pp.1643-4). Mom
has an indivisible treat, say one candy, she can give to either one of her children, Abigail or
Benjamin. Mom is indifferent between (A) ‘Abigail getting the candy For Sure’ and (B) ‘Ben-
jamin getting the candy For Sure’, and strongly prefers either one of these consequences to the
one whereby (C) ‘None of them gets the candy For Sure’. Mom however strictly prefers the
Probabilistic consequences – she can construct by flipping a coin – of (D = (A, .5;B, .5)) ‘50%
chance that Abigail gets the candy and 50% chance that Benjamin gets the candy’ to either
one of the Sure consequences. Formally, Mom’s preferences are D  A ∼ B  C. So Mom
flips a coin, it turns out that Abigail wins the candy, but Benjamin steps in and says: ‘Mom,
you told us Earlier that you preferred ‘to flip a coin’ over ‘Abigail getting the candy for sure’
(D  A), Now Abigail is getting the candy for sure so please respect you preferences and flip a
coin’. In other words, Benjamin argues from (Hammond’s) consequentialism that Mom should
respect the independence axiom of EU by sticking to the part of her initial preferences that
does not violate the requirement of linearity in the weighting of probabilities (i.e., preferring the
gamble over one sure consequence, D  A). Mom answers “You had your chance!” and gives
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the candy to Abigail. In other words, Mom argues that she is happy to violate consequentialism
because she wants to be dynamically consistent with the part of her initial preferences that
violate EU (i.e., preferring the gamble over the indifference between both sure consequences,
(A, .5;B.5) = D  A ∼ B). Machina (1989) argues at length that (Hammond’s) consequen-
tialism is a dynamic version of the very separability requirement that non-EU decision makers
violate in the first place. Hence, if they have normative justifications for their violations, which
is clearly the case for Mom here, another type of dynamic consistency than the one implied by
Hammond’s consequentialism is needed for non-EU decision makers. In Mom’s example, the
reason justifying her choice is a preference for fairness, indeed following the original literature
in normative economics where these counter-examples to EU’s normative dimension originally
emerged. But Machina’s point is more general. Roughly put, it is that ‘history matters’ in the
following sense. Mom’s preferences for ‘giving the candy to Abigail if the uncertainty of 50%
chance that Benjamin Benjamin gets the candy Has Been Borne (but not realized)’ is already
her preferences ex ante, i.e., before she knows the outcome of the coin flip. Hence by saying ‘no’
to Benjamin ex post she is being dynamically consistent with her ex ante preferences.36
I would like to make two points on Kreps and Porteus’ and Machina’s papers. The first con-
cerns only Machina’s paper. Reading Machina’s paper through the lenses of interactions across
the three dimensions, which is not the theme of his paper, one realizes how much interactions
across the three dimensions are sources of reasons – or “generators of reasons” (Broome 1991,
p.23, my emphasis) – in economics for both economic agents and economists. For economic
agents faced with decisional conflicts in one dimension, e.g., uncertainty in Mom’s case, an-
other dimension is used to bring the justification that resolves the conflict, e.g., other people in
Mom’s case. For economists intending to formally represent such resolution in one dimension,
contributions from other economists working in subfields that focus on other dimensions become
relevant. In Machina’s case, it is not only the contributions from normative economics in the di-
mension of other people, but also from intertemporal consumptions as he makes an analogy with
the non-separable time preferences used there to ground his arguments (1989, pp.1644-1645).
36One classical argument against Machina’s (made for example by Hammond) is that if the description of
consequences is rich enough, including all the relevant psychological dimensions of the decision maker within
them, then the independence axiom is not violated anymore. This argument is also made for Allais’ paradoxes
and other classical challenges from behavioral economics. We shall argue against this argument in chapters 4
and 5 on framing effects.
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Interactions across the three dimensions are also sources of reasons in the sense that they makes
intuitive decision theoretic arguments appealing in economics. Take for instance the well-known
Dutch book (under uncertainty) or, more generally (under certainty) money pump arguments
that are used to establish the economic rationality of not violating the independence axiom or
the axiom of transitivity. The appeal of these arguments relies on Another (fictional) agent
who has rather anti-social preferences toward the decision maker, as the former tries to put the
latter to ruin Over Time (by repeated decisions).
The second point concerns the relation of both papers to the empirical picture presented in
the first subsection of this section. Notice that the structure of the interactions across dimensions
in both papers is not the same as the one in the empirical picture. Furthermore, both papers
have been relatively disconnected from behavioral economics before the mid-2000s. However
the theoretical outcomes of the empirical picture have made such a connection. This is so for
Kreps and Porteus because Thomas Epper and Helga Fehr-Duda’s (2015) theoretical unification
of interactions across risk and time includes the former’s phenomenon as one to be unified
among the other ones constitutive of the empirical picture. And this is so for Machina because
both Fudenberg and Levine’s (2012a) and Stefan Trautmann and Wakker’s (2010) theoretical
contributions motivated by the empirical picture (respectively about the interactions across
risk and other people, and across other people and time) make non-trivial uses of the former’s
reasoning. In a nutshell, Fudenberg and Levine show that all the models of non-self-centered
motives discussed in the previous section cannot be extended under expected utility theory
without violating a preference for ex ante fairness. That partly explains why none of these
models can account for interactions across the dimensions of risk and other people presented
in the first subsection of this section. Trautmann and Wakker make roughly the same point
and emphasize how the phenomenon is better understood by connecting it with violations of
dynamic consistency in the dimension of time. Finally, Andreoni et al. (2016) proposes a
set of experiments to test whether decision makers tend to be consequentialist or dynamically
consistent in social allocation problems under uncertainty. The answer is that it depends, among
other factors, on whether they make their decisions ex ante (where they tend to be dynamically
consistent) or ex post (where they tend to be consequentialist).37
37Rotemberg (2014, sect.6) provides a recent review of the post mid-2000s’ interactions across the dimension
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Summing up, it can be argued that Machina’s arguments tried to establish even further the
primacy of time over risk over social preferences in decision theory that was mentioned in the
second subsection of the previous section. While Kreps and Porteus also went in that direction,
it was merely by arguing against a full primacy of risk preferences. Though initially discon-
nected from behavioral economics, both these contributions are now being discussed around
it because of the experimental results on interactions across dimensions. These facts, together
with the value judgments against consequentialism and for fairness, are currently triggering some
changes in the theoretical conventions constitutive of the study of individual decision making
in economics. Again, a condition of possibility for the intelligibility of the whole process is the
marking of linguistic distinctions within and across Rastier’s table. Notice however that the
interdisciplinary issue of the relations between economics and Psychology are somewhat absent
from the contributions discussed so far in this section. In the next subsection, we shall discuss
two sets of contributions in which not only this issue is explicit but also explicitly connected
with the issue of the primacy of one type of preference over the others.
2.2.4 p-&-Psychology with the issue of primacy across the three
dimensions
The goal of this subsection is to discuss two contributions, one on the qualitative issues underly-
ing the interactions across dimensions and the other on the quantitative ones, in order to show
how both the issue of interdisciplinarity between economics and Psychology and the issue of the
primacy of one type of preferences over the others raise themselves in each case.
The contribution on the qualitative issues underlying the interactions across dimensions is
Yoram Halevy’s (2008) “Strotz Meets Allais”, published in the American Economic Review.
Halevy accounts for Keren and Roelofsma’s (1995) results about the introduction of time in
the dimension of risk and vice-versa. Halevy did not (just) weakened some axioms of EU
or EDU to be compatible with the psychologists’ results, his modeling strategy sought to be
compatible with the Psychological explanations of these results by Keren and Roelofsma. The
of risk and social preferences. Trautmann and Vieider (2012) provide a very wide survey of the different ways
by which other people can be introduced in the dimension of uncertainty in behavioral economics and social
psychology. It should also be noted that Fudenberg and Levine’s (2012a) contribution has motivated further
empirical (see esp. Brock et al. 2013) and theoretical (see esp. Saito 2013) contributions on the interactions
between risk and social preferences.
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latter have to be understood against a background of claims defended in various publications
by psychologist Howard Rachlin (a behaviorist whose work has non-trivially inspired Ainslie’s).
Part of Rachlin’s work has already been referenced in some footnotes above on ‘social distance’
and ‘social discounting’, where he argued that decision maker’s relations to other people are
derivable from their relations to time, i.e., time is a primary notion explaining the modalities of
interpersonal relations, esp. altruism. The claims against which Keren and Roelofsma argued
were similar but about decision makers’ relations to uncertainty, i.e., being derivable from their
relations to time. Keren and Roelofsma argued that there might not be any primacy of one
over the other, and that even if so, the other way around is more likely. The key argument that
they want to defend in their paper is that The Future is necessarily Uncertain for various
reasons but at least because of the omnipresent possibility of sudden death, while Uncertainty
can also be in The Present which is thus not necessarily Certain. Furthermore, the inherent
uncertainty of consequences in the future stemming from the possibility of sudden death can
only disappear through the Immediate experience of those consequences.
This argument plays a central role in Halevy’s contribution, where the future is modeled “as
a random process that has a positive probability of stopping at any given period” and “may
be interpreted as the hazard of morality” (2008, p.1145). This captures the (“implicit”) risk
inherent in the future, which is absent in the present (i.e., equals one) so that the non-linear
weighting function gives disproportionate weights to the present, inducing a present bias and
dynamic inconsistency. The model nonetheless uses an exponential discount function, hence
not the whole of time discounting stems from risk preferences. Thus, Halevy’s model can ac-
count for the facts that quasi-hyperbolic models were designed to account for as well as the
facts that are in contradiction with these models, i.e., Keren and Roelofsma’s disappearance of
the immediacy effect when the present is uncertain. In the words of the entanglement thesis,
Halevy’s uses of formal language articulate the non-standard theoretical conventions of decision
under uncertainty to obtain the behavioral implications that account for facts that the stan-
dard and non-standard theoretical conventions of decision over time cannot altogether account
for. Furthermore, Halevy justifies this use of formal language by, among other references in
economics, arguments from both Psychology and from the psyschology he shares with decision
makers. From Psychology, he relies on Keren and Roelofsma’s experimental results against
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Rachlin (Halevy 2008, p.1155 explicitly takes a stance against the latter). From psychology,
he follows the argument from the possibility of sudden death which Keren and Roelofsma call
an “analytical argument” (1995, abstract and pp.293-4) by which they mean an argument from
common sense and not from experimental results.38
The contribution on the quantitative issues underlying the interactions across dimensions is
Steffen Andersen, Glenn Harrison, Morten Lau and Elisabet Rutström’s (2008) “Eliciting Risk
and Time Preferences”, published in the Econometrica (see also their 2014a; b). These authors
argue that the great diversity and variance in measured discount rates mentioned in the previous
section is mainly due to the assumption of linear utility in the majority of experimental work
eliciting discount rates, e.g., assuming u(xt) = xt when computing utilities between now and the
next period in u(x1) + u(x2)1+ρ . The interaction with risk preferences comes from their interpreta-
tion of u(.)’s curvature through EU, i.e., as representing risk attitudes (2008; 2014a contains an
interpretation through RDU). They accordingly develop an experimental methodology where
decision makers’ risk attitudes are systematically estimated from risky decision problems and
then used in the estimation of time preferences from intertemporal decision problems. Their
main result is that, under exponential discounting, the estimated average discount rate is sig-
nificantly lower and more stable than usual (2008; 2014a). And under hyperbolic discounting,
the non-constant decrease of the rate of discounting is smaller when concave utility is esti-
mated through risk preferences than it is when assumed to be linear (2008). From the general
perspective of this dissertation, notice that Andersen et al.’s contributions nicely illustrate the
entanglement of facts and theoretical convention in the classical sense of ‘theory-ladeness’, i.e.,
how the facts about observed discount rates are laden into the theoretical conventions used to
make them observable.39
From the perspective of this chapter, two aspects of Andersen et al.’s contribution are worth
noting. The first one is the methodological debates it has triggered with other experimentalists,
arguing notably against its rather explicit primacy of risk preferences (Andreoni and Sprenger
38Besides the paper by Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015) mentioned in the previous subsection, Baucells and
Heukamp (2012) another theoretical contribution of the post mid-2000s’ interactions across the dimensions of
risk and time. Saito (2011) provides a non-trivial technical correction to Halévy (2008).
39They even statistically reject the existence of quasi-hyperbolic discounting from their (2014a) data, but it
should be noted that none of their intertemporal experiments involve tradoffs between Now and Later, only
between consequences that are Later or in The Future.
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2012; 2015; Abdellaoui et al. 2013; Wakker40; and esp. Andreoni et al. 2015). These other
experimentalists argue that it is not clear why the concavity of u(.) expressing risk attitudes in
atemporal settings should alone and adequately account for its concavity in temporal settings.
The second aspect is their econometric use of so called ‘mixture models’, which, roughly, allow
to analyze a data set as if the choices were generated not by one optimization process but two
(see 2014b for a general discussion). These two processes can be taken from different models,
e.g., by EU and prospect theory (in Harrison and Rutström 2009) or by EDU and hyperbolic
discounting (in Andersen et al. 2008, sect.3.D; 2014a). Or these can be taken from one model
which postulates two such processes (in Andersen et al. 2008). In this latter case, Andersen et
al. justify this methodological strategy through arguments from p-&-Psychology. They argue
that it is well in line with new economic models (Benhabib and Bisin 2005; Fudenberg and
Levine 2006) inspired from Psychology that can rationalize classical challenges from behavioral
economics (i.e., from the previous section) within the dimension of risk and time. These models
are the ‘dual models’ that are at the center of next chapter, where we shall see how the ones
from Fudenberg and Levine can also rationalize challenges about interactions across dimensions.
However, though the latter has indeed the unificatory power suggested by Andersen et al., there
is a latent primacy of time preferences in their work that is arguably not in line with Andersen
et al.’s work.
Summing up, interactions across the three dimensions have triggered a set of contributions
where the issue of the primacy of one type of preference over the two other is an explicit issue.
Though the primacy of risk preferences is still clearly in place (Andersen et al.) and can be
justified from p-&-Psychology (Halevy). The changes in the entanglements of facts, values and
theoretical conventions documented earlier in this section tends to undermine this primacy, sug-
gesting a primacy of time preferences instead. Again, we emphasize that the marking of linguistic
distinctions within and across Rastier’s table is a condition of possibility for the intelligibility
of the underlying theoretical and empirical issues.
40See Wakker’s annotated bibliography available at http://people.few.eur.nl/wakker/refs/webrfrncs.docx, last
consultation: 21/01/2016.
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Conclusion
This section has provided an empirical and theoretical picture of the main challenges posed
to both behavioral and standard economics by experimental results on the interactions across
the three dimensions. Though the primacy of risk over time over social preferences can still
be felt in these contributions, a primacy of time preferences undermines it. Notably regarding
the positive/normative issue, value judgments from dynamic consistency are being increasingly
made to argue for the rationality of the factual violations of EU’s theoretical conventions in the
dimension of risk (following Machina’s pioneering contribution) and of other people. We have
seen one argument from Psychology against a primacy of time preferences, namely that The
Future is necessarily Uncertain because of the omniPresent possibility of future death while
the Present can be certain when consequences are occurring Immediately. We have however
suggested that a grounding of a primacy of time preferences from Psychology may be available in
the dual models used by Andersen et al. Anticipating on the next chapter, these models provide
another path to theoretical unification that the one offered in the theoretical contributions
discussed in this section, notably because the issue of interdisciplinary between economics and
Psychology is more prominent in the former. Finally, as in the previous section, one condition
of possibility for the discussions provided here is the marking of linguistic distinctions within
and among Rastier’s table.
Conclusion and transition: from three dimensions to two
sub-individual entities
This chapter proposed to see rationality in 3D. That is, whether in the classical challenges
within dimensions or in the recent ones across dimensions, a systematic discussion of the three
dimensions altogether has been conducted for the sake of a better understanding of the behav-
ioral versus standard economics debates. Both the positive/normative issue and the issue of
interdisciplinarity underlying behavioral economics, it was argued, are better understood when
seeing rationality in 3D. The use of Rastier’s typographical convention of capitalizing instances
of his table presented in the introduction of this chapter was meant, not only to see rational-
ity in 3D more vividly, but also to see that one condition of possibility for these challenges
148
to be even intelligible is the linguistic marking of the distinction within and across his table.
Indeed, if a decision modeler cannot do that, then, e.g., an experimenter cannot implement the
experiments discussed in this chapter. And if the decision maker cannot recognize that, then
all the results discussed in this chapter loose some of their meaning, at least in their normative
implications. We also saw a progressive reversal of the primacy of risk over time over social
preferences towards a primacy of time over risk over social preferences.
It can be argued that seeing rationality in 3D has two main and related implications. Firstly,
an explicit motivation shared by most contributions on interactions across dimensions – which,
recall, focus on distinct pairs of dimensions – is that, in the real world, the two dimensions they
treat are always in interactions. Seeing this world though a one-dimensional theoretical lens, it
is usually argued, leads to significant biases in empirical observations. Hence taking all these
contributions together, i.e., seeing rationality in 3D, implies that interactions across the three
dimensions are always at play. This is at least plausible for important economic decisions, so
that the three dimensionsal picture presented here may be used to critically reinterpret existing
empirical studies that used an unidimensional theoretical framework for interpretation. This
first implication will not be investigated in this dissertation (together with Cléo Chassonnery
Zaïgouche and Judith Favereau, we try to do so in a working paper). Secondly, it is by seeing
rationality in 3D that one can recognize that the whole empirical picture presented in this
chapter points a non-trivial area of reconciliation between behavioral and standard economics.
That is, accounting for interactions within and across the three dimensions suggests itself as
a relevant criterion for the methodological evaluation of claims of theoretical unification, and
by the same token of reconciliation, between behavioral and standard economics. In the next
chapter, we will use this criterion to scrutinize a set of models – the ‘dual models’ mentioned at
the end of this chapter – that claim to achieve such unification and (maybe to a lesser extent)
reconciliation, mainly by representing the individual economic agent as the interaction of two
sub-individual entities.
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Chapter 3
The rise of dual models: behavior as
language
“With explanatory power comes
explanatory responsibility”
(Rabin 2013, p.622)
In the previous chapter, we saw that an area of convergence between behavioral and stan-
dard economics has recently emerged, and lies in the interactions across risk, time and social
preferences. At about the same period, i.e., from the mid-2000s onwards, prominent behavioral
economists started, in their methodological manifestos, to make strong claims about a new way
of modeling individual behavior. The latter consists in representing behaviors of individual eco-
nomic agents as the outcome of an interaction between two sub-individual entities. The strong
claims concerned how these models could play an important role in the convergence of behav-
ioral economics and standard economics, both between themselves and with other cognitive and
behavioral sciences. The clearest statement of this is by Camerer, who is worth quoting at
length because I will then use his words to set the goals of this chapter:1
“Tremendous progress has been made in going from deviations and anomalies to
general theories, which are mathematical and can be applied to make fresh pre-
dictions. [...] Excluded from [“rational-choice principles and behavioral economics
1See also Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec (2005, p.43, p.56), Ashraf, Camerer, and Loewenstein (2005,
p.132), Camerer (2006, pp.199-200; 2008, p.55, pp.62-63), Loewenstein, Rick, and Cohen (2008, p.650 and
p.665), Angner and Loewenstein (2012, p.676).
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alternatives”...], and from the basic ideas [“and tools of behavioral economics”...]
are a rapidly emerging variety of formal “dual system” models, drawing on old di-
chotomies in psychology. These models generally retain optimization by one of the
systems and make behavior of another system automatic (or myopic) and nonstrate-
gic so that extensions of standard tools can be used. (Intuitively, think of part
of the brain as optimizing against a new type of constraint – an internal constraint
from another brain system, rather than a budget constraint or an external constraint
from competition.) In Kahneman (2003) the systems are intuitive and deliberative
systems (“systems 1 and 2”). In Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2004) the systems
are deliberative and affective; in Benhabib and Bisin (2005) the systems are con-
trolled and automatic; in Fudenberg and Levine [2006] the systems are “long-run”
(and controlling) and “short-run”; in Bernheim and Rangel [2004] the systems are
“hot” (automatic) and “cold”. In Brocas and Carillo [2008] a myopic “agent” system
has private information about utility, so a farsighted “principal” (who care about
the utility of all agents) creates mechanisms for the myopic agents to reveal their
information. [...] In the years to come, careful thought will probably sharpen our
understanding of the similarities and differences among models. [....] And of course,
empirical work is needed to see which predictions of different models hold up best,
presumably inspiring refinements that might eventually lead to a single model that
could occupy a central place in microeconomics.” (2006, pp.199-200, my emphasis)
The years have come. Does “careful thought” have since “sharpen our understanding of the
similarities and difference among” the “formal “dual systems” models”? Is there “a single model
that” now occupies “a central place in microeconomics”? In a less dramatic tone: nearly a
decade has passed, and that seems enough to make these two questions legitimate. The main
goal of this chapter is to answer these two questions by scrutinizing the limits and scopes of
these models, how they are to be situated between economics and Psychology and how the
positive/normative issue is articulated within them.
There have been some thoughts on the similarities and differences among these models (see
e.g., Ross 2010; Ross, Ainslie and Hofmeyr 2010; Ainslie 2012; Alós-Ferrer and Strack 2014).
But these have been made from fairly narrow angles of analyses, and none takes the five models
altogether. This chapter therefore proposes a more complete comparative exercise in order
to further our understanding of these models. It ends up suggesting that there is not yet a
single (new) model for microeconomics, but an increasing number of (standard) economists are
seriously thinking about it. We can derive a simple criterion to frame and evaluate the answers to
these two questions from the previous chapter: can these models account for interactions within
and across risk, time and social preferences? One of the main conclusions of this chapter is that
Fudenberg and Levine’s model is the only one that accounts for interactions across dimensions.
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This makes it the most promising candidate for the position of new central microeconomic
model, at least from the perspective of this dissertation.
When the ‘strong claims’ are taken altogether (i.e., Camerer’s quote and the references in the
previous footnote), there is a fairly clear agreement that five models have independently imple-
mented this new form of modeling in the mid-2000s: Loewenstein and O’Donoghue’s (2004), Jess
Benhabib and Alberto Bisin’s (2005), Bernheim and Rangel’s (2004), Fudenberg and Levine’s
(2006), and Isabelle Brocas and Juan Carillo’s (2008). In these papers, as in the literature that
references them, we do find echoes to Camerer’s observations: a new way of modeling indi-
vidual behavior seems to have emerged in economics which may achieve theoretical unification
not only between behavioral and standard economics, but also between economics and other
behavioral and cognitive sciences. There is no label to refer to these models. ‘Dual-processes
model’, ‘dual-systems model’ and ‘dual-selves model’ are used somewhat interchangeably across
and within the strong claims, across and within the models themselves and across and within
the literature that references them. As we will see, this terminological diversity is important in
itself. It provides some clues as to how these models broadly fit in the relations between eco-
nomics and Psychology. But for the sake of convenience, I will nevertheless refer to these five
models by using a common label: dual models – and their authors, the dual modelers. Beyond
convenience and sobriety, ‘dual’ and ‘models’ capture two sets of features of these models. Some
brief comments on these two words are therefore in order, which I will do by presenting the
main conclusions that will be drawn in this chapter.
What kind of ‘models’ are dual models? Both ‘dual processes’ and ‘dual systems’ refer to
what can be called a ‘dual trend’ in various areas of Psychology. It can be argued that this
trend is in fact well known outside of Psychology because a highly representative contribution
to it is Kahneman’s (2003; 2011) famous System 1/System 2 framework (roughly, the systems
are two sets of processes responsible for our irrational and rational tendencies, respectively).
This trend is driven by theoretical unification, in the sense of a search for one framework to
fit several phenomena (i.e., experimental regularities), theories and models. Dual models are
likewise explicitly driven by theoretical unification, but differently. On the one hand, they
are concerned with phenomena, theories and models that are at the center of the ‘behavioral
economics versus standard economics’ debates. On the other hand, uses of formal languages are
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central in such theoretical unification, whereas it is not so in the dual trend in Psychology. This
theoretical unification is achieved through various applications of dual models, meant mostly as
contributions to economics. By contrast, in constructing the cores of their dual models, most
dual modelers, who, recall, are economists, intend to make a direct contribution to Psychology.
The issue is of interdisciplinarity is however tricky here because these contributions are done
without dual models being influenced by the dual trend in Psychology (e.g., by an existing dual
framework from Psychology). Unlike dual models, Kahneman (2003; 2011) interprets much of
his work through the lenses of an existing dual system in Psychology (Stanovich and West 2000),
and does not use any formal language (it proposes a table articulating some crucial conceptual
distinctions). Hence his work will not be discussed on a part with the other dual models in
this chapter. Finally, ‘Dual selves’ is a label related to, though different from, ‘multiple selves’
models economics (e.g., Laibson 1997 discussed in the previous part). The difference is that all
selves of a multiple selves model are equal in the sense that they are all the exact same type of
entities, i.e., just ‘selves’, while in dual selves models there are two types of selves, one focusing
only on the present and one focusing on both the present and the future. Furthermore, dual
selves models explicitly claim to be alternatives to multiple selves models.
Though they have slightly different backgrounds from economics and Psychology, dual mod-
els share a central conceptual feature, related to the qualifier ‘dual’. So in what sense are dual
models ‘dual’? Dual models consist in modeling individual behavior as the outcome of the inter-
actions between two sub-individual entities, which can be two processes, two systems, two selves,
etc. – ‘entities’ is here used to remain as general and neutral as possible. These two entities are
different from, though not unrelated to, (1) the two main sub-individual entities in the stan-
dard approach, namely preferences and beliefs, and (2) the multiple sub-individual entities in
the multiple selves approach. In a dual model, the interactions between its two sub-individual
entities represent human’s capacities to exercise what is usually called in both everyday and
scientific ordinary language self-control or willpower. That is, our capacities ‘to restrain our
behavioral impulses’, ‘to resist temptation’, etc. The outcome of the interactions between the
two sub-individual entities, dual modelers argue, is the behavior of an individual entity, namely
a human economic agent. In a way, dual models update old philosophical questions about the
duality Man and instead of representing the agent as more driven by one or the other side of
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that duality, they try to show how the agent is created by their interaction. We shall however
not be concerned with these philosophical issues in this chapter, to focus instead on issues raised
by dual models in terms of economic analysis.
The positive/normative issue in dual models is not discussed explicitly by dual modelers
(with the exception of Bernheim and Rangel). The issue is ambiguous because, there are two
ways of interpreting the normative dimension of dual models. On the one hand, one can equate
rationality with one sub-individual entity and any deviation from that cannot be normatively
justified. On the other hand, one can equate rationality with the decision maker’s evaluation,
but not to any of its underlying sub-individual entities (one is ‘too’ rational, while the other is
irrational). This latter interpretation is in line with a predicament often made by philosophers
talking about normativity, namely that ‘ought implies can’. In economists’ language, self-control
is inevitable, they are a constraint (albeit an internal one) under which the decision maker ought
to optimize. This is Camerer’s implicit interpretation in the opening quote of this chapter. But
we shall see that the constraint is not one of the sub-individual entity, as Camerer suggests, it is
rather the medium by which two different optimization processes (namely the two sub-individual
entities) interact. 2
We have just stated what this chapter aims to clarify in terms of both the issue of interdisci-
plinarity and the positive/normative issue within dual models. The role of language in economic
rationality will here be tackled by abstracting from the uses of language by economic agents.
Hence we focus solely on the uses language from dual modelers. More precisely, the goal here is
to scrutinize a set of technical language borrowed from Psychology and mixed with the formal
language of economics to represent individual behaviors. In a sense, individual behaviors are
taken by dual modelers as a language to be decoded and the decoding is operated through the
mix of technical language from Psychology and formal language from economics. Hence the
second part of the title of this chapter, behavior as language.
This chapter is structured in three sections. The cores of dual models are presented through
an intuitive example and by marking the uses of technical language from Psychology, which is
2The two ways of interpreting the normative dimension of dual models could be grounded further into the
literature on normativity and rationality in the cognitive and social sciences (see resp. Stein 1996; and Turner
2010). However, the vocabulary and connected issues of these literatures (esp. in Turner 2010) would render the
comparative examination of dual models way too complicated. This chapter can however be seen as a first step
for such further work.
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then put in perspective with how the backgrounds of dual modelers as economists affect their
respective uses of formal languages (3.1). This first subsection is mainly concerned with the in-
terdisciplinarity issue in an intuitive fashion, i.e., the relation between economics and psychology
within dual models. The positive/normative issue within dual models start to be discussed from
the second section onwards. The shared backgrounds of dual models from Psychology (i.e., the
origins of the technical language marked in the first subsection) and from economics (i.e., the
literature in which they seek to contribute) are presented to further our understanding of the
similarities and contrasts of their intended contributions (3.2). The applications of dual models
are compared, which is tantamount to comparing how they achieve theoretical unification within
and/or across the three dimensions discussed in the previous part (3.3). The conclusion of this
chapter summarize the arguments and emphasize on one common limit to dual models, namely
their inadequacy to capture so-called ‘framing’ phenomena.
3.1 Cores: Psychology and the backgrounds of dual modelers
The goal of this subsection is to compare the cores of dual models. The issue of interdisciplinarity
is discussed intuitively by marking the technical language from Psychology used by dual modelers
and explaining it through a common decision example constructed for this purpose (3.1.1). That
is, the details about the scientific meaning of this language as well as its origins from various areas
of Psychology is silenced (because it will be scrutinized in the next section). Dual modelers’ uses
of formal languages is then discussed informally by emphasizing their respective backgrounds as
economists (3.1.2).
3.1.1 The cores of dual models with a piece of cake and a cup of coffee
Imagine you are at a conference and there are delicious cakes during the coffee breaks. At a
certain break, and without thinking too much about it, you are about to take a piece of cake
and then a cup of coffee. But at the last second before you reach the piece of cake, you think
you should not get cake and coffee for some reasons, e.g., you are on a diet and have had too
much coffee today. This thought makes you slightly deviate the aim of your hand from the cake
to grab a cup of coffee, which you drink. So you initially wanted both cake and coffee, and then
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wanted neither cake nor coffee, to end up choosing just coffee. In this subsection, we shall see
how the cores of the five dual models can or cannot explain this simple example. Notice that the
structure of the example is different from the more traditional intertemporal problems discussed
in the previous chapter (e.g., small consequence now vs. bigger consequence later). Indeed, the
specificity of its structure is meant to reflect the specificity of dual models with respect to the
models of intertemporal choice discussed in the previous chapter. Throughout this section, I
will use single inverted comas (‘like this’) to mark the specific terms from Psychology used by
dual modelers, the exact references of which will be discussed in the next section; I will also
italicize (like that) the specific terms that are proper and central to the respective dual models.3
The two sub-individual entities at the core of Loewenstein and O’Donoghue’s dual model
are two ‘systems’, a deliberative one and an affective one. These two systems are two sets of
psychological and possibly but not necessarily neural ‘processes’, that are supposed to be at play
in the various conflict we encounter in everyday decision making. Loewenstein and O’Donoghue
postulate that each system have their own optimal consequence. In our example, the affective
optimum is to take a piece of cake and a cup of coffee, while the deliberative optimum is to take
nothing. The actual consequence, i.e., taking just coffee, is the outcome of this conflict, which
depends on three parameters in Loewenstein and O’Donoghue’s dual model. One parameter
is ‘willpower strength’. It represents the mental effort needed to push behavior towards the
deliberative optimum at the expense of the affective system. Intuitively, it represents how
disagreeable it was when you steered your hand away from the piece of cake towards the cup
of coffee. The more disagreeable it feels, the more likely it is that you take the piece of cake.
Another parameter is ‘cognitive load’. It represents the amount of thinking you dedicated to
something else than the conflict. The higher the cognitive load is, the more likely it is that you
take the piece of cake. A very high cognitive load can be illustrated by a telephone number you
are trying to memorize during the conflict: you barely notice this conflict and find yourself eating
the cake before you know it. A lower cognitive load can be illustrated by a mildly interesting
conversation you are having during the conflict: you can still think about your diet and steer
your hand towards the cup of coffee. The last parameter is the intensity of affective ‘motivations’.
3I thank Alberto Bisin for having pointed out to me the difference in structures between the problem presented
here and the ones from the previous chapter.
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It represents how strongly your affective system is attracted by a given object of choice in a
given situation. The stronger the intensity of affective motivation is, the more likely it is that
you take the piece of cake. To illustrate, such intensity is very high for a cake you particularly
like, which is very well presented, and that you can have here (not in another room) and now
(not later as if you had to chose beforehand what you will be eating during coffee breaks). By
contrast it is lower for a cake you don’t particularly like, or for one that you particularly like
but which is not well presented or is not available here and now. Giving values to these three
parameters allows a utility calculus of the cost of willpower that the deliberative system pays
to lower the affective system’s utility (by not taking cake and coffee), which also lowers (since
it is a utility cost) the former’s utility. The core of Loewenstein and O’Donoghue’s dual model
has no problem accounting for the kind of in-between compromise of our example. The cost in
utility to be paid by the deliberative system to take nothing was higher than the cost in utility
to be paid to not take cake plus the loss in utility for taking coffee.4
The two sub-individual entities at the core of Fudenberg and Levine’s dual model are two
types of selves, a long-run one and short-run ones, playing a sequential game. The same long-
run self plays during all the sequences of the game, while every short-run selves plays only one
sequence. One sequence of the game consists in two stages: the long-run self first plays a self-
control action which influences the current short-run self’s utility, who then plays an action. All
short-run selves optimize regardless of history and future, and the long-run self knows that and
plays his self-control actions accordingly. In our example, your long-run self played a self-control
action such that the current short-run self’s utility for cake and coffee becomes inferior to the
utility of just coffee, whereas the reverse would have been the case without any self-control
actions. So why didn’t your long-run self play a self-control action such that taking nothing
becomes the optimal action for your short-run self? In Fudenberg and Levine’s dual model,
the long-run self’s utility is the exponentially discounted and expected sum of all the short-run
selves’ utilities. Hence losses of utility from self-control actions are incurred by the long-run self
as well. Thus, in our example, your long-run self decided that the cost in utility to be imposed
so that your short-run self takes nothing was too big, and compromised for taking just coffee.
4It could be argued that such psychological interpretations of utility is at odds with standard economics. As
already pointed in the previous chapter (§2.1.2), this is not at odds with the interpretation of utility in behavioral
economics; this remark also applies to dual modelers.
158
There is one non-trivial refinement of the core of their dual model, with shorter-run selves
playing more than one sequence (Fudenberg and Levine 2012b; c). In this case, the long-run
self commits his self-control actions to all the sequences played by one shorter-run self, i.e., he
cannot change his self-control actions between these sequences.
The two sub-individual entities at the core of Benhabib and Bisin’s dual model are two
types of processes, ‘controlled processes’ and ‘automatic processes’. The core of their dual
model is formalized in a two period intertemporal decision problem, where the first period is
not necessarily now. The more the first period is in the future, the more controlled processes
are able to evaluate the utility of the consequences through exponential discounting. And the
closer to the immediate present is the first period, the more likely it becomes that automatic
processes evaluate the utility of the present consequences as disproportionately greater than the
utility of future consequences. In our example, the first period is immediate: cake and coffee are
to be consumed immediately. The second period can be thought of as everything that happens
after, e.g., the next coffee break and/or tonight’s cocktail party. Controlled processes evaluate
the utility of taking nothing as superior to the utility of cake and/or coffee; automatic processes
evaluate the utility of cake and coffee as superior to just coffee or nothing. If we postulate these
two optima for these two processes, as we did with the other dual models, then Benhabib and
Bisin’s dual model cannot account straightforwardly for the decision to just take coffee. This
is so because they formalize one function of controlled processes, namely the total inhibition
of automatic ones. Such inhibition is called ‘cognitive control’, and is said to occur through
the ‘supervisory attention system’. Benhabib and Bisin model self-control as an instance of
cognitive control through an attention cost parameter and this cost is measured in utility. The
attention cost parameter represents the utility cost above which exerting cognitive control will
yield less utility to the decision maker than the utility given by automatic processes’ optimum.
In our example, focusing attention to the consequences in next break and/or tonight’s cocktail
party diverts attention from taking cake and coffee now (in order to take nothing now), which
represents a cost in utility. If this cost is superior to the difference between (1) the utility of
taking nothing now and something later and (2) the utility of taking cake and coffee now but
nothing later, then cognitive control is not exerted, i.e., automatic processes are not inhibited
hence cake and coffee are consumed now. If the cost is inferior to that difference, then cognitive
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control is exerted, i.e., nothing is consumed now. It should be emphasized that Benhabib
and Bisin could easily explained our example if we had postulated different optima for the
processes, e.g., with just coffee as the controlled processes’ optimum. However, doing so makes
the comparison with other dual models less direct (the same remark applies to Bernheim and
Rangel’s presentation below).
The two sub-individual entities at the core of Bernheim and Rangel’s dual model are two
systems, ‘the mesolimbic dopamine system’ and a cognitive forecasting system. The mesolimbic
dopamine system is a neural system, sometimes called the reward system. It generates instan-
taneous utility, notably based on the association of ‘cues’ in one’s present environment with
past short-term hedonic experiences: a mechanism that Bernheim and Rangel call the hedonic
forecasting mechanism. In our example, the cues can be the smell of coffee, or empty cups of
coffee, or empty plates of cake; and the hedonic forecasting mechanism is responsible for wanting
to take a piece of cake and a cup of coffee. This evaluation of consequences competes with long-
term evaluation from the cognitive forecasting system. In our example, this system forecasts the
long-term utilities of taking nothing, which it evaluates as higher than taking cake and/or coffee.
Bernheim and Rangel model this competition within a stochastic and dynamic intertemporal
model of ‘addiction’. In the core of their dual model, the decision maker can be in two modes of
decision making. In a hot mode he automatically chooses an addictive consumption, e.g., cake
and coffee; in a cold mode he chooses whether or not he does so. At each period, the decision
maker faces a sequence of two decision problems. He first chooses a lifestyle activity, always in
the cold mode. Lifestyle activities have different levels of utility, in inverse proportion to the
probability of encountering addictive consumptions, or cues of addictive consumptions. In our
example, three lifestyle activities can be: going to the coffee break room (high utility), or going
outside but close to the break room (medium utility), or going directly to the room where there
will be the next session you want to attend but which is far away from the break room (low
utility). Once the lifestyle activity chosen, the decision maker faces a probability of entering the
hot mode. This probability depends ultimately on factors, especially past consumptions and
cues in the environment, that influence the utility of the addictive consumption as evaluated
by the hedonic forecasting mechanism. There is a utility threshold above which that utility
completely override the cognitive forecasting system’s evaluation, so that the decision maker
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enters in the hot mode. In our example, the decision maker may choose to go to the coffee break
room, derived substantial utility from cakes and coffee at previous breaks and sees everybody
else eating cake and drinking coffee. The probability that he enters in the hot mode is therefore
quite high. If it occurs, he consumes cake and coffee (if it would have occurred while in the
next session’s room he couldn’t have consumed cake and coffee, i.e., he precommitted against
it); if it does not occur, he chooses whether he consumes cake and coffee or not. If we postulate
that the mesolimbic dopamine system’s optimum is cake and coffee and the cognitive forecast-
ing system’s optimum is taking nothing, then Bernheim and Rangel’s dual model is unable to
straightforwardly account for the decision to just take coffee.
The core of Brocas and Carillo’s dual model is trickier to explain because, unlike all other
dual modelers, they do not build a core for their model and then apply it to different problems.
It can nevertheless be reconstructed by focusing on what is shared by the great majority of their
applications. The two sub-individual entities at the core of their dual model are pairs of ‘brain
systems’ constituted of a principal system and an agent system. The decision maker can choose
how much to do of two actions, and the principal system wants to do more of one action and
less of the other than the agent system. In our example, the two actions are (1) consuming
cake and coffee and (2) consuming nothing. The agent system’s optimum is to do only the
former, and the principal system’s optimum is to do only the latter. The two systems have
therefore conflicting preferences over the relative quantity of the two actions. Conflicting but
not opposite: the principal derives its utility from the agent’s utility, but with different marginal
utility. Furthermore, the principal can control the agent’s actions, but to do so optimally,
she needs information about the agent’s marginal utility. Brocas and Carillo capture this in
an information parameter, over which there is an asymmetry of information between the two
systems: the principal does not know the agent’s marginal utility. In our example, the principal
does not know how much the agent will actually enjoy eating cake and coffee and dislike eating
nothing. The principal can design an incentive mechanism to reveal this information from the
agent. With this information the principal can then constrain (as if a contract was designed) the
pairs of actions available to the agent, so as to achieve a second best solution from the principal’s
point of view. Such constraint depends on other characteristics of the principal-agent relation,
which are application-dependent. In our example, the two main constraints discussed by Brocas
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and Carillo apply quite well: the principal wants to constrain the agent’s action for the sake of
future marginal utility (to enjoy the next break or tonight’s cocktail party better), or because
she is aware that the agent’s present marginal utility is biased, e.g., once the cake eaten, the
agent will not feel as satisfied as he thought he would have been. In both cases, the second-best
solution is obvious: just take coffee.
Regarding the methodological perspective of this chapter, a first comparative summary of the
cores of dual models can be put as follows. Fudenberg and Levine are the only ones not using any
language from Psychology in the construction of the core of their dual models. That is, they are
only using only psychological language to motivate and/or interpret their theoretical constructs,
most of which are fairly standard game theoretical notions. All other dual modelers make explicit
references to contributions in Psychology, of which we have only marked the technical language
through inverted commas, in the construction of the cores of their dual models. The cores of
both Loewenstein and O’Donoghue’s and Brocas and Carillo’s dual models are the only ones that
are not inherently temporal, in the sense that they can account for static or atemporal decision
problems, while the others would do so by formally bringing a temporal dimension. The core
of Bernheim and Rangel’s dual model is the only one that is inherently under uncertainty, in
the sense that there has to be a specific risk associated with choices of lifestyle activities for the
utility of these choices to be meaningful. No dual models’ core is inherently social, at least in
a sense related to the standard notion of social preferences as discussed in the previous chapter
(Bernheim and Rangel’s lifestyle activities is however social in the sense of choosing among
which kind of people one wishes to interact). Finally, the cores of Bernheim and Rangel’s and
of Benhabib and Bisin’s dual model cannot account straightforwardly for the outcome of our
simple example, i.e., just taking coffee. Both Loewenstein and O’Donoghue and Fudenberg and
Levine account for it through modeling costs of self-control, while Brocas and Carillo account
for it by modeling an asymmetric informational constraint between their two sub-individual
entities.
3.1.2 Uses of formal languages from the backgrounds of dual modelers
All dual modelers use formal languages (i.e., mathematics, logic and probability theory) with
some slight yet non-trivial differences. These differences are best understood by paying some
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attention to the variety of dual modelers’ backgrounds as economists. The goal here is to
discuss these differences in order to better understand the relation between economics and
Psychology in dual models. Very broadly these backgrounds can be characterized as: game
theory for Fudenberg and Levine, contract theory for Brocas and Carillo, behavioral economics
for Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, macroeconomics for Benhabib and Bisin and public economics
for Bernheim and Rangel. They will be discussed in this order.
The most central formal feature of the core of Fudenberg and Levine’s dual model is the
reduction of the game between a long-run self and short run selves to a simple optimization
program for a single decision maker (2006, Theorem 1). In economics, the language of ‘multi-
ple selves’ historically comes from the use of game theory to bypass the technical impossibility
of modeling inconsistent intertemporal preferences through straightforward optimization under
constraint (cf. previous chapter). The core of Fudenberg and Levine’s dual model can there-
fore be seen as a historically non-trivial contribution to this literature. It provides substantial
gains in analytical tractability for economists that want to generate dynamically inconsistent
intertemporal preferences. Their expertise in game theory is certainly not innocent here, as can
be grasped by their uses of the adjectives ‘long-run’ and ‘short-run’ to qualify the two types
of self. Both Fudenberg and Levine have made contributions on games between long-run and
short run players that were unrelated to multiple selves problems (see the collected papers in
Fudenberg and Levine 2009). Considering such a game within an individual allows for assump-
tions that would not make sense otherwise. Especially, one player cannot control the actions of
another player in the same fashion as one self can control another self. This is the key insight
that Fudenberg and Levine use in their characterization of a specific equilibrium for their game,
which they prove to be equivalent to a simple optimization problem for a single decision maker.
The contribution of the core of their dual model is thus strictly internal to economics.
The core of Brocas and Carillo’s dual model that can be reconstructed from their applications
is also strictly intended as contributions to economics (see 2008a; 2014). Throughout their work,
they explicitly use the formal language from “the tradition of the contract theory literature”
(p.1317). They more precisely use a blend of contract theory with mechanism design theory (see
Börgers 2015, pp.2-3 on how common and natural is this blend). This is well in line with their
formations at the Toulouse School of Economics, an institution famously known for its researches
163
on contract theory and mechanism design. Though the substance of the core of their dual
model is intended as contributions to economics, they nevertheless recurrently argue that the
mathematical techniques of constrained optimization with informational asymmetries are more
rigorous and precise than computational models used in neurosciences. Hence, the methodology
underlying the core of their dual models is also intended as contributions to neurosciences,
including Psychology (see esp. Brocas 2012).
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue insist on their main contribution being twofold: (1) the the-
oretical construction of their affective system and its interactions with the deliberative system,
and (2) the formalization of this construction through rather simple functional relations. The
core of their dual models is presented as a direct contribution to the dual trend in Psychology.
Their uses of a simple formal language can be seen as a way to communicate with psychologists,
in an effort of integration between economics and Psychology. Hence the core of Loewenstein
and O’Donoghue’s dual model is a formalized instance of the claims sometimes made by be-
havioral economists about the possibility and potential fruitfulness of an integration between
economics and Psychology (e.g., Camerer 1999; Loewenstein, Rick and Cohen 2008), which
standard economists tend to criticize (see, e.g., Gul and Pesendorfer 2008).
In a similar fashion, Benhabib and Bisin explicitly present the core of their dual model as a
theoretical contribution to the literature in Psychology from which they borrow the constructs
of automatic and controlled processes. They acknowledge that the formalization they propose
has empirical implications at the neural level which have never been tested. They thus propose
an experimental design in order to make such a test (see 2005, Fig. 1 p.467). Furthermore, in
their contributions to The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics (Benhabib and
Bisin 2008), their dual model is taken as an illustration of their methodological reflections on
the modeling of individual behavior for positive economics, which prone a rather strong form of
interdisciplinarity with Psychology. Their backgrounds as macroeconomists do not show up in
the core of their dual model, however. It does in their application of the core of their dual model
to characterize a representative agent in a dynamic stochastic economy (2005, pp.467-479).
Bernheim and Rangel take great pains to ground their sub-individual entities in the “psy-
chology, neuroscience, and clinical practice” of addiction (2004, p.1582). The core of their dual
model is intended as a positive contribution to the modeling of addiction behaviors generally
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Table 3.1: Comparison of dual models’ cores
(pp.1568-1572), i.e., to both the literatures mentioned previously and to the economics of addic-
tion. Their backgrounds as public economists show up in the applications of their dual model
(2004, pp.1572-1580), which consist in the analysis of policies related to addictive behaviors.
Furthermore, in their contributions to The Foundations (Bernheim and Rangel 2008), which
reformulates the whole axiomatics of welfare economics to characterize behavioral mistakes,
they use their dual model as an “illustration” of the models of individual behavior that can be
used in such a framework (see p. 187; this claim is invariably made in their work in normative
economics, see, e.g., 2007b, p.470; 2009, p.79; Bernheim 2009, p.36).
This subsection can be summarized in one short sentence. Every dual modelers but Fuden-
berg and Levine intend their uses of formal language from economics to make a contribution to
Psychology.
Conclusion
Table 3.1 summarizes the main outcomes of the comparison made in the two subsections of this
section (using dual modelers’ initial for space reasons).
Two of this chapter’s conclusions can already be glanced at. First, by contrast with the
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previous chapter, there is a primacy of time over risk and social preferences. This will be
strengthened in the third section on dual model’s applications. Secondly, the success of Fuden-
berg and Levine’s dual model among economists suggests that the reconciliation between be-
havioral and standard economics does not imply a strong interdisciplinarity between economics
and Psychology. This will be weakened in the third section on dual model’s applications, where
we will see that Fudenberg and Levine make some non-trivial uses of language from Psychology.
In any case, to the exception of Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, the movement of theoretical
unification between standard and behavioral economics through dual models is mainly carried
by economists that were considered ‘standard’ before the 2000s.
3.2 Shared backgrounds: from Psychology and from economics
This section scrutinizes the shared backgrounds from Psychology and from economics against
which their dual models are best understood. In the first subsection, the types of Psychology
from which dual modelers borrowed the scientific language marked in the previous section are
discussed (3.2.1). In a second subsection, the contributions from economists with respect to
which dual modelers place their contributions are discussed (3.2.2). In both cases, the discussions
systematically proceed in two steps. A comprehensive account of the contributions is first
given only in an intuitive fashion, usually by putting the reader into the shoes of a subject
participating to the experiments underlying these contributions. Then an explicitation of the
potential sources of normativity underlying these contributions is proposed. It should be noted
that neither the terms from Psychology nor the contributions in economics discussed in this
section are exhaustive of dual modeler’s uses of Psychology and economics. The contributions
selected for the discussion here are however more central and shared across dual models than
others. Though I shall only discuss explicitly the dual modelers for whom a given reference is
central, each of the references discussed below are usually also used by at least three other dual
modelers. This is why I use the expression ‘shared backgrounds’ throughout.
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3.2.1 Participating to, but not influenced by, the dual trend and its critics
This subsection scrutinizes the language from Psychology used in dual models by giving brief
explanations and illustrations of the references underlying the terms marked in the previous
section. We shall see that the relation of dual models to what was called the dual trend in
Psychology (in the introduction of this chapter) is surprisingly tenuous. Dual modelers are
inspired by references that are also discussed in the dual trend in Psychology, and their dual
models are even referenced by psychologists as being part of the trend (e.g., in Keren and Schul
2009). But with the exception of Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, and later Fudenberg and Levine
(in a paper co-written with a psychologist), dual modelers neither situate their contributions
within that trend, nor do they make direct references to it.
The first references to be discussed dates back from 1977, when cognitive psychologists Walter
Schneider and Richard Shiffrin coined ‘automatic processes’ and ‘controlled processes’ in a way
that has been substantially used in the dual trend (Schneider and Shiffrin 1977; Shiffrin and
Schneider 1977). To illustrate what that means, suppose you are in front of a computer. You
have to memorize four digits, e.g., {1,5,3,7}, before you see a series of screen with four letters
on each screen, except for one screen where a digit replaces a letter, e.g., {A,B,C,D}, then
{D,O,P,Z}, then {F,K,1,H}, and then {O,I,Y,T}. For each screen, you have to press one of two
buttons: “no” if you don’t see any of the memorized digits or “yes” if you see one of them. This is
very roughly the kind of experiments conducted by Schneider and Shiffrin, with a great number
of variations, e.g., varying the time between each screens or having to memorize letters (unlike
in the previous example) which you then have to detect in series of screen with letters (like in
the previous example). The main goal of these experiments was to use the data to construct “a
general theory of human information processing” (Schneider and Shiffrin 1977, p.3). At the basis
of their theory is a qualitative difference between two types of information processing: ‘controlled
search’, e.g., when you search a memorized letter among other letters, and ‘automatic detection’,
e.g., when you detect a digit among letters. In their theoretical account, these two types of
processes cannot operate simultaneously, but are triggered under different conditions, especially
regarding the type of learning that may have accompanied the memorization of the target set
of digits or letters. This distinction between automatic processes and controlled processes has
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been influential in cognitive Psychology, notably for theories of attention as witnessed in the
comprehensive and critical review by cognitive psychologists Stephen Monsell and Jon Driver
(2000).
It is from this tradition in cognitive Psychology that Benhabib and Bisin borrow the con-
structs of automatic and controlled processes at the core of their dual model. Notice that in
the kind of tasks used by these cognitive psychologists, there are clear correct and incorrect
answers. Pressing “yes” when no memorized digit appears on the screen is a mistake in a sense
that cannot be said of choices made in behavioral economists’ intertemporal choice tasks. In
the words of the entanglement thesis, the value judgment of mistaken behaviors is derived from
the factual observation of subjects conforming or not to the dual modelers’ conventions ex-
plicited in the experimental instructions, on the one hand, or to the theoretical convention of
dynamic consistency from economics, on the other. Therefore, in the former, the main source
of normativity is simply the dual modeler, whose instructions define somewhat arbitrarily what
is a correct or an incorrect answer (by contrast with, say, the laws of logic or of probability
theory). The distinction between these two types of tasks is related to what has historically
been a sharp opposition between ‘cognition’ and ‘motivation’ in most of (American) mainstream
Psychology (see Higgins 2012, p.213); with the notion of ‘affect’ and ‘emotion’ being associated
with ‘motivation’. ‘Cognitive control’ and ‘self-control’ denotes the mental efforts one has to
do respectively in the former to get right answers and in the latter to make choices that are
dynamically consistent. Benhabib and Bisin’s contribution to Psychology consists in postulat-
ing and modeling self-control problems as instances of cognitive control problems. By doing so,
they identify dynamic inconsistencies with automatic processes and failures of cognitive con-
trol. In a way, their contribution to Psychology is to give a formalized cognitivist account of
a motivational problem, thus furthering Shiffrin and Schneider’s initial ambition of theoretical
unification.5
Call the type of Psychology just discussed ‘pure cognitive Psychology’. It is in great contrast
with so-called ‘affective neuroscience’, where the next reference on ‘brain systems’, and especially
5Although they cite Monsell and Driver (2000) approvingly, Benhabib and Bisin seem to be subjected to three
interrelated contemporary criticisms reviewed by them. These are the refusals (1) of an automatic/controlled
dichotomy, (2) of inhibition as the only type of interaction between both, and (3) of postulating a unique and
unified system responsible for all form of cognitive control. We have seen that the core of Benhabib and Bisin’s
dual model predict that either one of the two processes will be in charge (a dichotomous outcome), through
inhibition of the automatic processes monitored by one ‘supervisory attention system’.
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on the ‘mesolimbic dopamine system’ comes from, namely from the work of Kent Berridge and
his co-authors. As Berridge explains in various places, dopamine is a neurotransmitter that, for
a long time, was associated with the experience of pleasure (e.g., Berridge 2003; Berridge and
O’Doherty 2014). Berridge and his co-authors have argued that the best way to measure the
experience of pleasure lies in the observation of facial expressions during the consumption of
something sweet (e.g., sugar). It produces “a pattern of tongue protusions, lip sucking, facial
relaxation, and the occasional smile” common to humans, monkeys and rodents (Berridge 2003,
p.25). Mostly using experiments with rats, they found that high activation of the mesolimbic
dopamine system, one of the main brain system involved in the release of dopamine, is not
associated with the experience of pleasure. Then, to understand with what it was associated,
they conducted further experiments where rats were trained to make efforts by pressing a lever
to get sugar on some days, and on other days they were conditioned (à la Pavlov) by a red
light or a specific sound which occurred just before they receive sugar without making any
efforts. Once the conditioning is successful, those sounds or lights are said to be ‘cues’ for
sugar. In the experimental session, amphetamine is injected in the brain of some rats, which
triggers a high activation of the mesolimbic dopamine system. The rats can press the lever
(they learned that efforts in doing so is rewarded with sugar), the lights or sounds sometimes
occur (the cues triggering expectation of sugar without efforts), but in any case no sugar is
delivered throughout the experiment. What they observe is that rats that have not been injected
amphetamine smoothly decrease their efforts during the session, with no big difference when
a cue occurs. Rats that have been injected amphetamine display the same tendency, except
when a cue occurs, which triggers a level of effort that is more than four hundred percent
higher for about 30 seconds. For Berridge, the main theoretical goal behind these types of
experiments is to argue for a neurologically founded distinction between liking (the experience
of pleasure) and wanting, with a sub-distinction between ordinary wanting and cue-triggered
‘wanting’ (which Berridge always distinguish by uses of inverted commas). Ordinary wanting is
akin to “a conscious desire for cognitively-represented outcome” (p.27), or “cognitive wanting”
for short; it is the (possibly discounted) anticipation of pleasure. On the other hand, ‘wanting’
is akin to “cued attraction to salient incentives”, or “cue-triggered ‘wanting”’ for short (ibid).
The main contribution from Berridge’s work is the identification of the role of dopamine for
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‘wanting’ but not necessarily for wanting and liking.
It is mainly with respect to this tradition from neurosciences that Bernheim and Rangel
situate their contributions, especially in two respects. First, like Berridge and many others,
the relevance of these findings are used to understand human behavioral phenomena related to
addictions. More precisely, Bernheim and Rangel provides a theoretical unification of several
such phenomena based mostly on Berridge’s work. Second, again like Berridge, they explicitly
see choices based on ‘wanting’ as clearly irrational, by contrast with choices based on wanting.
It should be noted that the Berridge’s own normative position follows explicitly what we have
called earlier the primacy of time preference in the work of Kahneman (cf. chapter 1). In the
words of the entanglement thesis, the value judgments of mistakes and irrationality are derived
from the theoretical conventions of hedonism together with the factual observation of animal
and pathological behaviors.
Next, I would like to discuss the references in Psychology related to ‘cognitive load’ and
‘willpower’ altogether, and starting with only an illustration of the empirical phenomena they
refer to. Dual modelers have associated ‘cognitive load’ with the experimental results of Baba
Shiv and Alexander Fedorikhin (1999). To put yourself into their subjects’ shoes, imagine that
you are asked to remember either two digits (low cognitive load) or seven digits (high cognitive
load), and then to make a choice between chocolate cake and fruit salad. According to Shiv
and Fedorikhin’s results, there is a strong probability that you will choose cake over fruits with
high cognitive load and the reverse under low cognitive load. ‘Willpower’, on the other hand,
is associated by dual modelers to the work of Roy Baumeister, a typical experiment of whom
goes as follows (2003, sect. 3.3). Imagine that you enter a room with a table on which there are
two plates, one with radishes and one with freshly baked cookies. In a first phase, your task is
either to eat only radishes (so that you have to use your willpower not to eat cookies) or to eat
whatever you want (so that you don’t have to use your willpower). In a second phase, regardless
of what you were asked in the previous task, your task is now to solve a problem that, unknown
to you, is unsolvable. According to Baumeister’s results, there is a strong probability that if
you had to use your willpower in the first phase (you were asked to eat only radishes), then you
will spend less time (using less willpower) trying to solve the problem in the second phase.
Theoretically, Shiv and Fedorikhin’s (1999) goal is to provide evidence for models in Psychology
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that postulate an impact of cognition on affects (or ‘emotion’ or even more broadly on ‘moti-
vation’). And Baumeister’s experiments are meant to provide evidence for his own model of
self-control that postulate such an impact. In part, the core of Loewenstein and O’Donoghue’s
dual model uses Shiv and Fedorikhin’s results to develop Baumeister’s model. To understand
the latter, another empirical tendency from his work needs to be stated: “people who performed
minor exercises in self-control for two weeks, such as trying to improve their posture (i.e., stand
and sit straight), showed improvements in self-control on laboratory tasks [e.g., spent more time
on the unsolvable problem] relative to people who did not exercise” (Baumeister 2003, p.12).
Hence Baumeister’s ‘strength’ model conceptualizes ‘willpower’ or ‘self-control’ (terms he uses
interchangeably) as a muscle: “just as a muscle becomes tired when exercised but eventually
becomes stronger, the capacity for self-control becomes depleted in the short run but may be
strengthened in the long run if it is used regularly” (ibid). The depletion of willpower capacity
observed in Baumeister’s work is becoming popular throughout Psychology under the name ego
depletion (see, e.g., Kahneman 2011). The 2012 extension of the core of Fudenberg and Levine’s
model does formalize ego depletion, unlike both their 2006 initial dual model and Loewen-
stein and O’Donoghue’s (though they roughly mention how it could). Indeed, Loewenstein and
O’Donoghue simply add a cognitive load parameter which mediates the use of willpower capac-
ity: for a given task, the higher the cognitive load, the more willpower will be needed. In terms
of the normative dimension of these behavioral phenomena, Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999, p.289)
cite some of their preliminary results to contrast “[t]he traditional view of impulse behavior
as being irrational” from researcher’s perspective with the “consumers”’ own perspectives, who
“do not seem to view impulse behavior as normatively inappropriate, at least immediately after
the behavior occurs”. They however suggest that this can be mere post-hoc rationalization,
not to be trusted by researchers. Baumeister holds a more radical view: failures of self-control
due to ego depletion are simply and straightforwardly irrational, and this is justified mainly by
appealing to the reader’s intuition through casual examples (see esp. Baumeister 2003; 2005;
2015). In both cases, the value judgment of irrationality comes from the factual observation of
the impact of cognition on motivation together with the social conventions used by psychologists
in their introspection and casual empiricism.6
6It should be noted that the phenomenon of ego depletion is currently under a replication crisis in Psychology,
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In one way or the other, the references discussed so far are mentioned in the dual trend
in Psychology but they are far from being central in it, with the exception of Schneider and
Shiffrin’s work. The dual trend in Psychology arose from three subareas that are not part of dual
modeler’s shared background from Psychology: the ‘cognitive Psychology of deductive reason-
ing’, the ‘cognitive Psychology of inductive judgment’, and ‘social cognition’. They respectively
study the cognitive processes underlying the making of deductive inferences, inductive infer-
ences, and social perceptions and behaviors. Three brief remarks are worth making in order to
contrast dual model’s shared background from Psychology (references are in the next footnote).
First, the dual trend is a movement of theoretical unification within which the uses of ‘systems’
as a set of ‘processes’ has stabilized around the famous labels System 1 (including ‘conscious’,
‘fast’, ‘automatic’, etc. processes) and System 2 (including ‘unconscious’, ‘slow’, ‘controlled’,
etc. processes). Second, critics to that trend have targeted two ambiguities in ordinary language
uses. One ambiguity concerns the substance of the processes (e.g., ‘automatic’ and ‘controlled’),
with many authors meaning different things by the same terms. The other ambiguity concerns
the conceptual relation between processes and systems: processes from a given system do not
have necessary connections, two processes from each systems can be active at the same time,
and interactions between two processes of a given pairs (e.g., ‘automatic’ and ‘controlled’) sug-
gest that the binary entities lie on a continuum rather than forming a qualitatively dichotomous
distinction. Defenders of the trend have argued that dual system models are still useful at the
metatheoretical level, and that the ambiguities are not so pervasive in a given applied work. In
other words, they argued that the pairs of binary distinction are neither dualism nor dualities,
but ordinary distinction useful from applications to applications. To anticipate on this chapter,
we shall argue that this is also the best interpretation that dual models can receive. Third, the
sources of normativity in these three subareas, namely logic, probability theory and social norms,
are different from the ones spotted above in this subsection.7
i.e., a set of psychologists have claimed and shown that some underlying effects that were thought to be robust
during the past decade are actually not so. Discussing this along with its non-trivial implications for the
rise of dual models in economics is beyond the scope of this chapter. Michael Inzlicht is one of the lead-
ing psychologist from this group and provide recent update on this replication crisis on his scientific blog
http://michaelinzlicht.com/getting-better/, last consulted 18/04/2016. A comprehensive platform of replica-
tions in Psychology is http://curatescience.org/#section-3, last consulted 30/04/2016. I thank Tania Ocana for
having pointed this to me.
7On the dual trend as a movement of theoretical unification across three subareas of Psychology, see esp.
Stanovich and West (2000), Evans (2004; 2008), Frankish and Evans (2009), Frankish (2010), Bonnefon (2013);
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Finally, one last reference from Psychology that we have already encountered in the previous
chapter should be mentioned: Ainslie. With the exception of Bernheim and Rangel, Ainslie is
referenced by all dual modelers but it would be an exaggeration to count him in dual model’s
shared background. This is because they reference Ainslie only when they claim that intertem-
poral preference reversals are pervasive, but they do not borrow much (if at all) theoretical
insights from his work. Similarly to the dual trend, it is worth briefly commenting on Ainslie’s
work for the sake of contrasting dual models’ shared background from Psychology. Ainslie’s
(1992; 2001; 2012) work is encyclopedic on self-control in two senses. Empirically, he reviews an
impressive amount of dynamically inconsistent human and animal behaviors. And theoretically,
he situates his theoretical contribution, which aims at providing a unifying account of these be-
haviors, within a wide scope in Psychology, philosophy and economics. Roughly, the specificity
of Ainslie with respect to the other psychologists discussed above is his (partial) inspiration from
‘behaviorist Psychology’. This is manifest in two features. First, his theoretical account empha-
sizes the role of ‘motivation’ and downplays the role of ‘cognition’ that these other psychologists
emphasized. Second, there is a strong primacy of time preferences Ainslie’s theoretical account.
The core of his model is a continuum of ‘short-range interests’ and ‘long-range interests’ on
which lies the whole of self-control problems. This includes the most unconscious ones (e.g.,
itches and nail biting) to the most conscious ones (e.g., spending too much time building a career
at the expense of leisure). From these two features, he has criticized dual models as being too
focused on the cognitive aspects of self-control problems and/or (depending the dual model) as
not considering the motivational aspects of long-range interests. He nevertheless considers that
the 2012 extension of Fudenberg and Levine’s dual model is the one that captures the most of
his account (see Ainslie 2012). Finally, the sources of normativity in Ainslie’s work are far too
numerous and complex to be discussed here, but it should be noted that he clearly identifies
exponential discounting and hyperbolic discounting as rational and irrational respectively, quite
like economists and behavioral economists.
Summing up this subsection, we have seen that dual models’ shared background from
see also Frantz (2005) and Egidi (2008) for discussions related to economics. For the criticism of the trend see
esp. Keren and Yaacov Schul (2009; see also Keren 2013; Sahlin et al. 2010; Kruglanski 2013; Osman 2013); and
for the answers by defenders, see esp. Evans and Stanovich (2013a;b); see also Monsell and Driver (2000) who
make some similar points restricted to pure cognitive Psychology. On the normativity of logic and probability
theory in the cognitive Psychology of reasoning and of judgment, see Stein (1996). On the trickier issue of the
role of social norms in the debates within social cognition, see Bargh (1999).
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Psychology is various, implying a variety of sources of normativity. Among these sources, some
that are within the shared background are: dual modelers themselves (Schneider and Shiffrin),
the unbiased anticipation of pleasure (Berridge) and the cognitive capacity to resist impulses
(Shiv and Fedorikhin, Baumeister). Among those that are not in the shared background as
characterized here are logic, probability theory and social norms (the dual trend) along with the
motivational capacity to resist impulses (Ainslie). Notice also that, unlike dual modelers (with
the exception of Bernheim and Rangel), all the psychologists reviewed here (with the excep-
tion of the critics to the dual trend) are pretty clear on the normative dimension of behaviors
violating the aforementioned norms: they are mistaken or irrational. Finally, notice also that
all dual modelers seek to articulate two domains of Psychology, pertaining to ‘cognition’ and
‘motivation’ respectively, that have long been separated. Though psychologists often debate
the ‘primacy’ of motivation over cognition or vice-versa, this is not an issue with which dual
modelers are concerned (with the exception of Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, especially in the
2004 early version of their dual model).
3.2.2 Thaler and Shefrin, Gul and Pesendorfer, and a neuroeconomics
controversy
We now turn to the economics part of dual models’ shared background, in much the same
fashion as in the previous subsection. Three sets of references constitute this part of the shared
background: the early work of Thaler and Hersh Shefrin in behavioral economics, the work of
Gul and Pesendorfer in standard economics, and a controversy in neuroeconomics.
All dual modelers agree with Thaler and Shefrin’s own claim to have provided “the first
systematic, formal treatment of a two-self economic man” (1981, p.394). Constructed in two
papers (1981; Shefrin and Thaler 1988), the core of their model is indeed extremely close to
the ones discussed above. They model individual behaviors as the interactions between two
types of self: one ‘planner’ optimizing a lifetime utility constituted by the aggregation of a
succession of ‘doers’ optimizing the utility of each periods. The interaction is formalized in
a principal-agent framework where the planner (i.e., the principal) can influence doers’ (i.e.,
the agents’) choices to avoid ‘temptations’ (i.e., consuming too much now at the expense of
future doers). More precisely, the planner can influence doers directly, externally or internally,
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but it represent utility costs that Thaler and Shefrin associate with the cost of self-control:
‘willpower’. Direct influences require the most willpower, they consist in the planner changing
the doers’ preferences (intuitively, picture yourself trying to ‘become another kind of human
being’ or ‘improve your personality’). External influences require the least (but still some)
willpower, they consist in (physical, social or institutional) precommitments, such as subscribing
to saving plans and the like. These two influences correspond respectively to Strotz’s strategies
of consistent planning and of precommitment (cf. the previous chapter). Internal influences
require an amount of willpower which is in-between the two previous types of influence, and
consist in self-imposed rules, e.g., ‘never buy new clothes more than twice a months’. Clearly,
their two sub-individual entities are conceptually similar to Fudenberg and Levine’s, and their
interaction through direct influences is conceptually similar to both Fudenberg and Levine’s
and Loewenstein and O’Donoghue’s. However, their interaction is formally closer to Brocas
and Carillo’s, but with limited control (of the planner over the doers) instead of informational
asymmetry as the justification for the formalism. We shall see later that the interaction through
internal influences that is at the core of Thaler and Shefrin’s model is conceptually close to the
applications of three dual modelers: Brocas and Carillo, Benhabib and Bisin, Fudenberg and
Levine.8
Thus, the formalization of internal influences is the specificity of the core of Thaler and
Shefrin’s model with respect both to the literature that followed Strotz and to the cores of
contemporary dual models. More precisely, in the core of their 1988 model, internal influences
are formalized through ‘mental accounts’, which refer to a development made by Thaler (1985)
to his (1980) microeconomic theory of consumer choice discussed in the first chapter of this
dissertation. At the microeconomic level, Thaler argues that decision makers perform a mental
arithmetic on the monetary consequences of their choices whereby mathematical operations are
allowed between monetary consequences within a mental account but not between monetary
consequences across mental accounts. But Shefrin and Thaler use a simplified version of mental
accounting for macroeconomic analysis. To illustrate, consider “the following four events: a
$1000 bonus received at work; a $1000 lottery windfall; a $1000 increase in the value of the
8While Bernheim and Rangel do not reference Thaler and Shefrin’s model in the text of their paper, the
latter is so pervasive in dual models that it still found its way into the former’s bibliography!
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household’s home; and an inheritance, to be received in ten years, with a present value of
$1000” (Shefrin and Thaler 1988, p.615). In any of these four events, do you consume goods
you did not plan to consume (e.g., you treat yourself with a nice restaurant)? If yes, then
you violate standard macroeconomic theory (permanent income or life-cycle hypotheses) that
assumes consumption smoothing, i.e., that if one of these four events happens, you smooth
your consumption through life (you consume the same thing you consumed but slightly more,
you don’t buy goods you did not planned buying). Furthermore, suppose the four events occur
simultaneously, do you consider that you have an extra $4000 to spend or just $2000 (adding the
first two, but not the last two)? If the latter, then it refines the explanation of why you violate
consumption smoothing, namely because you do not treat money as being totally fungible. That
is, you don’t spend the same given amount of money in the same way depending on where the
money comes from (e.g., inheritance versus gambling money), and on how large it is compared
to the usual flow of money that comes from that source (e.g., a $1000 bonus on a $3000 salary
versus on a $30000 salary). Shefrin and Thaler replace the subtleties of the microeconomics of
mental accounting by only three broad mental accounts: “current spendable income (I ) [where
you probably put the bonus and lottery money], current assets (A) [where you probably put
the home money], and future income (F) [where you probably put the inheritance money, but
possibly some of the bonus and lottery money if your salary is around $1000]” (1988, pp.614-15,
my comments in brackets). In the core of Shefrin and Thaler’s model, internal influences of the
planner on doers is formalized by assigning different marginal propensity to consume to each
of these mental accounts, and the exact value of the marginal propensity is parametrized on
a cost function representing the amount of willpower (which is thus account-dependent). The
two main connections with contemporary dual models are these. First, Fudenberg and Levine
(2006, p.1461; cf. next section) claim to provide microfoundations for Shefrin and Thaler’s
mental accounting, i.e., deriving the different marginal propensity from the core of their dual
model instead of imposing them as assumptions. And in a recent extension for social preferences
(Dreber et al. 2016; cf. next section), they have integrated mental accounting in the core of their
dual model. Second, like Benhabib and Bisin, the core of Shefrin and Thaler’s model can be
taken as a contribution to microeconomics, but it is intended for applications to macroeconomics.
The normative dimension of the core of Thaler and Shefrin’s model is, as with dual models,
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an ambiguous issue; but by contrast with them (minus Bernheim and Rangel), it is an explicit
issue. The ambiguity is exactly the one described in the introduction of this chapter. On the
one hand, in their 1981 paper, they claim that the behaviors modeled are rational because self-
control costs are an unavoidable constraint, and optimizing under that constraint is rational.
But on the other hand, in their 1988 paper, they claim that rationality is to be equated with
the standard theory and corresponds to the planner’s preferences; the doers are irrational and
the individual is quasi-rational. This shift is, I would argue, attributable to one thing that
happened between the publications of these two papers, namely the beginning of Kahneman
and Tversky’s researches on framing. Indeed, Shefrin and Thaler explicitly present ‘framing’
with mental accounting as being the two new ingredients of their 1988 model from their 1981
one, the common ingredient to both being self-control. The role of framing in Shefrin and
Thaler’s model is deferred to the conclusion of this chapter. What is left to discuss here are the
rather unusual sources of normativity in their model. In the 1981 model, human organizations,
and especially firms are the main source of normativity. They argue that self-control behaviors
are rational because they can be model, through the theoretical convention of the principal
agent-framework, as following the same rules used by profit maximizing firms. In the 1988
model, the fungibility of money is main source of normativity. They argue that it is because
decision makers treat money as not totally fungible that their behaviors are not totally rational
(especially because it leads to framing effects, see the last section of this chapter). Indeed,
as Thaler noted in 1985, when a system of mental accounting is formalized, “the normative
principle of fungibility is relaxed” (Thaler 1985, p.201, my emphasis). In both cases and in
the words of the entanglement thesis, value judgment of rationality or irrationality are made
from both the factual observation of individual struggling with self-control problems and the
theoretical conventions from economics.
While the work of Thaler and Shefrin can be seen as the behavioral economics region within
dual models’ shared background from economics, the work of Gul and Pesendorfer represents the
standard economics region. Indeed, Gul and Pesendorfer have provided an axiomatic framework
where self-control problems can be formalized with very minimal deviation from the standard
model, and allowing various applications (2001; 2004a; b; 2005; 2007). The core of their contri-
bution starts by changing the objects of choice over which preferences are defined. Instead of
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being over the (probabilistic and/or temporally situated) consequences of a decision problem,
Gul and Pesendorfer formalize preference over decision problems. To illustrate with a slightly
modified version of their paradigmatic example (2001, pp.1402-3), consider the choice between
two consequences: a vegetarian dish denoted by x and a hamburger denoted by y. In the morn-
ing (i.e., at t = 1), the decision maker can make a reservation for lunchtime (i.e., at t = 2)
in a vegetarian restaurant where his choice set at lunchtime will be {x}, or in a hamburger
restaurant without vegetarian dish hence with the choice set {y}, or in a restaurant where there
will be both hence with the choice set {x, y} that is the union of the two former, i.e., {x}∪ {y}.
In other words, in the morning, the decision maker’s preferences are over the set of decision
problems {{x}, {y}, {x, y}} that he can face at lunchtime. Drawing on the work of David Kreps,
Gul and Pesendorfer observe that the standard model is characterized by the following implicit
set-theoretic axiom: in the morning, a weak preference for the vegetarian dish over hamburger
implies an indifference between, on the one hand, the vegetarian dish, and, on the other hand,
the union of the vegetarian dish with the hamburger, i.e., {x} % {y} ⇒ {x} v {x} ∪ {y}.
Gul and Pesendorfer slightly strengthen this implicit axiom by interpreting a choice for the
vegetarian dish in the morning as a precommitment against the self-control cost to resist the
temptation of a simultaneously available hamburger, i.e., {x} % {y} ⇒ {x} % {x} ∪ {y} % {y}.
They call this axiom set betweeness, and it is at the center of most of their formal results. They
notably prove the equivalence of standard preferences respecting the independence axiom plus
set-betweeness with, on the one hand, a utility functional with a self-control cost function, and,
on the other hand, a choice function respecting the standard axioms of consumer choice theory.
From this, Gul and Pesendorfer make three main contributions. First, they solve Strotz’s strat-
egy of consistent planning without using dynamic game theory i.e., without implying multiple
selves. Second, they characterize the revealed preference implications of behavioral economics’
models with quasi hyperbolic discounting. Third, they formally represent intertemporal prefer-
ence reversals in a dynamically consistent model. Their applications are in macroeconomics –
related notably to the work of Laibson, Thaler and Shefrin and Benhabib and Bisin – and in
the economics of addiction – related notably to the work of Bernheim and Rangel.
In terms of the sources of normativity, Gul and Pesendorfer explicitly endorses the standard
view depicted in the two previous chapters. That is, on the one hand (cf. chap.1), they consider
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that the behaviors captured by their model are rational in so far as they respect consistency
conditions on a choice function which implies the optimization of a utility function (see all the
references cited in the previous paragraph). And on the other hand (cf. chap.2), they judge the
independence axiom, which is always part of their axiomatic framework, as normatively justi-
fied because of its intuitive appeal (see Gul and Pesendorfer 2008, p.29). Gul and Pesendorfer’s
emphasis on the rational interpretation of the behaviors plays a specific role with respect to
Fudenberg and Levine’s dual model. To understand how, we need to briefly state one feature of
the latter’s dual model which is in-between its cores and its applications, namely its possibility
to represent self-control costs that are convex (i.e., non-linear). Roughly, the issue of linear
versus convex self-control cost function is about whether the marginal cost of self-control is
proportional (linear) or more than proportional (convex) to the forgone marginal utility it en-
tails. Fudenberg and Levine (2006, section VI) compare their modeling approach to self-control
with Gul and Pesendorfer’s type of axiomatic approach. Fudenberg and Levine show that with
linear costs of self-control, the preferences induced by their dual model are consistent with the
axioms of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001). But this is not the case anymore when self-control costs
are not linear, as their dual model then violates some of the most basic axioms: contraction
consistency on choice functions (cf. chap. 1), and the independence axiom on preference rela-
tions (cf. chap.2). The point I wish to make here is twofold. On the one hand, Fudenberg and
Levine do not see the violation of the standard axioms as necessarily entailing irrationality, by
contrast with the standard view. They rather argue that if convex self-control is an internal
constraint against which the decision maker cannot do anything, then “insights from psychology
and neuroscience” becomes useful to characterize what counts as rational (see Fudenberg and
Levine 2006, p.1469). On the other hand, their work have motivated further contributions in
the axiomatic approach (surveyed by Lipman and Pesendorfer 2013, see esp. sect.7), which
have themselves motivated further extensions of Fudenberg and Levine’s dual model (2012c).
In the words of the entanglement thesis, value judgment of rationality or irrationality depends
on the factual observation of dynamically inconsistent behaviors and the theoretical conventions
of economics (for both Gul and Pesendorfer and Fudenberg and Levine) and Psychology (for
Fudenberg and Levine only).
The last part of dual models’ shared background from economics is a controversy in neuroe-
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conomics that can be circumscribed to two sets of papers. On the one hand, two papers involving
behavioral economists Laisbon and Loewenstein (McClure et al. 2004; 2007), and on the other
hand, one paper involving neurobiologist Paul Glimcher (Glimcher et al. 2007). Both presented
decision maker with the type of intertemporal choice discussed in the previous chapter while
scanning their brain activity. In terms of behavioral results, McClure et al.’s were consistent
with β-δ preferences (i.e., quasi hyperbolic discounting), and Glimcher et al.’s with hyperbolic
but not quasi hyperbolic discounting (i.e., the sooner-smaller consequences were chosen whether
they occurred immediately or with some delay). In terms of neural results, Glimcher et al.
use their observations to argue for a unitary neural system of valuation, contradicting multiple
selves and dual models of discounting. By contrast, McClure et al. use their observations to
argue for a neural foundations of quasi hyperbolic discounting: a ‘β-system’ strongly activated
when immediate consequence are available (related to the mesolimbic dopamine system), and
a ‘δ-system’ activated continuously regardless of the timing of consequences (unrelated to the
mesolimbic dopamine system). We shall not go into the detail of this opposition, but only note
two different ways of using neuroeconomics references by dual modelers, who cite both references
but emphasize on McClure et al’s. One way, taken by Fudenberg and Levine and Loewenstein
and O’Donoghue, is to argue that dual modeler’s two sub-individual entities are not inconsistent
with what is known about the brain. The other way, taken by Brocas and Carillo, is to take
McClure et al’s findings as the neural foundations from which theoretical models of individual
behavior have to be constructed. In short, neuroeconomics is definitely part of dual models’
shared background, but it is clearly central only for Brocas and Carillo.9
The two main sources of normativity in neuroeconomics are not traditional for standard
economics. One source is medical. Behaviors associated with the activation of brain areas
that are similar to the activations known to be characteristic of pathological subjects (e.g.,
9It should be note that this is only the intertemporal part of a larger controversy which is constitutive of
the 2000s development in neuroeconomics. On the one hand, there is a trend constituted mainly of behavioral
economists seeking neural evidence for behavioral economics models’ and against standard economics’ models; on
the other hand, there is a trend constituted mainly of neurobiologists using the axiomatic framework of standard
economics to theorize about the behavior of the brain’s neural activity. The issue is mainly about the use of
formal language, especially about the helpfulness of the axiomatic method from economics for the computational
ones used in Psychology and the neurosciences. The specificity of the intertemporal part of this controversy
is that no camp claims any positive adequacy of standard exponential discounting. (see, e.g., Rustichini 2008;
Glimcher and Fehr 2014; or Vromen 2011; Vallois 2012b; Ross 2014 for a reflexive perspective). Also, notice
that for chronological reasons both Bernheim and Rangel and Benhabib and Bisin don’t cite McClure et al.’s
and Glimcher et al.’s references. Arguably, the latter would side with Brocas and Carillo’s way, while the former
would be in-between them and the other dual modelers.
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schizophrenic, sociopath, drug addicts etc.) are deemed to be irrational. The other source is
the distinction between Man and animals. Behaviors associated with high activation of brain
areas that are known not to be shared with animals are deemed rational. The former source
is explicitly used by all dual modelers with the exception of Fudenberg and Levine, while the
latter is explicitly used by Loewenstein and O’Donoghue only. Again, it is beyond the scope of
this dissertation to go into the details of these biological sources of normativity (see references
in the preceding footnote).
Summing up this subsection, dual models’ shared background from economics is less various
than the one from Psychology, yet it contains various sources of normativity. Among these
sources, there is, of course, the traditional one from consistency and optimization arguments
(Gul and Pesendorfer, and to a certain extent, the 1981 version of Thaler and Shefrin where
self-control costs are an inevitable constraint under which to optimize). But there are some
others which are far less traditional: the analogy of self-imposed rules with profit-maximizing
firms (Thaler and Shefrin 1981), the fungibility of money (Shefrin and Thaler 1988), and the
two biologically driven distinctions (neuroeconomics): the medical pathological/normal one and
the human/animal one. We have pointed one source of normativity related to ‘framing’ but
have left it undiscussed until the conclusion of this chapter. Finally, given the role played by
Thaler in the constitution of behavioral economics and the role of neuroeconomics with Gul and
Pesendorfer (2008) in the 2000s ‘behavioral versus standard economics debates’, this subsection
suggests that dual models are indeed at the center of the reconciliation between standard and
behavioral economics.
Conclusion
We can summarize the two subsections of this section very briefly regarding the purpose of this
chapter. On the one hand, the psychologists studied in the first subsection, though drawing on
a variety of sources of normativity, invariably and implicitly favor an interpretation where the
sub-individual entity that evaluated as optimal to take neither cake nor coffee in the preceding
section is rational, and any deviation from it cannot be normatively justified. On the other hand,
the standard economists studied in the second subsection arguably favor the alternative implicit
interpretation where the decision maker’s evaluation (i.e., just coffee is optimal) is rational, so
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that a normative interpretation can be given to the core of a dual model, but not to any of its
underlying sub-individual entities (one is ‘too’ rational, while the other is irrational). However,
the role of ‘framing’ from behavioral economics in that latter interpretation may complicate
matters a little.
3.3 Applications: theoretical unification through self-control
This section pursues the comparative studies of dual models by focusing on their applications.
We briefly discuss various applications that are peripheric to the empirical and theoretical issues
discussed in the previous part of this dissertation (3.3.1). We then turn to applications directly
related to these issues, by highlighting a primacy of time preferences (3.3.2) and a primacy of
risk over social preferences (3.3.2) for dual modelers.
3.3.1 Applications peripheric to the primacies of time, risk and social
preferences
Macroeconomics and the economics of addiction are the two main domains of application that
lie outside of last part’s empirical and theoretical scopes. They are respectively associated
with Benhabib and Bisin’s and Bernheim and Rangel’s dual models. Here we shall briefly
illustrate how their applications proceed and note the implications that are relevant from the
methodological perspective of this dissertation.
Benhabib and Bisin are interested in a representative agent’s consumption-saving rules within
a dynamic economy with stochastic temptations (unplanned opportunity to consume for imme-
diate utility). Only automatic processes derive utility from stochastic temptations, determining
a certain marginal propensity to consume different from the marginal propensity to consume of
controlled processes. The theoretical unification achieved by Benhabib and Bisin stems mainly
from the possibility of their dual model to generate different consumption-saving rules, i.e.,
with the automatic or controlled processes’ marginal propensity to consume. The representa-
tive agent adopts either of these rules under different circumstances, depending on the size of
stochastic temptation and of the attention parameter. This allows them to account for empir-
ical regularities that models from neither standard (i.e., with life-cycle and permanent income
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hypotheses) nor behavioral (e.g., Laibson’s work) macroeconomics can account for. The clearest
example of such regularity is the observation of different marginal propensity to consume out of
income shocks (akin to stochastic temptations) depending on the size of the shock (the bigger
it is, the smaller the propensity to consume; see Benhabib and Bisin 2005, pp.478-9).
Bernheim and Rangel are interested in the conditions under which drug addicts make mis-
takes in their choices to consume drugs. Making mistakes consists in planning not to consume
drugs in the cold mode but then entering in the hot mode and consuming drugs. The theo-
retical unification achieved by Bernheim and Rangel stems mainly from the possibility of their
dual model to generate such mistakes without assuming that the decision maker has conflicting
preferences (and he can furthermore rationally anticipate the risk of such mistakes in the cold
mode). The clearest example of an empirical regularity that neither standard nor behavioral eco-
nomics’ models of addiction can account for is what they call ‘self-described mistakes’: choices
of drug consumption that are described as a mistake by the addict while he is consuming the
drug. That is, his current choice goes against his current preferences. Standard models cannot
account for it because of their methodological commitment to revealed preferences (esp. in Gul
and Pesendorfer’s work). Behavioral economists’ models rely on multiple selves and cannot
account for it because for the self who is consuming, choice matches preferences. It is only from
the perspective of another (past or future) self that the choice can said to be mistaken (esp.
in Laibson’s work and his followers). But then the mistake is not recognizing during the act of
consumption.
More generally, the main similarity between the applications from these two couples of dual
modelers is that it can be deemed to be a theoretical exercise for the following reasons. Their
applications consist in conducting intertemporal comparative statics (i.e., comparative dynam-
ics) to derive the economic implications of the cores of the their dual models. Both emphasize
that the economic behaviors thus generated account for empirical regularities that standard
and behavioral economics models can and cannot account for. These empirical regularities are
only used as indirect evidence, i.e., qualitative patterns the model would predict, but none of
them calibrate their dual models with existing data to predict other existing data. Finally,
both emphasize their achievement of theoretical unification by pointing out how variations of
parameter values can reduce their dual models to either standard or behavioral existing ones.
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For Bernheim and Rangel, when the hot mode probability distribution is set to zero their dual
model reduces to standard models (where consumption of temptations is always the result of
a utility calculus in a cold mode style). And they explain what modifications would allow a
multiple selves reinterpretation of their models, which they criticize (see 2004, pp.1581-2). For
Benhabib and Bisin, theoretical unification is more straightforward: when the attention cost
parameter is set to zero, then it reduces to standard models (where temptations are avoided at
no costs), and when it is set to infinity, then it reduces to behavioral models (where temptations
cannot be avoided without external precommitments).10
Not much can be directly learned about the positive/normative issue w{ithin dual models
from these applications. However, the role played Bernheim and Rangel’s in The Foundations
of Positive and Normative Economics (Caplin and Schotter 2008a) is instructive. Roughly, it
lies in Gul and Pesendorfer’s (2008) criticisms of their modeling of ‘cues’ and ‘mistakes’ within
Bernheim and Rangel’s dual model. ‘Cues’ was indeed one of the central term at stake in
the Gul and Pesendorfer (2008) versus Camerer (2008) exchange framed as an issue over the
use of formal and ordinary language by economists (cf. the general introduction). Gul and
Pesendorfer’s criticism of ‘mistakes’ triggered most of the discussion of the positive/normative
issue in The Foundations. They targeted the only everyday life example (i.e., not about addiction
as theorized by scientists) offered by Bernheim and Rangel (2004, pp.1561-2). This example is
about the following empirical regularity: American tourists crossing streets in Great Britain
often get injured because they tend to look only to the left before crossing, though cars arrive
from the right. Bernheim and Rangel’s point is that choice of looking only to the left before
crossing would be better modeled as a systematic mistake rather than as a revealed preference
for doing so. Gul and Pesendorfer (2008, pp.22-23) disagree and argue that a revealed preference
approach is possible even in such cases. Mistakes can be modeled as “subjective constraints on
the feasible strategies that are not apparent from the description of the decision problem” (ibid),
and that such constraints should be motivated by observable data such as “data showing that
American tourists in London avoid unregulated intersections” or “that a sign that alerts the
American tourist to “look right” alters the decision even though such a sign does not change the
10Brocas and Carillo (2008, sect. III.B) venture into a brief application of their dual model to macroeconomics,
where they note that they cannot explain the strong correlation between unexpected income changes and marginal
propensity to consume that Benhabib and Bisin are able to explain.
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set of alternatives” (ibid). Such a revealed preference approach is in fact close to what Bernheim
and Rangel propose in their normative contributions that are not restricted to the economics
of addiction (see 2007a; b; 2008; 2009; Bernheim 2009). Their only difference with Gul and
Pesendorfer is that they prone an interdisciplinary approach where choice data are not anymore
the only type of data that would help to characterize mistakes; their use of neurosciences in
their dual model is always taken as an example of that, as already noted in the first section
above. Benhabib and Bisin (2008) have the exact same position on the issue of mistakes (see
esp. pp.325-6). Furthermore, in their discussion of mistakes, though they remain implicit about
the normative dimension of their own dual model, it is obvious for them (as it is intuitive as
well) that mistakes are the produce of automatic processes (see esp. p.327).11
Summing up in one sentence, although Bernheim and Rangel and Benhabib and Bisin’s dual
models do not tackle the empirical and theoretical issues at the center of the standard versus
behavioral economics debate, they (esp. Bernheim and Rangel) played a non-trivial role in the
underlying methodological issues of this debate.
3.3.2 The primacy of time preferences in dual models
Having discussed Bernheim and Rangel’s and Benhabib and Bisin’s applications, we let them
aside to concentrate on the remaining three couples of dual modelers. The simplest application
to time preferences is Loewenstein and O’Donoghue’s in the published version of their dual
model with Bhatia (Loewenstein et al. 2015, pp.65-61). The deliberative and affective system’s
utility functions are both endowed with exponential discount functions, but the deliberative
system discounts at a lower rate than the affective system. Furthermore, the latter’s discount
function depends on the intensity of affective motivation parameter: the higher this parameter,
the lower the discounting from the affective system. Theoretical unification for time preference
is achieved straightforwardly by Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and Bhatia. They show that the
previous characterization yield a utility function for the decision maker with a discount func-
11It should be noted that Gul and Pesendorfer (2008, pp.10-13) mistakenly attribute some quotes from Bern-
heim and Rangel (2004) to Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec (2005). We shall not discuss the issue of ‘mistakes’
in The Foundations further because it belongs to the positive/normative issue at the level of subareas in eco-
nomics (see esp. Bernheim and Rangel’s notion of ‘ancillary conditions’ and ‘multiself Pareto optimality’ in the
references mentioned above ; see also Köszegi and Rabin 2008a;b). Note also that how Camerer’s (2008, pp.55-
56) take on the issue of mistake and feasible constraint is even more illustrative of the role of not only technical
ordinary but also everyday ordinary language in the interdisciplinarity issue (cf. the general introduction).
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tion that does not have a constant discount rate, but one that varies according to the three
parameters of their dual models. Discounting gets closer to impatience and even impulsivity if
cognitive load increases, and/or willpower strength decreases, and/or the intensity of affective
motivation increases. These parametric variations allow them to derive smooth hyperbolic dis-
counting for the decision maker (i.e., à la Ainslie), as well as quasi hyperbolic discounting (i.e., à
la Laibson) in the special case where the intensity of affective motivation is so great as to imply
a discount rate that tends to infinity for the affective system. In that latter case, the constant β
from quasi hyperbolic discounting becomes a variable which depends on the cognitive load and
willpower strength parameters. In short, because their dual model nests both hyperbolic and
quasi hyperbolic discounting (and also exponential discounting with appropriate parametriza-
tion plus assuming the same optima for both systems), it achieves theoretical unification for
economics; and the threefold parametric variations allow to achieve theoretical unification of
finer phenomena that are more of interest to psychologists working on ego depletion.12
Brocas and Carillo’s (2008, sect. II) main application to time preferences also starts by
distinguishing their two sub-individual entities by different time horizons: long-term for the
principal brain system, short-term for the agent brain system. Their choice set is constituted
by a sequence of triples occurring at each time periods: one desirable action, one undesirable
action, and an information parameter about the relative desirability of both actions. On the
one hand, the principal can control the agents’ actions without utility costs and derives utility
from the undiscounted sum of agents’ utilities. But on the other hand, only agents have access
to the information parameter, and, contrary to the principal’s optimum plan, agents optimize
at each period regardless of the future. The interaction between both, i.e., how the former
elicit information from the latter and design contracts for them, depends on an intertemporal
constraint (akin to a budget constraint that has to be met at the last period) containing the
information parameter. Their theoretical unification is achieved less straightforwardly than
Loewenstein et al. (2015). First, they formalize a two-periods consumption-labor problem
(with borrowing and saving) within this setup. In this problem, the second best optimal contract
designed by the principal can be interpreted in ordinary language as reflecting the kind of “self-
12Loewenstein and O’Donoghue’s (2004; 2007) applications to time preference have been subjected to great
changes across versions. Notably, they used to separate their accounts of intertemporal choice from an account
of temptation and claimed that their dual model also nests Gul and Pesendorfer’s models.
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disciplining rule” (i.e., internal influence à la Thaler and Shefrin) we usually impose on ourselves
in everyday life. Brocas and Carrillo put it as ““I will go to this dinner party only if I first exercise
for an hour”” (2008, p.1322). Second, they extend the two-periods setting to an indefinite (but
not infinite) horizon. In this extension, the previous asymmetric information case generalizes
into a discount function. Because they did not assume constant discounting, the discount rate
in their function is endogenous in the sense of being a variable depending on the characteristic
of the informational asymmetry. They stress how this function can exhibit the property of
hyperbolic discounting and is problem-dependent, accounting for the diversity of discount rates
mentioned in the previous part. Third, they slightly modify the consumption-labor model by
postulating that the two actions are either two consumption actions (e.g., food and clothing)
or two labor actions (e.g., working in the morning or working in the afternoon), and argues
that this captures mental accounting phenomena. Finally, Brocas and Carillo (2008, sect.IV)
modify the core of the model depicted so far by abstracting from its temporal dimension. They
do so by drawing on Berridge’s work explained above: the principal system optimizes the liking
of pleasure and derives utility from the agent system’s utility, which however optimizes the
wanting of pleasure. The bias between liking and wanting is again captured by an information
parameter, and the formal second best contract by the principal can be interpreted in ordinary
language as reflecting internal influences à la Thaler and Shefrin, e.g., ““as long as you don’t
abuse, you can do whatever you want ”” (2008, p.1330). This result can be seen either as the
special case of the previous model for one shot decision, i.e., its very core, or as another dual
model built from their methodology.
We can start by illustrating one application of Fudenberg and Levine’s to time preferences
with linear cost of self-control (2006, sect.II), i.e., the cost in utility to avoid a given amount
of consumption is proportional to the marginal utility of that amount. In an infinite horizon
consumption-saving (without borrowing) setting, short-run selves’ actions are assumed to deter-
mine the saving rates, which would be zero so that all wealth is consumed by the first short-run
self without the intervention of the long-run self. In this case, the optimal saving rate is a
constant part of lifetime wealth but the size of that part varies depending on the ratio of pro-
portionality underlying the linearity of self-control costs. In the case with shorter-run selves,
i.e., living more than one period, Fudenberg and Levine refine this result showing how it can
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also depend on the length of time over which a shorter-run self derives utility (2012b, pp.15-13).
These two results nest quasi-hyperbolic and hyperbolic discounting and allow for parametriza-
tion generating the diversity of discount rates mentioned in the previous part. But the greatest
source of unifying power in Fudenberg and Levine’s dual model stems from its possibility to
generate convex (i.e., nonlinear) costs of self-control, i.e., the cost in utility to avoid a given
amount of consumption is superior to the marginal utility of that amount. It is the experimen-
tal results of Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) on the positive relation between cognitive load and
the cost of self-control that first motivated Fudenberg and Levine (2006, sect.V) to explore this
formal possibility of their dual model. To do so, they simply provide a convex specification of
the self-control cost function with a cognitive load variable that increases the marginal cost of
self-control for a given consumption, i.e., for one such consumption, the higher the cognitive load
the higher the utility lost by the long-run self to control the short-run self. This account of cog-
nitive load is static. Fudenberg and Levine (2012c) made it dynamic by drawing on the work of
Baumeister and replacing the cognitive load variable with a stock of willpower. They formalize
a depletion-repletion dynamics whereby willpower resources not used in one period carry over
in the next one. Roughly, by exploring combination of linearity and nonlinearity of the stock of
willpower’s (1) depletion, (2) repletion and (3) impact on the cost of self-control, Fudenberg and
Levine (2012c, sects. 5-6) provide a formal account of ego depletion. In the previous section, one
reason why convex cost of self-control loom large in Fudenberg and Levine’s work was already
discussed: it violates the independence axiom and the condition of contraction consistency on
choice function, but Fudenberg and Levine (2006, sect.VI) do not necessarily see these violations
as irrational. Another reason is that the violations of the independence axiom are worked out
by Fudenberg and Levine so as to account for Allais’ paradoxes for risk preferences and the
interactions of risk and time preferences. Only one of these interactions fits this subsection,
namely the introduction of risk in the dimension of time. The intuition in how they model the
latter is quite simple: the marginal cost of self-control not only depends on the timing of the
consequence, i.e., the sooner the bigger the cost, but also on its probability of occurrence, i.e.,
the surer the bigger the cost. Fudenberg and Levine (2011, pp.43-44) show that when both of
these functional relations are convex, there dual model implies the qualitative pattern of Keren
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and Roelofsma’s (1995, exp.1) data discussed in the previous chapter.13
We can sum up the applications of these three dual models to time preference by pointing that
all achieve theoretical unification in the same way. Namely, they turn the standardly constant
discount rate into a variable which depends on further parameters reflecting the p-&Psychology
of self-control. The unification is theoretical in the sense that it nests existing (hyperbolic and
quasi-hyperbolic) models already accounting for the variability of discount rates (cf. previous
chapter). And it is interdisciplinary in the sense that it formally accounts for ego depletion
phenomena dear to psychologists. Finally, notice that there is a primacy of time preference
in each dual model the following senses. Brocas and Carillo (2008) model only behaviors that
are traditionally discussed in relation to time preferences. Therefore, in the next subsection
they will be put aside, so that there will remain only two couples of dual modelers left. While
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue model behaviors over time, under risk and regarding other people
separately (in a different section for each, as we shall see), they nevertheless state that “[t]he
most straightforward application of our model is to intertemporal choices” (Loewenstein et al.
2015, p.16). Fudenberg and Levine start by modeling the classical economic application of
intertemporal choice, namely consumption-saving behaviors, before modeling the less classical
ones involving cognitive load and other ones related to risk and social preferences. And as
we shall see in the next subsection, they necessarily introduce a temporal dimension in their
modeling of behaviors that are classically considered as being uniquely under risk or uniquely
regarding other people.
What can be learned about the positive/normative issue within dual models from the ap-
plications discussed here? I propose to answer this question only for Brocas and Carillo here,
and defer the answer for the two other couples of dual modelers to the next subsection (once
all their applications would have been discussed). In lights of their applications discussed here,
a set of earlier methodological manifestos from Brocas and Carillo allow to clarify where the
ambiguity on the positive/normative issue comes from in their work (2003a; b; 2004a; Brocas et
al. 2004). Put roughly, they share the same ambiguities already discussed in this dissertation:
the two-ways direction of influence between the two levels of the normative/positive issue (see
13Another application to time preference (with linear self-control cost) include procrastination (2006, sect.IV)
where they argue that their model nests Rabin and O’Donoghue’s model (cf. previous chapter) with more
analytical tractability and better predictions.
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e.g., 2003b, p.90), taking standard economics and the economic agents as sources of norma-
tivity while ignoring possible conflicts between both (see e.g., 2003a, p.xiii). With respect to
Brocas and Carillo’s dual model, the latter problem implies either to count as irrational the
self-disciplining rules we use in everyday life, or to count them as rational which implies seeing
their dual model as a new standard economics where our everyday quasi-rational behaviors are
the new norms. An aspect of Brocas and Carillo’s position complicates the picture and is highly
specific to their background as economists (i.e., contract theory and mechanism design), namely
their reliance on strategic ignorance as a potential source of normativity. Indeed, their applica-
tions of their dual model suggest that it may be optimal not to fully know oneself’s preferences,
i.e., to ignore a little bit what one’s tastes are (as the saying goes, ‘ignorance is bliss’). Brocas
and Carrillo (2003b, sect.3.3; Brocas et al. 2004 sect.3) make it clear that this is the translation
to intrapersonal conflict of well established results about the efficiency of commitments to ignore
information in interpersonal conflicts. Although counting everyday quasi-rational behaviors as
the norm to be enforced can be seen as an interesting perspective, doing that by counting Brocas
and Carillo’s dual model as the new normative benchmark where the main source of normativity
is ignorance faces non-trivial objections. Generally speaking, Sen’s (1987, p.86) comments on
the use of strategic ignorance at the interpersonal level might still applies to their intrapersonal
translation: “[i]t may be that people are often ignorant, but a model of ‘rational’ behaviour that
counts on ignorance for being able to achieve good results, which will fail to be realized if people
become better informed, has an element of perversity in it” (see also Walsh 1996, p.200). 14
3.3.3 The primacy of risk over social preferences in dual models
One of the typical behavioral phenomena under risk that Fudenberg and Levine (2006, sect.
III) account for through their dual model (with linear self-control costs) is the Rabin paradox.
Recall that Rabin (2000) showed that plausible risk aversion over win/lose small stakes implies
implausible risk aversion over large ones with expected utility theory (c.f., previous chapter).
Fudenberg and Levine’s account of the Rabin paradox starts from a modification to their simple
consumption-savings model: each period is divided into two subperiods, a “bank” subperiod
14For a radical criticism of the normative implications of the use of ‘ignorance’ in standard economics, see
Mirowski and Edward Nik-Khah’s forthcoming book.
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and a “nightclub” subperiod. In the bank subperiod, consumption is impossible so that the
long-run self decides without self-control costs how much to save and thus how much “pocket
cash” is carried in the nightclub subperiod. In the latter, a short-run self consumes out of
pocket cash and the rest goes to the next period’s bank. But in each nightclub subperiod there
is a probability which cannot be anticipated by the long-run self that lotteries are among the
possible consumption available from pocket cash. If that probability does not occur, then again
the long-run self does not need to impose self-control cost so that the short-run self consumes
all the pocket cash. If that probability occurs, then the long-run self will use self-control to
influence the short-run self’s evaluation of the lotteries. Fudenberg and Levine (2006, Theorem
2) determine the conditions under which a lottery will be evaluated only regarding consumption
out of pocket cash, or also regarding consumption out of wealth (i.e., future periods’ spendings
and savings). Roughly, these conditions ultimately bear on the size of the expected consequence
from the lottery. And the long-run self only pays self-control costs if that size is big enough so
that integrating (at least a part of) it into lifetime wealth has a marginal utility superior to these
utility costs. This double standard of evaluation depending on the size of lotteries’ consequences
implies the Rabin paradox: small stakes are evaluated with respect to pocket cash and large
stakes are evaluated with respect to lifetime utility so that the former evaluation is made through
a higher level of risk aversion than the latter. Notice two features of Levine and Fudenberg’s
(2006) account of the Rabin paradox: (1) only the size of consequences plays a theoretical role,
not the size of the probabilities, and (2) self-control costs are linear. As already glanced in the
previous subsection, they later allowed both the size of probability to play a theoretical role in
determining short-run selves’ temptations and convex costs of self-control within the previous
setup to account for further phenomena related to risk preferences. Among them are the Allais
paradoxes and the pattern of preferences due to the introduction of time in the dimension of
risk discussed in the previous chapter (see Fudenberg and Levine 2011, pp.45-48).15
Social preferences are currently being modeled within Fudenberg and Levine’s dual model
in a working paper with economist Anna Dreber and psychologist David Rand (Dreber et al.
15Because the explanation of the Rabin paradox does not need convex self-control cost, Fudenberg and Levine
(2006, p.1461) discuss how quasi-hyperbolic discounting in a proper setting could also explain the Rabin paradox.
There is also further phenomena related to risk preferences that Fudenberg and Levine account for but that were
not discussed previously in this dissertation (see Fudenberg and Levine 2011, pp.48-49; see also the simplification
of the dual model for risk preferences by Fudenberg et al. 2014).
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2016). They introduce altruism as “a positive concern for others”, i.e., a new “worthiness”
parameter in Fudenberg and Levine’s dual model with shorter run selves (2012b; c) and for
one shot-decisions (following Fudenberg et al. 2014’s simplification). The setting is indeed
constructed for simple binary allocations of money where utility is derived from money spent on
consumption for “me” (i.e., the decision maker), but also from the money “you” (i.e., the other)
receives thanks to me. It is on this latter source that the worthiness parameter applies: the
smaller this parameter, the smaller the utility derived from a given amount of money received
by you. There are three periods instead of subperiods, and everything that happens after the
third one is ‘the future’ from which only the long-run self derives utility. In the first ‘mental
accounting’ period, without any cost of self-control (because there is no consumption in the near
future), the long-run self sets a “spending limit” constraining the second period. In the second
“decision period”, money from two sources has to be allocated between me and you: from found
money that was unexpected in the previous period, on the one hand, and from lifetime wealth,
on the other hand. Dreber et al. make two benchmark assumptions. First, that the long-run
and shorter-run selves have identical concerns for me and for you, i.e., the conflict is only over
time, not regarding people. Secondly, that in the absence of found money, it is optimal to
give nothing to you and to spend only the predetermined spending limit for me. In the third
“consumption period”, the utility from spending the allocation on me’s consumption and for
you is received. What matters about this last period is the time between it and the previous
one, determining the lifespan of a given shorter-run self. Dreber et al. (2016, Theorems 1-2)
determine the parametric conditions under which it is optimal to give money to the other only
from unexpectedly found money, and how, in this case, the optimal amount to be given depends
on the amount found by me and received by you (the latter includes the possibility of a transfer
multiplier, e.g., if me gives €5, you receives €10). Among the six phenomena that Dreber et al.
seek to explain, only two were discussed in the previous chapter. The first one is the donations
in dictator games that can be (1) all, (2) nothing, (3) half or (4) in-between amounts of a given
sum. Roughly, the explanation here comes from their assumptions (a) that this sum was not
anticipated in the first period by the long-run self and (b) that the worthiness parameter is
neutral (i.e., = 1). In this case their formal results (Theorem 2) can predict all of the four
cases through variations of the other two parameters (self-control costs and shorter run self’s
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discounting). The second phenomenon is the introduction of time in the dimension of other
people displayed in Kovarik’s (2009) experiments. Roughly, the explanation relies on the effect
of the time between the decision and consumption periods on the previous results. Because the
longer this time the bigger the discounting, it increases the thresholds above which the decision
maker gives everything or something (hence reducing average sharing in the future for a given
amount of money). Notice that convex costs of self-control play no role in the explanation of
these two phenomena, though it does for others not discussed in the previous chapter.16
Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and Bhatia’s (2015) theoretical unification for risk (pp.65-71) and
social (pp.71-73) preferences are more straightforward, and follow roughly the same logic of their
theoretical unification for time preferences discussed in the previous section. We can therefore
discuss both in parallel instead of separately. The first two modeling steps that are common to
the three of Loewenstein et al.’s theoretical unification are, firstly, to change the initial choice
set to a set of lotteries for risk preferences and a set of binary allocations between the decision
maker and another person for social preferences, and, secondly, to specify the two systems’ utility
functions. For risk preferences, they assume that the deliberative system’s utility function is
expected utility for non-monetary decisions and expected value for monetary decisions; and that
the affective system weights probability non-linearly and exhibit loss-aversion in the evaluation
of consequences. For social preferences, they focus on altruism by assuming that the deliberative
system puts a stable weight on the utility he derives from the consequences to the other while the
affective system puts a variable weight on them, this weight being just the intensity of affective
motivation parameter. In both cases, the interaction of the two systems’ utility functions is
mediated by the cost of mobilizing willpower in a way that can steer the individual utility
function to account for phenomena or results that are usually accounted for by models from
either standard or behavioral economics. Yet the theoretical unification achieved for risk and
social preferences can be methodologically distinguished as follows. For risk preferences, the
theoretical unification is theoretical in roughly the same sense as theirs for time preferences.
They show how their dual model of risk preferences nests standard and behavioral economics’
16Briefly, the other phenomena are the amount people tend to give to beggars on the street which has nothing
to do with the amount they tend to give to other anonymous in the lab, the effects of cognitive load and time
pressure on decision maker’s allocation (where convex costs of self-control play the main explanatory role), and
the tendency to “avoid the ask” (e.g., crossing the street not to give to a beggars we would have otherwise given
to). Notice also that Dreber et al. (2016) is the paper mentioned in the previous section where Fudenberg and
Levine makes reference to the dual trend in Psychology for the first time.
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models through parametric variations. So it can explain the regularities already explained by
the latter. They notably discuss the Rabin paradox and the endowment effect under certainty,
both explained principally through the affective system’s loss aversion. They indeed emphasize
that their dual model can easily approximate Kahneman and Tversky’s original (1979) prospect
theory, while making further predictions concerning the effect of ego depletion on risk taking.
For social preferences, the theoretical unification cannot be achieved in the same sense as for the
two other types of preferences, because there is no clearly identified standard versus behavioral
economics’ models (see the plurality of models in the previous chapter; and Loewenstein and
O’Donoghue 2004, p.34). In principle, their account of social preferences allows them to formally
account for any possible binary allocations. But it would be done in a very narrow data-fitting
way by changing the intensity of affective motivation parameter for each change in allocations.
They indeed explicitly acknowledge (p.73) that more structure would be needed to apply their
dual model to the motivations underlying the plurality of results in the dictator game, which
are not all affective (e.g., equality, fairness and the like). Again, they focus more on the effect
of ego depletion or pure affective features (e.g., showing pictures instead of numbers in charity
requests) of decisions related to social preferences.
The applications of Fudenberg and Levine’s and Loewenstein and O’Donoghue’s dual models
discussed in this and the previous subsection can be contrasted in two respects: their relations to
empiricism and the positive/normative issue. Their relation to empiricism nicely illustrate these
dual modelers’ backgrounds as economist. On the one hand, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue’s
backgrounds as behavioral economist is illustrated by the great number of empirical evidence
they cite from neurosciences and animal studies to justify the assumptions they use for each
system’s utility function. For each of the three types of preferences, they systematically make
two new predictions (one from the cognitive load and willpower parameters, the other from the
intensity of affective motivation parameter) for which they encourage the conduct of experiments.
Concerning the very empirical phenomena they seek to give a unifying explanation of, however,
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (and Bhatia) usually satisfy themselves with showing that their
dual model nests the corresponding behavioral economics model that already explain them, and
do a little comparative statics (or dynamics) to show that their predictions go qualitatively in the
right direction. On the other hand, Fudenberg and Levine’s backgrounds as standard economist
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is illustrated by the quasi absence of evidence used to motivate the behavioral assumptions: it
comes more from introspection and casual empiricism for them than it does for Loewenstein and
O’Donoghue, maybe with the exception of their uses of Shiv and Fedorikhin’s (1999) results to
motivate convex costs of self-control. The new predictions they derived from their dual model are
much less systematic than Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, though they do make some non-trivial
ones, such as the one about the interaction between time and risk (see 2006, pp.1461-2) or social
(see ibid, p.1458) preferences. And the comparative dynamics they conduct is more thorough,
using different functional forms in appendixes to encourage standard economists to use their
dual models, with some non-trivial success, notably Andersen et al.’s (2008) econometric paper
discussed in the previous chapter. The behavioral versus standard contrast can be illustrated
further by pointing out that Fudenberg and Levine’s dual model would have a hard time to
work with experimental data on hypothetical choices about losses, as the decision maker can
only lose money he does have. But the contrast is also severely blurred by pointing out that their
2016 paper is co-written with a psychologist (Rand) and an experimental economist (Dreber),
notably because they wanted more data on the interaction between time and other people than
Kovarik’s (2009), and conducted their own experiments accordingly.17
Finally, it is easier to discuss the positive/normative issue by treating time with risk pref-
erences separately from social preferences. In Fudenberg and Levine’s applications, most of
the challenges from behavioral economics about risk and time preferences can be rationalized
in the strong sense of counting as rational. For time preferences, this is done by adopting an
interpretation akin to Camerer’s in the opening quote of this chapter: self-control is an inherent
constraint to decision making and optimizing under this constraint is rational. For risk prefer-
ence, this logic is carried somewhat automatically by the structure of their dual model where the
account of risk preferences is embedded into their earlier account of time preferences. Fuden-
berg et al. (2014) further show that their account of risk preference does not violate first-order
stochastic dominance, which we saw in the previous chapter is the necessary condition of ratio-
nality in standard economics. Notice that their dual model therefore provide new arguments,
17Fudenberg and Levine (2011) are the only dual modelers deriving quantitative prediction from their dual
model from calibration with one set of data to predict another set of data. But this is not really a marker of the
standard versus behavioral economics contrast. Also, all the dual trend in Psychology was driven (post-2000)
by the need to account for inter-individual differences. All dual modelers claim that their model can do that as
well (‘in principle’), but the only quantitative exercise by Fudenberg and Levine (2011, fn5 p.36) explicitly claim
that representative agent predictions are better suited for economics.
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namely from the internal constraints of self-control, for the rationality of violating the indepen-
dence axiom that are different from Allais’ initial arguments (i.e., the value of certainty for the
avoidance of ruin, cf. the previous chapter). In Loewenstein and O’Donoghue’s applications,
it would be more appropriate to say that most of behavioral economics’ challenges to risk and
time preferences are quasi-rationalized, following Thaler and Shefrin’s terminology. As they put
it in an earlier version of their dual model: “[o]ur general modeling strategy is to assume that
the deliberative system conforms to prescriptive models of decision making, such as expected
utility, whereas the affective system incorporates many descriptive features of decision making
identified in psychology” (Loewenstein and O’Donoghue 2007, p.4). In the published version
(as well as in the previous ones) arguments for this strategy are further provided by references
to the biological sources of normativity from neurosciences and animal studies discussed in the
previous section (aside from casual empiricism and introspection). Therefore, their view seems
to be that what counts as rational are the deliberative system’s optima, that the individual
would like to attain but cannot, though without going all the way down to affective system’s
optima. The individual is in-between, namely quasi-rational. For social preferences, the issue is
more ambiguous with both dual models. Dreber et al. (2016) do not even implicitly mention the
issue of normativity or rationality in their applications to social preferences. We can however
speculate that the work of Fudenberg and Levine (2012a) on social preferences discussed in the
previous chapter, on the need to have model of social preferences extendable under risk without
respecting the independence axiom to capture some behaviors that are arguably rational, could
be done through their dual model. But they have not work on the interaction between risk and
other people yet. And as already mentioned, Loewenstein et al. (2015) suggest that the affective
system’s instability towards other people is not rational, but they carefully suggest that such
instability regarding the motives at play in dictator games, which they do not treat, clearly has
a deliberative dimension as well.
Summing up this subsection, we can note two main contrasts between Fudenberg and Levine’s
and Loewenstein and O’Donoghue’s applications. First, besides the general primacy of time
preferences in the sense of the previous subsection, there is a clear primacy of risk over social
preferences in the following senses. For Fudenberg and Levine, this primacy is exhibited in the
formal structure of the settings of their applications, i.e., the social preferences applications are
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made within the structure of the bank/nightclub originally designed for risk preferences, itself an
extension of the consumption-saving setting of their first application. This somewhat complex
structure allows Fudenberg and Levine to account for interactions across dimension somewhat
naturally, as their early bold predictions made in their 2006 paper shows. For Loewenstein and
O’Donoghue, the primacy of risk over social preferences is exhibited by the differential number
of pages and phenomena accounted for, along with their own introduction of their applications
to risk (but not social) preferences as “natural” (Loewenstein et al. 2015, p.65). Finally, in
terms of the positive/normative issue within dual models, both point to two different views
of rationality as either a humanly attainable characteristic of decision making (Fudenberg and
Levine) or as an ideal norm mostly beyond human reach (Loewenstein and O’Donoghue).
Conclusion
This subsection has compared how dual models achieved theoretical unification in their applica-
tions. We have seen that even the two couples of dual modelers (Bernheim and Rangel, Benhabib
and Bisin) that did not focus on the behavioral phenomena discussed in the previous chapter
played a non-trivial role in the current behavioral versus standard economics debates. The
remaining three couples of dual modelers (Brocas and Carillo, Fudenberg and Levine, Loewen-
stein and O’Donoghue) achieve theoretical unification for time preferences in roughly the same
way, namely by modeling the interactions between their two sub-individual entities through self-
control so as to turn the original constant discount rate into a variable. Only two couples of dual
modelers (Fudenberg and Levine, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue) tackle theoretical unification
for risk and social preferences. But only Fudenberg and Levine have a theoretical structure
that account quite straightforwardly for interactions across dimensions, albeit not for all the
interactions discussed in the previous chapter (e.g., not between risk and social preferences).
We have also further illustrated the tension between two possible interpretations of the norma-
tive/positive issue within dual models. Behavioral economists (Loewenstein and O’Donoghue)
seem to follow the psychologists discussed in the previous section in taking rationality as an ideal
norm that we are unlikely to attain empirically. And standard economists seem to view ratio-
nality as both an empirical characteristic of decision making and an ideal norm, with sources
of normativity that seems more problematic (ignorance for Brocas and Carillo) than others
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(willpower capacity for Fudenberg and Levine). Finally, it can be argued that the emerging
implicit primacy of time preferences emerging in decision theory that was illustrated in the
previous chapter is here complete and explicit.
Conclusion and transition: framing as the limit to theoretical
unification
The main goal of this chapter was to conduct a comparative study of the five dual models
altogether. It was done by focusing on how the import of a new language from Psychology,
namely, the language of self-control, was informative to understand both the interdisciplinarity
and positive/normative issues within dual models. These two issues raised themselves quite dif-
ferently within each dual model. One difference was the extent to which dual modelers sought
to contribute directly to Psychology. The two extrema of minimal and maximal contributions
to Psychology are respectively represented by Fudenberg and Levine’s and Loewenstein and
O’Donoghue’s dual models. Another difference concerned the scope of theoretical unification.
Here, both Bernheim and Rangel’s and Benhabib and Bisin’s dual models represent the mini-
mal extremum (addiction and consumption-savings), while Loewenstein and O’Donoghue’s and
especially Fudenberg and Levine’s dual models represent the maximal extremum (time, risk and
social preferences). A further difference concerned the positive/normative issue, with the follow-
ing tension that was illustrated throughout (besides a plurality of sources of normativity). On
the one hand, behavioral economists Loewenstein and O’Donoghue tend to side with psycholo-
gists’ view that models of decision from standard economics provide a sound but unattainable
set of norms of rationality. Their dual model is however not taken to be such a model, it is
rather an in-between quasi-rational model of decision making. By contrast, the other (at least
‘former’) standard economists tend to stick to the view that models of decision in economics
should picture rationality as an empirically attainable and indeed (most of the time) empirically
attained set of norms of behaviors.18
18As already noted in one footnote of this chapter’s introduction, this tension could be further analyzed through
the philosophical literature on normativity and rationality in the cognitive (see Stein 1996) and social (see Turner
2010) sciences. Somewhat ironically, the conclusion of this chapter would be that the tension between the two
ways of interpreting dual models with respect to rationality correspond to Stein’s (1996) “pragmatic picture of
rationality” and “standard picture of rationality”, but it is the standard economists who hold the pragmatic one
and the behavioral economists who hold the standard one.
198
Can we therefore conclude that one dual model is likely to occupy a central place in microe-
conomics (i.e., Camerer’s suggestion in the introduction)? Arguably, this is not yet the case
and even if it does happen, which dual models will hold such central place will depend on what
microeconomists are most interested in. For instance, the core of Bernheim and Rangel’s dual
model is fit for the interests of those who practice normative economics; Benhabib and Bisin’s for
those interested more in microfoundations of representative agent models in macroeconomics;
Brocas and Carillo’s for those taking information as the central concept in microeconomics;
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue’s for those interested in furthering interdisciplinary communica-
tion with psychologists. Fudenberg and Levine’s dual model is fit for the criterion set up in
this chapter’s introduction, which was in terms of unificatory power, especially with respect to
the behavioral phenomena discussed in the previous chapter about the interactions within and
crucially across the three dimensions of economic behaviors (over time, under uncertainty and
regarding other people). Fudenberg and Levine’s dual model is the only one to account for
interactions across dimensions. Their theoretical unification is achieved through an explicit pri-
macy of time over risk over social preferences. And new normative arguments from self-control
as a mental constraint are derived to rationalize behavioral regularities that were previously
considered as irrational. Another way of saying this is that part of the notion of consistency
would change if their dual model were to hold a central place in microeconomics. The primacy
of time preferences underlying such change is however in line with the latent normative primacy
of time preferences in the previous chapter (cf. the ultimate justification of the independence
axiom from dynamic consistency).
There is at least two ways in which Fudenberg and Levine’s theoretical unification is not
complete. First, all the types of interactions across dimensions discussed in the previous chapter
are not explicitly accounted for yet (e.g., between risk and other people). But it would not be
surprising if that happen in a future extension of their dual model. Second, there are a set of
behavioral phenomena that are usually labeled ‘framing’ which Fudenberg and Levine repeatedly
designate as the class of phenomena that is hard to capture formally. For instance,
“Cues are obviously the key to understanding the effect of context in general, and
framing in particular. The dual-self theory implies that it is the attention span of the
short-run self that is relevant for determining what constitutes a “situation,” which
is the most difficult modeling issue in confronting these types of issues.” (Fudenberg
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and Levine 2006, p.1472)
Even more explicitly, Fudenberg claimed that “[u]nfortunately, framing and context are very
difficult to capture in formal models, and are ignored in most of the more formal papers” (2006,
p.699), and that “frames, cues, and mental accounts, for the time being they are a crucial but
unexplained part of many behavioral analyses” (2006, p.700; see also p.708). These types of
remarks are present in both Fudenberg and Levine’s and other dual modeler’s writings.19
That framing phenomena are hard to capture formally, even with the flexibility offered by
dual models, might sound somewhat paradoxical because ‘framing’ was explicitly a key modeling
ingredient of Shefrin and Thaler’s (1988) original dual model. Shefrin and Thaler introduced
framing as an instances of mental accounting (see 1988, p.610 and p.615), whereby different
presentations of the same amount of money generate different marginal propensity to consume.
Their favorite examples of framing are bonuses:
“In a standard economic model, a completely anticipated bonus is simply income
with another name. Thus the distribution of earnings into income and bonus would
be considered irrelevant.” (p.633)
In Shefrin and Thaler’s (1988) paper, as well as in the references mentioned in the previous
paragraph and footnote, different ‘frames’ or ‘framing’ of something (consequences, problems,
amount of money etc.) are often said to be different descriptions of that something. But
characterizing framing in this way is deeply ambiguous regarding whose descriptions we are
talking about. It can be economists’ descriptions, e.g., (1) “anticipated bonus is simply income
with another name”. But it could also be economic agents’ descriptions, in which case there is a
further complication that can be illustrated by the following contrast: (2) ‘here is your promised
€1000 bonus’ – say the decision modeler to the decision maker – versus (3) ‘I finally got that
€1000 bonus’ – say the decision maker to himself while doing his mental accounting. Whether
it can be said that (1), (2) and (3) are equivalent in the sense of just being redescriptions of the
same phenomenon is the kind of question that will be asked in the next chapter. By contrast
with the present chapter, where we abstracted from the uses of language by economic agents to
focus on the economists’, in the next one we shall abstract the analysis from the economists’
19See Benhabib and Bisin (2008, p.325; see also Benhabib et al. 2010, p.206), Bernheim and Rangel (2007a,
esp. pp.10-11, 35, 38, fn25 p.61, p.64, 66; see also Saez 2007 comments on on Bernheim and Rangel 2007a),
Brocas (2012, p.307), Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2004, p.39).
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uses of language to focus on the economic agents’, which we will argue is crucial for a full
understanding of framing phenomena.
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Chapter 4
Language as behavior: the structure of
framing phenomena
“Judgements about the intended
meaning of utterances are
themselves judgements under
uncertainty” (Hilton 1995, p.266)
The previous chapter ended by pointing ‘framing phenomena’ as the limit to dual mod-
els’ theoretical unification and reconciliation between behavioral and standard economics. This
chapter scrutinizes framing phenomena to understand their empirical structure and theoretical
implications for behavioral and standard economics. As can be already glanced in Fudenberg
(and Levine)’s quotes ending the previous chapter, the issues underlying framing phenomena
go well beyond dual models. We shall see that they extend to all formal modeling of individual
decisions in economics (and maybe even beyond that), irrespective of the ‘behavioral’ or ‘stan-
dard’ style of modeling. The problem in trying to understand exactly how this is the case is that
the uses of the words ‘frame’, ‘framing’ and ‘framing effects’ is getting broader and broader.
That is, these are used to refer to an increasingly heterogeneous set of phenomena. The only
element these phenomena have in common is that they consist in preference reversals triggered
by different presentations of the same decision problem, i.e., ‘the same’ from the perspective of
standard models of individual behaviors. Heterogeneity in framing phenomena comes from the
various kinds of differences in the presentations. There can be different orders of presentation
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of the objects of choice (first presenting the vegetables and then the hamburger or vice-versa),
different ways of eliciting preferences (by choice, preference statement, cash equivalent, certainty
equivalent etc.), different objects of choice that can be set as a “default” (chosen when no choice
is actively made), etc. That heterogeneity shows that there are different ways of establishing
equivalences between presentations of decision problems from the standard model’s perspective.1
This chapter will not deal with all types of framing equally. It will focus on what is arguably
one of the most paradigmatic, pervasive and formally challenging kinds of framing, namely
the ‘framing of consequences’. The classical example is known as the ‘Asian Disease’ from the
original paper that introduced framing phenomena in decision theory back in 1981 by Tversky
and Kahneman. We can take the occasion to illustrate the Asian Disease to introduce the main
terminology and way decision problems will be presented throughout this chapter to dissect
their empirical structure, notably using brackets:
[decision scenario] Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual
Asian Disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to
combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimate
of the consequences of the programs are as follows:
[object of choice] If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
[object of choice] If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people
will be saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved.
[decision question] Which of the two programs would you favor?
[object of choice] If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die.
[object of choice] If Program D is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that nobody will
die, and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die.
[decision question] Which of the two programs would you favor?
Beside thinking about your preferences among programs A, B, C and D, try also to think about
whether all the programs are equivalent, how you would construct other programs that you would
consider to be equivalent, and whether you would present all these programs equivalently to the
agent who is supposed to make the choice. You may wonder, ‘But equivalent with respect
to what?’. In a way, this is the central question of this chapter. Traditionally, experimental
subjects are presented with identical decision scenario (“Imagine that...”) and decision question
(“Which of...”) but only one of two frames that are supposed to be equivalent: either the ‘save
frame’ where the choice set is {A,B} or the ‘die frame’ where the choice set is {C,D}. Notice
1Textual evidence for the heterogeneity in the uses of ‘frame’, ‘framing’ and ‘framing effect’ can be found by
reading, e.g., Bernheim and Rangel (2007a), Saez (2007), Salant and Rubinstein (2008), DellaVigna (2009), Holt
and Laury (2014), among many others.
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that {A,B} and {C,D} are identical in terms of their consequences because the numbers of
people that die or that will be saved in the sure programs (A and B) and in the probabilistic
ones (C and D) are numerically equal. The only differences lie in the descriptions of these
consequences, i.e., in the framing of the objects of choice. A framing effect is usually observed
here because subjects tend to choose A over B but D over C, i.e., they exhibit a preference
reversal. In short, different descriptions of the same objects of choice reveal preference reversals.
I want to emphasize that the framing of consequences discussed in this chapter involve different
descriptions in ordinary language, not, e.g., in terms of graphical illustrations.
My use of the notions of equivalence, identity and equality is borrowed from philosopher
Craig Dilworth (1988). According to Dilworth, “the view that identity is a relation may derive
from its being confused with equality and equivalence, and that, in the case of the identity of
a thing with itself, identity in effect marks the absence of relation” (1988, p.83). Roughly, on
Dilworth’s account, identity characterizes individuation of things, concepts, terms, or more gen-
erally of entities; equivalence characterizes relations between individuated entities; and equality
characterizes identity of numerical values, either in its most abstract form in mathematics (es-
pecially in number theory), or as the result of measurement procedures in the empirical sciences.
This distinction is useful to understand the structure of framing phenomena because the notion
of equivalence is central yet often confused with identity in comments on the empirical struc-
ture of framing experiments. Furthermore, framing experiments involve numerical quantities,
and the equality or inequality between some of these quantities is central in the theoretical
explanations from economics or Psychology.2
2Dilworth (1988) defends a position that is controversial regarding the foundations of logic, but that does not
really matter here because his distinction and vocabulary will be used for its virtues of clarification regarding the
structure of framing experiments, not regarding the role of logic in the theories of psychologists and economists.
Still some more details on his position are in order here. Individuation by identity is, on his account, marked by
the absence of relations, and not by the presence of a reflexive relation, as is more traditionally conceived. Equiv-
alence, by contrast, characterizes the very presence of (conceptual, linguistic, physical etc.) relations between
distinct (conceptual, linguistic, physical etc.) entities, i.e., entities that have distinct identities. Furthermore,
he argues that “[o]ne can speak of many sorts of things as being equivalent, and the notion is often used in the
context of attaining some end”, for instance: “certain actions may be equivalent – running twelve minutes is
equivalent to walking one hour, when it comes to the burning of calories” (Dilworth, 1988, p.86). Finally, in
1 + 1 = 2, the two 1s in the left side of the equations are identical and equal, and the mathematical expression
1 + 1 is not identical to 2, though it is equal to it because both have the same numerical values, namely 2 (ibid,
p.88). And “in the case of physical laws expressed by equations what are equated are measurable properties (pa-
rameters)” (ibid). In U = IR, which expresses Ohm’s law whereby “in a closed circuit voltage is equal to current
times resistance”, “voltage is not being said to be identical with current times resistance – what is identical in
this case, as in the purely mathematical case, is the numerical value of that which is represented on each side of
the equation” (ibid).
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Like Fudenberg and Levine along with the other dual modelers at the end of the previous
chapter, plenty of standard and behavioral economists have commented on framing phenomena
‘in passing’, so to speak. From all these comments, the following big picture emerges. First,
framing phenomena have not been subjected to any systematic study in behavioral or standard
economics: ““framing” has yet to receive any complete treatment, though various insights have
emerged over the years” (Quiggin 2014, p.713). Second, the framing effects in the framing
of consequences are taken to violate “an invisible axiom of preference theory [...] that the
way a choice is described should not influence its attractiveness (“description-invariance”)”
(Camerer 2004, p.386, my emphasis). Third, because of that, they supposedly don’t fit within a
utility maximizing framework; i.e., they are supposedly “mathematically intractable” (Tversky
and Kahneman 1986, p.89). Fourth, framings of consequences are supposedly explained by
nonstandard models of individual behaviors, especially prospect or cumulative prospect theory
(see Tversky and Kahneman 1981; 1992). Fifth, violations of description invariance are taken as
instances of irrationality; they are supposedly “normatively distasteful” (Tversky and Kahneman
1986, p.89).3
Beside these comments, there are also some contributions on the framing of consequences
in economics, though they are few in numbers and they will be discussed in the next chapter
as the related literature to the formal account presented there. In both these comments and
contributions, economists tend to focus their discussion of the framing of consequences on Kah-
neman and Tversky’s 1980s work. Yet other psychologists have, over the last twenty-five years
or so, progressively refined the conditions under which this framing effect holds. The number
of publication on this topic is fairly high, hence it is no surprise that in the few instances where
economists have referred to them, some crucial features of the underlying framing effect are
still missing. Accordingly, the main goal of this chapter is to contribute to the first point of
the big picture from the previous paragraph. To do so, a systematic study of how the fram-
ings of consequences have been handled in Psychology will be conducted by taking the Asian
3Textual evidence for these claims can be found in the following references (pages indicate especially clear
statements of one of the five points): Arrow (1982, pp.6-8), Smith (1985), Machina (1987, pp.144-146), Kreps
(1988, p.197), Sugden (1991, p.759), Quiggin (1993, §14.5), Camerer (1995, p.652; 1999, p.10577), Rabin (1996,
pp.46-47; 1998, pp.37-38; 2002, p.662), Starmer (2004 [2000], p.111-2, p.129), Luce (2000, p.8, pp.34-35, pp.216-
217), Camerer and Loewenstein (2004, p.12, p.14), Samuelson (2005, pp.93-95), Varian (2005, pp.549-550), Thaler
and Sunstein (2008, p.37), Kösegi and Rabin (2008a, p.1824), Loewenstein and Haisley (2008, pp.219), Schotter
(2008, p.73), Wakker (2010, p.234, pp.241-2, p.250, p.265, p.350, pp.377-378), Bardsley et al. (2010, pp.130-1),
Kahneman (2011, chap.34), Angner and Loewenstein (2012, p.663, p.668), Spiegler (2013).
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Disease as a guiding benchmark for comparison with other framing phenomena. The issue of
interdisciplinarity will be dealt with by conducting this systematic study from the perspective
of economics regarding the second, third and fourth points. That is (and respectively), the
demands of the implicit axiom of description invariance will be characterized, how it may be
weakened to account for its violations formally (which is done in the next co-authored chapter)
will be informally discussed, and how prospect theory cannot straightforwardly account for ex-
isting variations on the Asian Disease will be pointed out. Also, further experiments to better
understand the framing of consequences through the Asian Disease will be suggested along the
way. The positive/normative issue will be dealt with by scrutinizing how the entanglement of
facts, values and conventions in the framing of consequences suggests some conditions under
which the underlying framing effects is rational, hence arguing against a generalization of the
fifth point.
The main argument of this chapter is that a full understanding of the framing of consequences
requires a systematic account of the potential interactions between (1) how the decision modeler
presents the decision problem and (2) how the decision maker represents this decision problem
to himself. Indeed, Kahneman retrospectively acknowledged that an “important distinction
between what decision makers do and what is done to them” was “blurred” by “[t]he use of
a single term”, i.e., “the label “frame”” in their pioneering contributions (2000, p.xvi). To
mark this distinction throughout the chapter we shall call (1) ‘external frames’ and (2) ‘internal
frames’. The uses of language by economic agents is a condition of possibility for the interactions
between external and internal frames to take place. Such uses of language is here considered as
economic behaviors (hence part of the title of this chapter: language as behavior), as already
argued in the first chapter of this dissertation. Indeed, the account of the interactions between
external and internal frames given here is nothing but a development to what was called the
communicative structure of choices there. To facilitate this development, we shall abstract
from the uses of language by economists (in the sense used in the previous chapter, i.e., in
his activity of theory making) to focus on the uses of language by (economic) agents in their
activity of decision making. It will also be argued that, from the perspective of economics, it
is more the structure of the objects of choice that needs to be modified than the structure of
preferences, which should be able to be represented over different possible descriptions of one
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same consequence. Hence, unlike existing discussions of framing effects, more attention will be
devoted to the empirical structure of external frames than to the psychological interpretations
of their impacts on internal frames.
This chapter is organized in three sections. The systematic study is first conducted through
Kahneman, Tversky and other behavioral economists’ works on framing (4.1), before moving to
other psychologists who adopt a perspective that is quite compatible with the latter’s (4.2), and
finally to psychologists who share a perspective on the communicative structure of choices that
is well in line with this dissertation’s (4.3). The conclusion of this chapter draws some impli-
cations for other framing phenomena and regarding the notorious fuzziness and permissiveness
underlying the notion of consequence used in economics.
4.1 Pervasiveness and empirical subtleties of framing phenomena
The framework that will be used to conduct the systematic study of framing phenomena is
constituted by three distinctions. Two of them have already be introduced. The first one is
between identity, equivalence and equality, and constitutes the main originality of the framework
in so far as it has never been used (to the best of my knowledge) to study framing phenomena.
The second one is between external and internal frames. The last one comes from psychologist
Deborah Frisch (1993, p.399), who coined the distinction between “strict” and “loose” framings
(her work is discussed in the third section). Strict framings are about “pairs of problems that
involve a redescription of the exact same situation” (ibid) as in the Asian Disease. Loose
framings are about “pairs of problems that aren’t exactly the same, but which are equivalent
from the perspective of economic theory” (ibid) as in much of the framing effects discussed in this
subsection. One goal of the systematic study of framing phenomena is to highlight the various
conventions from economic theory that allows the establishment of equivalence between pairs
of decision problems. Throughout, I will mainly focus on decision modelers’ external frames
in framing experiments, only mentioning the decision makers’ modal preferences (using bold
characters as in chapter 2). As we shall see, framing phenomena are pervasive in the sense that
they occur under uncertainty (4.1.1), under certainty (4.1.2), regarding other people (4.1.3) and
over time (4.1.4). Theoretical accounts of the internal frames (4.1.5) and implications for the
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positive/normative issue (4.1.6) are briefly discussed for all the framing phenomena altogether
at the end.4
4.1.1 Under uncertainty
We can first contrast the Asian Disease with the following “isolation effect” (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979, p.273):
[Decision scenario] In addition with whatever you own, you have been given €1000.
[decision question] You are now asked to choose between
A: 50% chance of winning €1000 and 50% chance of winning nothing
B: 100% chance of winning €500 for sure
[Non-identical decision scenario] In addition with whatever you own, you have been
given €2000. [identical decision question] You are now asked to choose between
C: 50% chance of losing €1000 and 50% chance of losing nothing
D: 100% chance of losing €500 for sure
This is a loose framing effect because the first ‘gain frame’ and the second ‘loss frame’ are not
redescriptions of an identical situation. Indeed, the decision scenario needs to change across
frames for the choice sets {A,B} and {C,D} to have equivalent consequences from the perspec-
tive of economic theory. The equivalence is established through the convention of counting as
consequences, not the mere outcome of a choice, but the consequence of such outcome on the
decision maker’s wealth. Hence the necessity to integrate the gains or losses with the endow-
ment given in the decision scenario. Once this integration is done, it yields numerically equal
quantities, making the consequences equivalent from the perspective of economic theory. The
consequences of choosing A or C, and B or D are, by themselves, not identical as they involve
either gains or losses; only the consequence of wining nothing or losing nothing is identical in
the two frames. By contrast, in the strict framing of the Asian Disease, the decision scenario
is identical across the ‘save frame’ and the ‘die frame’. It does not need to change for the
consequences to be equivalent from the perspective of economic theory.
In their 1981 paper Tversky and Kahneman provided a tripartition of external frames, into
the framings of “acts”, of “contingencies”, and of “outcomes”, the latter is taken as synony-
mous with ‘consequences’ in this chapter. Both the isolation effect and the Asian Disease are
respectively loose and strict framings of consequences. To illustrate the contrast, consider the
4Parts of the developments in this section have been used in Jullien (20016a).
209
following loose framing of acts (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, p.454), where the objects of
choice A,B,C,D in the first frame are combined through the logical operator & to make new
objects of choice A&D,B&C in the second frame:
[decision scenario & decision question] Imagine that you face the following pair of
concurrent decisions. First examine both decisions, then indicate the options you
prefer.
Decision (i). Choose between:
A. a sure gain of €240
B. 25% chance to gain €1000, and 75% chance to gain nothing
Decision (ii). Choose between:
C. a sure loss of €750
D. 75% chance to lose €1000, and 25% chance to lose nothing
[non-identical (because absence of) decision scenario & identical decision question]
Choose between:
A & D. 25% chance to win €240, and 75.% chance to lose €760.
B & C. 25% chance to win €250, and 75% chance to lose €750.
At first sight, there is no straightforward relation of equivalence between the two frames, but
a relation of inclusion. In the first frame, two choices have to be made, one in {A,B} and one
in {C,D}, so that the choice set is in fact equivalent to {A&C,A&D,B&C,B&D}, in which
the second frame {A&D,B&C} is included. From the conventions of decision theory, however,
one can see a loose equivalence between these two frames by considering that the part of the
former not included in the latter, i.e., A&C and B&D, are irrelevant. The former because it is a
strict loss. And the latter because you would have a non-binary lottery with three consequences,
i.e., +€1000 (with probability 916 ), €0 (with probability
6
16 ) and -€1000 (with probability
1
16 ).
Arguably, the irrelevance of the latter is more disputable than the irrelevance of the former.
More generally, the point is that if one considers that A&C and B&D are relevant, then he can
argues against Tversky and Kahneman that we are in the presence of a framing effect here.
In the following framing of contingencies (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986, pp.S263-4), notice
how the blue marbles in the first ({A,B}) frame disappear but not their consequences, as they
are redistributed into the yellow marbles in C and into the green marbles in D, and how the
green and red marbles in B have the same consequences and have been combined into the red
marbles in D:
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[decision scenario] Consider the following lotteries [...]. [decision question] Which lottery do you prefer?
Marbles White Red Green Blue Yellow
Option A 90%, €0 6%, win €45 1%, win €30 1%, lose €15 2%, lose €15
Option B 90%, €0 6%, win €45 1%, win €45 1%, lose €10 2%, lose €15
[identical decision scenario & decision question]
Marbles White Red Green Yellow
Option C 90%, €0 6%, win €45 1%, win €30 3%, lose €15
Option D 90%, €0 7%, win €45 1%, lose €10 2%, lose €15
Here, the equivalence is achieved by combining marbles that yield the same distribution of
expected values. The blue and yellow marbles in A yield the same expected consequences, and
are combined into the yellow marbles in C. The red and green marbles in B yield the same
expected consequences, and are combined into the red marbles in D. Thus the overall expected
values and distributions of consequences of both lotteries are preserved between frames, which
make them equivalent from expected utility theory.
These framings of acts and of contingencies are loose ones because the equivalence from the
point of view of expected utility theory across frames does nonetheless underlie consequences
that not physically identical across frames. That is, for each framings, the two frames refer
to non-identical situations. In the framing of acts, the opportunity to make one binary choice
disappears (along with the decision scenario) and sums of money are added. In the framing
of contingencies, marbles are removed and added. Hence, changes in the written words (that
are thus non-identical across frames) imply changes in the physically implemented experimental
setups (that would thus be non-identical across frames). In the Asian Disease, by contrast, there
are physical identity of the consequences: 200 people live and 400 people die in both A and C,
and this reasoning carries over to the probabilistic consequences. The non-identical features
in the Asian Disease’s objects of choice do not concern the consequences but only the words
describing them. To illustrate the contrast more vividly, if you remove the words “blue: lose
€15”, you ought to remove the blue marbles in the underlying experiment, but the redescription
of “200 people will be saved” (out of 600 people) into “400 people will die” (out of 600 people)
only implies changes in the written words used in the experiments.
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[decision scenario] You receive £50 [identical decision scenario] You receive £50
[decision question] Choose between the
gamble or the sure option
[identical decision question] Choose between
the gamble or the sure option
Figure 4.1: Stricter framing effect from De Martino et al. (2006)
Recall from chapter 2 that, intuitively, one lottery first-order stochastically dominates an-
other one if you can win more money without taking more risk. Notice that the external frames
in these framings of acts and of contingencies involve such relations of first-order stochastic
dominance: B&C dominates A&B for the acts, and B and D dominate respectivelyA and C
for the contingencies. First-order stochastic dominance is the most important type of relation
between lotteries (‘in the world’, i.e., in external frames) about which expected utility theory
has something to say concerning individuals’ preferences (‘in the head’, i.e., in internal frames)
regardless of risk attitudes: namely, individuals should prefer the dominating lottery over the
dominated one. Unlike the frames being either positive (‘save’) or negative (‘die’) in the Asian
Disease, they are said to be ‘transparent’ ({A&D,B&C} for the acts, {A,B} for the contingen-
cies) when they make the relation of dominance clear and ‘nontransparent’ ({A,B,C,D} for
the acts, {C,D} for the contingencies) when it is not clear. Indeed, in the transparent frames,
decision makers do not violate preference for first-order stochastic dominance. There was no
violation of preference for first-order stochastic dominance in the Asian Disease for the simple
reason that there is no such relations of dominance within its choice set.
The last framing effect under risk to be contrasted to with the Asian Disease comes from by
neuroeconomists Benedetto De Martino, Dharshan Kumaran, Ben Seymou and Raymond Dolan
(2006, p.685); it is reproduced in figure 4.1.
With respect to the Asian Disease, there is a further invariant dimension here: the pictorial
design allows to use identical words in the presentation of the probabilistic object of choice
212
across frames (which in both cases read ‘1/3 probability of keeping the £50 and 2/3 probability
of losing the £50’). In this sense, this is a stricter framing of consequence than the Asian Disease
under risk, and suggests that there seem to be a specific role played by the sure consequence in
it (the next two sections will provide strong support to this point).5
4.1.2 Under certainty
Framing phenomena under certainty have indeed been observed since the beginning of Tver-
sky and Kahneman’s work on the topic. Here is a well-known example of a loose framing of
consequences under certainty (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, p.457):
[decision scenario:] Imagine that you have decided to see a play where admission is
€10 per ticket. As you enter the theater you discover that you have lost a €10 bill.
[decision question:] Would you still pay €10 for a ticket for the play? Yes No
[non-identical decision scenario:] Imagine that you have decided to see a play and
paid the admission price of €10 per ticket. As you enter the theater you discover
that you have lost the ticket. [...]
[non-identical decision question:] Would you pay €10 for another ticket? Yes No
The framing effect here is obviously a loose one: by contrast with the Asian Disease, the frames
are not redescriptions of an identical situation (one is a situation where a bill is lost, the other
where a ticket is lost). The equivalence is established through the convention from economic
theory that sunk costs (whatever the form they take) should not affect economic choices. In
both frames there is an equal sunk cost of €10, which does not affect choices in the first ‘lost
bill frame’, but it does so in the second ‘lost ticket frame’.
There are acknowledged mutual influences between Kahneman and Tversky’s work on fram-
ing (especially under certainty) and Thaler’s work on mental accounting (see, e.g., Kahneman
and Tversky 1984, p.347; Thaler 2008, p.12). Thaler’s work on mental accounting indeed in-
volves the construction of choice experiments triggering framing phenomena. For instance, in
the following one, he presents subjects with pairs of decision scenarios, in each of which “two
5As far as I know, Hollard et al. (2016) provide the only experimental investigation of this stricter framing
effect by economists. Other phenomena usually labeled as ‘framing’ under risk within the province of standard
and behavioral economics include notably some in the literature on mental accounting discussed below (see
Thaler and Johnson 1990, sects.4-5), others related to the writing of instruction and presentation of lotteries in
measurement of risk preferences (see Holt and Laury 2014), and famous violations of procedure invariance (see
Slovic and Lichtenstein 2006).
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events occur in Mr. A’s life and one event occurs in Mr. B’s life”, events that are explicitly
“intended to be financially equivalent” (Thaler 1985, p.202):
“[decision scenario]Mr. A’s car was damaged in a parking lot. He had to spend €200
to repair the damage. The same day the car was damaged, he won €25 in the office
football pool.
[non-identical decision scenario]Mr. B’s car was damaged in a parking lot. He had
to spend €175 to repair the damage.”
[decision question]Who was more upset? A, B, no difference (ibid, p.204)
Besides the obvious looseness of this framing effect, by contrast with the Asian Disease (and )
and all other experiments discussed so far, here it can be argued that Thaler takes whole frames
to be the objects of choice. In a way, deciding who is the more upset is tantamount to ranking
the two decision scenarios, which are therefore the objects of choice, the “no difference” being
explicitly identified as “emotionally equivalent” (p.202).6
4.1.3 Regarding other people
The following framing effect is an early instance of a framing phenomena related to social
preferences (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1986a, p.731):
[decision scenario] A company is making a small profit. It is located in a community
experiencing a recession with substantial unemployment but no inflation. There are
many workers anxious to work at the company. The company decides to decrease
wages and salaries 7% this year.
[decision question] Acceptable Unfair
[non-identical decision scenario] A company is making a small profit. It is located in
a community experiencing a recession with substantial unemployment and inflation
of 12%. There are many workers anxious to work at the company. The company
decides to increase salaries only 5% this year.
[identical decision question] Acceptable Unfair
There is a change of real income (i.e., purchasing power) that, in both frames, is equivalent to a
7% decrease. From the conventions of economic theory, economic behaviors should be based on
6We shall see the theoretical side of Thaler’s mental accounting later, but note that in the original 1985
paper as well as in further extension, not all mental accounting phenomena are about decisions under certainty
(see Thaler and Johnson 1995; Thaler 1999; Shafir and Thaler 2006; Thaler 2015, part III). Another topic
where framing under certainty has been developed within the province of standard and behavioral economics is
the behavioral study of money illusion (see Shafir, Diamond and Tversky 1997), which is also related to social
preferences as the next decision problem also illustrate. An econometric study of the effects of advertisement in
the field by Bertrand et al. (2010) on loan take out observed classic framing phenomena that can be thought of
as being in-between under certainty and over time.
214
real, not nominal, prices. Hence social preferences for fairness should not be influenced by money
illusion, as it is the case here. But here again, the framing effect is a loose one: by contrast
with the Asian Disease the two frames describe two situations with non-identical consequences.
Not only the amount of money written in the workers’ bank account would differ, but so would
the speech acts from the company, as declaring a decrease or an increase in wages do not have
identical propositional contents. The reasons behind both speech acts are however identical, i.e.,
“a recession with substantial unemployment” and “There are many workers anxious to work at
the company”, as are the consumption bundles available in both frames.7
4.1.4 Over time
Finally, here is an instance of framing phenomena in intertemporal choices (Loewenstein 1988):
[decision scenario] For every pair, please circle the choice you prefer
(1) €7 in 8 weeks vs. €5 in 1 week
(2) €7 in 8 weeks vs. €5.25 in 1 week
(3) €7 in 8weeks vs. €6.25 in 1 week
(4) €7 in 8 weeks vs. €6.50 in 1 week
[identical decision scenario]
(4′) €7 in 1 week vs €7.50 in 8 weeks
(3′) €7 in 1 week vs €7.75 in 8 weeks
(2′) €7 in 1 week vs. €8.75 in 8 weeks
(1′) €7 in 1 week vs. €9 in 8 weeks
Some pairs are equivalent from the theoretical convention of constant discounting which implies
that the minimum premium the decision maker is willing to be paid for incurring a delay on
a given consequence should be numerically equal to maximum cost he is willing to pay for
speeding up this consequence (see Loewenstein 1988, p.203). Under this theoretical convention,
7Notice that in the previous framing problems, the consequential equivalence arguably requires more economic
assumptions, e.g., all loans (especially real estate’s) are indexed on inflation and that all prices (not only the
average price) grow with inflation (I thank Ismaël Rafaï for pointing this to me). Closer to how social preferences
have been discussed previously in this dissertation, Dreber et al. (2013) tried to observe a framing phenomena
in the dictator game. One manipulation involves loose framings: 100 cents are given either to the decision maker
in a ‘give frame’ or to the other in a ‘take frame’ but the allocation is done in both cases by the former. Another
manipulation involves strict framings: only the label of the game changes in the instruction, either the “Giving
Game” or the “Keeping Game” (in some conditions the entire decision problem, including the description of
the consequences in the objects of choice, remains identical. They do not observe any framing phenomena, by
contrast with the effects of these manipulations on other games with a game theoretical structure. The original
study introducing framing of acts in public good games is from economist Andreoni (1995). The one introducing
the framing of label is from psychologists Liberman et al. (2004) who relabeled prisoner dilemma games either
the “Wall Street Game” or the “Community Game”. A recent contribution in economics observing framing effects
in both these types of framing is from Dufwenberg et al. (2011).
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(1) and (4) in the ‘speed up frame’ are respectively equivalent to (1′) and (4′) in the ‘delay
frame’ without framing effects because the preferences in the former two respectively imply the
preferences in the latter two. But (2) and (3) are respectively equivalent to (2′) and (3′) with
a framing effect because the preferences in the former two respectively imply the reverse of the
preferences in the latter two. Unlike in the Asian Disease, this is however not a strict framing
effects since, obviously, the decision situations are not identical across both frames.8
4.1.5 Theoretical accounts of internal frames
We can now briefly turn to the internal frames as they features in the theoretical accounts of the
authors who demonstrated the framing phenomena that have been presented. The underlying
accounts of internal frames rely mostly on prospect theory, especially on the value function (cf.
chapter 1).
The explanation is quite straightforward for the recession with/without inflation and lost
ticket/bill problems, as the reference point does not change across decision problems. In the
former, the reference point is one’s current nominal wage. A decrease in it without inflation
is seen as a loss (which it is in both nominal and real terms) and loss aversion steers social
preferences towards unfairness, i.e., the decision would be rejected if given the opportunity. An
increase in it with inflation is still seen as a gain (which it is not in real terms), which therefore
seems like an acceptable, fair, decision. In the latter, the reference point is to buy a ticket to
see a play. Buying it for the first time is seen as a gain in utility from the play to be seen
which is superior to the disutility from the €10 costs, and the lost €10 bill is not considered
as part of the same economic decision. Losing it and having to buy it for the second time is
seen as a part of the same economic decision, which makes (especially through loss aversion)
the disutility from the €20 costs in ticket superior to the gain in utility from the play to be
seen. Thaler’s work on mental accounting is a theoretical refinement, conceptually and formally,
8The framing phenomena presented here is reconstructed from Loewenstein’s mean results and instructions
in his appendix. Much of the framing phenomena in intertemporal choices is usually discussed about the strong
violations of procedure invariance in the elicitation of time preferences (see Frederick et al. 2002; and Manzini et
al. 2014 for a recent contribution). There are however a few experiments that are closer from the one discussed
here. For instance, Benhabib et al. (2010) use different framings of willingness to accept. An noteworthy
contribution in psychology are Kirby and Guatsello’s (2001) experiments who implement Ainslie’s notion of
bundling (which he himself refer to as an instance of ‘framing’) central to his theoretical account of hyperbolic
discounting.
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of this latter kind of explanation from prospect theory. In these refinements, money or utility
are not necessarily fungible and Thaler extends the value function (u(.)) to two consequences
that can be received jointly, i.e., at the same time. Roughly, Thaler provide various conditions
under which the joint receipts of two consequences will be integrated, i.e., u(x, y) = u(x + y),
or segregated, i.e., u(x, y) = u(x) + u(y), with the relaxation of fungibility allowing to treat
cases where both would not yield the same utility, i.e., u(x + y) 6= u(x) + u(y). This depends,
among other features, on whether the consequences are gains (i.e., x, y) or losses (i.e., −x,−y)
or both, in which case whether the gains are greater than the losses or vice-versa matters. The
car damage example is easily explained by firstly setting the reference point to zero for both Mr.
A and Mr. B. And secondly by assuming A segregates his mixed consequences thus yielding
less disutility than B’s unique negative consequence, i.e., uA(−€200) + uA(€25) > uB(−€175).
Hence the latter is more upset as loss aversion is greater for consequences closer to the reference
point.
Loewenstein (1988) explains framing phenomena over time simply by using prospect theory’s
value function within an otherwise standard model of discounting. The reference point changes
across both external and internal frames, from ‘€7 in 8 weeks’ to ‘€7 in 1 week’. Hence, the
disutility from the monetary losses involved in the first frame are higher than the utility from
the monetary gains in the second frame despite both amounts of money being numerically equal
in absolute value. Thus a shift in the reference point and loss aversion explain the differences
in elicited discount rates without postulating different time preferences.
Contrasting the isolation effect with the Asian Disease is especially instructive of the degree
of liberty offered by potential but not necessary changes in reference point within prospect
theory. In the isolation effect, the reference point changes across external frames (from +€1000
to +€2000), but remains invariant in the internal frames. That is, the decision maker evaluates
both frames with a same reference point of zero and hence sees the consequences in the ‘gain
frame’ as involving gains (hence choosing the sure consequence), and the ones in ‘loss frame’ as
involving losses (hence choosing the risky consequences). By contrast, in the Asian Disease, the
reference point is invariant across external frames (“600 people are expected to be killed”), but
changes in the internal frames. As Kahneman and Tversky put it, {A,B} “implicitly adopts as
a reference point a state of affairs in which the disease is allowed to take its toll of 600 lives”,
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while {C,D} “assumes a reference state in which no one dies of the disease” (1984, p.341). But
who “adopts” and who “assumes” here? This is an instance of the confusion between external
and internal frames retrospectively acknowledged by Kahneman (2000). It is only because the
Asian Disease is carefully designed as it is by the decision modeler (here Kahneman and Tversky
the experimenters) that different reference points are induced. In this respect and by contrast
with the isolation effect, the Asian Disease shows that the framing of the consequences within
the choice set can, by itself, give specific meanings to the decision scenario interpreted as shifts
of the reference point under prospect theory. De Martino et al.’s (2006) stricter framing of
consequences, which is explained through prospect theory exactly as is the Asian Disease, shows
the key role of the framing of the sure consequence for inducing shifts in the reference point. In
the isolation effect, {A,B} and {C,D} are, taken in isolation, given gains and losses respectively;
so it is not surprising that they are seen as gains and losses respectively. By contrast, in the
Asian Disease’s external frames, the sets of consequences taken in isolation are neither gains
nor losses, they are mixed gains and losses. But it seems pretty obvious that {A,B} are seen
as gains and {C,D} as losses in the internal frames, because of the semantics of “saved” and
“die” respectively. This contrast highlights the difference between establishing an equivalence
between frames through a theoretical convention, i.e., integration of gains an losses with the
endowment, and through an atheoretic convention, i.e., the semantics of “saved” and “die” in
ordinary language uses. Though both equivalences hold for the decision modeler, they don’t for
the decision maker.
The original (1979) weighting function also plays a role in the theoretical explanations of
framing phenomena from the previous paragraph by exacerbating the risk seeking/risk aversion
asymmetry across frames, its role is not as crucial as for both the framings of acts and (especially)
of contingencies. In the framings of acts, the weighting function also exacerbate the asymmetry
in risk preferences within the first frame but it does so up to a point leading to violation of first-
order stochastic dominance (by choosing A&D over B&C). In the framings of contingencies, the
weighting function plays the crucial explanatory role through its property of subadditivty. The
weights attributed to the probabilities of getting €45 by drawing a red marbles (with probability
.06) and a green marble (with probability .01) in B of the transparent frame is superior to the
weight attributed to the probability .07 of getting €45 by drawing a red marble in D of the
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nontransparent frame, i.e., pi(.06) + pi(.01) > pi(.07), explaining the shift of a preference for B
to a preference against D (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986, p.S263).
Finally, DeMartino et al.’s (2006) account of internal frames is based on the observation that
the modal pattern of preferences exhibiting the framing effect is correlated with higher activation
of the amygdala (than other patterns of preferences), a brain region usually associated with the
experience of emotions. They accordingly emphasize the role of emotions in decision making
and cast they results within a dual-system account of internal frames.
4.1.6 The positive/normative issue in framing phenomena
Despite the variety of framing phenomena sharing a fairly clear and common explanation from
prospect theory, their status regarding the positive/normative issue are less clear and different.
We shall be brief on the ones related to social and time preferences not only because there is
not much to say but also because the rest of this chapter will focus on framings under certainty
and uncertainty. The same standard position as the one highlighted in chapter 2 still holds for
framings related to social preferences: ‘fairness’ judgments are studied only in so far as they
are recognized as such by economic agents. Economists explicitly refuse to judge whether the
content of such judgments are indeed fair or unfair, can be deemed rational or irrational (see esp.
Kahneman et al. 1986a, p.729), though it is emphasized throughout that they violate standard
models of individual behaviors. Likewise but more maybe surprisingly for time preferences,
Loewenstein (1988) makes no comment on the normative implications of framing phenomena
in intertemporal choices. Such implications have however been drawn from start in Kahneman
and Tversky’s work on framing and Thaler’s on mental accounting (see the references mentioned
above). This is notably the case in the following passage from Tversky and Kahneman (1981),
which is also relevant for (and is indeed about) framings under certainty and uncertainty:9
“Further complexities arise in the normative analysis because the framing of an
action sometimes affects the actual experience of its outcomes [...]. [D]eliberate
manipulation of framing is commonly used as an instrument of self-control [here a
footnote references Strotz, Ainslie, Elster, and Thaler and Shefrin]. When framing
9See Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) along with Read et al. (1999) for further reflections of Loewenstein on
framing in intertemporal choice connected with mental accounting.
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influences the experience of consequences, the adoption of a decision frame is an
ethically significant act.” (Tversky and Kahneman 1981, p.458)
This passage underlies two related tensions (both retrospectively acknowledged by Kahneman
2000), between the two types of frames and between two views about the notion of equivalence,
which will be scrutinized in the rest of this chapter. The tension between the internal and
external senses of a frame transpires in every sentences of the passage. Whose act of framing is
ethically significant? Is it the decision modeler’s choices of an external frame over another? In
contemporary behavioral economics terms, this corresponds to the activity of ‘choice architects’
discussed in chapter 1, who for instance designs precommitment devices to solve other agent’s
self-control problems (e.g., pension plans, cf. chapter 2). Or is the ethically significant act
the decision maker’s choices of an internal frame over another? This corresponds to both the
strategy of consistent planning (cf. chapter 2) or ‘internal influences’ (cf. chapter 3) to cope
with self-control problems (e.g., an ethically significant internal frame to avoid succumbing to
temptation consists in focusing as much as possible on the future bad consequences). From the
arguments of chapter 1 about the communicative structure underlying most economic choices,
it does not make much sense to consider both questions separately. The ethical significance,
i.e., normative implications, of external and internal frames cannot be fully understood if not
studied in interaction. Was the decision maker aware of his self-control problems before encoun-
tering the external frame? What was the intentions of the decision modeler in choosing one
frame over another (compare: a friend recommending a product versus an ad for this product)?
These issues underlie the interactions between internal and external frames. Kahneman and
Tversky’s theoretical focus was exclusively on internal frames. Besides explicit acknowledgment
from Kahneman (2000), the change in label from the “editing phase” of the 1979 version of
prospect theory to the “framing phase” of the 1992 cumulative prospect theory is a marker of
this theoretical focus.
The other tension is, as Kahneman (2000, p.xv) puts it, between a “theory-bound” view
and a “lenient” view of equivalence – Kahneman (2000) emphasizes that they (with Tversky)
switched from the former to the latter in the 1980s. The theory-bound view is essentially the
one displayed so far: equivalences are established from the theoretical conventions of economic
theory. By contrast, in the lenient view, they are established by “the decision maker [...] after due
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consideration of both problems” (ibid). Therefore and in principle, it is possible for a decision
maker to rationally view two frames as non-equivalent and maintain his preference reversals
even after the equivalence from economic theory has been explained to him. As emphasized by
Tversky and Kahneman (1981, p.458), his justification can be hedonistic (he derives more utility
from a given consequence under one frame than under the other) or ethical (one frame can fit
some standards better than another frame). A tension arises in practice because such possibility,
which is a key implication of the lenient view of equivalence, never arises in discussions of framing
effects by Kahneman, Tversky and Thaler.
Arguably and from the perspective of this dissertation, this is sometimes quite sound, as
for the framings under certainty, and of acts and contingencies under uncertainty discussed
above. For instance, Kahneman (2011, p.371) includes the ‘lost bill frame’ in the framing under
certainty in the “good frames” that lead to “more reasonable decisions” because “[h]istory is
irrelevant”, as the standard justification from the theoretical convention that sunk costs should
not matter holds it. The discussion ends as follows:
““Would you have bought tickets if you had lost the equivalent amount of cash? If
yes, go ahead and buy new ones.” Broader frames and inclusive accounts generally
lead to more rational decisions.” (ibid)10
Within the constraints of the decision scenario of this experiment, there is indeed not much
to be argued against that conclusion. Few would find the following justification convincing: ‘I
would be so upset to have lost the ticket that I will not enjoy the play, which does not happen if
I had lost €10’. That there is no convincing justification comes mostly from the fact that there
is no communicative structure in the decision. In a sense, within the real-world counterpart of
the experiment you would be both the decision modeler and the decision maker for the choice
of whether or not to buy a ticket, i.e., you construct your own counterfactual to make up your
mind.
For the framings of acts and of contingencies leading to violations of first-order stochastic
dominance, there is also not much to be argued for the rationality of preferring less to money to
more money. Doing so would require a lot of contextual factors which are not involved in the lab
experiments as witnessed by the 100% of the subjects who choose the dominant lottery under
10Thaler (2015, part III) holds a similar position on mental accounting phenomena.
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transparent framing (see also MacCrimmon 1968, sect. V). Demonstrations of such framing
effects were indeed central to Tversky and Kahneman’s claims that “the dream of constructing
a theory that is acceptable both descriptively and normatively appears unrealizable” (1986, p.
S272). This is so because framing effects are pervasive (hence should be descriptively accounted
for) but can lead to violations of first-order stochastic dominance (hence cannot be normatively
defended as rational). One implication of such claims was to take the principle of description
invariance as “normatively indispensable” (ibid) or “normatively unassailable” (Tversky and
Koehler 1994, p.565).11
But it can be argued, especially from the systematic study conducted above, that description
invariance does not have the same normative implications in all framing effects, mainly because
strict framings cannot lead to violation of dominance. After all, a standard economics account
(i.e., no value judgment on the content of preferences) could be given to strict framing effects,
whereby they are not necessarily irrational as long as any arguments are made against the
rationality of a preference for one description of a consequence (or of a decision problem) over
another description of the same consequence (or of the same decision problem). Kahneman
and Tversky have indirectly made such arguments. On the one hand, they mentioned some
casual observation of decision makers who were explained the equivalence between frames in the
Asian Disease and were then conflicted between keeping their preference reversals and respecting
description invariance at the same time (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1984 p.343). On the other
hand, Kahneman (2011, chap.34) discusses strict framings of consequences in the Asian Disease
and De Martino et al’s (2006) altogether by using the expression “emotional framing” over and
over again, referring to what’s going on in the Asian Disease as “empty intuition”. He again
reports the casual observation that “when people are confronted with their inconsistency” and
are asked “[“n]ow that you know these choices were inconsistent, how do you decide?” The
answer is usually embarrassed silence” (Kahneman 2011, p.369). In short, strict framings of
11Notice that there is an apparent paradox here. Recall from chapter 2 that Kahneman and Tversky amended
their 1979 prospect theory into their 1992 cumulative prospect theory in order to avoid violations of first order
stochastic dominance. Recall also that the latter is the main theoretical convention in decision theory from which
value judgments of rationality and irrationality are derived. Given that Kahneman and Tversky never claimed
that cumulative prospect theory has a normative dimension, and that they had already demonstrated factual
violations of first-order stochastic dominance prior to 1992 (the framings of contingencies and of acts), why did
they wish to analytically prevent such violations? The paradox is however only apparent because these violations
occur in these very specific situtations involving (nontransparent) framings, while the 1979 implications of such
violations were systematic.
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consequences are “illustration of how the emotion evoked by a word can “leak” into the final
choice” (Kahneman 2011, p.366). The main problem with this position is that it virtually
ignores more than two decades of research by other psychologists on the Asian Disease and
other strict framings going beyond casual observation, i.e., doing experiments on the processes
by which decision makers judge frames to be equivalent or not. By scrutinizing their work, we
shall argue that something is indeed leaking in framing effects, and that is not just emotion but
also information about the decision situation that can be relevant in some cases.
Conclusion
We can briefly conclude this section by noting the contrast between framing effects and the
challenges to standard economics such as Allais’ paradoxes seen in chapter 2. The latter’s exter-
nal frames were pairs of decision problems with unequal consequences across the two problems
constitutive of a given pair. Despite this inequality, there was certain numerical relations be-
tween these pairs such that the modal preferences were deemed ‘inconsistent’ because of their
violations of theoretical conventions such as the independence axiom. These modal preferences
were not inconsistent anymore within theories that relaxed these theoretical conventions (e.g.,
rank-dependent utility theory), which was normatively justified by the work of Allais, Mac-
Crimmon, Quiggin and others. By contrast, the framing effects discussed in this section are
pairs of decision problems with equal consequences across the two problems constitutive of a
given pair. In loose framing effects, these equalities are established through various theoreti-
cal conventions, each of which have more or less defensible economic logic. In strict framing
effects, these equalities are established through atheoretic conventions from ordinary language
uses, which have been argued ex post (to the demonstration of framing effects) to constitute an
implicit axiom of the standard model, namely ‘description invariance’. Description invariance is
usually considered to be ‘obviously’ rational without justification by an economic logic beyond
common sense. In short, the uses of ordinary language constitutive of the external frames in
Allais’ paradoxes are not as crucial to the underlying behavioral phenomenon as they are in
strict framing effects.
The distinction between loose and strict framing effects, and especially the specificity of the
latter within the distinction, are worth investigating because even psychologists specialized in
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the matter have made confusions with non-trivial implications (see Fagley 1993).
4.2 Strict framings beyond Kahneman and Tversky
There is an impressive number of contributions on strict framing effects in Psychology, as the
sheer number of reviews and meta-analyses testifies (i.e., Kühberger 1997; 1998; Kühberger et
al. 1999; Levin et al. 1998; Piñon and Gambara 2005; Maule and Villejoubert 2007; Keren 2012;
2011a; Mandel and Vartanian 2012; Takemura 2014, Part V). As emphasized in the most cited
of the latter, within the existing variation in framing effects, “the likelihood of obtaining choice
reversals [is] directly related to the similarity between features of a given study and features of
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) original “Asian disease problem.”” (Levin et al. 1998, p.157).
The effect is robust to changes in scenario and type of consequences, e.g., money instead of lives.
Hence, it makes sense to focus on the structure of the Asian Disease’s external frame to guide
potential theoretical developments. This section comments on a selective set of results that are
the most useful for both the perspective of such developments and for the positive/normative
issue in strict framing effects. Fairly straightforward arguments concerning the latter issue are
first presented (4.2.1). Some variations in the Asian Disease’s external frames that are relevant
for both issues are then discussed (4.2.2). The empirical structure of the Asian Disease is finally
scrutinized to show how it embeds two other types of strict framings, some features of which
are non-trivial for both the theoretical and methodological purposes of this chapter (4.2.3).
4.2.1 Weak reasoned scrutiny, intelligence and incentives
One way to argue straightforwardly for the rationality or irrationality of strict framing effects
is to see what happens when subjects are asked to take the time to provide a rationale for their
choices. This has been done in several ways, yielding mixed results. With the original Asian
Disease problem, the framing effect disappears in some experiments (e.g., Miller and Fagley 1991;
Takemura 2014, pp.111-2) while remaining robust in others (e.g., Sieck and Yates 1997; LeBoeuf
and Shafir 2003). There seems to be no underlying regularity about the way the experimenter
(i.e., the decision modeler) asks for the rationale and the disappearance or robustness of the
framing effects. For instance, this can be done by asking to briefly write the rationale (Miller
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and Fagley; LeBoeuf and Shafir) versus asking to take some time to do it in a structured manner
(Takemura; Sieck and Yates); or to write it ‘publicly’ versus ‘privately’ so that the experimenter
respectively can or cannot read it afterward (e.g., Miller and Fagley, Takemura, LeBoeuf and
Shafir versus Sieck and Yates, respectively). Recall that, in chapters 1 and 2, we characterized
‘reasoned scrutiny’ as the production and weighting of existing arguments for or against a given
choice. We can say that we have here an implementation of weak reasoned scrutiny in so far
as only the production of arguments is concerned and not the weighting of existing ones. All
these studies are conducted using between-subject designs, i.e., subjects are exposed only to
one of the two frames and the framing effects occurs (or not) in the modal preferences of the
general population. Only Robyn LeBoeuf and Shafir use (also) a within-subject design, i.e.,
subjects are exposed sequentially to both frames so that framing effects can be observed (or
not) for a given subject. It is arguably at this level that the positive/normative issue is most
meaningful, hence some more comments on their results are in order. One specificity of LeBoeuf
and Shafir’s within-individual results is that they are interpreted in light of an inter-individual
difference measure called ‘need for cognition’. Roughly, subjects are asked, independently of their
responses to framing problems, to rate a series of statements such as ‘I would prefer complex to
simple problems’ or ‘Thinking is not my idea of fun’ on a scale “from -4 (very strongly disagree)
to +4 (strongly agree)” (2003, p.81). The overall ratings of all these statements give individual
scores that are known to be positively correlated with “more thoughtful analyses of written
messages, engag[ing] in greater information search, and pay[ing] less attention to surface cues”
(p.79, references omitted). Their main result is twofold. Firstly, framing effects (i.e., preference
reversals) slightly diminish for subjects who scored high in need for cognition compared to
subjects who scored low. Secondly, the influence of framing in the first frame presented (i.e.,
choosing the sure consequence in the ‘save frame’ and probabilistic one in the ‘die frame’) is
the same regardless of the scores on need for cognition. In short, subjects with high need for
cognition are just as susceptible to framing as those with low need for cognition, though the
former slightly tend to seek more consistency by avoiding violation of description invariance.
Broadening the spirit of LeBoeuf and Shafir’s experiments, another way to argue quite
straightforwardly for the rationality or irrationality of strict framing effects is to look for corre-
lation between their occurrence and subjects’ intelligence. Indeed, cognitive psychologists and
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behavioral economists have been recently (circa 2000) interested in the relation between the
notions of rationality and intelligence. They do so by looking at correlations between inter-
individual measures of cognitive ability (the need for cognition is only one among many) and
departures from or abidance by standard models of individual decisions. These measures have
been shown (1) to inter-correlate between one another, (2) to be positively correlated with
characteristics such as success in education (and others like the ones mentioned in the previous
paragraph, see Stanovich and West 2000) and (3) to be further positively correlated with so-
called ‘cognitive reflection tests’. The latter are simple and handy tests developed for systematic
uses in experiments delivering a score which serves as a proxy for cognitive ability measure. A
cognitive reflection test usually consists in answering three brief mathematical questions, e.g.,
“A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more than the ball. How much
does the ball cost?” (Frederick 2005, p.26), scoring 1 point if the good answer is found or 0
otherwise. There is a fairly clear pattern of positive correlations between cognitive reflection
tests’ results and non-violations of normative axioms of the standard models, i.e., the lower the
score the most likely the violations. However, strict framing effects in the Asian Disease are
an exception (Toplak et al. 2014, p.159). That is, there is no significant tendency whereby the
most ‘intelligent’ subjects are those who do not violate description invariance (contradicting the
slight tendency observed by LeBoeuf and Shafir).12
More traditional for economists, another quite straightforward way to argue for the ratio-
nality or irrationality of strict framing effects is to look for variations in the incentive structure.
Anton Kühberger, Michael Schulte-Mecklenbeck and Josef Perner (2002) have checked just that
in a series of experiments using both real and hypothetical monetary consequences in within-
subject designs (the structure of the task is akin to De Martino et al.’s (2006), though slightly
more complicated). The results are quite clear: there is no difference between real versus hy-
pothetical monetary consequences, but the bigger the consequences, the greater the framing
effects, i.e., small monetary consequences make the framing effect disappears contrary to what
they call “The economists’ argument” (Kühberger et al. 2002, sect.5.1).
Summing up this subsection, three sources of normativity – weak reasoned scrutiny, intel-
12The arrival of the notion of intelligence in the debates around individual rationality in economics and
Psychology, though not surprising, has (also unsurprisingly) not been uncontroversial (see Stanovich and West
2000, pp.665-701).
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ligence, incentives – that have been used to argue for the rationality or irrationality of some
behavioral regularities all fail to unambiguously argue for the irrationality of strict framing
effects.13
4.2.2 Checking, inducing and varying equivalences
By contrast with the previous experiments focused on decision makers’ preferences, Frisch (1993)
– who coined the ‘strict framing’/‘loose framing’ distinction – was more interested in checking
their indifferences between whole decision problems (i.e., not only between consequences). This
is tantamount to checking equivalence classes of consequences in internal frames. Doing so
requires the external frames to allow for so-called “joint evaluations”, i.e., both frames are
presented at the same time (e.g., being presented with {A,B,C,D} in the Asian Disease), by
contrast with more traditional “separate evaluations” where they are presented sequentially
in a within-subject design, e.g., first {A,B} and then {C,D} in the Asian Disease (see Hsee
1996 on this distinction). Frisch (1993) uses both modes of evaluations as follows. In her first
experiment, subjects have to make choices in traditional (loose and strict) framing problems
in separate evaluations (i.e., in both frames presented sequentially), which are then presented
in joint evaluations. In the latter, there are the following instructions: “You are to read the
two situations and decide whether you think the two situations should be treated the same way
or whether you think they should be treated differently” with a place to write the rationale
for why they thought they were different when they thought so (p.404). These rationale were
then coded by two independent judges as belonging to one of three categories, to which Frisch
attached different theoretical implications:
(1) Objective reasons if subjects inferred information that were not present in the prob-
lem, which implied that “the problems, as interpreted by the subjects, actually were
different, and therefore cannot be viewed as a violation of description invariance”
(p.405)
13At least two further results could have been added in this section: Keysar et al. (2012, experiment 1) show
that the Asian Disease’s framing effects disappear when performing the task in a foreign language and Reyna
et al. (2014) show that intelligence agents who deal with highly risky decisions on an everyday basis are more
prone to framing effects in the Asian Disease than college students and adult post-college students. However,
they both argue for the irrationality of framing effects anyway. Their arguments are, roughly, because foreign
language makes the problem less emotional and push one to reason more carefully than in one’s native language;
and because daily expertise pushes over-uses of intuitions over deliberation.
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(2) Subjective reasons if subjects saw the difference in terms of “regret, fairness, waste-
fulness” (ibid) or emotional states, which implied that “subjects are violating utility
theory and on reflection think it is reasonable” hence “we might question the nor-
mative status of the principle of description invariance” (ibid).
(3) No reasons if subjects did not give any justifications or unclear justifications; here
Frisch remains silent in terms of theoretical implication).
Among the subjects who revealed the framing effect in the Asian Disease, 69% said the two
situations should have been treated the same way (i.e., description invariance should not have
been violated), no one stated objective reasons, 10% stated subjective reasons and 21% stated
no or unclear reasons. Most other (loose) framing problems are around or (sometimes well)
below 50% of those who exhibited framing effects judging the two problems to be the same
after all. Hence, despite description invariance not been universally accepted as normatively
sound in general, including in the Asian Disease, it is judged as more normatively sound in this
problem compared with other framing problems. This conclusion will be qualified and weakened
throughout the rest of this chapter by discussing other results on the Asian Disease, starting with
Frisch’s (1993) second experiment. The latter is the same as the first one, with the exception
that subjects do not have to provide a rationale anymore, but only answer “yes” or “no” to the
following question: “Do you think the difference in these two situations warrants treating them
differently?” (p.410). In this case, there is a general decline in the percentages of those who
exhibited the framing effect and then said the two frames should in fact be treated the same
way, which is now around 50% in the Asian Disease. We shall discuss the implications of these
results at the end of this subsection, but notice one methodological feature of Frisch’s (1993)
experiments: they show that it is possible to empirically investigate decision maker’s equivalence
classes, in a somewhat more refined way than Thaler’s experiments on mental accounting.
Notice also that decision makers’ equivalence classes are influenced by elicitation procedures
(i.e., providing a rationale or not, as already seen in the previous subsection), inducing more
or less match (in experiment 2 or 1, respectively) with decision modeler’s equivalence classes
where description invariance holds. Hidetaka Okder (2012) provides even neater procedures for
inducing equivalences in internal frames. In his second experiment, he presents the Asian Disease
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in joint evaluations with a modification of the decision scenario whereby two committees propose
each one frame (one proposes {A,B} while the other proposes {C,D}). There are four decision
questions: (1) “From committee 1, do you prefer Program A or B?”, (2) “From committee 2, do
you prefer Program C or D?” (3), “Do you think that Program A in committee 1 and Program
C in committee 2 are equivalent?” and (4) “Do you think that Program B in committee 1 and
Program D in committee 2 are equivalent?”. One result is that the modal preference reversal
disappears as 77.1% of decision makers have consistent preferences here (the modal pattern is
slightly for the sure consequence, i.e., [A&C]). However, the great majority of the remaining
22.9% do not think that there is an equivalence between the two frames (i.e., they answered “no”
in both (3) and (4)). Notice that the choices are made in joint evaluations, by contrast with
Frisch’s external frames where only the elicitation of the equivalence classes was made in joint
evaluations. In his third experiments, he presents the Asian Disease in separate evaluations, but
adds six decision questions before the original one asking which of the programs is favored, e.g.,
for the ‘save frame’ {A,D} (the italicized beginning is common to all six questions): “How many
people will be estimated to be (1) saved when no program is adopted? (2) lost when no program
is adopted? (3) saved when Program A is adopted? (4) lost when Program A is adopted?
(5) saved when Program B is adopted? (6) lost when Program B is adopted?”. One result is
that the modal preference reversal disappears even further than in the previous experiment, i.e.,
nearly everybody is consistent (again the modal pattern is slightly for the sure consequence)
and provide answers in (1)-(6) matching with the good answers from the decision modeler’s
perspective, i.e., 0 to (1), 600 to (2), 200 to (3), 400 to (4) etc.
In a way, Okder partly answers a rather straightforward and intuitive criticism of the Asian
Disease, which is made explicitly by Wakker: “The message “200 people will be saved” does not
make clear what will happen to the other 400 people, whether they will die or not”14. But it
would be a mistake to conclude from Okder’s results that when there is no more ambiguity the
Asian Disease is fully explained and there are no paradoxes anymore (because no more preference
reversals and framing effects). This would beg the general methodological implications arising
from the literature on framing effects taken as a whole: how is the remaining information to
14From the comments on Tversky and Kahneman (1981) in Wakker’s annotated bibliography available at
http://people.few.eur.nl/wakker/refs/webrfrncs.docx, last consultation: 21/01/2016.
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described (or ‘framed’) in ordinary language? The following results illustrate how preferences
are not invariant also to the different ways by which descriptions of the consequences in the
Asian Disease can be made more or less complete (all the following illustrations have decision
scenarios and questions identical to the original Asian Disease). For instance, completing the
sure consequences by descriptions from their respective ‘save’ and ‘die’ external frames restores
consistency:15
If Program A′ is adopted, 200 people will be saved and 400 people will not be saved.
If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved,
and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved.
If Program C ′ is adopted, 400 people will die and 200 people will not die.
If Program D is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3
probability that 600 people will die. (Kühberger 1995, exp.1)
But using only these complementary descriptions triggers a framing effect which is the reverse
of the original one:
If Program A′′ is adopted, 400 people will not be saved.
If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved,
and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved.
If Program C′′ is adopted, 200 people will not die.
If Program D is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3
probability that 600 people will die. (Kühberger 1995, exp.2)
Finally, mixing the original descriptions from the save and die frame pushes the modal preference
towards the sure consequence:
If Program A′′′ is adopted, 200 people will be saved and 400 people will die
If Program B′′′ is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved
and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die. (Mellers and Locke 2007, p.362)
Varying equivalences between frames in a strict framing problem is essentially a linguistic exer-
cise. The above variations played on two basic linguistic devices to generate arguably equivalent
statements: presence or absence of negations (‘not’) and opposites (‘saved’/‘die’). Bringing syn-
onyms into the mix (e.g., ‘survived’/‘perished’) let us appreciate how the possibility of different
descriptions for the same consequences and combinations by pairs to constitute Asian Disease
15A similar manipulation tend to cancel intertemporal preference reversals, i.e., making explicit that if the
smaller consequence is chosen now then no consequence will occur in the future and if the later consequence is
chosen then no consequence occurs now (see Magen et al. 2008). I am not aware of similar manipulations for
social preferences.
230
frames may well be infinite. As preferences are already influenced in all directions within the
small subset of this infinity considered so far, it seems rather misplaced to hope for clear-cut
empirical patterns. In my opinion, the only empirical fact worth considering for a formal account
of strict framings of consequences is just the observation made in this paragraph, namely that
all consequences can be described in an infinity of manners by virtue of presence or absence of
negations, opposites, synonyms (which only constitute some of the most basic linguistic devices
to generate different descriptions of the same thing), and that preferences can exhibit all sorts of
patterns within this infinity. Trying to formally capture the details of the underlying extensive
power of ordinary language uses is hard enough for linguists.16
Summing up this subsection, there is a variety of means to construct external frames that
allow the study of how equivalences within internal frames can be empirically checked, induced
and variated. It is quite obvious that the variations cannot be straightforwardly predicted and
explained by prospect theory, or by any existing theory for that matter (for detailed statements
of this claim, see Kühberger 1997; and Takemura 2014, chap. 10). Furthermore, it is not the
case that all violations of description invariance implied by these variations are always deemed
irrational by the decision makers who commit them, though of course some do consider it as
irrational and would reverse their preferences. The main lesson from this subsection is that a
formal account of strict framing phenomena should allow for the logical possibility of representing
the infinity of possible different descriptions of same consequences, without imposing a priori a
peculiar pattern of preferences. It seems wiser to account for such patterns parametrically, but
what features of the decision situation should be parametrized remains unclear so far. The next
subsection along with the next section may suggest some clues to clarify this issue.
4.2.3 Strict framings of attributes and goals within the Asian Disease
An influential typology of framing effects proposed by Irwin Levin, Sandra Schneider and Gary
Gaeth (1998) classifies the Asian Disease as belonging to the “risky choice framing effect” subset
of a “valence framing” set, which contains two other subsets, the so-called “attribute framing”
16Further experiments varying equivalences in the Asian Disease are summarized by Kühberger and Tanner
(2010, Table 2; see also Schulte-Mecklenbeck and Kühberger 2014); Tombu and Mandel (2015) provide other ones
with financial problems, along with further references varying equivalences in strict framings of consequences (see
also Chick et al. 2015).
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Figure 4.2: Decision questions from Levin (1987)
and “goal framing”. The paradigmatic example of an attribute framing is Levin’s (1987) ground
beef example where two frames, a ‘lean frame’ and a ‘fat frame’ are used to describe the same
ground beef as follows (p.85):
[decision scenario:] In each pair we want you to indicate by filling in one of the
squares which item in the pair you are most apt to associate with a purchase of 75%
lean ground beef and the extent to which you associate the purchase with that item
rather than the other item in the pair.
[decision questions:]
See Figure 4.2.
Results: relative tendency toward good-tasting, greasless, high quality and lean
[non-identical decision scenario:] In each pair we want you to indicate by filling in one
of the squares which item in the pair you are most apt to associate with a purchase
of 25% fat ground beef and the extent to which you associate the purchase with that
item rather than the other item in the pair.
[identical decision questions, i.e., identical set of pairs]
Results: relative tendency toward bad-tasting, greasy, low quality and fat
The paradigmatic example of goal framing is Beth Meyerowitz and Shelly Chaiken’s (1987)
Breast Self-Examination [BSE] example where two frames, an ‘inaction leading to bad conse-
quences frame’ and an ‘action leading to good consequences frame’, are used to describe the
results of the same medical researches on BSE (p.504; only the crucial passage of the scenario
is reproduced here):
[decision scenario:] “Research shows that women who do not do BSE have a de-
creased chance of finding a tumor in the early, more treatable stage of the disease”
[decision questions (not reported by the authors) on “9-point scales” attitudes and
intentions, and “5-point scales” behaviors]
Results: relatively strong intentions, attitudes and behaviors toward BSE
[non-identical decision scenario:] “Research shows that women who do BSE have an
increased chance of finding a tumor in the early, more treatable stage of the disease.”
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[identical decision questions]
Results: relatively weak intentions, attitudes and behaviors toward BSE
The main similarity with the Asian Disease is that both attributes and goal framing are strict
framings. Both involve pairs of frames that only differs by their different descriptions of identical
consequences, of the ground beef to be consumed and of the BSE to be performed. Hence they
show further impacts of ordinary language uses on decision makers. One minor dissimilarity is
that the framing effects here are obtained by keeping the objects of choice (i.e., the scales within
the decision questions) identical across frames but changing the descriptions in the decision
scenario (as in the loose isolation effect), while the reverse is the case in the Asian Disease.
A more important dissimilarity from the perspective of economics is that attribute and goal
framings do not involve, at least in the experimental setup from the study referenced above,
choices strictly speaking (though ‘behaviors’ in the BSE refers to whether or not subjects actually
performed it some times after the experiments). But it should not be complicated either to
replace the ratings scale by a willingness to pay question, or a yes/no question (or to introduce
appropriate objects of choice, e.g, the 75% lean framed ground beef versus another type of meat,
and the 25% fat framed ground beef versus the same other type of meat). We would thus have
another strict framing of consequences under risk (BSE) and under certainty (ground beef), and
if the results from the scales carry over, we would thus have strict framing effects.17
By contrast with Levin et al.’s arguments for distinct theoretical treatments of the internal
frames in risky choice, attribute and goal framing effects, I want to point out the empirical
embeddedness of their external frames with its implications for understanding the Asian Disease
from the perspective of this dissertation. Let’s first focus on attribute framings within the
original Asian Disease. The framings of consequences in the Asian Disease are indeed nothing
but framings – as “will be saved” under one frame or “will die” under another – of the attributes
of the set 600 people and its subsets including the empty set . Within the objects of choice,
there are six such framings of attributes, i.e., three by frames: (1) the subset 200 people will be
saved in A, (2) the subset 400 people will die in C, the set 600 people (3) will be saved in B
or (4) will die in D and the empty set zero people in (5) will be saved in B or will die in D.
17See Kreiner and Gamliel (2016) and the references therein for manipulations varying equivalences in attribute
framings. Unsurprisingly, presenting a complete and mix description of the attribute reduces the framing effect.
I am not aware of similar manipulations in goal framings.
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Within the decision scenario, there is one such framing of attributes, namely the set 600 people is
“expected to [be] kill[ed]”, i.e., will die. Observing that framings of attributes loom large in the
Asian Disease matters especially because of a result established within researches on attribute
framings, namely that the effect is not only on the ratings of the objects of choice but also on
the actual experience of its consumption. The classical demonstration of this is from Levin and
Gaeth (1988). They extended the above results on ground beef in two further experimental
conditions: one where subjects actually consumed 75% lean-25% fat ground beef before the
ratings, and another one where they did so after the ratings. That the framing effects, though
slightly reduced, still held strongly suggests that different descriptions of the same ground beef
influence the utility derived from its experienced taste. Intuitively, it can be argued that this is
not a very surprising result. Think of fancy restaurants and customers spending so much efforts
and money to respectively make and consume well presented food, with sometimes very weird
and long descriptions on the menus.18
Such reasoning in terms of utility can be translated in terms of disutility in the Asian Disease.
The negative mental experience associated with the choice of a program that will lead to the
death of some people will be smaller when these deaths are left implicit than when they are
made explicit in the descriptions of the programs. If you had to choose just between A and
C, i.e., just between two descriptions of the same consequences, it is not totally inconceivable
that the disutility derived from C would be larger than the disutility derived from A. This
observation is especially relevant regarding the key role of the sure consequences in the Asian
Disease as discussed in the previous, the framing of which has the exact same structure as
traditional framings of attributes (i.e., left the proportion of the opposite attribute implicit).
There is some indirect evidence for this reasoning coming fromMarc van Buiten and Keren (2009,
experiment 3). They presented the two frames of the Asian Disease in a joint evaluation mode
with the equivalence between frame imposed explicitly by both an arithmetical justification and
an explanation that the two programs A (i.e., A and C of the original version) and two programs
B (i.e., B and C of the original version) were redescriptions of the same programs. Since the
18For further non-conventional evidence supporting this intuitive argument, see the story that made
the news in October 2014 about McDonald’s food being untruthfully presented as ‘organic food’ to
food experts who for tests, most of whom declared that it tasted way better than McDonald’s,
e.g., http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2804875/Dutch-pranksters-fool-food-experts-organic-convention-
believing-MCDONALD-S-actually-new-healthy-dish.html, last consulted 23/01/2016.
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four descriptions were part of the decision scenario, the objects of choice were just A and B
without descriptions. The results are an equal distribution of preferences between A and B, but
to the question “which formulation do you consider most convincing as a reason for your choice?”
there is a very strong modal influence of the ‘save frame’, i.e., regardless of the actual choice for
A or B. Much more direct evidence for the reasoning presented above comes from Kühberger
and Patricia Gradl’s (2013, experiments 3 and 4). Subjects were presented the Asian Disease in
a joint evaluation, and had to rate all four programs on three scales: (1) likeliness to choose, (2)
believed efficacy and (3) emotional impact. The modal preferences from (1) are A  B ∼ D  C,
which highly correlate with the efficacy ratings from (2), both of which weakly correlate with
the emotional ratings from (3) in the overall, though the correlation is much stronger when
only the emotional ratings for the sure consequences are considered (experiment 3). The modal
preferences A  B ∼ D  C is also found in their last experiments where subjects had to rank
directly (i.e., no ratings anymore) the four programs (experiment 4).19
We can now turn to the framings of goal within the Asian Disease, which is a slightly trickier
issue. Within the decision scenario, the decision modeler expresses his goal to “combat the
disease”. That is, the goal is to do something, which is easily shared by the decision maker,
by contrast with not doing anything and letting 600 people die. Within the decision question,
the decision modeler tries to elicit the decision maker’s goal. That is, the latter has to express
what he will do (choose) with respect to what he “favor[s]” (prefers), by contrast with either
the opportunity of not choosing anything or the opportunity of expressing his goal with respect
to what he disprefers by selecting the program he does not choose which is also known to create
framing effects (Shafir 1993). Hence, framings of goals within the decision scenario and decision
question are quite obvious and identical across frames. Whether there are framings of goal
within the objects of choice could be a controversial issue. Under one interpretation there are
no framings of goals, period. This is the most likely to correspond to the decision modeler’s
interpretation if he is an experimenter working in decision theory or behavioral decision theory
19Note that, this partly undermines Kahneman’s (2011) interpretation – through De Martino’s (2006) neuro-
biological results – of the Asian Disease framing effect as underlying emotional processes evoked by the wording
of the problem, because it is not clear why these emotions should be evoked only from the words of the sure
consequence but not from the exact same words in the probabilistic ones. For further neurobiological results
on strict framings of consequences undermining Kahneman’s (2011) interpretation in this direction, see Yu and
Zhang (2014, esp. p.8). Also, for a formally articulated philosophical explanation of Kühberger and Gradl’s
results, see Geurts (2013).
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where individual decisions are conceived as taking place between a purposeful decision maker and
the purposeless ‘Nature’. Under a second (opposite) interpretation, there are framings of goals
because the ones in the decision scenario and question somewhat ‘leak in’ the objects of choice.
With respect to the decision modeler’s goal “to combat the disease”, that people are “saved”
(Program A) is congruent with that goal, while that they “die” (in Program C) is incongruent.
Restricting our attention to A and C, which is justifiable from the key role they play in the
framing effect as discussed in the previous section, the difference across frames can be interpreted
as an asymmetry of congruence with respect to the decision modeler’s goal. Hence this second
interpretation provides further argument against the equivalence of frames in strict framings.
Under a third and fourth (in-between) interpretations, there are either neutral framings of goal
(third interpretation) or random framings of goals (fourth interpretation) because of the mix in
the semantics of the probabilistic programs arising from the occurrence and non-occurrence of
negations in “nobody” and “no people”. The set of work discussed in the next section provides
arguments to characterize the conditions under which the second interpretation is more likely
to be true.
Summing up this subsection, considering the embeddedness of risky choice, attribute and
goal framings, along with further results established in the respective literatures, suggests two
reasons why the two frames of the original Asian Disease would not be considered as equivalent.
On the one hand, they might not be equivalent because parts of the utility derived during the
experience or realization of the consequences come from the descriptions of their attributes. On
the other hand, they might not be equivalent because of an asymmetry between the expression of
the decision modeler’s goal to save people (which is arguably easily shared by the decision maker)
and the expression of the decision maker’s goal about how he actually intends to implement it
with respect to his preferences.
Conclusion
This section summarized a set of arguments based on experimental results for the non-systematic
imposition of description invariance in models of individual behaviors, for both positive and nor-
mative reasons. With respect to the conclusion of the previous section, it should be noted, from
an historical perspective, that the independence axiom and the axiom of description invariance
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were both initially hidden in the formalism of the standard model. Both were made concep-
tually and formally explicit only ex post (see Malinvaud 1952; and Fishburn and Wakker 1995
on the independence axiom). This calls for one further comment on the work of Frisch (1993).
Her experiments were explicitly inspired by the ones pioneered by MacCrimmon discussed in
chapter 2 that led to theoretical developments weakening the axiom of independence. Her ex-
periments were also inspired by Levin and Gaeth’s (1988) results on the increased experienced
utility from descriptions along with Kahneman and Tversky’s comments on the rationality and
irrationality of framing effects mentioned in the previous section. Frisch argued that, against
this background, her results warranted a weakening of the axiom of description invariance just
as the independence axiom had been weakened. The arguments made in this section and in the
next one are meant to motivate this project further, at least for strict framing phenomena.20
4.3 The communicative structure of external and internal frames
There is a growing trend in Psychology that studies strict framing phenomena through the
communicative interaction between the decision modeler and the decision maker, though they
are respectively called the speaker and the listener or hearer. For the sake of giving a broadly
coherent account of framing phenomena in this chapter, we shall discuss this trend in a way
that develops the ‘goal leaking’ interpretation suggested at the end of the previous section. We
shall see how the decision modeler’s choice of one description over another may leak his goal
(4.3.1). Then, how this leaking can be understood more precisely by delving into the descriptive
structure of a consequence (4.3.2). And finally how the philosophical and linguistic backgrounds
of these contributions are consistent with both the one from this dissertation in terms of speech
act theory (cf. chapter 1) and decision theory in economics (4.3.3).21
20Though Frisch’s position was rather uncommon at the time (compare to now, see the next section), an even
earlier similar position was held by philosopher MacLean (1985).
21Most of contributors to this trend are reunited in Perspectives on Framing (Keren 2011b). Besides them,
two prominent contributors on framing in Psychology, David Mandel and Kühberger, have lately expressed strong
sympathy with this trend, see Mandel and Vartanian (2012), Mandel (2014; 2015), Tombu and Mandel (2015),
Kühberger and Tanner (2010), Kühberger and Gradl (2013).
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4.3.1 Goal leaking through the choice of a description
A crucial motivator of the aforementioned trend is the information leaking account of framing
(and other) phenomena advanced by Craig McKenzie with various co-authors (especially Shlomi
Sher). The following is a vivid illustration of an experimental demonstration of how the mere
choice of one description over another leaks choice-relevant information for the decision maker
– here the information is about a reference point and the demonstration works by symmetrical
pairs of experiments with hypothetical scenarios (McKenzie and Nelson 2003, experiments 1
and 3). In the first experiment, subjects have a clear reference point: they are asked to imagine
being in front of a 4-ounce cup which is either full in one frame, or empty in the other frame.
They briefly leave the room and, unobserved by them, some changes occur to the contents of the
glass: when they come back there is, irrespective of the frame, water at the 2 ounces level. In
the other experiment, subjects are told a similar story about Mary: she is in front of a glass,
the contents of which is unknown to the subjects. Mary briefly leaves the room, and, seeing a
change in the contents of the glass when she is back, says either “The glass is half full” in one
frame or “The glass is half empty” in the other frame. The decision questions are symmetrical.
In the first experiment, subjects have to choose the most natural of two descriptions: “The glass
is half full” or “The glass is half empty”. And in the second experiment, they have to infer the
most likely of two states: “The glass was full before its contents changed” or “The glass was
empty before its contents changed”. There is the following symmetrical framing effects in both
experiments. The modal preference of those starting with an empty cup is for the consequence
of the changes described as a half-full cup (and vice-versa for those starting with a full cup).
Hence different initial reference points induced different descriptions of the same consequence.
And symmetrically, different descriptions of the same consequence by Mary induced different
inferences about her initial reference point because those to whom she said the glass is half-
empty made the modal inference that the glass was full. Taken together, these results suggest
that, by virtue of linguistic regularities underlying a shared language, one’s choice of description
can leak information – here about the initial reference point – that goes beyond the description
itself, and this information can be rationally inferred by the one to whom the description is
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made.22
Two features of the previous experiments are worth noting. First, the framing effects are
loose ones and the inference is precisely about what makes the two situations non-identical, i.e.,
a glass that is initially full or empty, by contrast with conventional uses of ‘the glass half-full or
half-empty’ to express difference of perspectives on the same situation. Secondly, the inference
is about states of affairs in the world, and not about, though drawn from, what someone said
and her potentially related beliefs, preferences or other mental states, e.g., the contrast between
optimism and pessimism conventionally expressed by ‘the glass half-full or half-empty’ is not
relevant here (at least not ‘directly’ relevant). Both features are different in Sher and McKenzie’s
(2008, pp.89-90) experimental investigation of the Asian Disease. They used their “embedded
creativity” experimental design (2006), where subjects have to construct (i.e., ‘create’) a frame
or a description, rather than choosing one that is fully already made (as were the descriptions in
the previous paragraph). After subjects are instructed about the structure of the two programs
in the Asian Disease, and have expressed their own preferences for either one of the two programs
(in a mixed frame, i.e., both ‘saved’ and ‘die’ within one description; personal communication
with Sher), its embedded creativity version runs as follow (2008, p.90):
“Imagine that your job is to describe the situation [...] to a committee who will then
decide which program, A or B, to use. Please complete the sentences below as if you
were describing the programs to the committee”
The sentences to be completed are reproduced in Figure 4.3.
The main results, the preliminary nature of which is emphasized by Sher and McKenzie
(2008), are: (1) among those who prefer the probabilistic program there is roughly an equal
distribution between framing the sure one as ‘200 saved’ and as ‘400 die’, (2) regardless of prior
preference there is a modal framing of the probabilistic program as ‘1/3 of 600 saved and 2/3
of 600 die’, and (3) among those who prefer the sure one there is a strong modal framing of
the sure one as ‘200 saved’. As ‘200 saved’ corresponds to the modal preference of decision
22Sher and McKenzie (2006) replicated McKenzie and Nelson’s (2003) results with non-hypothetical decision
scenarios, e.g., with tasks involving real glasses of water. It should also be noted that McKenzie and Nelson’s
(2003) results and theoretical interpretations are more complex than discussed in this paragraph. Besides in-
cluding other quantities (e.g., 1/4 empty 3/4 full), they hypothesized and observe a tendency to describe a
consequence by focusing on what has increased with respect to the initial reference point. As will be argued
later, this is the kind of empirical subtleties that formal account of framing effect in economics should allow for,
without systematically implying it, at least at the axiomatic level (i.e., not parametrically in a given model).
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Figure 4.3: Sher and McKenzie’s (2008) embedded creativity for the Asian Disease
makers in the original version and in general (cf. previous section), (3) suggests one non-trivial
informational leaking in the Asian Disease, namely about the decision modeler’s own preferences
leaked through the saved framing of the sure program.
Sher and McKenzie (2008) argue that if this informational leak is interpreted by the decision
maker as an implicit recommendation, then the original preference reversal is not necessarily
irrational. The conditions under which this argument is most likely to hold, at least in the Asian
Disease, have been investigated by van Buiten and Keren (2009, experiments 1 and 2). These
conditions bear on what they argue is a joint/separate evaluation modes asymmetry between
decision modeler and the decision maker. While the former usually chooses an external frame in
a joint evaluation mode (i.e., {{A,B}, {C,D}}), the latter’s internal frame is usually constructed
from the external frame presented by the decision modeler in a separate evaluation mode (i.e.,
either {A,B} or {C,D}). The idea is that there is information leakage when the decision modeler
puts himself into the decision maker’s shoes when choosing the external frame. This reasoning
is experimentally translated by instructing subjects to promote one of the two programs and
that they have to choose one of the two original frames in which the decision maker will then
make his choice. When the two frames are presented in a joint evaluation mode, the modal
choice is the ‘save frame’ regardless of the program that should be recommended (experiment
1). But when the two frames are presented in a separate evaluation mode, then the modal
choices are the ‘save frame’ for those who have to promote the sure program and the ‘die frame’
for those who have to promote the probabilistic program (experiment 2). These results suggest
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the following refinement to Sher and McKenzie’s (2008): information leaking about the decision
modeler’s preference for the sure program is likely to be non-intentional if the latter constructed
the external frame without putting himself into the shoes of the decision maker, i.e., in a
separate evaluation mode where the impact of linguistic regularities underlying a shared language
becomes more salient. When decision modeler are in the latter mode of evaluation, intentional
information leakage about all programs is more likely, though not necessarily about the decision
modeler’s preferences and not necessarily designed to be inferred by the decision maker, e.g.,
about a recommendation imposed to the decision modeler (against his own preference or not)
and designed to influence decision makers (against their own preferences, e.g., manipulation, or
not, e.g., benevolent nudging).23
Arguably, the account of the strict framing of consequences in the Asian Disease given so far
in this subsection is in line with the interpretation from the previous section whereby decision
modeler’s goal can leak in the objects of choice through the description of consequences. To
close this subsection, I propose to speculate on three possible and non-mutually exclusive ways
to refine this interpretation, all inspired from other areas of research on strict framing effects.
Refinements from the literature on goal framing from Psychology are less straightforward
than one would thought because of a lack of investigation of the communicative structure of
choices in the same fashion as the contributions discussed in this subsection (see Rothman and
Updegraff 2011). The notion of goal in this literature has been mostly developed by applying the
so-called self-regulatory focus framework on decision makers’ internal frames (see Higgins 2012).
Roughly, in the latter, (1) the construction of goals, (2) choices to attain them and (3) related
experiences of consequences within internal frames are promotion focus when guided by the ideal
of getting the optimal positive consequences and prevention focus when guided by the obligation
of avoiding the maximal negative consequences. Kühberger and Christian Weiner (2012) have
investigated strict framings of consequences in a monetary version of the Asian Disease under
this framework. Their main results are that the correlation between kinds of regulatory focus
23Two points are worth mentioning. First, McKenzie et al. (2006) discuss finer explanations and results on
implicit recommendation, but in the domain of default options (e.g., about how the choice of a default option can
leak, in a non-mutually exclusive fashion, information about the decision modeler’s own preferences, or beliefs
about what people ought to do, or beliefs about what people would like to do; and how these information are
rationally inferred or not). Second, van Buiten and Keren (2009, experiment 1) hypothesized and observed a
positivity bias documented elsewhere in Psychology, explaining the tendency to select the positive frame in joint
evaluation mode irrespective of the imposed program to be promoted. Again, a formal account of framing effect
in economics should, at the axiomatic level, allow for this kind of empirical regularities without implying them.
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and gain-loss frames is at best very weak, and that, irrespective of frames, clearly prevention
focused decision makers strongly tend to choose the sure program and clearly promotion focused
decision makers strongly tend to choose the risky program. Hence there is a strong effect of the
congruence of decision makers’ goals with consequences per se but not with their framings. As
Kühberger and Weiner emphasize, their results open a lot of questions, to which we can add two
further sets of questions motivated by the previous section. The first set concerns the decision
makers’ goals. Their results were obtain in between-subjects design. If regulation focus has
strong effects independently of framing then framing effects should disappear in within subject-
subjects design, which is usually not the case. How can that be? Furthermore, their results
were obtained in the classic version of the framing of consequences (e.g., ‘€200 will be saved’
versus ‘€400 will be lost’). Would they hold in the variety of other framings were framing effects
usually disappear or reverse? The second set concerns the decision modelers’ goals. As argued
in the previous section, the implicit goals within the descriptions of the consequences stem
from an interplay with the description of the decision scenario and question. It seems possible
to manipulate the regulatory focus of the decision modeler by making it more explicit. For
instance, compared with the original consequences, the original “is expected to kill 600 people”
and “to combat the disease” in the decision scenario seem either without clear regulatory foci or
mildy prevention focus. ‘600 people are expected not to live because of an unusual Asian Disease’
and ‘to save these people’ would seem more clearly promotion focus. Would such manipulation
trigger an effect of congruence between decision makers’ and decision modeler’s goals?24
Further refinements can be made from the literature on so-called ‘direction of comparison
effects’. Classic direction of comparison effects involve contradictory answers to pairs of questions
such as ‘How similar is China to North Korea?/How similar is North Korea to China’ or ‘Does
traffic contributes more to air pollution than industry?/Does industry contributes more to air
pollution than traffic?’. As discussed by Michaela Wänke and Leonie Reutner (2011), direction
of comparison are quite robust and the main feature that matters is not the order of words per
se but which entity is put as the subject (to be evaluated) and which is put as the referent
24Two points are worth mentioning. First, the prevention/promotion focus distinction seems to be currently
under debate regarding its status as an interindividual difference grounded in the decision makers which would
be ‘chronically’ of either kinds or in decision situations which would contingently ‘induce’ either kinds. Second,
Kühberger and Weiner measured types of self-regulatory foci either by verbal protocols analysis of decision makers
instructed to think aloud when making their choices (experiment 1) or by questionnaires (experiment 2).
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(providing the norm of evaluation). For instance, in ‘How similar China is to North Korea?’,
China is the subject and North Korea the reference, hence diplomatic issues with the United
States or nuclear issues are more likely to come up as an evaluative dimension than with the
reversed question. Wänke and Reutner (2011, p.187) argue that exactly what it means to be
the subject in a sentence needs to be investigated to fully understand direction of comparison
effects. On their account, subjects “indicate the narrative theme or topic”, providing cues for
the reader or listener about the “conversational goal”, and allowing them to infer what is of
interest to the speaker in order to make their eventual answer to his eventual question relevant
to him (ibid). Translated to the Asian Disease, it suggests that some effects may be observed
if the conversational goal imposed by the decision modeler would change by taking the people
at stakes as subjects and the disease and programs as referent, e.g., ‘600 people are expected to
die from an unusual Asian Disease...’, ‘200 people will be saved by implementing Program A’.
As far as I know, it is exactly the reverse in virtually all versions of the Asian Disease used in
the literature.
Finally, refinements could be made from the so-called ‘constructive processing’ perspective
on framing effects. The constructive processing perspective on framing effects stems from the
very elegant results on the Asian Disease obtained by Herbert Bless, Tilmann Betsch and Axel
Franzen (1998). The latter simply added a simple “context cues” (ibid) to the original Asian
Disease: in one condition ‘statistical research’ was printed in a corner of the page on which
subject responded to one frame, and ‘medical research’ was printed in the condition. There
was still a framing effect with the medical cue but it disappeared with the statistical cue. As
discussed by Eric Igou (2011), this result is quite robust and has been interpreted in terms of
the need for the decision maker to infer further information than the one given in the medical
(but not statistical) problem. On his account, these further inferences are made through a
constructive processes whereby frames become “affective cues” (p.222) guiding the construction
of the decision maker’s goal. Hence the interaction between decision modelers’ and decision
makers’ goals seem highly moderated by the interaction between the contextual cues provided
by the former, inducing the frames to be affective cues for the latter.
I would like to sum up this subsection under the analysis of Sher and McKenzie (2006) on
attribute framing. The results discussed in this subsection (and to a lesser extent in the previ-
243
ous section) show that description invariance, as usually conceived between pairs of logically or
mathematically equivalent problems, does not necessarily imply information invariance, espe-
cially the invariance of choice-relevant information. While two descriptions may indeed provide
equivalent choice-relevant information, the choice of one of these description over the other by
the decision modeler is itself a relevant information for the decision maker’s choice. The decision
modeler’s choice of description leaks information that makes the informational content of two
descriptions of the same consequence non-equivalent for the decision maker. What exactly is
this leaked information about seems a highly situation-dependent matter, contingent upon sub-
tle details of the linguistic interaction between the decision modeler and the decision maker. If
“psychologically salient properties recruit congruent linguistic terms”, then there is a potential
systematicity in the decision modeler’s goal to be signaled (or ‘cued’) by his choice of descrip-
tion, hence informational leaking cannot be dismissed as random noise (Sher and McKenzie
2006, p.488). If the decision maker has a “sensitivity to subtle linguistic cues” (ibid, p.488),
then he absorbs this information. Exactly how remains unclear. It does not seem to be a
classic inductive inference because creativity and imagination (possibly through narrativity) are
involved in the process of going beyond literal information. But at the same time it seems to be
an unconscious process, “[o]therwise, the non-equivalence of attribute frames would have been
self-evident prior to our analysis, and no disturbing conclusions about human rationality would
have been drawn from attribute framing effects” (p.489). Following Sher and McKenzie (2006,
pp.491), it can be argued that “[strict] framing effects are best understood, not as paradoxes of
rationality, but as paradoxes of measurement”: “framing effects without information equivalence
raise the question of whether the analysis of preferences is being undertaken at sufficiently high
resolution” (p.492). From the perspective of giving a formal account of framing phenomena in
economics, two levels can be distinguished. At the axiomatic level, it seems reasonable only to
increase the resolution of the analysis a little bit, just to take account of the fact that different
descriptions of the same consequence can have different informational contents. This is the
level at which the formal contribution in the next chapter will be situated. At the modeling
level, getting acquainted further down in the linguistic dimension of informational leakage may
be useful to make quantitative predictions. The next subsection discusses a set of potential
inspiration for this project, along with its potential limits.
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4.3.2 Goal leaking within the minimal descriptive structure of a
consequence
If going from consequences to their different descriptions increases the resolution of analysis,
then going from these descriptions to their “independently moving parts” (Sher and McKenzie
2011, p.45) would further increase the resolution of analysis. It can be argued that the minimal
descriptive structure of a consequence is constituted by four (for choices under certainty) or five
(for choices under risk) types of such independently moving parts, expressing respectively:
(1) a quantity, e.g., “200”, “400”;
(2) what is being quantified, e.g., “people”;
(3) an attribute of what is being quantified, e.g., “saved”, “die”;
(4) the presence or absence of negation, which, at least in the Asian Disease, are used
to negate the attribute, e.g., “not be saved”, “not die”, or not used to express it,
e.g., “be saved”, “die”;
(5) the probability of occurrence of one combination of (1)-(4), e.g., “1/3 probability
that”, “2/3 probability that”.
Different descriptions of a same consequence can be generated by appropriate combinations
of one instance from each of the first four types, including one from the last type for conse-
quences under risk. Insights about the framings of each of these types have been gathered by
psychologists over the years, most of whom are contributors to Perspectives on Framing (Keren
2011b).
Denis Hilton (2011) provides the most systematic discussion of these insights by focusing on
the pervasive polarity that underlies the uses of logical expressions in ordinary language. Two
types of such logical expressions studied by psychologists are the so-called ‘natural language
quantifiers’, i.e., the ordinary language translation of numerical information, about either (1) or
(5). To illustrate with (1), consider the contrast between ‘a few people will be saved’ and ‘few
people will be saved’. For a given situation, even if ‘a few’ and ‘few’ denote the same quantity,
the connotations they convey about that quantity is nevertheless usually of opposite polarity.
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In the Asian Disease situation, ‘a few people will be saved’ is positively connoted by contrast
with ‘few people will be saved’ which is negatively connoted. But vice-versa in another situation
where the goal would be to kill as much people as possible through the same Asian Disease:
‘few people will be saved’ would be positively connoted and ‘a few people will be saved’ would
be negatively connoted. To illustrate with (5), the same reasoning and inversion would occur
in the contrast between ‘it is possible that everybody will be saved’ and ‘it is uncertain that
everybody will be saved’ (i.e., ‘possible’ and ‘uncertain’ can denote the same probability but
have an opposite polarity of connotation). Though these considerations do not bear directly on
the Asian Disease because of its use of numerical information (e.g., ‘200’, ‘1/3’), the underlying
regularities in everyday language uses have indirect implications.25
Quite intuitively, works on the effects of natural language quantifiers on decision makers
suggest that positive polarity tends to trigger reasons for the proposition expressed (e.g., a
program to combat or instill a disease) while negative polarity tends to trigger reasons against the
proposition expressed (see Moxey 2011; Teigen 2011). Hilton (2011) argues that because of the
pervasive polarity of logical expressions in ordinary language uses, the decision modeler cannot
be neutral in communicating such propositions. That is, regardless of issues of intentionality,
consciousness, persuasiveness and the like, information leakage is unavoidable because of this
pervasive polarity. Indeed, polarity is also pervasive in combinations of (3) and (4). Linda
Moxey (2011, pp.131-133) argues that the polarity underlying (3) in the Asian Disease, i.e.,
‘saved’ versus ‘die’, can be explained straightforwardly through the extension of the results on
natural language quantifiers. The positive polarity of ‘saved’ generates reasons for the sure
program, the negative polarity of ‘die’ generates reason against the sure program. This further
extends by inversion to (4): the negative polarity of ‘not be saved’ and the positive polarity
of ‘not die’ respectively generate reasons against and for the sure program. This provides
a straightforward explanation to the variations on framings presented in the previous section
(from Kühberger 1995), including the absence of framing effects when both polarities are present
within ‘200 will be saved and 400 people will not be saved’ and ‘400 people will die and 200
people will not die’. Notice, however, that this does not explain the return of a modal preference
25Using numerical expressions may be slightly more neutral than using natural language quantifiers (as argued
for instance by Keren 2012).
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for the sure program when both polarities are present within ‘200 people will be saved and 400
people will die’ (from Mellers and Locke 2007, p.362).
Indeed, as discussed by Yaacov Schul (2011) negations play a very tricky role in everyday
uses of ordinary language, which is far more complex than just ‘meaning the opposite’. Schul
distinguishes bipolar attributes such as ‘saved’ and ‘die’, the negations of which brings the
opposite to mind, i.e.., ‘not saved’ brings ‘die’ to mind and ‘not die’ brings ‘saved’ to mind,
from unipolar attributes such as ‘romantic’ which does not have a clear opposite which can be
brought to mind by ‘not romantic’. There is an intimate relation between (3) and (4) within the
minimal descriptive structure of a consequence because strict framing phenomena work by pairs
of decision problems involving bipolar attributes. Hence, the question is: what lies behind the
choice of describing an attribute as the opposite of a negation (e.g., ‘die’ instead of ‘not saved’,
‘saved’ instead of ‘not die’) versus as the negation itself (e.g., ‘not saved’ instead of ‘die’, ‘not die’
instead of ‘saved’)? One possibility is the communication of a norm or deviation from a norm
through what linguists and psycholinguists called markedness. Pairs of opposite terms such as
bipolar attributes usually carry a contrast between one of the two terms being the unmarked
in expressing “the usual, the normal, the common, and the neutral or less specific” (p.165) by
contrast with the marked one expressing something more peculiar, less usual etc. Suppose for a
moment that ‘die’ is the marked term and ‘saved’ the unmarked one in the ‘die’/‘saved’ pair, in
line with studies on Western societies showing that “markedness is associated with evaluative
negativity” (p.166). This asymmetry in (3) has the following implication in (4): using ‘not
saved’ signals nothing special because using ‘die’ would have signaled something unusual, and
conversely, using ‘not die’ signals something specific because using ‘saved’ would have signaled
nothing special.
The relation of markedness can be highly situation-dependent, and expectations and goals
are crucial factors of this situation-dependency (Schul 2011, p.170). To illustrate in the Asian
Disease, the expectations and goals set up in the decision scenario implies a conflict in terms
of markedness in the description of the consequences. Indeed, 600 people expected to be killed
makes ‘die’ unmarked and ‘saved’ marked contra the general tendency in Western societies,
while the goal to save people implies the reverse. If the expectation and/or the goal reverse, i.e.,
people are expected to survive and/or the goal is to kill them, the previous conflict in markedness
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could either resolve (both expectations and goal in line with the general tendency) or its sources
would reverse (expectation in line with the tendency but goals against it). Hence markedness
relations seems difficult to be used for fine grained analyses of the minimal descriptive structure
of a consequence, notably because the communication of social norms through linguistic terms
is highly situation-dependent, i.e., is not intrinsic to the descriptions of the consequences.
Notice also the following asymmetry in the uses of negations within the Asian Disease. While
‘not’ negates the attribute of what is quantified in the sure program, another form of negation
negates what is being quantified in the descriptions of the two consequences within all the
versions of the Asian Disease (except the mixed one of Mellers and Locke), i.e., ‘no people will
be saved’ and ‘nobody will die’. Given the tricky role of negation in human communication (see
the next subsection’s references), removing this asymmetry, e.g., by using ‘600 people will not
be saved’ and ‘600 people will not die’, could yield surprising experimental results.
Another form of polarity has been argued to be pervasive in the uses of numerical expression
because of the “scalar properties of the number system”, that is, as Karl Halvor Teigen (2011)
puts it, “smaller values [e.g., 200 people saved] are included in larger ones [e.g., 600 people
saved], but not vice versa” (p.212 and p.202). This property has been shown to have side effects
on the way people make predictions or evaluate the predictions made by others (see Teigen
2011). Predictions said to be ‘exact’ are, on the one hand, not often made by decision makers,
and, on the other hand, when made by the decision modeler, more often evaluated as lower-
bounded (e.g., ‘at least...’) than as upper-bounded (e.g., ‘at most...’) by decision makers. Notice
that this should not have implications in the Asian Disease because the decision scenario asks
subjects to “[a]ssume that the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the programs are
as follows [...]” (Tversky and Kahneman 1981, p.453, my emphasis). Teigen (2011) argues from
experiments on monetary versions of the Asian Disease that this assumption does not hold.
Though Teigen’s (2011) subjects had to estimate predictions, not to make choices, David
Mandel (2014) used an equivalent to the Asian Disease strict framing problems with lives where
subjects both estimated predictions and made choices. He found that when the exactness is left
implicit in the consequences (i.e., explicited only in the decision scenario), subjects indeed tend
to interpret the consequences as lower bounded, and hence, he argues, rationally reverse their
preferences across frames; when this lower boundedness is made explicit in the descriptions of
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the consequences (‘at least 200 people will be saved’, ‘at least 400 people will die’), which are
thus different descriptions of different consequences, the original framing effect is maintained;
but it disappears when the exactness is made explicit in the descriptions of the consequences
(e.g., ‘exactly 200 people will be saved’). Contradicting this latter result, Christina Chick,
Valerie Reyna and Jonathan Corbin (2015) found that the original framing effects remained by
using the exact same procedure (i.e., ‘exactly’ in the description of the consequences) along with
others (in other experiments) ensuring that subjects were interpreting all numerical information
as exact (even if not explicitly stated in the descriptions of the consequences). A charitable
interpretation of these contradictory results could be made by taking the experimenters’ goals
into account. Indeed, Mandel’s goal was to argue against irrationality claims made about the
effects in strict framing experiments, while Chick et al.’s was to maintain such a claim against
Mandel’s criticism. But this charitable interpretation is likely to be controversial. Indeed, it is
akin to an experimenter effect (with which both parties would disagree), pointing to a very high
level of situation-dependency in the leaking of goal discussed so far.26
Summing up this subsection, fined grained (i.e., high resolution) analyses of the minimal de-
scriptive structure of consequences point to an extreme form of situation-dependency regarding
their implications for framing effects. There is a pervasive polarity underlying each of the inde-
pendently moving parts with interactions between themselves and with the goals, expectations
and the like from the decision scenario. It can be argued that the emphasis on positive/negative
polarities, along with the signal of a norm and deviations from it, are both conceptually well
in line with the theoretical structure of prospect theory. An in-depth analysis of the commu-
nicative structure of a given decision situation seems necessary to pin-down the direction of
polarity at play in a given choice. The latter cannot be simply read off from the description of
a given consequence. The psychologists discussed in this subsection (and to a lesser extent in
the previous one) provide conceptual and methodological tools for an eventual formal modeling
in economics.27
26The controversy started from a failure to replicate Mandel’s result by psychologists Leif Nelson, Joe
Simmons and Uri Simonsohn (see the article on their scientific blog http://datacolada.org/2013/12/19/11-
exactly-the-most-famous-framing-effect-is-robust-to-precise-wording/ and Mandel’s response on his own blog
https://sites.google.com/site/themandelian/data-colada; both last consulted 13/02/2016).
27Two remarks are worth making. Firstly, we have not discussed the role of (2) (i.e., what is being quantified,
e.g., “people”) in the minimal descriptive structure because, on the one hand, psychologists have not investigated
it in the sense of, e.g., replacing ‘people’ by ‘corpses’, and on the other hand (and as already discussed), the
structure of strict framing effects is robust to whether lives or money is at stake. Secondly, since we focus on
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The next subsection discusses the theoretical background from linguistic and the philosophy
of language that is shared by the psychologists discussed in this subsection in order to put
their contributions in perspective with the communicative structure of choices developed in this
dissertation.
4.3.3 Conversational versus communicative structure of choices
With the exception of Chick et al. (2015), one common characteristic of the psychologists
discussed in the previous subsection is their (weak or strong) inspirations from the so-called
logic of conversation formalized by philosopher Paul Grice, along with its developments in
theoretical linguistics within the subfield of pragmatics by the neo-Griceans, especially Laurence
Horn. The goal of discussing the shared background from linguistics and philosophy of language
of these psychologists is twofold. On the one hand, it allows to illustrate how the standard
interpretation of the Asian Disease depends not only on a relation of logical equivalence but
also on a relation of conversational equivalence. On the other, it also allows to make more
precise the implications of the theory of speech act from Searle that was constitutive of the
development of the communicative structure of choices in this dissertation (cf. chapter 1).
Originally, Grice’s (1975) logic of conversation is formalized by one principle and a set of
maxims and supermaxims. The principle is one stating the cooperative nature of daily conver-
sation, i.e., the existence of a goal shared by the participants to a given conversation, which
is not necessarily fixed and may be only about the direction of the linguistic exchange. If the
cooperative principle is accepted by the participants of a conversation, then a set of maxims and
supermaxims can be used, by the speaker to mean more than he says (or writes) – performing
conversational implicatures –, and by the hearer to infer information beyond what is said (or
written), i.e., making conversational inferences about what is meant. Table 4.1 summarizes
Grice’s system (1975, pp.45-6).
The implications of this system for the analysis of the Asian Disease can be illustrated by
focusing on the save frame of the original problem. When presenting the problem, the decision
external frames and the decision modeler, we kept discussions of the decision maker’s internal frame at minimum.
It shall nevertheless be remarked that a consensus seems to emerge on the main cognitive processes explaining
framing effects from a purely internal frame perspective being the ones underlying the decision maker’s attention
(see e.g., Keren 2012; Moxey 2011; Teigen 2011).
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Cooperative principle
“Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the
accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged”
Regarding “the quantity of
information to be provided”, the
Maxims of Quantity are:
“1. Make your contribution as
informative as is required [...].
2. Do not make your
contribution more informative
than is required.”
Under the supermaxim “Try
to make your contribution
one that is true”, the
Maxims of Quality are:
“1. Do not say what you
believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which
you lack adequate evidence.”
Regarding
what is said
but not how it
is said,
“Be relevant”
is the single
Maxim of
Relation
Under the supermaxim “Be
perspicuous” regarding not
what is said but how it is said,
the Maxims of manner are:
“1. Avoid obscurity of
expression.
2. Avoid ambiguity.
3. Be brief [...].
4. Be orderly.”
Table 4.1: Grice’s (1975) system
modeler say, among other things, ‘If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved’; suppose
that the decision maker chooses the sure program A by saying ‘I favor program A’. By the
maxim of relation “Be relevant” the decision modeler implicates that the 200 people that will
be saved are part of the 600 that are expected to be killed, the decision maker infers this and
then implicates that he favors program A over program B (and plausibly further implicates that
he would prefer that A be implemented in a real situation or would chose it himself if he had
to etc.). Hence the standard interpretation of the Asian Disease presupposes that the decision
maker and the decision modeler abide by the cooperative principle and use some supermaxims
and maxims (at least the one of relevance) both to mean and infer more than what is said.28
Horn’s version of neo-Griceanism in theoretical linguistic pragmatics refines of the maxims of
quantity through the implicit pairs of polarized quantitative scales used in the making of scalar
implicatures (see, e.g., Horn 2006). These scales are sets of terms ordered from the strongest
to the weakest. For instance, < all, most, many, some > and < none, hardly, any, few > are
respectively positive and negative scales of quantifiers (Israel 2006, p.703; see this reference for a
thorough discussion of ‘Horn scales’ focused on the issue of polarity). The use of a given term to
express a proposition, e.g., ‘most people will die’, logically entails the truth of same proposition
with a weaker term (from the same scale or the other) as a lower bound, e.g., ‘at least some [or
few] people will die’, and conversationally implicates the negation of the same proposition with
28Grice (1975) discusses at some length the conditions under which the cooperative principle would not be
respected, or would be respected but implying inconsistencies between maxims and thus rational violations of
some. He later extended his system in various ways, as did many followers in various disciplines (see Davis 2014;
Korta and Perry 2015). The work of Horn discusses here is one instance of these extensions.
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Figure 4.4: Post-Aristotlean’s square of logical and conversational relations in the Asian Disease
a stronger term, e.g., ‘not all people will die’. Logical relations are deduced from the meaning of
the terms while conversational ones such as scalar implicatures and inferences are induced from
observed regularities in language uses. The conversational implicature just illustrated, i.e., using
a weaker term to implicate (or infer) the negation of a stronger one is maybe the most robust
existing regularities on Horn scales. Following Horn, we can use the so-called post-Aristotlean’s
square of opposition to illustrate the systematic contrast between logical and conversational
relations among the terms of a given scale and their negations, taking the three consequences
of the Asian Disease as terms of two ordered scales, i.e., one for the save frame and one for the
die frame. In Figure 4.4, the vertical axis represents distinctions in quantitiy (universals up and
particulars down), the horizontal one represents distinctions in quality (affirmations left and
negations right), and relations are supposed to hold only for a given scale, i.e., only between
pairs of same colored terms.
Notice again that the standard interpretation of the Asian Disease relies on a conversational
implicature: the presentation of the consequence in the sure program conversationally implicates
(rather than logically implies) the negation of the consequences in the probabilistic program.
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Seeing the Asian Disease in this schema makes it clear that the interpretation of framing effects
as irrational can be supported by pointing at two types of violations, namely of conversational
and/or logical relations. Violations of conversational relations here are simply the non-inference
of the conversational implicature just illustrated (in green on the schema) while violations of
logical relations would her be a so-called fallacy of affirming the consequent, i.e., inferring from
the truth of the entailed proposition that the entailing proposition is true. However, we have
seen that the high degree of situation-dependency discussed in the two previous subsections
allows several reasons to counter such irrationality claims, notably by taking into account the
descriptive structure of the decision scenario and the decision question. Further reasons are
provided by the even higher situation-dependency discussed by linguists on pragmatics of po-
larity and negation (e.g., Horn 2006; Israel 2006). This underlies rather subtle linguistic issues
that we will not discuss here because it would carry the analysis too far away from the scope of
decision theory, let alone economics.29
However the conversational perspective presented here can be contrasted with the commu-
nicative structure of choices underlying much arguments of this dissertation for the purpose of
further developing the latter. To do so, we briefly discuss one incompatibility of the former
with the theory of speech acts from Searle used in chapter 1 to flesh out the latter. This incom-
patibility concerns the notion of meaning underlying Grice’s logic of conversation (Grice 1957;
Searle 1965; 1969, §2.6; 2007). Grice’s notion of meaning is intentional and self-referential in
the following sense. A speaker has meant something to a hearer by saying something else if
the former had the intention to produce an effect (e.g., a belief, desire etc.) on the latter by
getting him to recognize that very intention to produce that very effect. To illustrate with the
Asian Disease, a decision modeler meaning ‘choose between the certain and the probabilistic
programs’ consists in producing the belief (i.e., the effect) ‘I have to choose between the two
29Rubinstein has argued that the main obstacle for such potential relevance is the necessity of the cooperative
principle, which severely limits the set of human interactions to be studied (see Rubinstein 2000, chap.3; 2012,
chap.4). To bypass this obstacle, Rubinstein uses game theory to model linguistic exchanges of arguments in
persuasion situations. It is not straightforward to apply his analysis to framing effects because, as a byproduct
of game theory, there is an assumption of common knowledge about the decision situation: “[w]hen the listener
interprets a statement in a persuasion situation, he is aware of the fact that the persuader is trying hard
to convince him” (2012, p.192). That is one reason why a decision theoretic approach to the problem remains
relevant, despite the strong game theoretic taste of the considerations discussed so far. See del Corral and Bonilla
(2008) for further references on pragmatics and game theory. Conversational pragmatics could also be used in
economics could because the underlying logic and mathematics of Horn scales are very close to the mathematics
from measurement theory used in decision theory (see Geurts 2013 for a contribution by a philosopher in that
direction). However, the extent to which Horn scales can be used without the cooperative principle is unclear.
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programs’ by getting the decision maker to recognize his intention to create that very belief
by saying ‘which of the two program would you favor?’. Though Searle uses Grice’s notion of
meaning in his theory of speech act, he revises it on two points he thinks are defective.
Firstly, meaning something is not always and only a matter of intention, it can also be a
matter of convention, i.e., what the words mean in a given language independent of the speaker’s
intention (Searle 1969, pp.44-45). For instance, imagine that I am a decision modeler who prefers
Program B but has to recommend Program A to a decision maker (e.g., as in van Buiten and
Keren 2009). To do so, I intend to produce both the belief that I prefer Program A and the
desire to choose it by describing it as ‘200 people will be saved’. Suppose further that the decision
maker recognizes my intention and this creates the aforementioned belief and desire, leading to
his choice of Program A. Does it follow that I meant ‘I prefer Program A’ by saying ‘200 people
will be saved’? No, what I meant was the conventional meaning of these words, namely that 200
people will be saved (and 400 will die out of the 600). Notice that the principle of cooperation
is violated in this situation. Hence, for the purpose of making value judgments of rationality or
irrationality about a given framing effect, an important feature to look for in the communicative
structure of choices is the asymmetry created by the decision modeler’s unilateral violations of
the cooperative principle through a calculated balance between intention and convention in the
performance of his illocutionary acts.
Secondly, Grice’s emphasis on the effects produced on the hearer blurs a crucial distinction
proposed by Austin (1975) in the theory of speech act, between so-called illocutionary act,
i.e., the type of speech act performed, and perlocutionary act, i.e., the effects produced on the
hearer by the performance of a speech act (Searle 1969, pp.46-47). Types of illocutionary acts
include: making a statement or a promise or an order etc. Types of perlocutionary acts include:
being convinced (of a statement) or being expectant (of a promise) or being subordinate (of
an order). Searle argues that what a speaker means is what he does in the performance of the
illocutionary act, but not necessarily what happens through the perlocutionary act. For instance,
a decision modeler can mean that ‘200 people will be saved’ by stating it without convincing an
excessively stubborn decision maker of the truth of this statement (just as an excessively skeptic
or unsubmissive hearer may never become expectant or subordinate, respectively). Given that
we are interested primarily by the decision maker’s behavior, it should therefore be noted that
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the primitive empirical phenomena we are looking for in the communicative structure of choices
are different perlocutionary acts achieved by different descriptions of a same consequence. As
remarked by several authors, perlocution is by far the most underdeveloped notion in the theory
of speech act, notably due to Searle’s focus on illocution (see Davis 1980; Gu 1993; Attardo 1997;
Kurzon 1998; Marcu 2000, Kang 2013; and esp. Liu 2013). One can speculate that some fruitful
mutual developments are possible between speech act theory and decision theory through the
study of (at least ‘strict’) framing effects.30
Summing up this subsection, the Gricean background underlying the contributions from the
previous subsection is not entirely compatible with the communicative structure of choices as
developed in this dissertation, notably through Searle’s theory of speech act. Nevertheless, it
is useful to points how the standard interpretation of the Asian Disease does not rely only
logical relations but also on conversational ones and to flesh out further implications of our
communicative structure of choices.
Conclusion
At a very general level, the main argument of this section can be put in an information theoretic
fashion. The decision modeler’s choice of one possible external frame over another may send
signals to the decision maker in the form of tacit information about the decision situation
that are not contained in the literal messages constituting the decision problem. The effects
of this tacit informational surplus cannot be formally captured in standard models without
relaxing the axiom of description invariance. The latter can be made formally explicit at least
at two different levels of resolution. One level higher than the standard model would capture
different descriptions of the same consequence. One level even higher would capture different
combinations of the independently moving parts constitutive of the minimal descriptive structure
of a consequence. However, the subtleties of ordinary language uses at the latter level seem too
complex to be tractable. From the perspective of axiomatic decision theory, it seems wise to stay
at the former level just to capture that different descriptions of a consequence can induce different
preferences (rationally or not). From the perspective of modelization, the latter level may be
30On Austin’s account every speech act is also constituted by the locutionary act of pronouncing sounds or
writing symbols according to syntactical and semantical rules.
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appropriate to capture the complex situation-dependency through a perlocution parameter.
Conclusion and transition: on the meaning of a ‘consequence’ in
economics
This chapter proposed a systematic study of framing phenomena focused on strict framings
of consequences. Regardless of the normative implications, preference reversals triggered by
different descriptions of the same consequences is a pervasive and robust phenomenon. The
pervasiveness of violations of description invariance is already well admitted around behavioral
economics. That these violations are not necessarily irrational is not as well recognized. Two
conditions under which such violations can be seen as rational are because the experienced
utility of a consequence may depend on its description and/or the decision modeler’s choice of
one description over another may itself be a choice-relevant information for the decision maker.
Fully fleshing out the normative implications of the latter is a complex task due to the subtle
linguistic details of the communicative structure of choices. How are these conclusions extend-
able to further framing phenomena? If framing phenomena is broadly defined as preference
reversals triggered by different presentations of the same decision problem, then much of the
conclusions may extend quite straightforwardly. It does not seem totally off the hook to con-
ceive systematic dependence of experienced utility on the presentation of a decision problem
and/or systematic leakage of choice relevant information by the decision modeler through his
choice of one presentation over another. However, much of the other framing phenomena are
not strict but loose, i.e., they involve pairs of different but equivalent decision problems, not
pairs of different descriptions of the same decision problem. Because loose framing effects still
involve ordinary language uses to make different descriptions (of features of different problems),
the linguistic details of the communicative structure of choices should still matter. There is
no reason to believe that the pervasive situation-dependency highlighted here for strict fram-
ing effects should not carry over to loose framing effects. But because loose framings involve
extra-linguistic differences across frames, the normative implications of preference reversals may
be easier to draw than with purely linguistic differences, as illustrated with the framings under
certainty and of acts and contingencies under uncertainty.
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At several points throughout the chapter, a parallel was made between, on the one hand,
the Asian Disease and the axiom of description invariance, and, on the other hand, the Allais
paradoxes and the axiom of independence. Notably, both were initially implicit in the standard
model and the importance of making them explicit was mostly motivated by experimental
demonstrations of their violations. However, the independence axiom greatly outnumber the
axiom of description invariance in terms of existing publications that (1) make the axiom formally
explicit, (2) weaken it to account for its violation and (3) defend such weakening as rational.
The intended contribution of the next chapter will be to use the systematic study in this one to
do those three things for the axiom of description invariance. By way of transition, I would like
to discuss a last parallel with the independence axiom. Looking back, some of the controversies
around the Allais paradoxes revolved around the descriptive structure of a consequence. As
reviewed by Broome (1991, chap.5), most defenses of expected utility theory consisted in arguing
that Allais’ paradoxes are not paradoxes anymore whence the consequences are redescribed to
add information about, for instance, some feelings of disappointment if the decision maker
does not win anything. Such redescriptions, e.g., ‘0’ and ‘0 plus disappointment’ are then
taken as different descriptions of different consequences, hence breaking the equivalence between
the two initial pairs of problem, and making it impossible to observe an inconsistency from
expected utility theory. Shouldn’t the same reasoning apply to the discussion of the Asian
Disease conducted in this chapter? It could, but a case can be made against it.31
The source of this reasoning (i.e., redescription with subjective elements) is the standard
notion of a consequence, which, following Savage (1972 [1954], p.13), is taken to mean “anything
that may happen to the person”, i.e., to the decision maker. This includes any “things, or
experiences, regarded as consequences” (ibid, p.14). It may be asked, regarded as a consequence
by whom? In standard decision theory, consequences are, in principle, regarded as such by
decision makers. But by virtue of revealed preference methodology, only the decision maker’s
observable choice behavior should be a primitive in the analysis which excludes his subjective
perception of what counts as one consequences. Hence, in practice, consequences are regarded
31It should be noted that Savage’s (1972 [1954], p.103) famous response to Allais does not involve redescriptions
of the consequences, but additions of events to ‘materialize’ Allais’ probabilities (from abstract numbers to lottery
ticket numbers). Savage then argued that his version and Allais’ original one were two different descriptions of
the same decision problem, and that his preferences in his version made him change his original preferences in
Allais’ original version.
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as such by a decision theorist guessing or postulating what a decision maker would count as
a consequence. In a way, the rather permissive and subjective meaning of a consequence is
a necessary requirement for the shared psychology between the economist and the economic
agent to be effective in the practice of decision theory. But the decision theorist’s eventual
redescription of the Asian Disease’s consequences would prevents to account for the simple fact
that one decision maker (or even one decision theorist for that matter) can entertain different
perspectives on the same consequence. That is, it prevents to account for the recognition by
the decision maker that different presentations of the same consequence (or “things”) trigger
different preferences (or “experiences”). Instead, it can be argued that we shall try to do justice
to the subjectivity of a decision maker who recognizes that one and the same consequence
can trigger different mental states in different situation, without conveniently postulating that
the differences were ‘in fact’ (or ‘equivalently’) about the consequences. This is in line with
Sen’s position (notably within the debates around the independence axiom) not to blend all
the factually relevant observations into one single theoretical construct (here of ‘consequence’)
in order to do justice to the decision maker’s values and hence make the related normative
analysis easier (see esp. Sen 1979; 1980; 1982; 2002, chaps.6, 11 and 15). In short, that
different descriptions of one same consequence can be described as such by a decision modeler
and recognized as such by a decision maker should be represented as such by the decision
theorist. The next chapter proposes one way of doing that.
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Chapter 5
An axiomatic framework to deal with
framing effects1
In this chapter, our goal is to provide an axiomatic structure in which some of the theoretical
implications of framing effects discussed in the previous chapter can be formally dealt with.
This is tantamount to making the axiom of description invariance formally explicit and then to
weaken it in a way that allows the representation of framing effects in terms of choice, preference,
utility and the equivalence among them. Our intended contribution is to show that description
invariance is not necessarily an ‘all or nothing’ axiom: either you have it or you don’t. It can be
characterized so that only some of its parts can be dropped, without dropping the whole axiom.
In other words, our goal is to characterize the role of language in economic rationality through
the technical language of economics, which implies using formal language to allow standard and
behavioral models to account for the uses of ordinary language by economic agents.
To do so, we broaden a little bit the interpretation of the decision modeler, here denoted by
dmo, who is not necessarily the one who poses a decision problem, but the one whose perspective
on a decision problem may be different from the perspective of the decision maker, here denoted
by dma. Hence, in the applications of our framework, the dmo can be identified with the one
1Most of this chapter is taken from a working paper co-written with Dino Borie who practices axiomatic
decision theory. In line with the literature on decision theory in economics, the word ‘axiom’ is used in its technical
sense of being necessarily true for a given deduction (of a proposition, theorem etc.), not in its old technical sense
of being necessarily true in the absolute by contrast with a ‘postulate’ which is true for a given purpose or in
a given science; in modern axiomatic work by logicians, mathematicians and scientists, the distinction between
axiom and postulate seems to be no more in use, both are called axiom (see Mongin 2003, esp. p.107). Hence it
make sense to say that an axiom holds for a given deduction but needs to be weakened for another one.
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who poses the decision problem (an experimenter, a policy maker, a firm, one particular self
of a multiple selves dma etc.) but it can also be identified with the one who just observes the
decision situation (an economist, a psychologist, a politician etc.). This broadening captures
the main condition of possibility for the existence of framing effects, namely that there can be
different perspectives on the same decision situation.2
Our axiomatic framework essentially refines the formal structure of the objects of choice
within the standard model so as to account for the specificity of cases where they are partly
constituted of ordinary language uses. In a nutshell, we construct a choice set with descriptions
of objects of choice instead of objects of choice, an equivalence relation determining which
descriptions are about the same object of choice from the dmo’s perspective and a concatenation
operation joining different equivalent descriptions to form a new description (e.g., “200 people
will be saved” can be concatenated with “400 people will not be saved” to form “200 people will
be saved and thus 400 people will not be saved”). The dma’s preferences over descriptions of
objects of choice will be a standard weak order. Our results determine how the dmo’s equivalence
relation is articulated with the dma’s indifference relation. This allows to characterize the key
implicit axiom of the standard model, which we call “Independence of Common Description”
(ICD), that makes it blind to framing effects we are interested in and to the communicative
structure of choices. We weaken the latter to allow such effects to be formally represented.
Further axioms characterizing finer degrees of dependence to descriptions are distinguished,
along with informational measures derivable from our framework.
Recall the fivefold picture presented in the previous chapter to characterize existing discus-
sions of description invariance in economics: (1) description invariance is an implicit axiom of
the standard model, the violations of which are (2) descriptively pervasive, (3) normatively un-
justifiable, (4) mathematically intractable and (5) explained by prospect theory. Our intended
contribution can be summarized with respect to these five points. (1) Description invariance
is an implicit axiom of the standard model that we make explicit by working primarily on the
formal structure of its object of choice and only derivatively on the dma’s preferences. We are
2From a methodological perspective, this broader interpretation of the relation between the decision modeler
and the decision maker who may or may not share a common ordinary language and psychology seems similar
to the position defended by Fritz Machlup (1978, chap.12). Likewise, the emphasis on a systematic distinction
between the economist and the economic agent to deal with issues underlying individual rationality in economics
seems similar to the position defended by Joseph Schumpeter (see Festré and Garrouste 2008; Arena 2012). A
more recent account of somewhat similar position is defended by Larry Samuelson (2005).
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driven by the conditions under which it is violated in psychologists’ experiments on the Asian
Disease (2) to make it formally explicit, (3) to provide normative justifications for weakening it,
and (4) to do so in a mathematically tractable way. (5) We account for variations in framing
effects for which prospect theory cannot (at least straightforwardly) account for.
More precisely, we tackle the issue of interdisciplinarity by intending our framework to con-
tribute to economics while motivating our axiomatic constructions with evidence from Psychology.
We focus on three subsets of evidence from all the ones that were discussed in the previous chap-
ter. The first one includes the effects of further redescriptions of the same consequence, i.e.,
the last set of results presented in §4.2.2: “200 people will be saved and 400 people will not be
saved”, “400 people will not be saved”, etc. The second one includes the direct impact of the
description of an object of choice on the utility derived from the occurrence of its associated
consequence, e.g., being better off when the rescue of 200 people and the death of 400 occurs
from having chosen A than from having chosen C: see the penultimate results presented in
§4.2.3. The last one includes the results presented in §4.3.1 about how the decision modeler
makes choices from sets of different descriptions of the same object of choice and how these very
choices (of one description over other possible ones) may influence the decision maker, e.g., the
former may signal that he would prefer that the sure program be chosen by describing it as “200
people will be saved” instead of “400 people will die” and the decision maker may infer that
signal.
We tackle the positive/normative issue by showing how the framework allows, in applications,
for clarifications and more precise discussions of the conditions under which a framing effects
is rational or irrational. By virtue of the distinction between the dmo’s and dma’s perspectives,
our framework is not tied to a universal position whereby they are all necessarily either rational
or irrational. We emphasize in the conclusion that though our uses of the terms ‘rational’ and
‘irrational’ are not defined ‘once and for all’ a priori, their meanings are justified situations by
situations.
This chapter is structured in three sections. We first present the axioms and results char-
acterizing our axiomatic framework (5.1). We then discuss the representations terms of utility
and choice functions possible from it (5.2). And we conduct a general discussion with several
applications, possible extensions and implications for the positive/normative issue underlying
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framing effects (5.3).3
5.1 Axioms and results
We first present the primitives of the framework (5.1.1). We then provide an axiomatic charac-
terization of the standard models’ unframed descriptive structure and suggest how to weaken
it to allow for a formal representation of framing effects compatible with empirical results and
intuitions. To do so, we present the basic axioms that we never weaken (5.1.2) before the ones
that characterize description invariance (5.1.3) which we weaken (5.1.4) in a way that allow us
to characterize two degrees of description dependence (5.1.5).
5.1.1 Primitives
Our framework has four primitives. The first one is X the nonempty set of objects of choice. Its
elements are descriptions of objects of choice instead of objects of choice. For the construction
of the framework, our objects of choice are going to be “described consequences”, in contrast
to the standard model’s “consequences”. This is the first step need to characterize description
invariance in terms of an equivalence between our framework and the standard model. Further-
more, we will work on static decision problems under certainty because violations of description
invariance can occur at this basic level, e.g., the attribute framing discussed above and other
framing effects discussed later. Abstracting from risk, the Asian Disease provides a handy il-
lustrative example throughout, which we will use with the following notation. Consequences
3It should be noted that we stick to the term ‘description invariance’ as in the previous chapter and as
originally used by Kahneman and Tversky (1984), while some other authors uses ‘extensionality’ and even
sometimes ‘consequentialism’ (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1986, S253) to refer to what framing effects violated
in standard models. Though it is beyond the scope of our framework to analyze how exactly are description
invariance, extensionality and consequentialism related within standard models, here are a few hints. It can be
argued that the ‘invariance’ in ‘description invariance’ refers to the mathematics of measurement theory, in the
making of which Tversky played a certain role (see Heukelom 2014). In this context, invariance roughly means:
what needs to remain invariant in a measurement procedure for the numerical outcome to be meaningful (see
Luce et al., 1990, chapter 22; Chao, 2007; Boumans, 2005, 144-119; 2007). By contrast, ‘extensionality’ was first
used in a discussion of framing by Arrow (1982), whose well-known background in the symbolic logic of Tarsky
easily led us to infer that extensionality here indeed refers to a famous foundational issue in the philosophy
of logic. Roughly, the issue is about the establishment of equivalence relations (and about the thorny issue of
defining ‘logical consequences’), and seem to have always been controversial (see e.g., Chisholm, 1941, sect. III;
Anscombe, 1969; Quine, 1994; Thiel, 2003, 2009). And so have been the implications of ‘extensionality’ for
economics (see e.g., Bacharach, 1994; Vilks, 1995; Cubitt and Sugden, 2003; Moscati, 2012). And so have also
been its implications in psychology within the debates on the psychology of inductive and deductive reasoning
in which Kahneman and Tversky’s work are central (see e.g., Cohen, 1981). Finally, Kahneman and Tversky
themselves refer to the work of Hammond (1988a; b) on consequentialism, whose role in decision theory we have
briefly presented in chapter 2.
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Consequences Described consequences
[x]
x1 ≡ “200 people will be saved”
x2 ≡ “400 people will die”
x3 ≡ “400 people will not be saved”
x4 ≡ “200 people will not die”
...
[y]
y1 ≡ “600 people will be saved”
y2 ≡ “nobody will die”
y3 ≡ “600 people will not be saved”
y4 ≡ “600 people will not die”
...
[z]
z1 ≡ “no people will be saved”
z2 ≡ “600 people will die”
z3 ≡ “600 will not be saved”
z4 ≡ “600 people will not die”
...
Table 5.1: Consequences and described consequences in the Asian Disease
are denoted by letters within brackets, e.g., [x], described consequences are denoted by letters
with subscripts differentiating different descriptions of a same consequence, e.g., x1, x2, and the
symbol ≡ reads ‘can be empirically instantiated as’. Table 5.1 shows how to use these symbols
with respect to most of the descriptions discussed in the previous chapter.
The second primitive is a nontrivial binary relation ≈ on X. Two described consequences
related by this binary relation are such that, from the “decision modeler” (dmo) perspective, they
are two descriptions of the same consequence (and conversely). Observe that ≈, by definition,
is an equivalence relation; if x ≈ y, we say that x and y are consequentially equivalent. In other
words, the dmo’s perspective defines equivalence classes of described consequences. By contrast
with the standard model where it is implicitly assumed that dma and dmo share the same
perspective on what counts as a consequence, we want the dma’s perspective to be analytically
free from the dmo’s, at least within the primitives of our model.
The third primitive is a partial binary operation ◦ on X. If x ≈ y we may wish to consider
them, taken together, as forming a single described consequence (i.e., a single object of choice
under certainty) denoted x ◦ y and called the concatenation of x and y. The concatenation x ◦ y
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is the joint description of the described consequences x and y, and is consequentially equivalent
to either one of them. To illustrate with the Asian Disease example, if the dmo considers
that “200 people will be saved” (x1) and “400 people will not be saved” (x3) are two different
descriptions of the same consequences, i.e., are consequentially equivalent (x1 ≈ x3), then they
can be concatenated and the concatenation is itself consequentially equivalent to either one of
the two described consequences. In other words, we have three different descriptions of the same
consequence: x1, x3 and x1 ◦ x3 ≡ “200 people will be saved and 400 people will not be saved”.
Definition 1. Let X be a nonempty set, ≈ a nontrivial binary relation on X, and ◦ a partial
binary operation on X. The triple 〈X,≈, ◦〉 is a descriptive structure iff ≈ is an equivalence
relation and for all x, y ∈ X, if x ≈ y, then x ◦ y is defined, and x ◦ y ≈ x.
Three related points need to be emphasized. First, the concatenation of described conse-
quences is different from the concatenation of consequences. The former is akin to the combi-
nation of information about one consequence. The latter is akin to the combination of at least
two consequences. This contrast can be illustrated by a comparison with the operation of joint
receipt (Luce and Fishburn 1991). While the joint description of one glass of water “half-full”
with one glass of water “half-empty” is the description of a glass of water “half-full half-empty”,
the joint receipt of one glass of water half-full with one glass of water half-empty is a full glass
of water. 4
Second, the operation of concatenation is not to be confused with the operations of addition
or multiplication (it can only define these operations if more structure is added). Thus, con-
catenation of descriptions can imply the addition of information from the dma’s perspective but
not from the dmo’s; concateation just explicitly puts next to each other what the dmo takes to
be consequentially equivalent. In other words, the concatenation of information can imply an
asymmetry of information between the dma and the dmo.
Third, the operation of concatenation does not imply a one-to-one translation between (1) the
mathematical representations of described consequences in the formal language of our setup and
(2) the empirical description of consequences in the ordinary language of, say, an experimental
4Assuming fungibility of water, which seems less problematic than fungibility of money, and that consequences
are only about water, not its physical container.
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setup testing framing effects. This is not the case because, by contrast with formal languages,
the concatenation of two described consequences in ordinary language is more vague (there
are multiple representations of a concatenation) but also more efficient (recursivity within the
representations avoids redundant repetitions which decreases the amount of symbols). For
instance, take x ≡ “a glass of water half-full” and y ≡ “a glass of water half-empty”. In ordinary
language, it would be natural that x ◦ y ≡ “a glass of water half-full and half-empty” or “a
glass of water half-full or half-empty” or “an half-full half-empty glass of water ” or yet other
formulations. But it is very unlikely that such formulations include “a glass of water half-full a
glass of water half-empty”. These are confusing, and implied by the requirement of a one-to-one
translation between our framework and its empirical counterpart. Therefore, our framework is
agnostic about the exact empirical counterparts of the concatenation operation ◦. This is in
part why we said that ≡ reads as ‘can be empirically instantiated as’ (and not ‘is necessarily
instantiated as’), which allows ◦ to be empirically described by “and”, “or”, “,”, “ ” (just a
space), etc. We just want to formally capture the possibility condition of framing effects: the
simple fact that one consequence can be presented under different descriptions, and that some
of these descriptions are combinations of other descriptions.
Nevertheless, common sense derived from our everyday uses of ordinary language, and, most
importantly, the large experimental literature on framing effects, provide fairly clear guidance
for the empirical application of our framework. As an illustration, consider the structure of
the sure thing in Asian Disease experiments. A described consequence involves expressions
of four dimensions of the consequence, i.e., (1) of a quantity (“200”, “400”), (2) of what is
being quantified (“people”), (3) of an attribute of what is being quantified (“saved”, “die”)
and (4) of the implicit assertion of the attribute (∅) or the explicit negation of it (“will ∅
be saved”/“will ∅ die”, “will not be saved”/“will not die”). Empirically speaking, we have
‘minimal descriptive structure’ of a consequence under certainty from the previous chapter,
which requires a combination of at least one expression of each dimension. Concatenations of
described consequences often involve the repetition, and always requires a combination, of at
least two different expressions of (at least) one dimension: “200 people will be saved and 400
people will not be saved”, (or possibly) “400 people will die and 200 will not”. Where we are
formally agnostic is on the empirical manifestation of those dimensions, the repetition of those
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dimensions, and the combination order of those dimensions.
To be clear on the interpretations of our primitives, let us contrast three possibilities. Firstly,
if X would be the set of all typographical symbols, the concatenation operation could be inter-
preted as forming words and sentences, e.g., w ◦ i ◦ l ◦ l ◦ ◦ d ◦ i ◦ e ≡ “will die”. Secondly, if
X would be the set of all expressions of the four dimensions of the minimal descriptive structure
of a consequence, the concatenation operation could be interpreted as forming described conse-
quences, e.g., with x ≡ “200”, y ≡ “people” z ≡ “will be saved”, x ◦ y ◦ z ≡ “200 people will
be saved”. Clearly, both these levels of analysis are not fitted for economics. Hence, the third
interpretation is the one we take in this chapter, where X is the set of described consequences,
empirically corresponding the expressions of at least one instance of each of the four dimensions
of the minimal descriptive structure of a consequence.5
What we want to formalize is that described consequences can generate further described
consequences, by concatenation. Formally, let 〈X,≈, ◦〉 be a descriptive structure, x ∈ X be a
described consequence and [x]≈ := {y ∈ X | y ≈ x} be the equivalence class of x by ≈.
Definition 2. [x]≈ is said to be generated by D ⊂ [x]≈ iff every element of [x]≈ can be
expressed as the concatenation of finitely many elements of D; and when both conditions hold,
[x]≈ = 〈D〉 and the elements in D are called generators.
Generators are simply described consequences that are not the result of a concatenation of,
and thus cannot be broken into, other described consequences. Identifying potential generators
in the experimental study of framing effects is useful to get a picture of the conditions under
which the effects hold and vary across different descriptions of the same consequences. For
example, in the literature on the Asian Disease problem, D contains at least four generators of
the sure program, namely x1, x2, x3 and x4 in Table 5.1. Their concatenations generate further
descriptions of the sure program, as shown in Table 5.2.
5Maybe the former level would be more fitted for linguists, logicians or philosopher of language. And the
work done by psycholinguists or psychologists inspired by psycholinguistics on framing effects can be interpreted
as been done at the latter level (Keren 2011b, esp. part II). Though some of their results may be useful for
further modeling or empirical work, there is a potential lack of tractability worth noting due to, as they show,
the potentially infinite makings of synonymous expressions (e.g., “alive”, “perish”) and the complex asymmetries
between negations and contraries.
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Kahneman and
Tversky (1981)
Kühberger (1995,
exp.1)
Kühberger (1995,
exp.2)
Mellers and Locke
(2007, p.362)
As x1 x3 x1 ◦ x3 ____x1 ◦ x2Cs x2 x4 x2 ◦ x4
Table 5.2: Generators and concatenations in the Asian Disease
The last primitive is the dma’s preference relation % on X. x % y means that x is at least
as desirable as y. As usual, the strict preference  and indifference ∼ relations are respectively
defined as the asymmetric and symmetric parts of %. We emphasize that % is defined over
described consequences. This contrasts with the standard model, where dma’s preferences are
defined over consequences. That is, in the standard model, the dma’s preferences are implicitly
defined over the dmo’s partition of X, i.e., on X/ ≈, the set of equivalence classes of X under ≈.
Notice that by restricting the concatenation of described consequences to the dmo’s perspective
(i.e., the operation of concatenation can only be performed between what is consequentially
equivalent, that is, between what is contained within equivalence classes of X defined by ≈),
such concatenations are logically independent from dma’s preferences, which are defined over
X i.e., over all described consequences irrespective of their equivalence classes from the dmo’s
perspective. This can be seen as a prerequisite to avoid the standard model’s problem of logical
omniscience, i.e., that the dma knows every logical implications of his knowledge (Lipman 1999);
or more precisely, that the dma knows and agrees with every implications of his knowledge
derivable from the dmo’s logic when the latter is identified with a decision theorist. That
furthermore implies, in the standard model, that the dma’s indifference relation implicitly holds
among all the elements of a given equivalence class, that is, among all different descriptions of
the same consequence.6
Within the present framework, it is possible to characterize three relevant cases of prefer-
ences under framing with different degrees of discrimination of consequences. The first case
6Logical omniscience is however plausible in some situations such as the glass example. If a glass of water
is described as half-full to the dma, it is very likely that he can unproblematically infer that the glass is also
half-empty. But this is less plausible in other more complex and economically relevant situations such as the
Asian Disease examples, and other ones discussed in the literature on framing effects. A non-trivial and intuitive
example of such situations involve inflation, where the dmo’s perspective establishes equivalence of purchasing
powers (i.e., economic consequences) in terms of income and prices, but that equivalence is often not shared
from dma’s perspective; i.e., the inference of equivalent purchasing powers at different levels of income and prices
(the combinations of which are then just different descriptions of the same economic consequences) is not so
straightforward. See Arrow (1982) for an early discussion, and Shafir et al. (1997) for empirical support and
further discussion.
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corresponds to what is usually called description invariance in the literature. This axiom is
invisible in the standard model because the latter works in an unframed descriptive structure
where preferences are only representable over consequences, e.g., over the dmo’s equivalence
classes of consequences [x]≈, [y]≈, etc. but not over described consequences, i.e., over x1, y1,
x2, y2, etc. By virtue of the structure of our choice set, we are always working in a framed
descriptive structure where preferences over described consequences are representable, hence
description invariance can be made formally explicit. The standard model’s case where it is
impossible to discriminate different descriptions of a given consequence corresponds here to the
case where the dma’s indifference relation holds among all the elements of a given equivalence
class:7
∀x, y ∈ X, x ≈ y ⇒ x ∼ y.
The second case is when regardless of the dma’s preferences among all possible descriptions
of the same consequence, his preferences among different consequences are “ordered”. We call
this case tidy description-dependence. Formally,
∀x, y, z ∈ X, suppose x ≈ z and x % z, then x % y and y % z ⇒ y ≈ x.
Remember that we are under certainty here, hence how the original framing effect in the Asian
Disease can be captured by tidy dependence cannot be illustrated directly. To do that, we need
to introduce probability distributions in our framework, which is done in the applications. Tidy
description-dependence prevents cases where the dma prefers one description of a consequence
to another description of another consequence and yet prefers a further description of the latter
consequence to a further description of the former (i.e., a framing effect under certainty, e.g.,
from Table 5.1, y1 % x1 and x4 % y2). This kind of case is the third one we distinguish here
and call untidy description-dependence. We characterize it only informally because there is no
formal relation within the set of consequences and there is no characterizable logic without
further hypotheses about the dma’s decision making process.
7We are not the first one to state description independence in this way, see, e.g., Bacharach (2003, p.65),
Blume et al. (2013, p.9), Lerner (2014, p.40) and esp. Giraud (2004b, p.52). We discuss these in the section
on applications, where the influence of Giraud’s work on our framework is acknowledged. It can be argued
that ‘the’ standard model is in fact characterized by x ≈ y ⇒ [x] ∼ [y]. If we would have defined preferences
over consequences, this would be the natural way of characterizing description invariance; however, with our
preference defined over described consequences, we feel that the above characterization is more natural.
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Hence it can be argued from a methodological perspective that, in our framework, the
framed descriptive structure with description invariance always characterize standard economics
and the normative positions of behavioral economics on framing effects. The framed descriptive
structure with tidy or untidy description-dependence marks different ways of seeing the frontiers
between standard and behavioral economics on framing effects. Under certainty, tidy descriptive
dependence never yield preference reversals, hence it may be acceptable to some standard and
behavioral economists as rational. Under risk, however, it can yield preference reversals, which
are usually deemed as irrational by behavioral and standard economists, but needs to be captured
in positive models of individual behaviors in behavioral economics. This reasoning always applies
to untidy description-dependence, i.e., regardless of whether or not we are under certainty or
under risk.
5.1.2 Basic axioms
We first state our axioms and then emphasize their empirical interpretations. We use a structure
inspired by the so-called “extensive structure” from Krantz et al. (1971) – the distinctions being
that we add the idempotency axiom, our concatenation operation is not total and we do not
use any Archimedean axioms.
Axiom 1 (Descriptive structure). 〈X,≈, ◦〉 satisfies Definition 1.
Axiom 2 (Weak order). % is complete and transitive.
Axiom 3 (Weak commutativity). If x ◦ y and y ◦ x are defined, then x ◦ y ∼ y ◦ x.
Axiom 4 (Weak associativity). If (x ◦ y) ◦ z and x ◦ (y ◦ t) are defined, then (x ◦ y) ◦ z ∼
x ◦ (y ◦ z).
Axiom 5 (Weak idempotency). If x ◦ x is defined, then x ◦ x ∼ x.
Axiom 1 corresponds to the structure of objects of choice from the dmo’s point of view.
Its empirical interpretation has already been given above. Axiom 2 is a standard requirement
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about dma’s preference relation over the objects of choice, that is, his preference relation is a
weak order. Notice that description invariance is not implied by the weak order alone. It is
implied by the behavior of its indifference part over possible combination of descriptions, as
characterized by the other axioms. Axioms 3 and 4 state that whenever the concatenation is
defined, it does not matter for the dma in what order described consequences are concatenated.
The order of the described consequences being concatenated (weak commutativity) and the
order of the concatenations of described consequences (weak associativity) may be reversed
without altering informational content, hence the dma’s indifference. Notice that these axioms
are plausible within the scope of the framing effects with which we are concerned; but would
need to be relaxed to study order effects under framing, with which we are not concerned (in
any case, empirically, it has been shown that there is no impact of the order of presentation in
framing effects of the Asian Disease type).8
Example 1. From Table 5.1, x1 ◦ x3, x3 ◦ x1, (x1 ◦ x3) ◦ x2 and x1 ◦ (x3 ◦ x2) can be defined
by the dmo to correspond to:
x1 ◦ x3 ≡ “200 people will be saved and 400 people will not be saved”,
x3 ◦ x1 ≡ “400 people will not be saved and 200 people will be saved”.
and
(x1 ◦ x3) ◦ x2 ≡ “200 people will be saved and 400 people will not be saved and also 400 people will die”,
x1 ◦ (x3 ◦ x2) ≡ “200 people will be saved and also 400 people will not be saved and 400 people will die”.
Hence, what remains implicit in the standard model is that because all the generators
(x1, x2, x3) and the concatenations are consequentially equivalent, the dma is indifferent be-
tween the order of the described consequences being concatenated (x1 ◦ x3 ∼ x3 ◦ x1 by
8Notice that axiom 2 can be weaken to a preorder (reflexive and transitive binary relation) quite easily. In
that case, axioms 3-5 would implicitly assume a minimal degree of comparability among different descriptions
of a same consequence. This would be in line with the growing body of authors who consider completeness
over consequences not to be a sound requirement of rationality. With a partial order, our results on unframed
descriptive structure would also show that, if the preferences of the dma are not complete, they are still complete
within classes of consequentially equivalent descriptions.
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weak commutativity) and between the order of the concatenations of described consequences
((x1 ◦ x3) ◦ x2 ∼ x1 ◦ (x3 ◦ x2) by weak associativity). 
Axiom 5 states that the dma is indifferent between a described consequence and the concate-
nation of this described consequence with itself. Formally, since the concatenation of a described
consequence with itself is a logical possibility, it is necessary to include it in the basic setting.
Intuitively, whether repetitions of described consequences do or do not increase informational
content is an open question. For the dmo, repeating the same information does not increase
the informational content about the consequence. But the very fact of an information being
repeated might impact the informational content about the consequence from the dma’s point of
view, rationally or not. In any case, notice that such repetitions are not involved in the framing
effects we are interested in, and there has been no empirical test of this to our knowledge.9
5.1.3 Framed descriptive structure with description invariance
The following axiom (also implicit in the standard model), together with the basic ones presented
above, make our framework equivalent to the standard model, i.e., preference relations can only
hold between consequences but not between different descriptions of the same consequences,
among which the dma is necessarily indifferent.
Axiom 6 (Independence of common description). If x◦ z and y ◦ z are defined, then x ∼ y
iff x ◦ z ∼ y ◦ z.
9A generalization of our framework should indeed dispense with the idempotency axiom as it is clear from
both cognitive and social psychology that dmas are anything but indifferent to informational repetitions and
redundancies (Cacioppo and Petty 1989; Judd and Braeur 1995; Moons et al. 2009; Kuhl and Anderson 2011;
Mulligan and Peterson 2013; English and Visser 2014). Technically, such weakening might not be too difficult:
the underlying algebraic structure associated to a consequence will no longer be a band but a commutative
semigroup. Empirically, we did conduct some informal classroom experiments on the Asian Disease to check
whether some of our axioms were or not respected. For the idempotency axiom, the results are very sensitive
to the empirical counterpart of the concatenation. Roughly, using just a coma without logical connectors to
concatenate the repetition could change the preferences between this concatenation and just one instance of the
generator (and with Tversky and Kahneman’s original generators, the overall preference reversal goes in the same
direction than in their); but the use of a logical connector that made it clearer that it was a repetition (e.g., “so
that”) did not change the preferences (with Tversky and Kahneman’s original generators, the overall preference
reversal disappeared). We are currently preparing lab experiments on framing effects along these lines.
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The independence of common description (ICD) axiom states that dma’s indifference be-
tween two described consequences is not affected by concatenation with a common described
consequence. And conversely, dma’s indifference between two concatenations sharing a common
described consequence is not affected by cancellation of the common described consequence.
The following implication of ICD is the crucial one that prevents a formal account of the
framing effects we are interested in. We already said that the standard model cannot (without
ad hoc assumptions) capture that different descriptions of the same consequence can convey
different information; it only captures that different descriptions of the same consequence can
convey the same information. Thus, it cannot discriminate between the following three cases.
First, when different information are conveyed by different descriptions, if the information of
one description is included in the information of another description, then we can say that
the latter description absorbs the former: the informational content of their concatenation is
identical with the informational content of the latter (absorbing) description. Second, when
the same information is conveyed by different descriptions, then these descriptions are mutually
absorbent. And third, when the information conveyed by a description absorbs all possible other
information conveyed by other descriptions, we say that the former description is maximally
absorbent. Formally, x ∈ X absorbs y ∈ X if and only if, x ◦ y ∼ x; x, y ∈ X are mutually
absorbent if and only if, x ◦ y ∼ x ∼ y; x ∈ X is maximally absorbent if and only if, for
all y ∈ S, x ◦ y ∼ x. ICD states that either there exists no absorbing description or that all
descriptions are maximally absorbent. But together with Axioms 1-5, ICD implies that every
description of the same consequence is maximally absorbent, so that all description of the same
consequence are mutually absorbent. In other words, the standard model cannot discriminate
relative absorbency among different descriptions of the same consequence.
Example 2. From Table 5.1, x1 ◦ x2 and x3 ◦ x2 can be defined by the dmo to correspond to:
x1 ◦ x2 ≡ “200 people will be saved and 400 people will die”,
x3 ◦ x2 ≡ “400 people will not be saved and 400 people will die”.
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ICD implies that if the dma is indifferent between these two concatenations of described con-
sequences, then he is indifferent between the two described consequences “200 people will be
saved” and “400 people will not be saved”, and conversely. 
When Axioms 1-6 hold, we are in a framed descriptive structure with description invariance,
which is equivalent to the standard model’s unframed descriptive structure.
Proposition 1. Let X be a nonempty set, ≈ and % nontrivial binary relations on X, and ◦
a partial binary operation on X. Suppose that the quadruple 〈X,≈,%, ◦〉 satisfies axioms 1-6.
Then
∀x, y ∈ X, x ≈ y ⇒ x ∼ y.
All proofs are in the appendix.
5.1.4 Framed descriptive structure with description-dependence
We will propose two ways of characterizing a framed descriptive structure with description-
dependence in order to suitably represent the framing effects we are interested in, i.e., two ways
our model can depart from the standard model’s unframed descriptive structure. This subsection
presents what is common to both ways; the next one presents the two characterizations and
explains their differences. We keep the basic axioms and propose to weaken the ICD axiom in
the same way for both characterizations. The ICD axiom can be decomposed in two parts:
Axiom 6.1 (Weak substituability) If x ◦ z and y ◦ z are defined, then x ∼ y implies
x ◦ z ∼ y ◦ z.
Axiom 6.2 (Weak simplifiability) If x ◦ z and y ◦ z are defined„ then x ◦ z ∼ y ◦ z implies
x ∼ y.
Example 2 above already illustrated the empirical interpretation of weak simplifiability,
weak substituability was only implicitly illustrated through the “and conversely” clause. Weak
substituability is the “if” direction of ICD: if the dma is indifferent between two informational
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contents, then the simultaneous adjunction of another (consequentially equivalent) informational
content preserves indifference. Weak simplifiability is the “only if” direction of ICD: if the
dma is indifferent between two informational contents conveyed by two descriptions of the same
consequence, then the retrieval of a common informational content preserves indifference between
the remaining informational contents. It is this latter part that we drop to give a formal account
of framing effects. To see why we drop weak simplifiability, consider the following example.
Example 3. From Table 5.1, x1 ◦ (x1 ◦ x2) and x2 ◦ (x1 ◦ x2) can be defined by the dmo to
correspond to:
x1 ◦ (x1 ◦ x2) ≡ “200 people will be saved and also 200 people will be saved and 400 people will die”,
x2 ◦ (x1 ◦ x2) ≡ “400 people will die and also 200 people will be saved and 400 people will die”.
Firstly, the basic axioms together with weak substituability imply that the dma is indifferent
between these two described consequences.10 Such indifference here is plausible, both intuitively
because the concatenations can be seen as clarifying the informational content implied by either
x1 or x2 and empirically because experimental results on the Asian Disease with the sure thing
being completely described indeed does not reveal preference reversals (cf. previous chapter,
§4.2.2).
Secondly, if weak simplifiability were to hold, it would further imply that the dma is indifferent
between x1 and x2, i.e., between “200 people will be saved” and “400 people will die”. Recall
that, as explained in the previous chapter, this is descriptively inaccurate from the classical
results of Tversky and Kahneman (1981); and normatively questionable from the results of Sher
and McKenzie (2008) on informational leakage. We have therefore good reasons to drop weak
simplifiability. 
Without the weak simplifiability axiom, the result from the previous subsection does not hold
anymore: the dma is no longer necessarily indifferent between different descriptions of the same
10This is so because by weak idempotence, x1 ◦ x1 ∼ x1 and x2 ◦ x2 ∼ x2. Weak substituability implies that
(x1 ◦ x1) ◦ x2 ∼ x1 ◦ x2 and x1 ◦ (x2 ◦ x2) ∼ x1 ◦ x2. Rearranging by weak associativity, weak commutativity
and transitivity of ∼ imply that x1 ◦ (x1 ◦ x2) ∼ x2 ◦ (x1 ◦ x2).
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consequence. Consequently, he may exhibit preferences within a dmo’s equivalence class, e.g.,
it is possible that, within [x], x1  x2 (or the reverse). It is because such cases of description-
dependence are representable when axioms 1-5 and 6.1 hold (i.e., when 6.2 is dropped) that
we say that axioms 1-5 and 6.1 characterize a framed descriptive structure with description-
dependence. In this structure, it is possible that different descriptions of the same consequence
can convey different information, i.e., all descriptions are not necessarily maximally absorbent
anymore, especially generators, and the dma is not necessarily indifferent among them, he can
prefer one description to another. But some indifference relations can still be implied.
Proposition 2. Let X be a nonempty set, ≈ and % nontrivial binary relations on X, and ◦ a
partial binary operation on X. Suppose that the quadruple 〈X,≈,%, ◦〉 satisfies axioms 1-5 and
axiom 6.1. Then
∀x, y ∈ X, x and y are generated by the same generators ⇒ x ∼ y.
Moreover, for all x ∈ X, if [x]≈ is finitely generated by n generators, then [x]≈ has at most
2n − 1 equivalence classes under ∼.
Proposition 2 is weaker than proposition 1 in the sense that the dma’s indifference relation
among described consequences is further constrained by their generators. Two different gen-
erators of the same consequence are not necessarily mutually absorbent and the dma is not
necessarily indifferent between them. But two different descriptions generated by the same gen-
erators are necessarily mutually absorbent and the dma is necessarily indifferent between them.
It also states that if the number of generators are limited within equivalence classes, then the
structure of our objects of choice (described consequences) does not entail an infinity of indif-
ference classes for a given consequence: the infinite number of described consequences does not
allow an infinity of indifference classes (which would be absurd). The number of informational
content possibilities is the number of distinct indifference classes, which is limited by the number
of generators. This results can therefore be of practical use for experimenters who wish to ensure
that they have tested (or at least considered) every logical possibility of different framings of
the same decision problem.
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Example 4. With x, y defined as in example 1, there exists, despite the infinite number of
described consequences they can generate, at most 3 distinct indifference classes for the dma:
[x1]∼ generated by x1, [x2]∼ generated by x2 and [x1 ◦ x2]∼ generated by x1 and x2 (notice
that they are all subclasses of one dmo equivalence class, [x]≈ here). As already noted in the
discussion of the idempotency axiom, it is an open question whether such repetitions of exactly
the same descriptions of consequences (i.e., the empirical counterparts of these concatenations)
does or does not increase informational content. This is not what is at stake in the framing
effects we are interested in. What is at stake is the possibility of representing preferences between
(but not within) elements of, respectively, [x1]∼, [x2]∼, and [x1 ◦ x2]∼. 
In the remaining of the chapter we work under two hypotheses. First, generators are finite
within equivalence classes; we just argued for the plausibility of this hypothesis. Second, the
number of consequences is finite (as in a given experimental setup, or in a given supermarket).
This greatly facilitates the exposition of our next results.11
5.1.5 Tidy and untidy description-dependence
The following two main ways of characterizing description-dependence are worked out with ax-
ioms 1-5 and 6.1 holding. We wish to discriminate between cases of tidy description-dependence
where the dma’s preferences over consequences are necessarily well-ordered, e.g., [x]≈  [y]≈ such
that x1  x1 ◦ x2  x2  y1  y4  y2 ◦ y3, from cases of untidy description-dependence, where
preferences over consequences are not necessarily well-ordered, e.g., [x]≈  [z]≈ and [z]≈  [x]≈
(tantamount to a framing effect or preference reversal under certainty) as with x1  x1 ◦ x2
 z3  x2. The following two axioms characterize the discrimination between tidy and untidy
description-dependence in so far as when they hold, it is necessarily the case that the dma’s
11The issue of the finite or infinite number of consequence is related to the issue of whether or not to include
and Archimedean axiom in our framework. If such an axiom is included, we would have a less extensive structure
in Krantz et al.’s sense, allowing us to explore utility representation which we do not explore in the subsection
dedicated to that below, notably cases such as u([a ◦ b]∼) = u([a]∼) + u([b]∼) or u([a ◦ b]∼) = λu([a]∼) + (1 −
λ)u([b]∼). The empirical interpretation of such representations remains an open question. Formally, if we stay
under the hypothesis that the number of consequences are finite, then we would need an infinite number of axiom
(as in Fishburn 1970, p.42). That would however not be the case anymore if we worked under the hypothesis
that the number of consequences are infinite. In any case, at a behavioral level, the empirical interpretations
we have given of our framework under the finite consequence assumption and without an Archimedean axiom
are enough to deal with all the framing effects presented in the previous chapter and to be presented in the last
section of this one. Finally, with an infinite number of consequences and without an Archimedean axiom, we
would have to deal with lexicographic preferences.
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preferences are only tidily dependent to the descriptions of consequences, while when they are
both dropped, his preferences can exhibit untidy description-dependence.
Axiom 7 (Non-triviality). If x 6≈ y, then there exist x′ ∈ [x]≈, y′ ∈ [y]≈ such that x′ 6∼ y′.
Axiom 8 (Independence of common description across consequences). If x 6≈ z, x ◦ y and
z ◦ t are defined, then x % z iff x ◦ y % z ◦ t.
Non-triviality requires that for each pair of different consequences there is at least one de-
scription of each that actively affect the dma’s strict preference relation . In other words, it
ensures that there is at least one way of describing two different consequences so that the dma
is not indifferent between them. Independence of common description across consequences (IC-
DAC) requires that for each pair of different consequences, neither concatenations nor unyoking
of both change the dma’s preference ordering between them. Note that if ICD holds, ICDAC
holds trivially, but not the converse. ICDAC together with non-triviality preclude cases of in-
difference between pairs of consequences implying indifference among all descriptions of both
consequences, which is exactly what we want to avoid regarding strict framings of consequences.
Proposition 3. Let X be a nonempty set, ≈ and % nontrivial binary relations on X, and ◦
a partial binary operation on X. Suppose that the quadruple 〈X,≈,%, ◦〉 satisfies axioms 1-5,
6.1, 7, and axiom 8. Then
∀x, y, z ∈ X, if x ≈ z and x % z, then (x % y % z ⇒ y ≈ x).
As said above, when both are dropped, we are within a framed descriptive structure with
untidy description-dependence. Evidently, we could see further shades of tidiness and untidi-
ness by weakening ICDAC. But we do not need to go so far to capture the strict framings of
consequences we are interested in.
277
5.2 Utility representation and choice function
5.2.1 Representation theorems
The previous results can be translated in terms of utility representations. When only axioms 1-2
or the basic axioms hold, under the finiteness assumptions, there exists a real-valued function
u on X, which represents dma’s preferences, that is, for all x, y ∈ X
x % y ⇔ u(x) ≥ u(y).
To see this, note that the finiteness assumptions imply that X is countable. Hence, represen-
tation in this case is a basic result. With the basic axioms, the image of X by u, denoted
by u(X), is at most countable. The results of propositions 1 and 2 imply that u(X) is finite
when we add ICD or just weak substituability. In the latter case, we are within a descriptive
structure with untidy description-dependence, and the utilities of a given consequence lie in a
bounded set, hence are contained in a finite interval that may overlap with other consequences’
finite intervals of utilities. Within a descriptive structure with tidy description-dependence,
i.e., with axioms 7-8 added, there is no such overlap. The following proposition summarize the
relevant properties of the representation theorems (which are practically trivial to prove due to
our finiteness assumptions, see the appendix):
Proposition 4. Let 〈X,≈, ◦〉 be a descriptive structure such that X/ ≈ is finite and [x]≈ is
finitely generated for all x ∈ X. For a binary relation % on X the following four statements
hold:
(i) If % satisfies axioms 1 and 2 (and possibly one or more axioms among 3-5), then
there exists an utility function on X that has an at most countable image;
(ii) If % satisfies axioms 1-6, then there exists an utility function on X that has a finite
image. Moreover, for all x, y ∈ X, a ≈ b implies u(x) = u(y);
(iii) If % satisfies axioms 1-5 and 6.1, then there exists an utility function on X that has
a finite image. Moreover, for all x, y ∈ X, if x and y are generated by the same
generators, then u(x) = u(y);
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(iv) If in addition, to the above conditions, % satisfies axioms 7 and 8, then for all
x, y ∈ X, such that x ≈ y and x % y, for all z ∈ X, u(z) ∈ [u(x), u(y)] implies that
z ≈ x.
5.2.2 Choice function
The goal now is to characterize the implications in terms of revealed preferences of the framework
presented in the previous subsections. Yuval Salant and Rubinstein (2008) have provided a
framework for what they call “choice with frames”. However, none of their examples, applications
and discussions consider the classical problem of description-dependence underlying Kahneman
and Tversky’s original framing effects. It may be thought that extending their framework
through ours would allow to deal with violations of description invariance from a revealed
preference perspective. This is not the case, and showing how allows to highlight the contribution
of our framework.
Salant and Rubinstein extend the traditional approach in terms of choice function on the set
of available alternatives A (i.e., a choice problem) from the set of alternatives X by constructing
choice functions on pairs (A, f), where f is one frame from a set of frames F . Their framework
can be extended to deal with framing effects due to different descriptions of the choice problem
as follows. Extend the relation ≈ on the set of alternatives to the set of choice problems, denote
this extended relation by ≈P . Define the pair ([A]≈P , f) where [A]≈P is a standard choice
problem with consequences and f indicates the description under which this choice problem is
presented to the dma. Consider a descriptive structure without concatenation 〈X,≈〉 such that
X is finite (or equivalently, X/ ≈ and [x]≈ are finite). Let P∗(X) be the set of all nonempty
subsets of X and P∗(X/ ≈) be the set of all nonempty subsets of X/ ≈. For nonempty subsets
of X, we will use notation A,B, . . ., and for nonempty subsets of X/ ≈, we will use notation
I, J, . . .. The relation ≈P on P∗(X) is defined as: for all A,B ∈ P∗(X),
A ≈P B iff (∀x ∈ A,∃y ∈ B, x ≈ y) and (∀y ∈ B, ∃x ∈ A, y ≈ x).
It is readily seen that the relation ≈P on P∗(X) is an equivalence relation. More precisely,
≈P extends the dmo’s perspective on consequential equivalence in choice problems. A described
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choice problem is a set of descriptions of alternatives. We can illustrate the previous definitions
with the following example.
Example 5. Consider three consequences. One inspired from Levin and Gaeth (1988): eating
ground beef [G] described either as “25% fat ground beef” g1 or “75% lean ground beef” g2. The
two other consequences are eating chicken C and eating beans B, for each of which we consider
only one description, respectively c and b, which need not to be defined for the purpose of the
example. Choosing between ground beef and beans is a choice problem {[G], [B]} that can give
rise to two different described choice problems: {g1, b} and {g2, b}. From the dmo’s perspective,
they are two descriptions of the same choice problem: {g1, b} ≈P {g2, b} because g1 ≈ g2 and
trivially b ≈ b. 
Moreover, to a choice problem we can associate all its descriptions, in particular there is a
natural correspondence between P∗(X)/ ≈P and P∗(X/ ≈).
Proposition 5. Let X be a set and ≈ an equivalence relation on X. There exists a bijection
r from P∗(X/ ≈) to P∗(X)/ ≈P .
The above proposition justifies the following definition: an extended choice problem is a pair
([A]≈P , f) where [A]≈P is a standard choice problem with consequences and f is a described
choice problem, that is, any subset A ⊂ X that belongs into [A]≈P .12
Following Salant and Rubinstein’s approach, an extended choice function c assigns a chosen
consequence [x]≈ to every pair ([A]≈P , f). Given a weak order % on X, the induced extended
choice function c% is defined by
c%([A]≈P , f) = {[x]≈ ∈ X/ ≈ | ∃x′ ∈ [x]≈ ∩ f, x′ % y, ∀y ∈ f} .
If X is finite, this set is necessarily nonempty. To see how their approach fails to capture
framing effects violating description invariance, we propose the following counter example. From
12More formally, a standard choice problem with consequences is a subset I ⊆ X/ ≈. By proposition 5, there
exists an unique [A]≈P such that I = r−1([A]≈P ), consequently with a slight abuse of notation and for the sake
of clarity we denote a standard choice problem with consequences by [A]≈P instead of I.
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the previous example, suppose that the dma likes meat very much and derives more utility from
what looks healthy, so that he prefers the ground beef described as “75% lean” over chicken
over beans over the ground beef described as “25% fat”, i.e., he exhibits the following profile of
preferences: g2  c  b  g1. Hence his preferences are untidy, there is no possible weak order on
X/ ≈. Furthermore the order on the described consequences violates Salant and Rubinstein’s
property ensuring the existence of an equivalence between an extend choice function and a
weak order on X. They call this property γ+-extended, which, adapted to deal with different
descriptions of choice problems, can be stated as follow: if c([A]≈P , f) = [x]≈, c([B]≈P , g) = [y]≈
and [y]≈ ∈ [A]≈P , then there exists a described choice problem h such that c([A]≈P ∪[B]≈P , h) =
[x]≈. To illustrate a violation, note that according to dma preferences: c(([B], [G]), (b, g1)) = [B],
c(([C], [G]), (c, g2)) = [G] and [G] ∈ ([B], [G]). However, c(([B], [C], [G]), (b, c, g1)) = [C] and
c(([B], [C], [G]), (b, c, g2)) = c(([B], [C], [G]), (b, c, g1, g2)) = [G], hence [B] /∈ c(([B], [C], [G]), h)
for all description h of the choice problem ([B], [C], [G]).
To bypass the weaknesses of γ+-extended to deal with descriptions of choice problems we
propose the following modification:
γ+-extended for descriptions: If [x]≈ ∈ c([A]≈P , f), [y]≈ ∈ c([B]≈P , g), [x]≈ ∩ f is a
singleton, and [y]≈ ∩ g ⊆ f , then for all described choice problem h ∈ [A]≈P ∪ [B]≈P such
that [x]≈ ∩ f ⊆ h ⊆ f ∪ g, it holds that [x]≈ ∈ c([A]≈P ∪ [B]≈P , h).
This modification of γ+-extended states roughly that if we are under the ‘same frame’ (e.g.,
either under the save frame or under the die frame in the Asian Disease), then there are no
preference reversals. With this modification, Salant and Rubinstein’s framework can deal with
all preference reversals violating description invariance. However, the weak order generated by
an extended choice function is not necessarily unique, preventing an account of tidy description-
dependence.
Proposition 6. Let X be a finite choice set of described consequences such that X/ ≈ is not
trivial and c an extended choice function. Then, c is an extended choice function that satisfies
γ+-extended for descriptions if, and only if, there exists a weak order % on X (not necessarily
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unique) such that c = c%.
The non uniqueness of the generated weak order makes it impossible to represent the modal
preference of Gaeth and Levine’s dmas, i.e., g2  g1 if there are no other consequences between
them. For instance, the following two profiles of preferences generate and are generated by the
same extended choice function whereas the behavior is indeed not the same: g2  g1  b and
g1  g2  b. That is, their framework can represent g2  g1 only by transitivity if g2  c  g1.
To sum up, Salant and Rubinstein’s framework, when extended to deal with descriptions of
choice problems, does not allow to discriminate between the unframed descriptive structure of
the standard model and the framed descriptive structure with tidy description-dependence of
our framework. That is, if γ+-extended for descriptions is satisfied we are necessarily in a case
of untidy description-dependence if framing effects are observed, but if no such framing effects
are observed, then we cannot know whether we are in a case of description invariance or tidy
description-dependence.
In order to discriminate between tidy and untidy description-dependence in terms of revealed
preferences, we propose to translate all our axioms in terms of choice functions. Let X be a
set of described consequences, a choice function for X is a correspondence c from the set of all
finite and nonempty subsets of X to X such that ∅ 6= c(S) ⊆ S for all S ⊆ X. The following
conditions are translations of our axioms on preferences to be imposed on c:
Condition 1 (Descriptive structure) 〈X, ◦,≈〉 satisfies Definition 1.13
Condition 2 (Contraction consistency and Expansion consistency (Sen 1971))
• Contraction consistency: If x ∈ c(S) and x ∈ T ⊆ S, then x ∈ c(T );
• Expansion consistency: if x, y ∈ c(S), S ⊆ T , and y ∈ c(T ), then x ∈ c(T ).
Condition 3 (Commutativity consistency) If x◦y ∈ c(S), then x◦y, y ◦x ∈ c(S∪{y ◦x}).
Condition 4 (Associativity consistency) If (x ◦ y) ◦ z ∈ c(S), then (x ◦ y) ◦ z, x ◦ (y ◦ z) ∈
c(S ∪ {x ◦ (y ◦ z)}).
13Axioms 1 does not change because it does not involve the dma’s choice function.
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Condition 5 (Idempotency consistency) If x ∈ c(S), then x, x ◦ x ∈ c(S ∪ {x ◦ x}).
Condition 6.1 (Substituability consistency) If x, y ∈ c(S) and x ◦ z, y ◦ z ∈ T , then
x ◦ z ∈ c(T ) iff y ◦ z ∈ c(T ).
Condition 6.2 (Simplifiability consistency) If x◦z, y◦z ∈ c(S) and x, y ∈ T , then x ∈ c(T )
iff y ∈ c(T ).
Condition 7 (Non-triviality) If x 6≈ b, then there exist S ⊂ X, finite, x′ ∈ S ∩ [x]≈,
y′ ∈ S ∩ [y]≈ such that x′ ∈ c(S) and y′ 6∈ c(S).
Condition 8 (ICDAC consistency) Suppose x 6≈ z, x ≈ y and z ≈ t.
• If x, z ∈ S, x ∈ c(S), then there exists T ⊂ X, finite, such that x ◦ y, z ◦ t ∈ T and
x ◦ y ∈ c(T ) ;
• if x ◦ y, z ◦ t ∈ S, x ◦ y ∈ c(S), then there exists T ⊂ X, finite, such that x, z ∈ T and
x ∈ c(T ).
These conditions characterize the behavioral dimension of description invariance and its
violations discussed previously. The revealed preferences will satisfy description invariance if
conditions 1-5 and conditions 6.1 and 6.2 are satisfied, tidy description-dependence if conditions
1-5 and conditions 6.1, 7 and 8 are satisfied (but not condition 6.2), and untidy description-
dependence if conditions 1-5 and condition 6.1 are satisfied (but not conditions 6.2 and 8).
Proposition 7. Let X be a set of described consequences and c be a choice function for X.
Then, c is a choice function that satisfies condition Ci if, and only if, there exists a binary
relation % on X such that c = c% and % satisfies axiom Ai.
5.3 Discussion: application, extensions and related literature
To show how our framework can be used to deal with framing effects and decision problems more
generally, we apply it to four sets of phenomena, namely to some cases of (5.3.1) framing of
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consequences under risk, (5.3.2) framing of acts and of contingencies (that we discuss altogether
and under both risk and uncertainty), (5.3.3) framing under certainty and (5.3.4) individuation
of consequences in the Allais paradox. For each of these, we contrast our framework with existing
formal contributions in economics and show when the compatibility between both allows for
non-trivial extensions.
5.3.1 The framing of consequences under risk
Given the illustrative example used throughout the construction of our framework, its most
natural application is to the original Asian Disease problem under risk (remember that the
framework was built under certainty hence could not deal with the classical Asian Disease
problems). The extension consists in using our framework within existing models of decision
under risk that respect an axiom of weak coalescing, which is tantamount to working with these
models on our choice set14. For instance, models in expected utility theory, rank-dependent
utility theory and cumulative prospect theory respect that condition. Let X be a nonempty
set of described consequences (space of risk-less outcomes) and ∆(X) be the set of all simple
distributions on X. The descriptive structure is now 〈∆(X),≈, ◦〉. This descriptive structure
induces another descriptive structure 〈X,≈X , ◦X〉 on described consequences15. It follows that
we can use the utility of described consequences in theories that respect weak coalescing. Our
results ensure that this replacement does not alter the axioms underlying these theories. It
is worth noting that under expected utility, the implied risk attitudes are dependent on the
descriptions of the consequences, and not the consequences itself, which is the whole point of
Asian Disease problems in the first place. Formally, using the notation from Table 5.1, the modal
preferences in the original Asian Disease can be represented straightforwardly in expected utility
theory (defined over our choice set) as:
14Weak coalescing holds if for all x, y ∈ X such that x ∼ y, (x, p; y, q; z, 1 − p − q) ∼ (x, p + q; z, 1 − p − q).
This property is stronger than coalescing with x = y.
15Another way of extending our framework under risk would be to follow Giraud (2004a, pp.7-11): Start
from 〈X,≈, ◦〉 and extend it to ∆(X). It is natural to extend ≈ on X as follows: for all l,m ∈ ∆(X), l ≈ m iff
(∀x ∈ s(l), ∃y ∈ s(m), x ≈ y, l(x) = m(y)) and (∀y ∈ s(m), ∃x ∈ s(l), y ≈ x, m(y) = l(x)), and ◦ pointwise. This
approach indeed works for the framing effects we are interested in, but leave aside logically equivalent lotteries
(for instance the ones in splitting effects, i.e., violating coalescing, see Birnbaum 2005). To avoid this drawback,
≈ mus be extended on ∆(X) by: l ≈ m iff the induced lotteries on consequences are equal. In this case, the
definition of ◦ becomes more tedious.
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u(x1) >
1
3u(y1) +
2
3u(z1)
1
3u(y2) +
2
3u(z2) > u(x2)
These inequalities can be rationalized by one weak order in the sense that u(.) is its numerical
representation and that it generates and can be generated by a choice function as defined in the
previous section. Furthermore, the same weak order can also rationalize all the other empirical
regularities on the Asian Disease problem.
The same reasoning carries identically to other framing of consequences besides the Asian
Disease. Two further illustrations are worth providing. One is DeMartino et al. (2006)’s where
the two different frames have identical descriptions of the probabilistic options, they differ
only by different descriptions of the sure options (cf. previous chapter). Formally, from the
dmo’s perspective, let a1 ≡ “Keep £20”, a2 ≡ “lose £30” ∈ [a]≈, b1 ≡ “keep all” ∈ [b]≈ and
c1 ≡ “lose all” ∈ [c]≈. The modal perspective from dmas can be represented straightforwardly
in expected utility theory:
u(a1) >
1
3u(b1) +
2
3u(c1)
1
3u(b1) +
2
3u(c1) > u(a2)
Notice the formal representation of the distinction between, on the one hand, a difference
in descriptions of the same consequence (for the sure one), and, on the other hand, an iden-
tity of descriptions of the same consequence (for the probabilistic ones). The last illustration
comes from McNeil et al. (1982) and has a different empirical structure than Asian Disease-
like problems. dmas are presented with hypothetical choices between two ways of treating lung
cancer, i.e., surgery vs. radiation therapy, in one of two frames. In one frame the cumulative
probabilities are presented as descriptions of survival rates:16
16The exact empirical wording of the problem appears only in Tversky and Kahenman (1986).
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Surgery: Of 100 people having surgery 90 live through the post-operative period,
68 are alive at the end of the first year and 34 are alive at the end of five years.
Radiation Therapy: Of 100 people having radiation therapy all live through the
treatment, 77 are alive at the end of one year and 22 are alive at the end of five
years.
In another frame, they are presented as descriptions of death rates:
Surgery: Of 100 people having surgery 10 die during surgery or the post-operative
period, 32 die by the end of the first year and 66 die by the end of five years.
Radiation Therapy: Of 100 people having radiation therapy, none die during
treatment, 23 die by the end of one year and 78 die by the end of five years.
In this framing problem, the objects of choice are streams of dated binary lotteries. In each
lottery, the binary consequences are mutually exclusive (i.e., being dead or alive) and from
the dmo’s perspective, presenting only one of the two branches (consequence plus associated
probability) allows to infer the other branch and thus the complete lottery. Furthermore, we
can define a logical equivalence between objects of choice over time (as was for the extension
of our framework for decision under risk). Under the standard assumption of inter-temporal
separability, we can focus only on lotteries independently of their place in the stream.
Formally, let
a1 ≡ “ 90100 chances of living through the post-operative period” ,
a2 ≡ “ 10100 chances of dying during the post-operative period”
 ∈ [a]≈
b1 ≡ “ 68100chances of living in one year” ,
b2 ≡ “ 32100chances of dying in one year”
 ∈ [b]≈
c1 ≡ “ 34100chances of living in five years” ,
c2 ≡ “ 66100chances of dying in five years”
 ∈ [c]≈
d1 ≡ “ 100100chances of living through the post-operative period” ,
d2 ≡ “ 0100chances of dying through the post-operative period”
 ∈ [d]≈
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e1 ≡ “ 77100chances of living in one year” ,
e2 ≡ “ 23100chances of dying in one year”
 ∈ [e]≈
f1 ≡ “ 22100chances of living in five years” ,
f2 ≡ “ 78100chances of dying in five years”
 ∈ [f ]≈
The modal perspective from dmas can be represented straightforwardly with the subscripts
0, 1y and 5y denoting respectively the postoperative period, one year after the operation and
five years after the operation:
u0(a1) + u1y(b1) + u5y(c1) > u0(d1) + u1y(e1) + u5y(f1)
u0(d2) + u1y(e2) + u5y(f2) > u0(a2) + u1y(b2) + u5y(c2)
Again, the results of our framework are enough to ensure that there is a binary relation of
preference underlying u and that it generates and can be generated by a choice function.
Let us now contrast our framework with other formal accounts of framing effects under risk.
The main difference with all of these accounts is that we considered a richer set of behavioral data
from the psychology literature to guide our axiomatic constructions. Among these accounts, the
closest from our framework is Giraud’s (2004a; b; 2005). We were indeed inspired from what
he calls a “normative” equivalence relation on the choice set, which is close to the perspective
of the dmo in our framework. However, we did not necessarily identify the dmo’s perspective
with a normative one that the dma would like to take and we characterized their relations
through an algebraic structure on descriptions. Hence we were able to decompose our invariance
axiom (ICD) and characterize how a utility and choice function still exist when this axiom is
weakened. That is, we went further than imposing the axiom and forcing a choice between
taking it to be true or false17. This considerably simplifies applications, especially because
Giraud cannot formalize a direct dependence of preferences on descriptions without interpreting
it as a failure of the dma to recognize that different descriptions are about the same consequences.
17We thank Giraud for explaining to us these differences in these terms
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To bypass this shortcoming, he gives an account of the original Asian Disease which is more
complex than ours, where the preference reversal is explained through a nonadditive decision
weight function, making the dma’s beliefs directly dependent on descriptions and preferences
indirectly so when revealed (see Giraud 2004a; b). Finally, he makes more assumptions about
the underlying psychological processes of the dma on which we are agnostic, and while we
narrowly focused on the role of descriptions, his framework is also built to deal with violations of
context independence (i.e., preference reversals triggered by expansion and/or contraction of the
choice set) and of procedure invariance (i.e., preference reversals triggered by different elicitation
methods). Hence, because we believe that our frameworks are compatible, incorporating our
choice set in his approach could make it more tractable while expanding the explanatory and
empirical scope of ours.
The few other formal accounts of framing effects in the literature have all been conducted in
frameworks that are less close to the standard one than Giraud’s and ours. Nevertheless under
one form or another, the differences just discussed resurface.
Take for instance Blume et al. (2013). They account for framing effects within their “con-
tructive decision theory” framework where objects of choice are syntactic descriptions of events
in a simple programming language. They show how this language naturally formalizes the two
frames of McNeil et al. (Surgery vs. Radiation) as two logically non-equivalent syntactic de-
scriptions. Description invariance is not derived and then weakened but imposed by a subset of
the syntactic descriptions that describes the same events according to the dma’s beliefs. This al-
lows to represent both dma revealing framing effects and those who don’t (simply by putting the
two syntactic descriptions of the two frames in different subsets or by regrouping them within
the same subset, respectively).
Or take Gold and List (2004). They use the resources of predicate logic to construct a choice
set in which the elements are either “target” propositions about the dma’s preferences or various
“background” propositions about the decision situation. Framing effects are formalized as arising
from a sequential process whereby beliefs about two different sets of background propositions
can influence contradictory beliefs about the same target proposition, e.g., the dma believes that
it is true that he prefers the sure program over the probabilistic one and the dma believes that
it is false that he prefers the sure program over the probabilistic one (see pp.267-268). They
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make description invariance formally explicit but not as quite straightforwardly as in our and
others’ frameworks.
Take finally Bourgeois-Gironde and Giraud (2009). They analyze framing effects through the
framework of Bolker-Jeffrey expected utility where preferences are over propositions. They make
explicit the implicit axiom of invariance in this framework by showing how it is hidden both in
the mathematical structure of the Boolean algebra with which the choice set is constructed and
in its interpretation as a set of propositions. Once made explicit, they however do not weaken
it, but propose to “bypass” it (p.390) by introducing a new set of information (“good news”
and “bad news”) to be associated with each events, hence refining the dma’s beliefs about the
latter. Following McKenzie and co-authors (see the previous chapter, §4.3.1), framing effects
are thus rationalized by refining invariance to the informational (and not only logical) structure
of decision problems.
Among these three contributions, the closest to ours in spirit is Bourgeois-Gironde and
Giraud (2009) because of their inspiration from McKenzie and co-authors’ results to motivate
an account of framing effects as not necessarily irrational. They however do not consider the
further results from psychology that motivated our formalization of a direct dependence of
preferences on descriptions. Bacharach (2003) provides an analysis of framing effects under risk
in this spirit, but it is quite informal and less motivated by behavioral data (concerning the
direct dependence of preferences on descriptions).18
Summing up, the main difference between ours and others’ frameworks is the axiomatic
approach through which we make description invariance explicit and then weaken it to allow for
a direct dependence of preferences on descriptions. The main advantages of this approach are its
simplicity (both of the framework itself and in its application) and its fit with existing behavioral
data on framing effects in psychology. Notice that these data include not only Kahneman and
Tversky’s original ones, but also the ones from other psychologists presented in the previous
chapter. One of the points of their early experiments was to demonstrate framing effects by
framing consequences, acts and events independently of each others. This threefold empirical
18Both Ryan (2005) and Lanzi (2011) claim to provide a framework to formalize framing effects. Their accounts
do not seem very tractable; in any case they do not provide concrete applications to framing effects showing how
the formalization should work (they do so for other phenomena). Lerner (2014) provides an account of framing
effects through intensional logic. Though she illustrates how her framework formalizes the Asian Disease, it is
again not very tractable.
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and conceptual distinction seems lost in others’ contributions, all of which introduce events and
beliefs in the formalization of problems such as the Asian Disease and other framing effects
under risk where there are no events and where only the consequences are framed19. What does
our framework have to say on beliefs and the framing of events and acts?
5.3.2 The framing of acts and events, under risk and uncertainty
To deal with this question, we propose to contrast our framework with Ahn and Ergin (2010).
The latter is primarily designed to account for framing effects due to the framing of events in
cases such as the following (ibid, p.655). Consider these two health insurance contracts stipu-
lating the consequences (i.e., the amounts of money in their left sides) occurring contingently
upon the realization of events (i.e., described in their right sides):

$500 surgery
$100 prenatal care
...
...


$500 laminotomy
$500 other surgeries
$100 prenatal care
...
...

Notice that “laminotomy” and “other surgeries” are both included in “surgery”, and the
union of the two former is equal to the latter. Hence we have two different descriptions of the
same contract. Ahn and Ergin’s axiomatic approach consists in making explicit the axiom of
invariance to such redescriptions that is implicit in the standard model, and then weaken it to
provide what they call a “partition-dependent expected utility” theory.
Our framework cannot deal directly with such framing effects. It could if properly extended
for acts as objects of choice instead of consequences. Such extension would be in line with Ahn
and Ergin’s framework because, due to our finiteness assumptions, we would need to weaken
description invariance with a finite state-space à la Anscombe and Aumann (1963) as they
do, i.e., not within an infinite one à la Savage)20. In a way, Ahn and Ergin’s elegant results
would make it easy for us to carry such an extension, which may not be trivial in the sense
of accounting for at least two further types of framing phenomena for which they cannot in
19With the exception of Bacharach (2003, p.66), who insists that “Framing is logically prior to believing.”
20Or to do so in Savage’s framework, we could work our extension trough Gul’s (1992) modification of the
former for finite state-space.
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their framework, namely those due to different descriptions (1) of the same consequence or (2)
of the same events when the redescription is “pure”, i.e., not made through the packing or
unpacking of an inclusion relation. The two following examples respectively illustrate each case
and are inspired from the field studies and lab experiments of Sinaceur et al. (2005) about
the impacts on various cognitive and behavioral measures of different descriptions of the same
disease either with the ordinary label “Mad Cow” or with the scientific label “bovine spongiform
encephalopathy” (BSE). Imagine that you ate beef and the consequences of that act are that
you get the disease in the event that the U.K. trades beef with France (abbreviated by “trades
with U.K.”) and that you don’t get the disease otherwise. Here are two different descriptions of
that act:

get Mad Cow trades with U.K.
don’t get Mad Cow no trades with U.K.
...
...


get BSE trades with U.K.
don’t get BSE no trades with U.K.
...
...

Now imagine that you ate beef at Mike’s place, and the consequences of that act is that you
get sick in the event that Mike bought infected beef and don’t get sick otherwise. Here are two
different descriptions of that act:

get sick Mike bought Mad Cow beef
don’t get sick Mike bought healthy beef
...
...


get sick Mike bought BSE beef
don’t get sick Mike bought healthy beef
...
...

It can be argued that Ahn and Ergin’s impossibility to deal with this latter example is
problematic in the sense that their model is devised to account for the effects of redescriptions
of the same event, while it is less problematic that they cannot deal with the former because
doing so is not their contention. On the other hand, we could deal with the former case quite
straightforwardly because it is the kind of framing effects we designed our framework for, while
the latter case would require more work. As we see it, a state-dependent account may be
the sensible way to go here. We believe so because state-dependent utility finds a natural
interpretation that is well in line with the work of McKenzie on information leakage which
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motivated our framework. The interpretation is that, it is not the descriptions of the event per
se on which the dma’s preferences are dependent, but on the fact that an entity chose a given
description over other possible ones. Hence preference reversals due to ‘who said what’ could
be formally represented in a neat way.
Finally, let us consider Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981, p.454) framing of act under risk
discussed in the previous chapter (though “act” is not to be taken in a Savagean sense because
there are no events in their example). It is worth reproducing the decision problem here for
convenience:
[First frame]
Imagine that you face the following pair of concurrent decisions. First examine both
decisions, then indicate the options you prefer.
Decision (i). Choose between:
A. a sure gain of $240
B. 25% chance to gain $1000, and 75% chance to gain nothing
Decision (ii). Choose between:
C. a sure loss of $750
D. 75% chance to lose $1000, and 25% chance to lose nothing
[Second frame]
Choose between:
A&D. 25% chance to win $240, and 75% chance to lose $760.
B&C. 25% chance to win $250, and 75% chance to lose $750.
In this framing problem, the object of choice are lotteries that are either composed in the
first frame or reduced in the second one. From the dmo’s perspective, both forms of lotteries
are equivalent, i.e., (A,D), A&D ∈ [AD]≈ and (B,C), B&C ∈ [BC]≈. The modal preference
from dmas, i.e., (A,D)  (B,C) and B&C  A&D, exhibit untidy description-dependence and
hence violate ICDAC. However, to fully represent these choices in terms of utility functions on
described consequences with their associated probabilities, we would need to incorporate our
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framework in models allowing for violations of first-order stochastic dominance (see the ones
presented by Birnbaum 2005).
5.3.3 Framing under certainty
In this subsection we briefly apply our framework to two famous cases of framing under certainty
to illustrate possible interpretations of the dma-dmo relation for the positive/normative issue,
i.e., regarding the rationality or irrationality of framing effects. The first case is from Quattrone
and Tversky (1988). It can be thought of as an analogue of the Asian Disease under certainty
where the choice is between two public policies with different trade-offs between (un)employment
and inflation:
If program A is adopted, 5% of the work force would be unemployed, while the
rate of inflation would be 17%.
If program B is adopted, 10% of the work force would be unemployed, while the rate
of inflation would be 12%.
If program C is adopted, 95% of the work force would be employed, while the rate
of inflation would be 17%.
If program D is adopted, 90% of the work force would be employed, while the rate
of inflation would be 12%.
In our framework, there are two straightforward ways to represent these modal preferences.
Firstly, the dmo is an economist who classes objects of choice in terms of their economic impli-
cations:
a1 ≡ “5%of the work force would be unemployed, while the rate of inflation would be 17%” ,
a2 ≡ “95%of the work force would be employed, while the rate of inflation would be 17%”
 ∈ [a]≈
b1 ≡ “10%of the work force would be unemployed, while the rate of inflation would be 12%” ,
b2 ≡ “90%of the work force would be employed, while the rate of inflation would be 12%”
 ∈ [b]≈
The modal perspective from dmas can be represented straightforwardly as u(a1) > u(b1) and
u(b2) > u(a2). If the dmo wish to take a normative perspective on these preferences, he can
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either argue that they are rational because representable by a utility and choice functions, or
irrational because they exhibit untidy description-dependence and hence violate ICDAC.
Secondly, the dmo is a politician who classes objects of choice in terms of whether they look
like good news or like bad news, respectively:
a1 ≡ “5%of the work force would be unemployed, while the rate of inflation would be 17%” ,
a2 ≡ “90%of the work force would be employed, while the rate of inflation would be 12%”
 ∈ [a]≈
b1 ≡ “10%of the work force would be unemployed, while the rate of inflation would be 12%” ,
b2 ≡ “95%of the work force would be employed, while the rate of inflation would be 17%”
 ∈ [b]≈
In this case, the modal perspective from the dmas can be represented straightforwardly as
u(a1) > u(b1) and u(a2) > u(b2). If the dmo wishes to take a normative perspective on these
preferences he can argue that they are rational not only because they are representable as utility
maximization and choice behavior, but also because they exhibit tidy description-dependence
and hence do not violate ICDAC. Alternatively, the dmo could argue for their irrationality
because they exhibit tidy description-dependence and hence violate ICD.
The second case of framing under certainty is Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) lost bill/lost
ticket example discussed in the previous chapter. Recall that, on the one hand, the two frames
are about two different situations (not two descriptions of the same situation, i.e., it was a
loose framing effects), and, on the other hand, beyond the lab this problem cannot really be
interpreted as an external dmo posing a decision problem to the dma (in the real world you would
be both the dmo and the dma and construct your own counterfactuals to make up your mind).
Nevertheless, it is possible to capture both these differences in our framework, and again in two
different but straightforward manner. Firstly, the dmo is either an observing economist or a self
of a multiple selves dma, both of whom class objects of choice by their consequences in terms of
opportunity costs:
a1 ≡ “paying for a $10 ticket after having lost a $10 bill” ,
a2 ≡ “paying for a $10 ticket after having lost a $10 ticket”
 ∈ [a]≈
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In this case, the modal preference of dmas can be represented straightforwardly as u(a1) >
u(a2). If the dmo wishes to take a normative perspective on these preferences, he can either
argue that they are rational because representable by a utility function and a choice function,
or irrational because they exhibit tidy description-dependence and hence violate ICD.
Secondly, the dmo is a self of a multiple selves dma who classes objects of choice by their
consequences in terms of their experienced utility, considering that the experience of being upset
from having lost a ticket is different from the experience of of being upset from having lost a
bill, respectively:
a1 ≡ “paying for a $10 ticket after having lost a $10 ticket” ∈ [a]≈
b1 ≡ “paying for a $10 ticket after having lost a $10 bill” ∈ [b]≈
In this case, the modal preference of dmas can be represented straightforwardly as u(a1) >
u(b1). If the dmo wishes to take a normative perspective on these preferences, he can either
argue that they are rational because representable by a utility function and a choice function, or
that they are irrational because they exhibit untidy description-dependence and hence violate
ICDAC.
By presenting the possibility of multiple interpretations from our framework we do not aim
to take a relativistic perspective on the normative issues underlying framing effects. Instead, we
believe that these issues are important and that the flexibility of our framework allows to make
precise discussions of the conditions under which a given interpretation of observed preferences
can be seen as rational or irrational. In that sense, though formally quite different, we take
a position similar to Gilboa et al. (2010), i.e., that a formal framework can help organize
rational discussions and even debates over normative issues underlying individual rationality in
economics.
5.3.4 Individuation and redescription of consequences
In this subsection, we suggest that something very close to our framework was presupposed in a
set of arguments constitutive of the debates around Allais’ paradoxes. Recall that the classical
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Allais paradox (a version of the so-called common consequence effect) goes as follows (Allais
1953, p.527; consequences are monetary, originally in French francs):
A: The certainty of winning 100 millions
B: 10% chance of winning 500 millions, 89% chance of winning 100 millions, and 1%
chance of winning nothing
Notice that both A and B share a common consequence, namely “winning 100 millions”, with
certainty in A and with 89% chance in B. Thus both A and B share at least 89% of winning 100
millions (and A has an extra 11% chance for it). So, if we retrieve this common consequence
with the common probability of occurrence, the preference between A and B should not change
to respect the independence axiom. But it does:
C: 11% chance of winning 100 millions
D: 10% chance of winning 500 millions and 90% chance of winning nothing
As reviewed by Broome (1991), most defenses of expected utility theory consisted in arguing
that Allais’ paradoxes are not paradoxes anymore when the consequences are redescribed to
add information about, for instance, some feelings of disappointment if the decision maker does
not win anything. Such redescriptions, e.g., “winning nothing” and “winning nothing and being
disappointed” are then taken as different descriptions of different consequences, hence breaking
the equivalence between the two initial pairs of problem, and making it impossible to observe
an inconsistency from expected utility theory. Within our framework, this reasoning could be
formalized as follows. The dmo is a decision theorist who classes consequences in terms of their
experienced utility, considering that the experience of being disappointed when winning nothing
is different from the experience of winning nothing:
a1 ≡ “winning nothing” ∈ [a]≈
b1 ≡ “winning nothing and being disappointed” ∈ [b]≈
By contrast, those who argued against this interpretation held a position that can be formalized
as :
a1 ≡ “winning nothing” ,
a2 ≡ “winning nothing and being disappointed”
 ∈ [a]≈
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It can be argued that the condition of possibility for this debate is the standard notion
of a consequence, which, following Savage (1972 [1954], pp.13), is taken to mean “anything
that may happen to the person”, i.e., to the dma. This includes any “things, or experiences,
regarded as consequences” (ibid, p.14). It may be asked, regarded as a consequence by whom?
In standard decision theory, consequences are, in principle, regarded as such by dmas. But
by virtue of revealed preference methodology, only the dma’s obervable choice behavior should
be a primitive in the analysis which excludes his subjective perception of what counts as one
consequence. Hence, in practice, consequences are regarded as such by a decision theorist
guessing or postulating what a dma would count as a consequence. The first position in the
debate on redescriptions in the Allais paradox shows that one drawback of this permissive notion
of a consequence is that it prevents to account for the simple fact that one dma (or even one
decision theorist for that matter) can entertain different perspectives on the same consequence.
That is, it prevents to account for the recognition by the dma that different presentations of
the same consequence (or “things”) trigger different preferences (or “experiences”). Instead, it
can be argued that we shall try to do justice to the subjectivity of a dma who recognizes that
one and the same consequence can trigger different mental states in different situation, without
conveniently postulating that the differences were “in fact” about different consequences. This
is the second position in the debate, which was notably held by Sen (2002, chap.6 and chap.11
[both from 1986]) and Machina (1989, sect.6.6). Following these two authors, we argue that in
order to do justice to the decision maker’s values and hence make the related normative analysis
easier, we shall not blend all the factually relevant observations into one single theoretical
construct (here of “consequence”). The empirical stakes are just as high as the normative ones
here, since too permissive a notion of a consequence makes any utility theory not amenable
to empirical falsification in principle, a methodological position which is not quite the same
as not being falsifiable in practice. Therefore, what underlies our whole framework is not the
standard notion of a consequence, but rather what Machina (1989, p.1660) calls “the operational
definition of a consequences”. We do not see this as a drawback, as it can be argued that the
whole of experimental economics (or at least its subpart that focuses on decision theory) does
indeed not rely on the standard notion of a consequence. We do not see how framing effects
could even be intelligible with that notion.
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In short, we argue that different descriptions of one same consequence that can be described
as such by a dmo and recognized as such by a dma should be represented as such by the decision
theorist (if he is not already the dmo). By virtue of the formal discrimination of different
descriptions of a same consequence, our framework allows to do this in a straightforward manner.
With it, we have tried to shed some lights on a debate around the Allais paradox which is not
a framing effect per se. Yet the underlying issues are not unconnected with framing effects (for
a sustained argument in that direction, see Giraud 2004b, pp.146-7). Whether out framework
can help to resolve deeper conceptual issues related to the permissive notion of consequence in
decision theory (see Aumann 1987 [1971]; Savage 1987 [1971]) is an open question that we left
for further work.
Conclusion: the decision maker and the decision modeler, together at
last
In this chapter, we proposed an account, in the language of economics, of the framing effects
violating description invariance that were presented in the previous chapter. This was made
through an axiomatic framework in which the axiom of description invariance that is implicit
in standard models could be made explicit and then weakened. We have seen that, to make it
explicit, the traditional choice set first needs to be refined from objects of choice to their descrip-
tions, and then description invariance can be characterized as an indifference relation between
all the descriptions and their possible concatenations of a given object of choice. Furthermore,
different weakening of description invariance can imply different different degrees of dependence
to descriptions. We have characterized the implications in terms of choice, preference and utility
of two such degrees, i.e., tidy description-dependence (preferences only within but not across
consequences) and untidy description-dependence (preferences within and across consequences).
Under tidy description-dependence, the Asian Disease and other well known framing effects can
be formally accounted for rather straightforwardly by integrating our choice set in standard
(as well as non-standard) models. For other framing effects, this is not so straightforward and
more work is needed. This is notably the case for framing effects due to different descriptions
of the same event, for which we should work on the dma’s beliefs. Because we have stated our
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framework in terms of informational content (instead of merely ‘descriptions’), such an exten-
sion is conceptually unproblematic. Notice that it is only through an extension to beliefs that
a full characterization of Sher and McKenzie’s informational leaking account discussed in the
previous chapter will be possible. We have suggested a way to make this extension in line with
the theory of speech act underlying the methodological perspective of this dissertation, namely
through state-dependent preferences with states identified as a speech act from a dmo .
To conclude, we would like to emphasize the possible mutual-influences between the method-
ological and philosophical approach taken in all the previous chapters and the formal one taken
here. On the one hand, it is straightforward that the methodological and philosophical con-
siderations of the previous chapter were the conditions of possibility of this one. Without the
previous chapter, there would never had adopted the dma and dmo distinction as we have done
in the interpretation of our framework.
On the other hand, we tried to make the case that the developments made in this chap-
ter also illuminate the methodological and philosophical problems posed in this dissertation.
For instance, we argued that our framework could help clarify the frontier between behavioral
and standard economics on framing effects. The framed descriptive structure with descrip-
tion invariance always characterize standard economics and the normative positions of behav-
ioral economics on framing effects; and the framed descriptive structure with tidy or untidy
description-dependence marks different ways of seeing the frontiers depending on whether we
are under certainty or uncertainty. Tidy descriptive dependence may be acceptable under cer-
tainty to some standard and behavioral economists as rational because preference reversals are
prevented; but not under risk, where the preference reversals it can yield are usually deemed
irrational by behavioral and standard economists, but needs to be captured in positive models of
individual behaviors in behavioral economics (the same reasoning applies to untidy description-
dependence, i.e., regardless of whether or not we are under certainty or under risk). Notice
however that we have not tackle the issue of theoretical unification regarding framing effects in
the three dimensions; this is left for further work.
Likewise, we argued throughout that the dma and dmo interpertation clarified the posi-
tive/normative issue underlying framing effects. This clarification stems from making explicit
the axiomatic conditions (i.e., violation of ICD versus ICDAC) under which one framing effect
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can be given two different interpretations, i.e., as rational or irrational. It could be argued that
this does not clarify anything because ‘rationality’ is never defined once and for all and then
used consistently for evaluative interpretations, i.e., the notion of rationality changes as dmo’s
perspective changes. We would respond, following Sen (2002, chap.1), that defining rationality
a priori and ‘once and for all’ does not pay full justice to the power of human reason. Being a
little more pragmatic about rationality does not imply to take all value judgments of rationality
and irrationality as being created equal (i.e., pragmatism is not relativism or nihilism, see Stein
1996). Arguably, the methodological attitude of defining rationality a priori and once and for
all played a nontrivial role in economists’ perspective on description invariance as an ‘all or
nothing’ axiom: either you have it or you don’t. By contrast, being a little more pragmatic
when it comes to rationality helps not only to see that this is not necessarily the case but also
to guide the formal constructions needed to weaken the axiom.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of proposition 1. Let x ∈ X. By axiom 1, ≈ is an equivalence relation, define
[x]≈ := {a ∈ X | a ≈ x} the equivalence class of x by ≈. [x]≈ is a subset of X and ∼ is an
equivalence by axiom 2. Let [x]≈/ ∼ be the set of equivalence classes of [x]≈ under ∼. Define
? on [x]≈/ ∼ as follows: [a] ? [b] = [a ◦ b]. By axioms 1, if a, b ∈ [x]≈, then a ◦ b is defined and
belongs to [x]≈. ? is a closed binary operation on [x]≈/ ∼. Observe that ? is well defined since
if a, a′, b, b′ ∈ [x]≈, a ∼ a′ and b ∼ b′, then, by axiom 1, a ◦ b and a′ ◦ b′ are defined and by two
applications of axiom 6, a ◦ b ∼ a′ ◦ b ∼ a′ ◦ b′, so [a] ? [b] = [a′] ? [b′]. We show that 〈[x]≈/ ∼, ?〉
is a cancellative idempotent commutative semigroup. If a, b, c ∈ [x]≈, then by axioms 1, a ◦ b,
b ◦ a, (a ◦ b) ◦ c and a ◦ (b ◦ c) are defined. Associativity follows from axiom 4; commutativity
follows from axiom 3; idempotence follows from axiom 5; and cancellation follows from axiom
6. It is a classical result that a commutative semigroup can be embedded in a group if and only
if it is cancellative. Note that 〈[x]≈/ ∼, ?〉 is idempotent, it follows that the group extension
of 〈[x]≈/ ∼, ?〉 is a group in which every element is idempotent. Every group has exactly one
idempotent element: the identity. It follows that for all a, b ∈ [x]≈, a ∼ b. Hence,
300
∀a, b ∈ X, a ≈ b⇒ a ∼ b.
Proof of proposition 2. As in proof of Proposition 1, define [x]≈ := {a ∈ X | a ≈ x} the
equivalence class of x by ≈; and ? on [x]≈/ ∼ as follows: [a] ? [b] = [a ◦ b]. As axioms 1-5 and
6.1 hold, it is clear that ? is well defined and that 〈[x]≈/ ∼, ?〉 is an idempotent commutative
semigroup. We show that if a ∈ X and b ∈ X are generated by the same generators, then
a ∼ b. Let B be an idempotent commutative semigroup generated by b1, . . . , bn. For each
x ∈ B, the length of x, denoted by |x|, is the minimum k such that x = x1x2 . . . xk, where
xk ∈ {b1, . . . , bn}, k ≥ i ≥ 1. Note that |x| ≥ 1 for all x ∈ B. The largest possible length of an
element of any idempotent commutative semigroup with n generators is n. Now, let a, b ∈ X,
generated by the same generators. The previous reasoning applies and by axiom 6.1, it is clear
that a ∼ b. Suppose that [x]≈ is finitely generated by n pure descriptions, then 〈[x]≈/ ∼, ?〉 is
finitely generated by n elements. By analogy with the cardinal of the power set of a finite set
〈[x]≈/ ∼, ?〉 has at most 2n − 1 elements.
Proof of proposition 3. In view of proposition 2, we show that axioms 7 and 8 imply that
∀x, y, z ∈ X, if x ≈ z and x % z, then (x % y % z ⇒ y ≈ x).
Assume that % satisfies axioms 7 and 8, take x, y, z ∈ X such that x ≈ z, x % z, and x % y % z),
and suppose that not y ≈ x, hence not y ≈ z. By axiom 7 there exist z1 ≈ z, x2 ≈ x, and
y1, y2 ≈ y such that not z1 ∼ y1 and not x2 ∼ y2. Assume z1  y1 or y2  x2, applying axiom
8 twice, we obtain y  z or z  x. This contradicts x % y % z. Hence, we have y1  z1
and x2  y2. By similar reasoning, x ∼ y, y ∼ z and x ∼ z are impossible. We can suppose
that x  y  z, but again, applying axiom 8 twice, by transitivity we obtain x ◦ z  x ◦ y, a
contradiction. Therefore, y ≈ x (and y ≈ z).
Proof of proposition 4. Let 〈X,≈, ◦〉 be a descriptive structure such that X/ ≈ is finite and
[x]≈ is finitely generated for all x ∈ X. Let x ∈ X, we can explicitly enumerate, in a countable
fashion, all possible concatenations on [x]≈. Since this provides a listing of all elements of
[x]≈, [x]≈ is countable. X/ ≈ is finite, whence it is the union of a finite number of countable
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sets, hence X/ ≈ is countable. It is well-known that a countable weakly ordered set admits an
utility representation, hence statement (i) is proven. Statement (ii) (respectively (iii), (iv)) is a
consequence of (i) and Proposition 1 (respectively Proposition 2, 3).
Proof of proposition 5. Define r : P∗(X/ ≈)→ P∗(X)/ ≈P by
r(I) :=
 ⋃
[x]≈∈I
[x]≈

≈P
.
We will show that r is onto. Let A ∈ P∗(X). Set I = {[x]≈ | x ∈ A}, we will show that⋃
[x]≈∈I [x]≈ ≈P A, that is r(I) = [A]≈P . If x ∈ A, by definition, x ∈
⋃
[x]≈∈I [x]≈. Conversely, if
y ∈ ⋃[x]≈∈I [x]≈, there is an x ∈ A such that y ≈ x. Therefore ⋃[x]≈∈I [x]≈ ≈P A. Next we show
that r is one-to-one. Suppose that r(I) = r(J) for some I, J ∈ P∗(X/ ≈). Let [x]≈ ∈ I, then
as
⋃
[x]≈∈I [x]≈ =
⋃
[x]≈∈J [x]≈, and [x]≈ ⊆
⋃
[x]≈∈I [x]≈, we have [x]≈ ⊆
⋃
[x]≈∈J [x]≈, whence
[x]≈ ∈ J . Hence I ⊆ J , by symmetry I = J .
Proof of proposition 6. Let X be a finite choice set of described consequences such that
X/ ≈ is not trivial and c an extended choice function. Let c = c% where % is complete and
transitive relation on X. To see that c satisfies property γ+-extended for descriptions, note that
if [x]≈ ∈ c([A]≈P , f), [y]≈ ∈ c([B]≈P , g), [x]≈ ∩ f is a singleton, and [y]≈ ∩ g ⊆ f , then there
exists a unique x′ ∈ f such that x′ ≈ x and x′ % z for all z ∈ f and there exists y′ ∈ [y]≈ such
that y′ ∈ f and y′ % z for all z ∈ g. It follows that x′ % z for all z ∈ f∪g. Let h ∈ [A]≈P ∪ [B]≈P
such that [x]≈ ∩ f ⊆ h ⊆ f ∪ g, whence x′ ∈ h, hence [x]≈ ∈ c([A]≈P ∪ [B]≈P , h).
In the other direction, let c be an extended choice function satisfying γ+-extended for descrip-
tions. Define%c onX as follows: x %c y iff x 6≈ y and ∃A ⊆ X such that x, y ∈ A, [x]≈∩A = {x},
[y]≈∩A = {y}, and [x]≈ ∈ c([A]≈P , A). If x 6≈ y, since c is nonempty by definition, it is straight-
forward to show that either x %c y or y %c x. Suppose that x %c y, y %c z and x 6≈ z. By defini-
tion, x %c y means x 6≈ y and ∃Axy ⊆ X such that x, y ∈ Axy, [x]≈∩Axy = {x}, [y]≈∩Axy = {y},
and [x]≈ ∈ c([Axy]≈P , Axy). And y %c z means y 6≈ z and ∃Ayz ⊆ X such that y, z ∈ Ayz,
[y]≈ ∩Ayz = {y}, [z]≈ ∩Ayz = {z}, and [y]≈ ∈ c([Ayz]≈P , Ayz). Let Axz be the maximal subset
(w.r.t inclusion) of Axy ∪Ayz which belongs to [Axy]≈P ∪ [Ayz]≈P and includes x, z as only rep-
resentative of [x]≈, [z]≈ respectively. Whence, [x]≈ ∈ c([Axy]≈P , Axy), [y]≈ ∈ c([Ayz]≈P , Ayz),
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[x]≈ ∩ Axy is a singleton, and [y]≈ ∩ Axy = {y} ⊆ Axy. Hence, γ+-extended for descriptions
applies, as Axz belongs to [Axy]≈P ∪ [Ayz]≈P and [x]≈ ∩ Axy = {x} ⊆ Axz ⊆ Axy ∪ Ayz, it is
true that [x]≈ ∈ c([Axz]≈P , Axz). Hence zx %c z because x 6≈ z. Now, if S ⊆ X is such that
for all x, y ∈ S, x 6≈ y whenever x 6= y, then the restriction of %c is a weak order on S. It is
easy to see that %c is Suzumura consistent, let %trc be its transitive closure. If there exits x, y
incomparable for %trc , then necessarily x ≈ y and there exist z1, z2 such that z1, z2 6≈ x, y and
z1 %trc x, y %trc z2 (or just z1 if x, y are bottom elements or just z2 if x, y are top elements). We
can easily complete %trc consistently. Let %oc be such completion. It is straightforward to show
that c = c%oc .
Proof of proposition 7. Let X be a set of described consequences and c be a choice function
for X. Define %c on X as follows: x %c y iff ∃S ⊆ X, finite, such that x, y ∈ S, and x ∈ c(S).
Given a binary relation % on X, the induced choice function c% is defined by
c%(S) = {x ∈ S | x % y, ∀y ∈ S} .
It is a classical result that c satisfies C2 if, and only if, there exists a binary relation % on X
such that c = c% and % satisfies axiom A2, that is, % is a weak order. We prove the proposition
for the conditions C5 (Axiom 5) and C6.1 (Axiom 6.1). The other cases are similar and/or
follow from basic definitions. Let c = c% where % is a binary relation on X that satisfies axiom
5. Suppose that x ∈ c(S) for some S finite. By definition, x % y, ∀y ∈ S, but x ∼ x ◦ x by
hypothesis, whence x ∼ x ◦ x % y, ∀y ∈ S, it follows that x, x ◦ x ∈ c(S ∪ {x ◦ x}). Conversely,
let c be a choice function satisfying C5 and %c the binary relation induced by c. By definition,
∅ 6= c({x}) ⊆ {x}, then clearly c({x}) = {x}. By C5, it is also clear that x %c x◦x and x◦x %c x.
Thus %c satisfies axiom 5. Finally, we prove the proposition for C6.1. Let c = c% where % is
a binary relation on X that satisfies axiom 6.1. Suppose that x, y ∈ c(S) and x ◦ z, y ◦ z ∈ T
for some S, T finite. It is clear that x ∼ y, whence x ◦ z ∼ y ◦ z. It follows that C6.1 holds.
Conversely, let c be a choice function satisfying C6.1 and %c the binary relation induced by c.
Suppose that x ◦ z and y ◦ z are defined and that x ∼c y. Set S = {x, y} and T = {x ◦ z, y ◦ z}.
Then C6.1 applies, c(T ) is nonempty by definition, it follows that x ◦ z ∼c y ◦ z.
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General conclusion
This dissertation proposed to scrutinize behavioral economics from a methodological perspective
that makes explicit the role of language in economic rationality. As explained in the general
introduction, we emphasized this methodological issue because because it had not been raised
previously around behavioral economics, by contrast with the other three related methodological
issues we also tackled: the issue of interdisciplinarity between economics and Psychology, the
positive/normative issue within models of individual behaviors, and the problem of theoretical
unification in the three dimensions of economic behaviors. Throughout the chapters, we have
investigated how these four sets of methodological issues intersect concretely within the scientific
literature around behavioral economics.
In chapter 1, we compared the founding work of the father of behavioral economics, Thaler,
with the work of Sen whose entanglement thesis on the positive/normative issue we endorsed.
This was tantamount to compare two different criticisms of the same models of economic be-
haviors under certainty. Though both criticisms started from the same observation, namely
that the positive and normative dimensions of standard models of individual behaviors need to
be articulated differently, they ended in radically different conclusions. Through an interdisci-
plinary relation with ethics, moral and political philosophy, Sen proposes that the normative
dimension can be developed from careful scrutiny of empirical facts; i.e., rationality should not
be defined a priori and once and for all. Through an interdisciplinary relation with Psychology,
Thaler proposes that the normative dimension should be separated from the positive one; i.e.,
standard models provide an adequate notion of rationality that can be used as a benchmark
to evaluate empirical behaviors. Two features of individual decision making revealed by the
comparison have been investigated further in the other chapters. On the one hand, there was
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the communicative structure of choices: decision problems do not fall from the sky, they are
posed by decision modelers to decision makers. We suggested Searle’s theory of speech acts to
flesh out this communicative structure in a way that is relevant for rational choice theory. On
the other hand, despite restricting ourselves to the economic analysis of individual behaviors
under certainty, the three dimensions of uncertainty, time and other people kept popping up in
various ways.
Thus, in chapter 2, we scrutinized the challenges posed by behavioral economics to the
standard models used in these three dimensions. We noticed a rupture between, on the one
hand, the classical challenges posed by behavioral economics to the three dimensions separately,
and, on the other hand, more recent challenges involving interactions across dimensions. It was
argued that the marking of linguistic distinctions within the three dimensions (e.g., ‘now’ and
‘later’, ‘certainly’ and ‘probably’, ‘you’ and ‘me’) is a feature of the communicative structure of
choices that constitutes the conditions of possibility for both the challenges within and across
dimensions. Several contrasts were made about standard and behavioral economists’ accounts
of behaviors in the three dimensions. On the issue of interdisciplinarity between economics and
Psychology, the dimensions of uncertainty and time have clear roots in respectively the works
of Kahneman and Tversky, and Ainslie. This contrasts with the dimension of other people
where no such root in Psychology is identifiable. On the positive/normative issue, the three
dimensions are connected by the doctrine of consequentialism, from which value judgments of
rationality and irrationality are derived. On this point, we saw that, historically, there has been
a slow shift in standard decision theory from a primacy of the dimension of uncertainty (over
the two others) to a primacy of the dimension of time in these consequentialist value judgments.
The chapter ended by emphasizing how neither standard nor behavioral economics’ models of
individual behaviors could explain the full set of behavioral regularities constitutive of the recent
challenges from interactions across dimensions. Accounting for interactions across dimensions
was therefore suggested as a potentially fruitful area of convergence for behavioral and standard
economics, at least for the purpose of theoretical unification.
This suggestion was developed further in chapter 3 by scrutinizing the dual models that
were explicitly seeking theoretical unification and eventually theoretical reconciliation between
behavioral and standard economics. There, we studied the role of language in economic ratio-
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nality as constructed by economists in their models, abstracting from economic agents’ uses of
language in their economic behaviors. To do so, we scrutinized the interactions between, on the
one hand, the formal and technical languages from economics, and, on the other hand, a new
technical language borrowed from the Psychology of self-control. Because self-control problems
are primarily about the decision maker’s relation to time, the historical shift from a primacy of
the dimension of uncertainty to the primacy of the dimension of time observed in the previous
chapter finds its paradigmatic illustration in dual models. It was argued that only Fudenberg
and Levine’s dual model tackles the issue of interactions across the three dimensions, hence
providing a promising avenue of theoretical unification and reconciliation between standard and
behavioral economics. Under their account, the standard notion of consistency is modified by
conceptualizing the mental limits responsible for self-control problems as an inescapable con-
straint under which decision makers optimize. Finally, it was shown that Fudenberg and Levine,
along with other dual modelers, point at framing phenomena as the main limit to theoretical
unification.
Hence we turned our attention to what standard and behavioral economists had to say
about ‘framing’ in chapter 4. It was first remarked that the term is being used to refer to
an increasingly heterogeneous set of behavioral phenomena. The only common point of these
phenomena is that different presentations of ‘the same’ decision problem can reveal preference
reversals. We emphasized the crucial role played by the theoretical conventions of standard
models in establishing relations of equivalence between decision problems. The focus was put
on framing effects violating the implicit axiom of description invariance, the axiom of standard
models that make them blind to the role of language in economic rationality as displayed by
economic agents. Despite some studies of violations of description invariance by behavioral
economists, notably in the three dimensions and under certainty, this axiom remains relatively
understudied in economics in view of the large body of research on the topic in Psychology. We
proposed to organize what we considered as the key features, from an economist’s perspective,
of three decades of research by psychologists on violations of description invariance. Hence
we abstracted from the role of language in economic rationality as constructed by economists
in their models to focus only on the role of language in economic rationality as displayed by
economic agents in their behaviors. We emphasized on the conditions under which Tversky and
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Kahneman’s original violation of description invariance (in the Asian Disease problem), on the
one hand, holds empirically, and, on the other hand, can be defended as rational. Among these
conditions, we argued that three of them could be especially useful for the purpose of a formal
account of framing effects in economics. The first one was about further redescriptions of the
same consequences (notably through the use of negation). The second one was about the direct
dependence of preference on description (notably justified by experienced utility). And the third
one was about the exchanges of tacit information through the uses of ordinary language in the
communicative structure of choices (as displayed in Sher and McKenzie’s work).
The three underlying sets of results from Psychology were then used to motivate, in chapter
5, an axiomatic framework constructed with Dino Borie to deal with violations of description
invariance. Our strategy was first to make the axiom explicit in a way that was fine-grained
enough to then weaken it, instead of characterizing it as an ‘all or nothing’ axiom, i.e., either you
have it or you don’t. We tried to make the case for discriminating different degrees of dependence
to descriptions, two of which we characterized axiomatically. It was then shown that under
the weaker degree of dependence to descriptions, most framing effects violating description
invariance could be represented in standard models, with the traditional equivalence among
choice, preference and utility. Throughout, we emphasized an interpretation of our framework
in terms of two simultaneous but possibly distinct perspectives on one decision problem, namely
the decision maker’s and the decision modeler’s. This was intended to place the communicative
structure of choices in the foreground. In turn, this allowed to tackle the positive/normative
issue of whether violations of description invariance are necessarily irrational by clarifying under
which interpretations some conditions rather than others are being violated in a given framing
effect. These minor modifications to economists’ formal and technical languages were intended
as a first step to take into account economically relevant uses of everyday language by economic
agents.
The intended contribution of this dissertation was to show how a methodological perspec-
tive on the twofold role of language in economic rationality can clarify three main issues (and
their connections) underlying the behavioral versus standard economics debates: the issue of
the theoretical unification regarding the three dimensions of economic rationality, the issue of
interdisciplinarity between economics and Psychology and the positive/normative issue within
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models of individual behaviors. We discussed several types of markers of the frontier between
standard and behavioral economics. Theoretical markers are constituted by a series of p-&-
Psychological notions such as loss aversion under certainty and risk, impulsivity over time,
various non-self-centered motives regarding other people. Empirical markers are essentially con-
stituted by framing effects. But there are not really any kind of normative markers, as the
doctrine of consequentialism is largely accepted on both sides to derive value judgments of ir-
rationality about what lies in the behavioral side of the theoretical and empirical markers. An
implications of this is that the behavioral versus standard economics debates are blind to Sen’s
notion of commitment. We have argued that one weakness of this position is that the notion of
‘a consequence’ shared by most economists does not seem to be well-defined for the purpose of
an empirical science.
Furthermore, this dissertation sought to go beyond mere clarification regarding the posi-
tive/normative issue and the role of language in the behaviors of economic agents. My intention
was to provide a constructive criticism of contributions from behavioral as well as standard
economists on both of these points. Following the entanglement thesis, it has been argued
that both standard and behavioral economists propose an unsatisfying articulation between the
positive and normative dimensions of models of individual behaviors; and that recognizing the
entanglement of facts, values and convention can actually be theoretically and empirically fruit-
ful. Furthermore, it has been argued that paying some attention to the role of language in the
behaviors of economic agents may sometimes show that a seemingly irrational behavior can in
fact be defended as rational. The formal contribution on this point was partly intended to show
that reflections from, on the one hand, methodology and philosophy, and, on the other hand,
standard economic theory, can have a mutually beneficial influence.
In terms of further work, some projects related to this dissertation are already in process.
The arguments sketched in chapter 2 about the possibility of critical reinterpretations of existing
empirical studies that have used only one dimension in their original interpretations of the data
are explored in a series of case studies with Judith Favereau and Cléo Chassonnery-Zaïgouche.
The arguments also sketched in chapter 2 about the relations between narrativity and identity
regarding dynamic consistency are the object of a paper with Tom Juille. Some of the arguments
sketched in both chapter 1 and 2 about the experimental translation of rationality are developed
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from an epistemological and historical perspectives in a working paper; the epistemological per-
spective tries both to ground the experimental translation of rationality in the epistemological
theory of reflective equilibrium while at the same time providing a possible empirical opera-
tionalization of that theory; the historical perspective discusses the influence (due to the rise of
behavioral economics) of economics on Psychology in the so-called ‘rationality debate’. In the
making of the working paper underlying chapter 5, we (together with Dino Borie) conducted
some classroom experiments on some implications of our framework; we are discussing the pos-
sibility of doing ‘real’ experiments with some experimental economists from the University of
Nice Sophia-Antipolis, notably Ismaël Raifaï with whom we have also discussed the possibility
of building a model of framing effects from our axiomatic framework.
I would like to conclude this dissertation with Fritz Machlup. In a paper entitled “If Matter
Could Talk”, Machlup introduces the methodological issue of the distinction between the social
and the natural sciences with a story, part of which goes as follows:
“As he spoke about random walk of molecules and about molecular collisions at
various pressures, someone shouted, “Stop that nonsense!” When he looked around
to see which student had made this impertinent remark, the voice continued. It was
obviously coming from the protective chamber with the suspended mirror, whose
movements were being tracked by the fluctuations of a reflected light beam. This is
what he heard: “It is time that you cease and desist from misleading your students.
What you teach about us molecules is simply not true. This is no random walk and
we are not pushing one another all over the place. We know where we are going and
why. If you will listen, we shall be glad to tell you.” He had not waited for more,
but had rushed here to report and get Professor R. to witness the event and to hear
what the molecules were about to tell.
“Oh,” said Professor R., “you mean they are going to tell us what they think they
are doing. By all means, let them go ahead.”” (Machlup 1978, p.310-311)
The goal of Machlup (1978 [1969]) is to argue that one methodological specificity of the social
sciences is that their “data and problems” (ibid, p.319) are soaked with language uses, not
only coming from the scientists (this is not a specificity of the social sciences), but also from
the objects of study. More precisely, he wants to argue that the social sciences are specific
because of the possibility of “contradictory communication” (ibid) between the scientists and
their subjects. While a sandstone cannot say to a geologist ‘No way, we are not from this family
you call ‘Sedimentary Rock’, we are very different from these individuals’, a decision maker can
say to a decision theorist ‘No way, I am not as you put it ‘irrational’ or ‘quasi-rational’, I have
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plenty of reasons to maintain my preferences as they are, and I do not ‘reverse’ them’. As we have
seen, this is roughly what happened around the Allais paradoxes for a brief historical moment
by the end of the 1970s. Decision scientists (MacCrimmon, Larson, Slovic, Tversky among
others) listened to their subjects instead of just trying to merely observe their behaviors; and
this contributed to nontrivial theoretical developments. As we have also seen, this is not without
methodological dangers, notably because there are many subtle features of a conversation that
cannot be controlled in the way the minimalist communication in experiments can be controlled.
In any case, the uses of language in economic rationality as constructed by economists and
as displayed by economic agents, notably within the communicative structure of choices, were
not restricted to the issue of contradictory communication. It is easier to state the issues we
were interested in by turning Machlup’s question upside-down: what if economic agents couldn’t
talk? If that were the case, then, as argued in chapter 2, none of the classical or more recent
challenges posed by behavioral economics in the three dimensions of economic rationality could
have been posed in the first place; as argued in chapter 4, framing effects would not exist; and if
we keep in mind that economists are economic agents, then, as argued in chapter 1 and chapter
3, the construction of models of individual behaviors would be severely impaired, if not totally
impossible. One warning I did receive about my focus on the role of language was ‘Don’t go
there, once you are interested in language, you see language everywhere’. Not only I agree, but I
agree that there are underlying methodological dangers to that. However, language may not be
strictly speaking everywhere, but it is quite pervasive in ways that are not trivial for economics.
In my opinion, there are just as great methodological dangers in denying the pervasiveness of a
pervasive phenomenon.
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Traductions21
Introduction générale
« Le langage ordinaire et la
pensée ordinaire ont été, en règle
générale, victimes de négligence
dans la science économique. Leur
potentiel pour l’explication des
phénomènes les plus économiques
peut, toutefois, être grand. »
(Bacharach, 1990, p.368)
« Les économistes semblent avoir
largement ignoré le langage.
C’est une situation malheureuse.
Le monde dans lequel nous
vivons est un monde de mots, pas
de fonctions, et de nombreux
phénomènes réels pourraient être
plus facilement analysés si nous
prenions cela en compte. »
(Lipman 2003, p.75)
« La plus grande partie du
partage de l’information n’est pas
accomplie par du signalement à
la Spence, par l’intermédiaire du
système des prix, ni au travers de
mécanismes d’incitations
compatibles à la Hurwicz : il se
fait par la discussion informelle,
ordinaire. » (Farell et Rabin
1996, p.104)
Au cours des trois dernières décennies, l’analyse économique des comportements individuels
a été soumise aux critiques incessantes d’une approche connue sous le nom d’ « économie com-
21Nous avons également traduit par nos soins les citations.
371
portementale ». Un ensemble croissant de régularités empiriques est présenté par les économistes
comportementaux comme contredisant les prévisions des modèles théoriques utilisés en économie
dite « standard ». Ces critiques sont accompagnées de considérations méthodologiques diverses
à propos, notamment, de l’absence de relations interdisciplinaires entre l’économie et la psy-
chologie, ou de la distinction positif/normatif dans les modèles de comportements individuels.
Au cours de la dernière décennie, les économistes qui se disaient ou se disent toujours « stan-
dards » ont de plus en plus répondu à ces critiques. Ces réponses ne sont pas homogènes.
Certains économistes standards ont accepté une partie de ces critiques ; d’autres en ont accepté
l’entièreté, et pratiquent désormais l’économie comportementale en se disant « économistes
comportementaux ». Néanmoins, un ensemble d’économistes standards ont retourné la critique,
arguant notamment que les économistes comportementaux ne comprennent pas correctement
l’approche standard. En bref, la frontière entre l’économie standard et l’économie comporte-
mentale est plus floue aujourd’hui qu’elle ne l’était il y a trente ans. Ce faisant, les problèmes
théoriques, empiriques et méthodologiques constituant cette frontière ont des connexions moins
claires qu’auparavant. Cette frontière floue entre l’économie comportementale et l’économie
standard est l’objet de cette thèse. Dans sa forme la plus générale, l’objectif est de fournir
une meilleure compréhension des transformations théoriques et méthodologiques, impulsées par
l’économie comportementale, que traverse aujourd’hui l’analyse économique des comportements
individuels.
Si cette frontière est floue, c’est en partie liée à la stratégie de l’économie comportementale :
s’inspirer de la psychologie pour modifier les modèles standards de comportements individuels.
En d’autres termes, l’ homo œconomicus traditionnel – dont le raisonnement est toujours correct,
les choix effectués dans le passé ne sont jamais regrettés et guidés seulement par l’intérêt propre
– est modifié pour prendre un visage plus humain, selon les économistes comportementaux. Cet
argument est systématisé par le père de l’économie comportementale, Richard Thaler (2015;
2016), qui met en contraste deux espèces, les « Econs » représentés dans les modèles d’économie
standard et les « Humains » représentés dans son approche. Dans l’économie comportementale,
soutient-il, les agents économiques sont représentés comme commettant parfois des erreurs dans
leurs raisonnements et dans leurs choix, en plus de ne pas toujours se comporter en regard de leurs
intérêts propres. Ainsi l’économie comportementale est présentée comme une généralisation de
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l’économie standard : les Econs ne se comportent jamais comme des humains, mais les humains
se comportent parfois comme des Econs. L’une des raisons pour lesquelles Thaler et d’autres
économistes comportementaux ne critiquent pas complètement l’économie standard est qu’ils
en ont besoin pour caractériser ce qui compte comme comportements rationnels : l’économie
standard est une référence normative pour l’économie comportementale. Par conséquent, la
psychologie est utilisée en économie comportementale dans le but de modéliser les écarts entre
la façon dont les agents économiques se comportent et comment ils doivent se comporter de
façon rationnelle. L’objectif de cette thèse est d’essayer de montrer qu’un aspect non trivial de
ce qui rend les agents économiques humains reste en grande partie inexploré dans l’économie
comportementale, et que l’exploration de celui-ci permet d’éclairer les débats entre économie
comportementale et économie standard. Cet aspect est tout simplement que nous parlons.
En effet, les manières dont nous utilisons notre langage ne sont pas partagées par les autres
espèces, y compris par les Econs. Comment les usages de langage jouent-ils un rôle dans la
rationalité économique qui pourrait nous aider à mieux comprendre les débats entre économie
comportementale et économie standard ?
Cette thèse soutient que nos usages de langage ne jouent pas un, mais deux rôles dans la ra-
tionalité économique. D’une part, les économistes utilisent du langage pour discuter et débattre
sur la rationalité économique, ainsi que pour la théoriser. D’autre part, les agents économiques
utilisent du langage pour faire des choix économiques ou, plus important encore, pour constru-
ire des problèmes de décisions dans lesquels d’autres agents font des choix économiques. Parmi
le petit nombre d’économistes qui se sont intéressés à la relation entre langage et rationalité
économique, Ariel Rubinstein exprime ces deux rôles de manière particulièrement frappante :
« Les agents économiques sont des êtres humains pour qui le langage est un outil
central dans le processus de prise de décisions et de formation des jugements. Et
[...] les autres "joueurs" importants dans la théorie économique - à savoir nous-
mêmes, les économistes théoriciens – utilisent des modèles formels, mais ce ne sont
pas simplement des modèles mathématiques; leurs significations découlent de leurs
interprétations, qui sont exprimées en utilisant le langage quotidien. » (2000 pp.3-4,
nos italiques)
En d’autres termes, le rôle du langage dans la rationalité économique est double : les com-
portements des agents économiques sont en partie constitués d’usages de langage, et il en est de
même pour les activités professionnelles des économistes, particulièrement les théoriciens. Deux
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ensembles de distinctions classiques utilisées par les linguistes et les philosophes du langage sont
pertinents pour davantage clarifier comment le rôle du langage, dans la rationalité économique,
est étudié dans cette thèse. Le premier ensemble, proposé par le linguiste et sémioticien Fer-
dinand de Saussure (1916, chap.3), distingue le langage, la langue et la parole. Brièvement,
le langage réfère de manière abstraite à l’ensemble de tous les moyens de communication (les
symboles, les gestes, les phonèmes, etc.), dont une articulation conventionnelle particulière con-
stitue une langue utilisée dans une communauté (l’Anglais, le Français, un dialecte local, etc.),
qui s’instancie individuellement dans la parole (des mots et phrases, écrits ou parlés). Le second
ensemble, proposé par le philosophe et sémioticien Charles W. Morris en 1938, distingue trois
types de relations entre les symboles constitutifs d’une langue (voir Posner 1987, Sect.1) : la
syntaxe, la sémantique et la pragmatique. Brièvement, la syntaxe désigne les relations entre
symboles, la sémantique désigne les relations entre des symboles et d’autres entités (des « objets
», « choses », « personnes », etc.) qui ne sont ni des symboles ni l’humain qui les utilise, et la
pragmatique désigne les relations entre des symboles et l’humain qui les utilise (quelles sont ses
intentions? Qui est son interlocuteur? etc.). Dans cette thèse, notre attention se portera sur la
parole et la pragmatique, des économistes participant au débat entre économie comportemen-
tale et économie standard d’une part, et des agents économiques dans les situations de prise de
décision qui sont abordées dans ces débats (par exemple, dans des expériences de laboratoire,
répondant à des enquêtes, effectuant une transaction sur un marché, etc.), d’autre part. Notre
argument est que l’examen de ces utilisations de langage peut contribuer à donner une image
plus claire des principales questions sous-jacentes aux débats entre économie comportementale
et économie standard.22
Cette introduction générale présente trois de ces principales questions, qui sont abordées
tout au long de la thèse, à savoir la question de l’unification théorique (0.1), la question de
22Pour une perspective historique et philosophique approfondie sur les distinctions présentées ici et d’autres
utilisées par les linguistes et les philosophes du langage, voir Rastier (2012). Mongin (2006b;c) examine d’autres
distinctions classiques vis-à-vis de la méthodologie économique, par exemple entre les phrases (entités linguis-
tiques), les énoncés (significations de phrases en termes de sens et de référence), les propositions (significations
de phrases en termes de vérité et fausseté) et les énonciations (actions de prononcer ou d’écrire des phrases par
un locuteur); ou entre l’utilisation de mots et de phrases et la simple mention de mots et de phrases. D’autres
économistes ont déjà soutenu que les usages du langage jouent un rôle spécifique dans la rationalité économique
qui reste à être pleinement examiné (pour une vision d’ensemble, voir Zhang et Grenier 2013; Alcouffe 2013).
Toutefois, la plupart (sinon la totalité) de ces contributions mettent l’accent sur une langue et non sur la parole.
La relation entre ces contributions et cette thèse ne sera pas abordée ici, mais plutôt dans des travaux futurs,
principalement parce qu’elles n’ont aucun lien avec l’économie comportementale (voir toutefois Chen 2013).
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l’interdisciplinarité entre l’économie et la psychologie (0.2) et la distinction positif/normatif (0.3)
; avant de présenter la manière dont les contributions de la thèse sont articulées en chapitres
(0.4).
0.1 L’unification théorique et les trois dimensions
Dans les termes de la distinction bien pratique établie par Esther-Mirjam Sent (2004) entre
la « nouvelle » et l’ « ancienne » économie comportementale, cette thèse porte strictement
sur la nouvelle économie comportementale. L’ancienne économie comportementale découle des
travaux d’Herbert Simon sur la rationalité limitée à partir du milieu des années 1950. La nouvelle
économie comportementale (simplement « économie comportementale » désormais) découle de
l’influence des psychologues Daniel Kahneman et Amos Tversky sur Thaler à partir de la fin des
années 1970.23
Depuis cette date, et surtout en empruntant les méthodes expérimentales des psychologues,
les économistes comportementaux ont étudié des régularités empiriques dans les comportements
individuels qui s’écartent systématiquement et significativement des prévisions faites par les
modèles standards. Diverses explications théoriques émanant de différents modèles étaient don-
nées à cette multitude de régularités comportementales (en caricaturant, il y avait un modèle par
régularité). Cependant, des explications théoriques unificatrices sont de plus en plus recherchées
depuis la moitié des années 2000 (un modèle pour plusieurs régularités). La plupart des mod-
èles de l’économie comportementale avant cette date sont reproduits dans le volume Advances
in Behavioral Economics (désormais Advances), édité par Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein
et Matthew Rabin en 2004. La structure d’une partie de ce volume, intitulée « sujet de base
», montre assez bien ce que les économistes comportementaux prennent comme étant les do-
maines les plus élémentaires de l’analyse économique. Dans cette partie, les contributions sont
organisées en cinq sections, dont les deuxième, troisième et quatrième dont sont respectivement
intitulées « préférences sur les résultats risqués et incertains », « choix intertemporels » et «
équité et préférences sociales ». Cette façon par laquelle trois dimensions des comportements
23Les liaisons et contrastes entre « nouvelle » et « ancienne » économie comportementale ne sont pas abordés
dans cette thèse, étant donné qu’ils ont déjà été discutés longuement ailleurs (voir, par exemple, Sent 2004; Klaes
et Sent 2005, surtout p.47; Egidi 2012; Kao et Velupillai 2015; Geiger 2016).
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économiques – ‘l’incertitude’, ‘le temps’ et ‘autrui’ – sont clairement séparées est omniprésente
dans la littérature autour de l’économie comportementale.24
Cette séparation est également présente dans des ouvrages classiques de l’économie standard
(par exemple, Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980; Mas-Colell et et al. 1995), quoique d’une façon
moins saillante. Cette séparation est extrêmement explicite dans les écrits contemporains des
économistes standards sur l’économie comportementale. Ce n’est pas seulement le cas dans les
deux recensions-essais d’Avances par Drew Fudenberg (2006) et Wolfgang Pesendorfer (2006),
mais aussi, par exemple, dans la critique de l’économie comportementale par David Levine
(2012). Concernant l’unification théorique, il convient de noter la position de Fudenberg:
« Les économistes comportementaux (et les économistes théoriciens!) devraient con-
sacrer plus d’effort à synthétiser les modèles existants et à en développer d’autres,
plus généraux, et moins d’effort à modéliser encore une autre observation comporte-
mentale particulière » (Fudenberg 2006, p.699, nos italiques)
Ce que Fudenberg demande c’est en réalité ce qu’il est en train de faire avec Levine (2006; 2011;
2012c), c’est-à-dire un modèle fournissant, pour les régularités observées par les économistes
comportementaux, une explication unifiée dans les trois dimensions ensemble. En résumé, les
relations théoriques et empiriques entre les trois dimensions des comportements économiques
sont actuellement un domaine de l’analyse économique où les limites entre l’économie com-
portementale et l’économie standard sont particulièrement floues. L’une des contributions que
la thèse tentera d’apporter est une étude des conditions sous lesquelles une unification théorique
(un modèle pour plusieurs régularités) articulant les trois dimensions ensemble est possible. Pour
ce faire, nous examinerons les usages de langage que font les économistes dans leurs modèles
de comportements individuels dans les trois dimensions (par exemple, la notion de « cohérence
dynamique ») et par les agents économiques dans les situations où les régularités comportemen-
tales sont observées (par exemple, marquer une distinction linguistique entre « maintenant » et
« plus tard »).
Dans cette thèse, l’économie standard réfère à l’économie pratiquée et défendue par les
économistes qui s’identifient eux-mêmes comme « standards » (par exemple, Fudenberg, Levine,
24Les deux autres sections considérées comme sujet de base par ces économistes comportementaux sont inti-
tulées « dépendance à la référence et aversion aux pertes » et « théorie des jeux ». La première comporte des
contributions sur les comportements individuels en situation de certitude qui auront une place spécifique dans
cette thèse. Par contraste, la seconde comporte des contributions concernant les interactions stratégiques (entre
au moins deux personnes) qui ne seront pas abordées dans cette thèse.
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Pesendorfer) et qui ont débattu ou commenté de manière critique sur les contributions des
économistes qui s’identifient eux-mêmes comme « comportementaux » (par exemple, Thaler,
Camerer, Loewenstein, Rabin). Cependant, ces critiques de l’économie comportementale ont
des positions différentes concernant ce que sont les principes fondateurs de l’économie stan-
dard. D’une part, les théoriciens des jeux, tels que Levine, soulignent que « le cœur de la
théorie économique moderne « rationnelle » est le concept d’un équilibre non coopératif ou «
Nash » d’un jeu » (Levine 2012, chap.2). Ce qu’est un équilibre de Nash peut être énoncé
comme l’identification des actions rationnelles à prendre par (au moins) deux agents indépen-
damment l’un de l’autre, mais les conséquences respectives de ces actions pour chaque agent
sont mutuellement dépendantes des actions choisies. Cette thèse ne sera pas concernée par ces
questions de théories des jeux. Elle sera en revanche concentrée sur les questions que soulèvent
les théoriciens de la décision tel que Pesendorfer, pour qui le principe fondateur de l’économie
est la « méthodologie » ou le « principe » de la préférence révélée – qui sont les mots utilisés
à la place de « théorie » (voir Pesendorfer Gul et 2008; voir aussi Dekel et Lipman 2010).
Pour le propos de cette introduction générale, ce qu’est la préférence révélée peut être énoncé
comme l’identification des choix effectués par les agents économiques (directement observables
dans les données économiques) avec leurs préférences (indirectement observables dans l’esprit
des agents).25
Par exemple, Pesendorfer présente ses principales préoccupations méthodologiques avec
l’économie comportementale comme suit :
« Les modèles de choix standards et les théories de l’économie comportementale
diffèrent dans leur orientation lors de l’analyse de phénomènes « comportementaux
» [...]. Le travail théorique en économie comportementale met souvent l’accent sur la
psychologie de la situation à l’aide du comportement économique comme une fenêtre
sur l’esprit du preneur de décision [...]. Remarquez l’inversion des rôles de l’économie
et de la psychologie. Les données économiques sont utilisées pour préciser les détails
d’un processus mental particulier qui est opérationnel pour ce cas particulier. »
(Pesendorfer 2006, pp.718-719)
25Une vision raffinée des relations entre l’économie « comportementale », « standard », « mainstream » et «
néoclassique » est offerte par Colander (2000) et Davis (2006, 2007b, 2009b, 2011). Sur l’évolution historique
et l’état contemporain des relations entre la théorie de la décision et la théorie des jeux, voir, par exemple,
Mirowski (2002, 2006, 2009) ou Drèze et Aumann (2009). Sur comment cette relation s’inscrit dans l’évolution
de la théorie de l’équilibre général, la théorie du choix du consommateur et la théorie de la demande, voir, par
exemple, Kirman (1989) ou Mirowski et Hands (2006). Sur le statut contemporain de la préférence révélée, voir
Hands (2012a; 2013b).
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En d’autres termes, selon une perspective de théorie de la décision, le principal problème
méthodologique avec l’économie comportementale est sa relation avec la psychologie; cette ques-
tion est présentée dans la section suivante.
0.2 L’économie et la psychologie : le problème de l’interdisciplinarité
Pesendorfer est le coauteur avec Faruk Gul (2008) de l’une des critiques de l’économie com-
portementale les plus sévères et les plus discutées dans les années 2000, jusqu’à avoir déclenché
un volume complet de réponses et de commentaires : The Foundations of Positive and Norma-
tive Economics (dorénavant The Foundations; Caplin et Schotter 2008a). Dans ce volume, les
échanges critiques entre Gul et Pesendorfer (2008) versus Camerer (2008) donnent une illustra-
tion explicite du rôle des usages de langage, par les économistes, dans la rationalité économique
par rapport au problème de l’interdisciplinarité entre économie et psychologie. À un certain
moment de leur défense de l’économie standard, Gul et Pesendorfer mettent deux citations -
une provenant de la psychologie et une provenant de l’économie – à côté l’une de l’autre, puis
examinent le contraste entre elles (2008, p.5, références omises, nos italiques) :
« Une bonne partie de l’aversion au risque est provoquée par des réponses de peur
immédiate, qui sont en grande partie traçables à une petite zone du cerveau appelée
l’amygdale.
Un preneur de décision est (globalement) averse au risque, . . . si et seulement si
son utilité von Neumann-Morgenstern est concave au niveau de richesse pertinent (à
tous les niveaux de richesse).
[. . . ]La plupart des chercheurs reconnaissent les divers termes dans la deuxième ci-
tation comme des abstractions appartenant au vocabulaire spécialisé de l’économie.
Bien que moins apparent, le langage dans la première citation est également spé-
cialisé dans son utilisation d’abstraction spécifique à une discipline. Les termes «
peur immédiate » et « traçables » sont des abstractions de la psychologie et des
neurosciences. »
On notera que le point de Gul et Pesendorfer n’est ici pas seulement que les économistes et les
psychologues utilisent un langage différent. C’est également que celui de l’économie (par exem-
ple, « utilité von Neumann-Morgenstern ») est un langage plus technique (ou plus « spécifique
à une discipline ») que celui de la psychologie (par exemple, « crainte immédiate ») qui est plus
proche de notre langage quotidien. Dans sa réponse, Camerer fait valoir à propos de certaines
régularités comportementales que :
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« Bon nombre de ces phénomènes peuvent être traduits dans le langage conventionnel
de l’économie. En effet, une contribution majeure de la neuroéconomie [qui signifie
également « économie comportementale » dans ce contexte - DJ] peut-être de fournir
un langage formel pour parler de ces phénomènes. [. . . ] D’autres phénomènes sont
plus clairement compris par l’adoption de nouveaux termes provenant de la psycholo-
gie et des neurosciences plutôt que de se démener à intégrer l’activité complexe du
cerveau maladroitement dans le lit de Procruste du langage économique. » (Camerer
2008, p.50, nos italiques)
Le point de Camerer est que le langage formel des mathématiques, de la logique et de la théorie
des probabilités utilisé en économie est d’intérêt à la fois pour les économistes, mais aussi pour
les psychologues (c’est même « une contribution majeure » de l’économie comportementale);
mais l’utilisation de ce langage formel ne devrait pas empêcher les économistes, lorsqu’ils en
ressentent le besoin, de l’interpréter avec le langage utilisé par les psychologues.26
Une contribution proposée dans cette thèse est d’étoffer de manière systématique cette per-
spective sur les utilisations du langage des économistes et des psychologues sur le problème de
l’interdisciplinarité entre économie et psychologie. Pour ce faire, nous utiliserons les catégories
de langage formel, technique et quotidien comme suit. Le langage formel désigne le symbol-
isme et la syntaxe des mathématiques, de la logique et de la théorie des probabilités tel que
les économistes les utilisent pour construire par exemple les « modèles formels » dont par-
lait Rubinstein – eux-mêmes utilisés à diverses fins telles que la mesure de certaines variables,
l’inférence de certaines conclusions, etc. (voir Boumans 2005; Morgan 2012). Le langage tech-
nique réfère à une langue qui est utilisée de manière « spécifique à une discipline » au sein
d’une communauté scientifique. Et le langage quotidien réfère à nos usages de langage dans
nos vies quotidiennes qui n’ont a priori rien à voir avec une pratique scientifique. En aucun
cas nous ne voudrions suggérer que ces trois distinctions partitionnent l’ensemble des usages de
langage par les économistes et les agents économiques en catégories nettes et indépendantes.
Bien au contraire, c’est lorsque l’on s’intéresse à la manière dont ces catégories interagissent et
s’influencent entre elles qu’un certain éclairage peut être apporté sur les débats entre l’économie
comportementale et l’économie standard. Par exemple, en économie, l’utilisation de langage
formel encourage la combinaison du terme technique « convexe » provenant des mathématiques
26Exactement la même conclusion sur l’importance explicite du rôle du langage pour les économistes standards
et comportementaux aurait pu être faite en discutant des deux introductions de The Psychology of Economic
Decisions (Brocas et Carillo 2003b; 2004a).
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avec le terme « préférences » provenant du langage quotidien pour former le terme technique «
préférences convexes » (au lieu d’utiliser une version plus longue en langage quotidien comme
« une préférence pour une quantité moyenne de divers biens sur une quantité extrême d’un
seul bien »). L’historien de la psychologie Kurt Danziger (1997) propose de rendre compte des
interactions entre les utilisations des langages techniques et quotidiens par les psychologues. Il
distingue la « psychologie » qui désigne les usages quotidiens de langage à propos du mental (par
exemple, « je préfère le chocolat », « j’ai eu immédiatement peur ») de la « Psychologie » qui
désigne les usages techniques de langage par les psychologues dans leurs activités scientifiques
(par exemple, « Cette tâche vise à mettre les sujets dans un état de dissonance cognitive »,
« le scanner cérébral montre que les réponses des sujets étaient dues aux émotions », la cita-
tion des psychologues par Gul et Pesendorfer ci-dessus, etc.). Nous adoptons cette distinction
typographique entre la psychologie quotidienne et la Psychologie technique, car elle se révèle
bien commode pour discuter du problème de l’interdisciplinarité entre économie et Psychologie,
sous-jacent aux débats entre économie standard et économie comportementale. Enfin, pour
mettre un peu plus en avant les interactions entre les langages techniques et quotidiens, nous
les considérerons comme deux occurrences d’usages d’un même langage ordinaire, une catégorie
plus générale qui sera souvent contrastée avec les usages de langage formel.27
De plus, la catégorie de langage ordinaire permet de connecter la perspective méthodologique
présentée jusqu’à présent avec le dernier problème sous-jacent aux débats entre économie com-
portementale et économie standard, c’est-à-dire, le problème de la distinction positif/normatif.
27Deux remarques s’imposent. Premièrement, parfois sous des noms différents, ces distinctions entre différents
types de langage sont examinées par d’autres auteurs en économie (voir surtout Dennis 1982a; b; 1996; 1998a;
b; Vilks, 1995; 1998; Weintraub, 1998; 2002; Backhouse, 1998; Mirowski 2002; 2012; Mongin 2001; 2003; 2004;
Giocoli Armatte 2004; 2003), comme c’est aussi le cas concernant le statut psychologique des « préférences » et
des « choix » en économie et en théorie de la décision (voir par exemple, Pettit, 1991 ; Rosenberg 1992, chap.5-6;
Mongin 2011; Guala 2012; Hands 2012a). Dans les deux cas, ces auteurs ne traitent pas des problèmes sous-
jacents à l’économie comportementale qui sont au centre de cette thèse. Secondement, en dehors de l’économie,
la question de l’interdisciplinarité dans les sciences contemporaines est discutée principalement dans les « études
d’interdisciplinarité » (par exemple, Klein 2010; Huutoniemi et al. 2010) ou au sujet de « l’unité ou la désunité
de la science» (par exemple, Oppenheim et Putnam, 1958; Kitcher, 1984). Cat (2013) fait valoir que les deux
perspectives sont parfois compatibles, surtout dans le travail de Galison (1999) qui met l’accent sur les interactions
entre différents langages à la fois à l’intérieure des, et entre les, disciplines; il convient de noter qu’Heukelom
(2009) a utilisé la perspective de ce dernier sur l’économie comportementale.
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0.3 Les problèmes du positif/normatif : la position de l’enchevêtrement28
Comme le nom du volume mentionné ci-dessus le suggère – The Foundations of Positive and
Normative Economics - et comme la perspective historique sur l’économie comportementale
développée par Floris Heukelom (2014) dans son ouvrage l’atteste, il existe diverses connexions
entre la question de l’interdisciplinarité et le problème de la distinction positif/normatif. En
dehors de l’économie comportementale, de la théorie de la décision et de certains sous-champs
de la méthodologie et de la philosophie de l’économie, le ‘problème du positif/normatif’ est
rarement associé aux modèles de comportements individuels ou à la rationalité individuelle. Il
est plutôt associé à des formes collectives de comportements ou de rationalité et à l’évaluation de
l’efficacité du marché. À ce niveau, le problème du positif/normatif concerne l’organisation des
sous-champs de l’économie en ‘économie positive’ et ‘économie normative’. L’économie positive
est censée décrire, expliquer et/ou prévoir des situations économiques, comme par exemple que
‘la demande de pommes a augmenté ou augmentera parce que le prix des pommes a diminué
ou diminuera’, ce qui pourrait être énoncé en théorie du choix du consommateur ou en analyse
de la demande. L’économie normative est censée évaluer, recommander et/ou prescrire des
situations économiques, par exemple que ‘la production de pommes devrait être subventionnée
pour accroître le bien-être des consommateurs’, ce qui pourrait être énoncé en économie du bien-
être, en économie publique et peut être aussi en théorie du choix social. Bien que les modèles de
comportements individuels en économie soient considérés à juste titre comme des ‘boîtes à outils’
utilisées par les économistes pour modéliser des phénomènes sociaux, le problème du positif/
normatif se pose également dans ces modèles à travers les réclamations de rationalité qui sont
attachées à leurs interprétations. En économie standard, ces modèles ont une dimension positive
en ce sens qu’ils décrivent, expliquent et/ou prévoient le comportement d’individus rationnels,
par exemple que ‘si vous préférez les pommes aux oranges et les oranges aux bananes, alors vous
préférez ou préférerez les pommes aux bananes, parce que vous êtes rationnel’. Mais ces mêmes
modèles ont également une dimension normative, dans le sens où ils évaluent, recommandent
et/ou prescrivent la rationalité des comportements individuels, par exemple que ‘si vous préférez
28Note de traduction : en anglais, nous avions utilisé une expression qui aurait dû se traduire ici par « thèse
de l’enchevêtrement » qui est à nos yeux plus correcte que « position de l’enchevêtrement ». Notre utilisation
de ‘dissertation’ en anglais permettait de ne pas éveiller la confusion entre la présente ‘thèse’ et l’usage que nous
y faisons de la ‘thèse’ de l’enchevêtrement. Ce n’est plus possible en français, nous avons en conséquence choisi
d’utiliser l’expression ‘position de l’enchevêtrement’.
381
les pommes aux oranges et les oranges aux bananes, alors vous devriez préférer les pommes aux
bananes, ou bien vous êtes irrationnel’.29
Est-ce que l’économie positive et l’économie normative peuvent être totalement séparées ?
Comment sont-elles articulées ? Ce sont les questions qui sous-tendent le problème du posi-
tif/ normatif au niveau de l’articulation entre économie positive et économie normative. Elles
ne seront discutées dans cette thèse que brièvement, et uniquement dans le but d’améliorer
notre compréhension du problème du positif/ normatif au niveau individuel. À ce niveau, les
questions sous-jacentes sont les suivantes. Comment se fait-il que les axiomes de rationalité
sur lesquels sont fondés les modèles de comportements individuels aient été considérés à la
fois comme étant normatifs et positifs avant de devenir positivement non plausible à la suite
d’expérimentation, tout en demeurant normativement plausible? D’où provient la normativité
de ces axiomes et de ces modèles ? Dans cette thèse, ces questions soulevées dans les débats
entre économie comportementale et économie standard seront examinées à travers les lunettes
de la position de l’enchevêtrement d’Hilary Putnam (un philosophe), Vivian Walsh et Amartya
Sen (deux philosophes et économistes). Nous adoptons cette position principalement en raison
du rôle central, dans les arguments qui la constituent, de l’articulation entre langage formel
et langage ordinaire. Pour comprendre brièvement cette position, il est utile de rappeler que
les racines philosophiques du problème positif/normatif en économie sont que « de nombreux
économistes prennent pour acquis le principe positiviste que seuls les jugements mathématiques
et les jugements de faits - et pas les jugements de valeur - se prêtent à la discussion rationnelle
» (Mongin, 2006c, p.258, nos italiques; voir aussi Hands 2001, chap.2-3; 2012b). En effet, il
semble facilement réalisable en principe de parvenir à un accord par la discussion rationnelle
sur ce que sont les faits, par exemple que ‘le PIB a augmenté de 10 %’ ou que ‘Nicolas a vendu
une bouteille de vin’, parce que les données (et le processus de leurs constructions) peuvent être
29Voir Hausman et McPherson (2006) ou Hands (2012b) sur les relations entre ces deux niveaux du problème
du positif/normatif. Au niveau individuel tout au moins, il convient de noter que la nuance entre ‘descriptif”
et ‘positif’ est parfois significative en économie. Globalement, le premier signifie ‘description de régularités
comportementales humaines’ et le second ‘explication théorique de comportements humains’. Mais ce n’est pas
toujours le cas. Bien souvent les deux termes ‘positif’ et ‘descriptif’ sont synonymes et prennent l’une ou l’autre
de ces deux significations. La même ambiguïté peut être soulevée concernant ‘normatif’ et ‘prescriptif’, souvent
utilisés pour signifier respectivement ‘explication théorique de certaines normes de comportements humains’
et ‘recommandations pour être en conformité avec certaines normes de comportements humains’. Il convient
également de noter que le terme ‘positif’ est souvent associé à la dimension prévisionnelle d’un modèle par
opposition à la dimension descriptive de ses hypothèses, en suivant Friedman (1953). Dans cette thèse, le sens
précis de ces termes sera explicité uniquement lorsque cela apparaitra comme crucial pour le propos et que le
contexte ne fournit pas suffisamment d’indices pour déterminer ce sens.
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vérifiées par autrui (au moins en principe). Il en va de même pour savoir si les preuves math-
ématiques de théorèmes et de propositions sont correctes, par exemple que ‘2x = 1 ⇔ x = 12 ’,
car les étapes d’une preuve peuvent être contrôlées par autrui. Mais cela ne tient pas pour les
valeurs, en particulier lorsqu’elles sont de nature éthique, par exemple énoncer que ‘porter des
jupes courtes est moralement inacceptable’ ou que ‘les riches devraient être solidaires avec les
pauvres’, sur lesquelles il semble qu’aucune procédure scientifique ou formelle ne nous permet-
tent de parvenir à un accord. Puis, quoi qu’il en soit, nous avons le sentiment (comme si nous
partagions un métajugement de valeur) que nous devrions être libres d’être en désaccord avec
les jugements de valeur de n’importe qui, et ce pour une foule de raisons différentes que tout un
chacun se plait à entretenir. La contestation de ce principe positiviste et la proposition d’une
alternative sont au cœur de la position de l’enchevêtrement.
Adaptée pour l’examen de l’économie comportementale, ce qui est nécessaire parce que ce
n’était pas la cible initiale de Sen, Walsh et Putnam, la position de l’enchevêtrement peut
être résumée comme suit. Peut importe à quoi réfèrent les scientifiques et les gens dans la vie
ordinaire, par exemple, les économistes et les agents économiques, lorsqu’ils parlent de faits
particuliers et de valeurs particulières, ces faits et ces valeurs ne peuvent pas être complètement
séparés et examinés en isolation les uns des autres. Mais ils peuvent être distingués et leur artic-
ulation peut être examinée. De plus, cette articulation ne peut jamais être pleinement comprise
sans prendre en compte le rôle des conventions, théoriques pour l’économiste et sociales pour les
agents économiques. Les usages du langage ordinaire jouent un rôle crucial dans la manière dont
les conventions sociales sont enchevêtrées avec les faits et les valeurs dans notre vie quotidienne.
Et symétriquement, les usages du langage formel de la logique, des mathématiques et de la
théorie des probabilités jouent un rôle crucial dans la manière dont les conventions théoriques
sont enchevêtrées avec les faits et les valeurs dans la science. C’est cette version de la position de
l’enchevêtrement qui sera adoptée dans cette thèse pour examiner les contributions théoriques
et empiriques constitutives des débats entre économie comportementale et économie standard
afin de fournir une meilleure compréhension du problème sous-jacent du positif/normatif dans
les modèles de comportements individuels.30
30La position de l’enchevêtrement rassemble et assemble des arguments préexistants contre l’existence de deux
dichotomies. D’une part, deux types d’arguments selon lesquels la dichotomie fait/convention ne tient qu’en tant
que distinction utile peuvent être dégagés : (1) en provenance de la philosophie des sciences, par les positivistes
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Brièvement, la position de l’enchevêtrement est le fruit d’une synthèse de divers domaines
de la philosophie (c’est-à-dire, l’éthique, la philosophie du langage, de la logique, des mathé-
matiques, de l’esprit et des sciences) que Putnam (2002; 2004; 2013; 2015) a proposée avant
sa mort récente. Les travaux de Putnam (surtout 2002) connectent avec le problème du posi-
tif/normatif en économie principalement par le biais des travaux historiques et méthodologiques
de Walsh (surtout 1996). Et Sen est pris à la fois par Putnam et par Walsh comme une illus-
tration de la pratique de la théorie économique consciemment effectuée sans les dichotomies,
c’est-à-dire faits/conventions ou faits/valeurs (voir surtout Sen 1987; 2002). En retour, Sen a
reconnu que les travaux de Putnam et Walsh dans les années 2000 ont en effet caractérisé ses
positions historiques et méthodologiques (voir Sen 2005; 2009, note p.357). En ce qui concerne
le rôle du langage, trois philosophes jouent un rôle spécifique dans l’arrière-plan de la position
de l’enchevêtrement : W.V.O. Quine (dans les travaux de Putnam), Ludwig Wittgenstein (dans
les travaux de Putnam et de Sen) et John Austin (dans les travaux de Putnam et de Walsh).
Afin d’éviter que la dimension philosophique de cette thèse ne prenne l’ascendant sur ses contri-
butions dirigées vers l’économie, nous ne discuterons pas les travaux de Quine, Wittgenstein et
Austin, mais resterons concentrés sur ceux de Putnam, Walsh et Sen (voir aussi les contributions
recueillies par Putnam et Walsh 2011).
Pour la même raison, dans cette thèse, la position de l’enchevêtrement sera mobilisée prin-
cipalement en illustrant de façon aussi concrète que possible divers enchevêtrements de faits, de
valeurs et de conventions dans les débats entre l’économie comportementale et l’économie stan-
dard. Cette stratégie, qui consiste à travailler par illustrations concrètes, semble cohérente avec
l’approche philosophique du pragmatisme ou du néo-pragmatisme à laquelle Putnam, Walsh
eux-mêmes, sur les implications des entités non observables dans la physique quantique, avec aussi le travail de
Quine depuis « Two Dogmas of Empiricism » (1951); et (2) en provenance de la philosophie des mathématiques
et de la logique à propos de l’indispensabilité des mathématiques et de la logique en science, et aussi à propos de
l’accord consensuel sur leur ‘objectivité’ malgré leur absence de référence à des objets observables dans le sens
selon lequel la science est censée référer aux objets observables selon le positivisme (voir surtout Putnam 1971;
2004). D’autre part, deux types d’arguments selon lesquels la dichotomie fait/valeur ne tient qu’en tant que
distinction utile peuvent être dégagés: (1) en provenance de l’école dite du pragmatisme en philosophie qui fait
valoir qu’en dehors des jugements de valeur éthiques, la pratique de la science nécessite beaucoup de jugements
de valeur épistémiques via des notions comme la ‘simplicité’, la ‘cohérence’, la ‘pertinence’, la ‘conservation des
théories passées’ dans la construction et dans la sélection des théories (voir surtout Putnam 2002, chap. 2); et
(2) en provenance des débats d’après 1960 en méta-éthique sur la distinction entre les prédicats fins permettant
de porter des jugements de valeur purement évaluatifs (ou ‘normatifs’), comme par exemple ‘bon’, ‘juste’, ‘il est
moralement bon de ne jamais mentir’, et les prédicats épais permettant de porter des jugements de valeur qui
sont à la fois, et de façon inséparable, évaluatifs et descriptifs (ou ‘normatifs’ et ‘positifs’), comme par exemple
‘cruel’, ‘rude’, ‘rationnel’, ‘préfère’, ‘il est rationnel de vendre une bouteille de vin lorsque l’on ne boit pas de
vin’.
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et Sen sont souvent identifiés et pour laquelle ils ont explicitement manifesté de la sympathie.
Notamment, cette stratégie semble correspondre aux premiers traits utilisés par Wade Hands
(2001, pp.216-217) pour caractériser le pragmatisme ou le néo-pragmatisme : (1) le refus d’une
méthodologie fondationnaliste selon laquelle les critères pour l’évaluation de contributions sci-
entifiques sont définis a priori et de l’extérieur de la pratique scientifique, et (2) le refus d’une
dichotomie tranchante entre contributions théoriques et contributions empiriques dans une dis-
cipline donnée. De plus, cette stratégie semble également adaptée aux contributions proposées
dans la thèse, comme nous l’expliquons dans la section suivante.31
0.4 Contributions proposées et articulation des chapitres
Pour mieux situer la perspective méthodologique, sur le rôle du langage dans la rationalité
économique, présentée jusqu’à présent, nous pouvons la comparer à deux autres positions ex-
istantes sur cette question en méthodologie et en philosophie de l’économie. D’une part, il y
a la position de Deirdre McCloskey (1998 [1985]), qui a analysé la rhétorique sous-jacente aux
utilisations du langage par les économistes. Brièvement, McCloskey soutient que (1) les normes
de conversation dans le langage quotidien sont nécessaires et suffisantes pour régler (2) les prob-
lèmes méthodologiques que rencontrent les économistes. Par conséquent (3) les prescriptions
épistémologiques plus ou moins inspirées de la philosophie des sciences que proclament parfois
les économistes, les méthodologues ou les philosophes, produisent des interférences parasites en-
tre (1) et (2). D’autre part, il y a la position de Don Ross (2005; 2014), qui peut être considérée
comme étant à l’exact opposée de celle de McCloskey; et à la différence de cette dernière, il traite
de l’économie comportementale. Brièvement, Ross soutient que (1) le langage quotidien produit
des interférences parasites dans la relation entre (2) les questions méthodologiques autour de
l’économie comportementale et (3) les solutions philosophiques qu’il y propose à partir de la
philosophie de l’esprit et des sciences (voir Ross, Ladyman et Spurrett et 2007 pour une version
plus générale de sa position). La perspective méthodologique sur le rôle du langage dans la
rationalité économique développée jusqu’ici, en particulier telle que nous l’avons ancrée dans la
31Il convient de noter que le trait (1) refuse également le relativisme radical. Les différences entre pragmatisme
et néo-pragmatisme ne sont pas significatives pour l”objectif de cette thèse, mais notons tout de même que ces
positions ne doivent pas être confondues avec la pragmatique du langage discuté au début de cette introduction
générale, malgré d’existantes connections non-triviales (voir Hands 2001, chap.6).
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position de l’enchevêtrement, se trouve entre ces deux extrêmes. En bref, cette thèse soutient
que c’est parce que (1) le langage quotidien (en particulier la psychologie) est une dimension
indispensable à la fois des choix que font les agents économiques et des théories que proposent
les économistes, que lui accorder une certaine attention peut contribuer à la fois à (2) et à
(3). Cela peut contribuer à (3) certains problèmes philosophiques posés par les méthodologues
ou philosophes s’intéressant à la théorie économique ou posés par les économistes eux-mêmes
dans leurs manifestes méthodologiques. Et cela peut également contribuer à (2) certains prob-
lèmes méthodologiques, théoriques et empiriques rencontrés par les économistes s’intéressant
aux comportements individuels des agents économiques.
Pour résumer, la contribution proposée dans cette thèse est de démontrer comment une per-
spective méthodologique sur le double rôle du langage dans la rationalité économique peut clar-
ifier trois principales questions (et leurs connexions) qui sous-tendent les débats entre économie
comportementale et économie standard : le problème de l’unification théorique vis-à-vis des
trois dimensions de la rationalité économique, la question de l’interdisciplinarité entre économie
et Psychologie, et le problème du positif/normatif dans les modèles de comportements individu-
els. De plus, cette thèse vise à aller au-delà de la simple clarification concernant le problème
du positif/normatif et du rôle du langage dans les comportements des agents économiques.
Notre intention est de fournir une critique constructive des contributions de l’économie com-
portementale, ainsi que celles de l’économie standard sur ces deux points. Suivant la posi-
tion de l’enchevêtrement, il sera soutenu que l’économie tant standard que comportementale
propose une articulation insatisfaisante des dimensions positive et normative dans les mod-
èles de comportements individuels; et que la reconnaissance de l’enchevêtrement de faits, de
valeurs et de conventions peut se révéler être théoriquement et empiriquement fructueuse. Il
sera également soutenu que prêter attention au rôle du langage dans les comportements des
agents économiques montre parfois qu’un comportement apparemment irrationnel peut en fait
être défendu comme rationnel; c’est pourquoi nous soutiendrons que l’axiome implicite - connu
sous le nom d’invariance à la description - dans les modèles standards de comportements indi-
viduels empêchant l’influence du langage doit être affaibli (mais pas complètement supprimé),
contrairement aux positions de la plupart des économistes standards et comportementaux.
Cette thèse est structurée en cinq chapitres, dont l’articulation est expliquée dans le résumé
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des développements qui suit.
Résumé étoffé du développement
Le premier chapitre développe ‘en action’ la perspective méthodologique esquissée dans l’introduction
générale, c’est-à-dire que les développements sont construits à partir des problèmes concrets qui
sous-tendent les débats entre économie comportementale et économie standard. L’ancrage de
cette perspective dans la position de l’enchevêtrement est également développé ‘en action’, en
discutant les critiques adressées par Sen aux mêmes modèles standards de comportements in-
dividuels qui sont critiqués par l’économie comportementale. Le chapitre est structuré autour
d’une étude comparative des travaux de Sen (représentant la position de l’enchevêtrement) et
Thaler (représentant la position de l’économie comportementale). Nous nous concentrons sur
la théorie du choix du consommateur et la théorie du choix rationnel en situation de certitude,
sur lesquelles portent les contributions principales des deux auteurs. Cela revient à comparer
deux critiques différentes des mêmes modèles de comportements économiques sous certitude.
Alors que les deux critiques prennent comme point de départ une observation commune, qui
est la suivante : les dimensions positive et normative des modèles standards de comportements
individuels doivent être articulées différemment. Les deux critiques aboutissent néanmoins à des
conclusions radicalement différentes. Au travers d’une relation interdisciplinaire avec l’éthique,
la philosophie morale et la philosophie politique, Sen propose de développer la dimension nor-
mative à partir d’un examen minutieux de faits empiriques; c’est-à-dire que la rationalité ne
doit pas être définie a priori et une fois pour toutes. Au travers d’une relation interdisciplinaire
avec la Psychologie, Thaler propose de séparer la dimension normative de la dimension positive;
c’est-à-dire que les modèles standards fournissent une notion adéquate de la rationalité qui peut
être utilisée comme référence pour évaluer les comportements empiriques.
Les deux points principaux de ce chapitre concernant le développement général de la thèse
sont les suivants. D’une part, si l’on veut prendre au sérieux le rôle du langage dans les choix
des agents économiques, alors ce que nous appelons la structure communicative des choix doit
être rendu explicite. Nous proposons de faire cela de deux manières complémentaires. La
première consiste à distinguer deux entités : le modeleur de décision qui pose un problème de
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décision à un preneur de décision qui effectue un choix. Le modeleur de décision peut, parmi
d’autres possibilités, être un économiste, en particulier dans les expériences de laboratoire où les
questions liées aux interactions entre le langage de l’économiste et celui de l’agent économique
ne sont pas triviales. La seconde consiste à introduire la théorie des actes de langage (autrement
appelée théorie des actes de parole), notamment dans la version qu’en propose le philosophe John
Searle, afin d’étoffer la structure communicative d’une façon qui est pertinente pour la théorie
du choix rationnel. D’autre part, alors que nous nous concentrions sur l’analyse économique
sous certitude, les trois dimensions des comportements individuels (l’incertitude, le temps et
autrui) n’ont cessé de surgir lorsque des questions liées aux causes ou facteurs déterminants
les préférences individuelles se posent (c’est-à-dire, lorsque les préférences ne sont plus prises
comme étant ‘données’).
Dans le deuxième chapitre les défis, dans les trois dimensions des comportements individuels,
posés par l’économie comportementale à l’économie standard sont examinés. Nous structurons
notre discussion autour d’une rupture historique entre deux périodes. La première période
débute à la fin des années 1970 et s’étend jusqu’au milieu des années 2000. C’est la période des
défis classiques posés par l’économie comportementale dans les trois dimensions, indépendam-
ment les unes des autres. Nous proposons, pour les trois dimensions, un examen comparatif (1)
des régularités empiriques constituant ces défis, (2) des modèles standards mis en défaut, et (3)
des alternatives de l’économie comportementale. Concernant le problème de l’interdisciplinarité,
l’examen de cette période révèle des inspirations très claires provenant de la Psychologie : les
travaux de Kahneman et Tversky dans la dimension de l’incertitude, et les travaux de George
Ainslie dans la dimension du temps. Cela marque un contraste fort avec la dimension du rap-
port aux autres, pour laquelle aucune forme d’interdisciplinarité claire, avec par exemple la
Psychologie sociale, n’existe. Nous insistons, à propos du problème positif/normatif, sur la
manière dont les trois dimensions sont liées par la doctrine du conséquentialisme. Doctrine à
partir de laquelle les économistes et les psychologues dérivent leurs jugements de valeur à propos
de la rationalité ou l’irrationalité des comportements. La seconde période est contemporaine et
commence au milieu des années 2000. Dans celle-ci, nous observons l’émergence d’un ensemble
de défis ayant trait aux interactions entre les dimensions, et posant des problèmes à la fois aux
modèles de l’économie standard et aux alternatives de l’économie comportementale.
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Trois points de ce chapitre peuvent être dégagés vis-à-vis du développement général. Le
premier est un développement de la structure communicative des choix : que ce soit pour les
interactions dans les dimensions ou entre les dimensions, une condition de possibilité des défis
qui sont discutés dans le chapitre est le marquage linguistique de distinctions relatives aux trois
dimensions (par exemple, ‘maintenant’ et ‘plus tard’, ‘certainement’ et ‘probablement’, ‘toi’ et
‘moi’) que le modeleur de décision (par exemple, l’économiste conduisant une expérience de lab-
oratoire) doit faire, et que le preneur de décision (par exemple, l’agent économique participant
à l’expérience) doit comprendre. Le deuxième point concerne la normativité du conséquential-
isme en théorie de la décision. Historiquement, il y a eu une lente transformation par laquelle
la primauté initiale de la dimension de l’incertitude (sur les deux autres dimensions) dans les
jugements de valeur de rationalité ou d’irrationalité des comportements individuels, s’est faite
concurrencer par une primauté de la dimension du temps. Concrètement, cela s’observe dans
le passage d’arguments qualifiés d’intuitifs, pour l’axiome d’indépendance de l’utilité espérée, à
des arguments fondés sur la notion de cohérence dynamique. Enfin, le troisième point concerne
l’unification théorique. Etant donné que les régularités comportementales entre les dimensions,
c’est-à-dire les défis de la seconde période, posent des problèmes à la fois pour l’économie stan-
dard et pour l’économie comportementale, l’unification théorique recherchée par les économistes
standards comme comportementaux ne peut ignorer les interactions existantes entre les dimen-
sions, impliquant de ne plus considérer les trois dimensions comme étant déconnectées les unes
des autres. En bref, les interactions entre les trois dimensions représentent un domaine po-
tentiellement fructueux pour une éventuelle convergence entre économie comportementale et
économie standard, au moins concernant le problème de l’unification théorique.
Dans le troisième chapitre, est examiné un ensemble de modèles cherchant explicitement
l’unification théorique entre économie comportementale et standard, que nous appelons les «
modèles duaux ». Cet examen est réalisé dans le but de savoir si les modèles capturent ou non les
interactions entre les trois dimensions. Le rôle du langage dans la rationalité économique, telle
qu’elle est construite par les économistes dans leurs modèles, est étudié en faisant abstraction de
l’utilisation du langage par les agents économiques dans leurs comportements. Plus précisément,
nous étudions les relations entre, d’une part, les usages de langage formel et technique ayant
trait à l’économie, et, d’autre part, un nouveau langage technique emprunté à la Psychologie
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du contrôle de soi (self-control). Parce que les problèmes de contrôle de soi sont principalement
liés à la relation du preneur de décision avec le temps, nous suggérons que l’évolution historique
d’une primauté de la dimension de l’incertitude à une primauté de la dimension du temps,
observée dans le chapitre précédent, trouve son illustration paradigmatique dans les modèles
duaux. Nous montrons également qu’un seul de ces modèles, à savoir, celui de Fudenberg
et Levine’s, capture une partie des interactions entre les trois dimensions, fournissant ainsi
une avenue prometteuse d’unification théorique et de réconciliation entre économie standard et
économie comportementale.
Deux points concernant le développement général de la thèse peuvent être dégagés. Première-
ment, Fudenberg et Levine prennent une version affaiblie de la position standard concernant le
problème positif/normatif dans leur modèle dual, bien que ce dernier ne soit pas entièrement
standard. C’est-à-dire qu’ils considèrent que leur modèle peut, dans certains cas où il contredit
le modèle standard, s’interpréter à la fois de manière positive et normative. Nous soutenons
qu’une vision empiriste de la rationalité sous-tend cette position, selon laquelle la rationalité in-
dividuelle ne doit pas tenir lieu que d’idéal, c’est aussi un phénomène empiriquement observable.
Une implication est que la notion de cohérence, utilisée pour qualifier les modèles standards de
normatifs, se trouve ici modifiée en considérant que les limites psychologiques responsables des
problèmes de contrôle de soi sont une contrainte inévitable sous laquelle les agents économiques
optimisent. Secondement, un ensemble de régularités comportementales connu sous le nom de
d’ « effets de cadrages » est explicitement pointé par Fudenberg et Levine (avec d’autres auteurs
et d’autres modèles duaux) comme la principale limite à l’unification théorique.
Par conséquent, dans le chapitre 4 nous dirigeons notre attention vers ce que les économistes
standards comme comportementaux énoncent à propos du « cadrage », et vers ce que nous pou-
vons tirer d’une trentaine d’années d’études sur ce phénomène par les psychologues pour en com-
prendre la structure empirique et les implications théoriques. Nous avons tout d’abord observé
que ce terme est utilisé pour désigner un ensemble de plus en plus hétérogène de phénomènes
comportementaux. Le seul point commun de ces phénomènes semble être que différentes présen-
tations du ‘même’ problème de décision peuvent révéler des renversements de préférences ; le
terme ‘même’ doit être compris comme ‘le même du point de vue des modèles standards de
comportements individuels’. La seule attention que nous portons au rôle du langage dans la
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rationalité économique, telle qu’elle est construite par les économistes, consiste à souligner le
rôle crucial joué par les conventions théoriques des modèles standards dans l’établissement de
relations d’équivalence entre problèmes de décision. Nous avons décidé d’étudier les effets de
cadrage en nous concentrant sur le sous-ensemble de ceux qui violent l’axiome implicite des
modèles standards, « l’invariance à la description », qui rend ces modèles aveugles aux usages
de langage par les agents économiques ; ainsi le rôle du langage dans la rationalité économique,
telle qu’elle s’expose dans les comportements des agents économiques, est étudié en faisant rel-
ativement abstraction de l’utilisation du langage par les économistes. En dépit de certaines
études sur les violations de l’invariance à la description par des économistes comportementaux,
cet axiome demeure relativement peu étudié en économie compte tenu de l’important corpus de
recherches sur le sujet qui existe en Psychologie. Le chapitre propose d’organiser ce que nous
considérons comme étant les principales caractéristiques, du point de vue d’un économiste, de
trois décennies de recherche par les psychologues sur les violations de l’invariance à la description.
Le principal point concernant le développement général de la thèse est le suivant. La vision
générale que les économistes ont des effets de cadrage, fondée sur les travaux pionniers de
Kahneman et Tversky dans les années 1980 et ignorant trois décennies de recherche par d’autres
psychologues, est insatisfaisante. Cette vision consiste à prendre l’axiome d’invariance à la
description comme une condition ultime de rationalité, dont les violations seraient toujours
irrationnelles. Or, en examinant les travaux des autres psychologues, deux conditions sous
lesquelles les violations de l’invariance à la description sont potentiellement rationnelles peuvent
être dégagées. Premièrement, les préférences peuvent dépendre directement et consciemment des
descriptions, de sorte que l’on peut considérer qu’il y a maximisation d’une fonction d’utilité
lors du choix d’une description d’un objet, mais pas lors du choix d’une autre description du
même objet. Secondement, la structure communicative des choix fait qu’il est possible que le
choix d’une description, et non d’une autre d’un objet, par le modeleur de décision soit une
source d’information plus ou moins tacite à propos du problème de décision, et que le preneur
de décision infère rationnellement cette information. En bref, il existe des raisons de ne pas
considérer l’axiome d’invariance à la description comme un gage ultime de la rationalité, ce qui
peut justifier la volonté d’affaiblir cet axiome pour capturer, non seulement les phénomènes de
cadrage, mais également la possible rationalité qui leur est sous-jacente.
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Le dernier chapitre est coécrit avec un praticien de la théorie de la décision axiomatique,
Dino Borie. Nous proposons une axiomatique formelle dans laquelle l’axiome d’invariance à la
description peut être rendu explicite d’une manière assez fine pour ensuite pouvoir explorer dif-
férents affaiblissements de cet axiome qui rendent compte des effets de cadrage. La contribution
théorique du chapitre est adressée à l’économie en se fondant sur les résultats des psychologues
étudiés au chapitre précédent. Nous appliquons cette axiomatique à différents effets de cadrage
pour montrer que les modèles existants (mais peu nombreux) pour le cadrage en économie ne
traitent pas des violations de l’invariance à la description, ainsi que du positif/normatif sous-
jacents aux effets de cadrage, de manière satisfaisante.
Les principaux points concernant le développement général de la thèse sont les suivants.
Tout d’abord, notre interprétation de la structure mathématique de ce travail formel est systé-
matiquement proposée en termes de deux perspectives distinctes, mais possiblement connectées,
sur un même problème de décision : celle du modeleur de décision et celle du preneur de déci-
sion. Cette interprétation vise à mettre en avant la structure communicative des choix. Ensuite,
nous soutenons que, contrairement à la vision générale des économistes sur le cadrage, l’axiome
d’invariance à la description n’est pas un axiome pour lequel un choix binaire s’impose entre
travailler avec ou travailler sans. Nous montrons comment il est possible de garder une version
affaiblie de cet axiome sans s’en débarrasser totalement, ce que nous faisons de deux manières,
qui elles-mêmes impliquent deux degrés différents de dépendance à la description. Cette stratégie
nous permet d’apporter quelques clarifications au problème du positif/normatif sous-jacent les
violations de l’invariance à la description, en qualifiant les conditions axiomatiques sous lesquelles
des interprétations en termes de rationalité ou d’irrationalité peuvent s’appliquer à un effet de
cadrage donné. Enfin, nos affaiblissements de l’axiome d’invariance à la description sont con-
duits de sorte que notre axiomatique puisse être intégrée dans les modèles comportementaux,
mais aussi standards. Pour ces derniers, nous démontrons comment l’équivalence standard en-
tre fonction de choix, relation de préférence et fonction d’utilité tient dans notre axiomatique.
La simplicité de notre cadre et la démonstration de ces équivalences sont conçues comme des
modifications mineures dans le langage formel et technique des économistes, qui permettent de
prendre en compte des utilisations du langage quotidien par les agents économiques qui ne sont
pas triviaux d’un point de vue économique.
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Conclusion générale
La contribution générale que nous avons tenté d’apporter dans cette thèse consiste à mon-
trer comment une perspective méthodologique sur le double rôle du langage dans la rationalité
économique peut clarifier trois principaux problèmes (et leurs connexions) qui sous-tendent les
débats entre économie comportementale et économie standard. Il s’agissait du problème de
l’unification théorique dans les trois dimensions (incertitude, temps, autrui) de la rationalité
économique, du problème de l’interdisciplinarité entre économie et Psychologie, et du prob-
lème du positif/normatif dans les modèles de comportements individuels. Nous avons discuté
plusieurs marqueurs de la frontière entre économie standard et économie comportementale. Des
marqueurs théoriques, qui sont constitués d’une série de notions à la fois psychologique et Psy-
chologique telles que l’aversion à la perte sous certitude comme sous risque, l’impulsivité dans le
temps, et diverses motivations non autocentrées envers autrui. Des marqueurs empiriques, qui
sont essentiellement constitués des effets de cadrage. Par ailleurs, il n’y a pas véritablement de
marqueurs normatifs, étant donné que la doctrine du conséquentialisme est largement acceptée
par les deux côtés pour dériver des jugements de valeur de rationalité et d’irrationalité à propos
de ce qui se trouve du côté de l’économie comportementale, c’est-à-dire à propos des marqueurs
théoriques et empiriques. Une des implications de cela est, par exemple, que les débats en-
tre économie comportementale et économie standard sont aveugles à la notion d’engagement
défendue par Sen. Nous avons également défendu qu’une faiblesse de cette position conséquen-
tialiste soit que la notion théorique de ‘conséquence’, utilisée par la plupart des économistes, ne
semble pas être assez précise pour être l’objet d’une science empirique.
Cette thèse a tenté d’aller au-delà d’une simple clarification concernant le problème du posi-
tif/normatif et le rôle du langage dans les comportements des agents économiques. L’intention
était de proposer, sur ces deux points, une critique constructive des contributions de l’économie
comportementale comme standard. En suivant la position de l’enchevêtrement (développé par
Putnam, Sen et Walsh), nous avons soutenu qu’à la fois l’économie standard et l’économie
comportementale proposent une articulation insatisfaisante entre les dimensions positive et nor-
mative des modèles de comportements individuels; et que la reconnaissance de l’enchevêtrement
de faits, de valeurs et de conventions peut se révéler être théoriquement et empiriquement
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fructueuse. En outre, il a été soutenu que prêter attention au rôle du langage dans les com-
portements des agents économiques montre parfois qu’un comportement apparemment irra-
tionnel peut en fait être défendu comme rationnel. En conséquence, nous avons défendu que
l’axiome implicite - connu sous le nom d’invariance à la description - dans les modèles standards
de comportements individuels empêchant l’influence du langage doive être affaibli (mais pas
complètement supprimé), contrairement aux positions de la plupart des économistes standards
et comportementaux. La contribution formelle sur ce point était en partie destinée à montrer
comment des réflexions en provenance de la méthodologie et de la philosophie de l’économie
peuvent avoir une influence bénéfique sur la théorie économique.
Concernant les travaux à venir, certains projets en lien avec cette thèse sont déjà en cours.
Les arguments esquissés dans le chapitre 2, sur la possibilité de réinterprétations critiques
d’études empiriques existantes ayant utilisé une seule dimension dans l’interprétation origi-
nale de leurs données, sont développés dans une série d’études de cas avec Judith Favereau et
Cléo Chassonnery-Zaïgouche. D’autres arguments, également esquissés dans le chapitre 2, sur
les relations entre narrativité et identité vis-à-vis de la cohérence dynamique, sont l’objet d’un
travail entrepris avec Tom Juille. Certains des arguments esquissés dans les chapitres 1 et 2,
sur la traduction expérimentale de la rationalité, sont développés dans une perspective épisté-
mologique et historique dans un document de travail ; le point de vue épistémologique tente à la
fois d’ancrer la traduction expérimentale de la rationalité dans la théorie de l’équilibre réfléchi
tout en fournissant simultanément une possible opérationnalisation empirique de cette dernière;
la perspective historique discute l’influence (due à l’émergence de l’économie comportementale)
de l’économie sur la Psychologie dans les débats sur la rationalité en sciences cognitives. Lors
de l’élaboration du document de travail qui sous-tend le chapitre 5, nous avons, avec Dino Borie,
fait quelques expériences sur nos étudiants afin de tester certains de nos axiomes; nous sommes
actuellement en train de discuter de la possibilité de faire ces expériences en laboratoire avec
les expérimentalistes de l’Université de Nice Sophia-Antipolis ; notamment Ismaël Rafaï avec
qui nous avons également discuté de la possibilité de construire un modèle d’effets de cadrage à
partir de notre cadre axiomatique.
Nous proposons de conclure cette thèse avec Fritz Machlup. Dans un papier intitulé « Que se
passerait-il si la matière pouvait parler », Machlup introduit le problème méthodologique de la
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distinction entre les sciences sociales et les sciences naturelles avec une histoire, dont le passage
suivant est tiré :
« Alors qu’il parlait de la marche aléatoire des molécules et des collisions moléculaires
sous différentes pressions, quelqu’un a crié « Arrêtez ces absurdités ! ». Quand il
a regardé autour pour voir quel étudiant avait fait cette remarque impertinente,
cette voix continuait de se faire entendre. Elle provenait de toute évidence de la
chambre de protection avec le miroir suspendu, dont les déplacements étaient suivis
par la fluctuation d’un faisceau de lumière réfléchie. Voici ce qu’il entendit : « Il
est temps que vous cessiez d’induire vos étudiants en erreur. Ce que vous enseignez
à propos de nous les molécules n’est tout simplement pas vrai. Ce n’est pas une
marche aléatoire et nous ne nous poussons pas les unes sur les autres un peu partout
et dans n’importe quel sens. Nous savons où nous allons et pourquoi. Si vous voulez
écouter, nous serions ravies de vous le raconter. » Il n’a pas attendu un instant de
plus, s’est précipité pour rapporter tout cela, et ramena le professeur R. pour assister
à l’événement afin d’entendre ce que les molécules étaient sur le point de raconter.
« Oh, » a déclaré le professeur R., « Vous voulez dire qu’elles vont nous raconter ce
qu’elles pensent qu’elles font. Par tous les moyens, laissez-les faire. » » (Machlup
1978, pp.310-311)
L’objectif de Machlup (1978 [1969]) est de défendre qu’une des spécificités des sciences sociales
est que leurs « données et problèmes » (ibid, p.319) sont imbibés d’usages de langage, non
seulement venant des scientifiques (ce qui n’est pas une spécificité des sciences sociales), mais
aussi venant de ses objets d’étude. Plus précisément, il soutient que les sciences sociales sont
spécifiques en raison de la possibilité de « communications contradictoires » (ibid.) entre les
scientifiques et leurs sujets. Alors qu’un grès ne peut pas dire à un géologue « Non, nous
ne sommes pas de cette famille que vous appelez « roches sédimentaires », nous sommes très
différents de ces individus », un preneur de décision peut dire à un théoricien de la décision «
Non, je ne suis pas comme vous le dites « irrationnel » ou « quasi-rationnel », j’ai de nombreuses
raisons de maintenir mes préférences comme elles sont, et je ne les « renverse » pas ». Comme
nous l’avons vu, c’est à peu près ce qui s’est passé autour du paradoxe d’Allais durant une courte
période de l’histoire à la fin des années 1970. Des scientifiques de la décision (MacCrimmon,
Larson, Slovic et Tversky entre autres) ont écouté leurs sujets au lieu de simplement chercher à
observer leurs comportements; et cela a contribué à des développements théoriques non triviaux.
Comme nous l’avons également vu, cela n’est pas dénué de dangers méthodologiques, notamment
parce que de nombreuses caractéristiques subtiles de la conversation ne peuvent être contrôlées,
de la même manière que la communication minimaliste dans des expériences de laboratoire peut
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l’être.
De toute façon, l’utilisation du langage dans la rationalité économique, qu’elle soit construite
par les économistes ou exposée par les comportements des agents économiques, y comprit dans
la structure communicative des choix qui peut réunir ces deux entités, elle n’est pas restreinte
au problème de la communication contradictoire. Il est plus facile d’énoncer les problèmes qui
nous ont préoccupés en inversant la question de Machlup : que se passerait-il si les agents
économiques ne pouvaient plus parler ? Si tel était le cas, alors, comme nous l’avons soutenu au
chapitre 2, aucun des défis classiques ou récents posés par l’économie comportementale dans les
trois dimensions de la rationalité économique n’aurait pu être posé en premier lieu; comme nous
l’avons soutenu au chapitre 4, les effets de cadrage n’existeraient pas; et si nous gardons à l’esprit
que les économistes sont également des agents économiques, alors, comme nous l’avons soutenu
au chapitre 1 et au chapitre 3, la construction de modèles de comportements individuels serait
gravement compromise, voire totalement impossible. Un avertissement que nous avons reçu à
propos de notre focalisation sur le rôle du langage était à peu près le suivant. ‘N’y vas pas, dès
que tu commences à t’intéresser au langage, tu vois du langage partout !’ Nous sommes non
seulement en accord avec le contenu de cet avertissement, mais également avec l’existence des
dangers méthodologiques réels qui le sous-tendent. Néanmoins, si le langage n’est pas, stricto
sensu, omniprésent, il est tout de même prévalant d’une manière non triviale pour l’économie.
Selon nous, il y a tout autant de dangers méthodologiques à nier la prévalence d’un phénomène
prévalant.
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Abstract
L’économie comportementale et le rôle du langage dans la rationalité économique:
une perspective méthodologique.
Dans cette thèse, nous proposons une perspective méthodologique sur le double rôle du
langage dans la rationalité économique, les utilisations de langage par les économistes pour
la théoriser et les utilisations de langage par les agents économiques pour l’exprimer, pour
clarifier trois principales questions (et leurs connexions) qui sous-tendent les débats entre
économie comportementale et économie standard : le problème de l’unification théorique
vis-à-vis des trois dimensions de la rationalité économique, la question de l’interdisciplinarité
entre économie et Psychologie, et le problème du positif/normatif dans les modèles de com-
portements individuels. Concernant le problème du positif/normatif et le rôle du langage
dans les comportements des agents économiques, notre intention est de fournir, au-delà
de la simple clarification, une critique constructive des contributions de l’économie stan-
dard comme de l’économie comportementale. Suivant la position de l’enchevêtrement du
philosophe Hilary Putnam et des philosophes-économistes Vivian Walsh et Amartya Sen,
il est soutenu que l’économie tant standard que comportementale propose une articulation
insatisfaisante des dimensions positive et normative dans les modèles de comportements in-
dividuels; et que la reconnaissance de l’enchevêtrement de faits, de valeurs et de conventions
peut être théoriquement et empiriquement fructueuse. Prêter attention au rôle du langage
dans les comportements des agents économiques montre parfois qu’un comportement ap-
paremment irrationnel peut en fait être défendu comme rationnel; c’est pourquoi nous
soutenons que, et montrons comment, l’axiome implicite - connu sous le nom d’invariance
à la description - dans les modèles standards de comportements individuels empêchant
l’influence du langage doit être affaibli (mais pas complètement supprimé), contrairement
aux positions de la plupart des économistes standards et comportementaux.
Mots-clés: économie comportementale, théorie de la décision, effet de cadrage, reverse-
ments de préférence, rationalité, méthodologie de l’économie, philosophie de l’économie
A methodological perspective on behavioral economics and the role of lan-
guage in economic rationality.
In this dissertation, we propose a methodological perspective on the twofold role of
language in economic rationality, economists’ uses of language to theorize it and economic
agent’s uses of language to express it, can clarify three main issues (and their connections),
underlying the behavioral versus standard economics debates: the issue of the theoretical
unification regarding the three dimensions of economic rationality, the issue of interdis-
ciplinarity between economics and Psychology and the positive/normative issue within
models of individual behaviors. Regarding the positive/normative issue and the role of
language in the behaviors of economic agents, the intention is to provide a constructive
criticism of contributions from behavioral as well as standard economists. Following the en-
tanglement thesis of philosopher Hilary Puntam and philosophers-economists Vivian Walsh
and Amartya Sen, it is argued that both standard and behavioral economists propose an
unsatisfying articulation between the positive and normative dimensions of models of indi-
vidual behaviors; and that recognizing the entanglement of facts, values and conventions
can actually be theoretically and empirically fruitful. Paying some attention to the role
of language in the behaviors of economic agents may sometimes show that a seemingly
irrational behavior can in fact be defended as rational; hence we argue that, and show how,
the implicit axiom – known as ‘description invariance’ – in standard models of individual
behaviors preventing the influence of language needs to be weakened (though not dropped
entirely), contrary to the positions of most behavioral and standard economists.
Keywords: behavioral economics, decision theory, framing effect, preference reversals,
rationality, economic methodology, philosophy of economics
